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The thesis is an attempt to reconcile law's dual nature, its factual dimension (its facticity)
and its normative/evaluative dimension (its normativity), in a non-reductive manner. The
tension between those two dimensions appears particularly acute when we try to discern
some object of reference for our normative talk/discourse. Then the possibility of absence of
such objects poses a high threat to the meaningfulness of the enterprise of law tout court.
Faced with this danger lawyers usually end up reducing legal referents to physical, non-
normative entities. Palpable for our senses as those entities may be, they do not seem to
eliminate the threat of meaninglessness posed to the legal enterprise, as they end up
eliminating law's normativity.
In contrast I argue that legal and broader practical norms can be reconstructed as
abstract objects that are available to knowledge. The method employed, relies predominantly
on a semantic explication of the 'objecthood' of norms along the lines of a neo-Fregean
theory of mental content. Further, I employ an analysis of the meaning of legal expressions
in order to show that a semantic account of legal 'objecthood' will be demarcated by the
pragmatic-normative requirements that support the relevant practices in which legal meaning
is generated (as is specified by some version ofWittgenstein's 'meaning as use' theory of
meaning). I proceed to argue that those pragmatic requirements include some transcendental
pragmatic norms which specify an ultimate practical or moral point of view against the
background of which practical meaning is possible. Later, this point of view is specified as a
Super-norm or Principle of Autonomy. This norm bestows an evaluative element upon the
meaning of all practical expressions/sentences and, via the semantic explication of ontology,
into the normative objects (rules, properties and so on) that correspond to them.
Finally, it is claimed that legal norms are a species of practical norms, to the extent
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v
best use out of the beautiful Georgian flat which Helen Williams has decorated in an early
twentieth-century Morris style.
I am indebted to the lecturers (Timothy Williamson, Rae Langton, Richard Holton)
and the participants of the MSc Contemporary Issues Seminar at the Department of Phi¬
losophy at Edinburgh during the academic years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, for giving me
the opportunity to consolidate and expand my philosophical knowledge in an environment
that pursues philosophy on the highest scholarly level. The same applies for all the reading
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influence is apparent throughout the text. Professor Susan Hurley offered me her rich and
insightful comments at an early stage of the writing-up process. I am sure that they saved me
a lot of time in misguided research. Amongst the people that read parts of the thesis and
offer detailed comments are also: Manolis Melissaris, Claudio Michelon, Kevin Walton,
Phil Barker, Sara Kneale, Tania Kyriakou. To all of them I am mostly indebted.
Though not directly involved in the dissertation, I would like to pay an (enormous)
academic debt, that is long due, to Professor Pavlos Sourlas, Andreas Takis and Philippos
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unreserved gratitude. Being in constant contact with Manolis' relentless scepticism, I had to
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of his argument. I thank him for that, as well as for the great times we had in the South
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I consider myself extremely lucky for having had so many good friends around to
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Introduction
The dissertation at hand is an effort to defend the claim that legal systems constitute
objective normative orders. This claim is connected with a handful of requirements, how¬
ever the dissertation is mainly interested in two of those, which it takes to be of central im¬
portance for the tenability of the claim. The first requirement consists in the thesis that legal
vocabulary, and more broadly legal discourse, refers to genuine legal entities (properties,
objects and facts). Put in a slightly different way, the first thesis argues roughly that it is
possible to ascribe truth values to legal sentences/propositions on the basis of existing legal
entities (facts, objects and so on). To that extent the first thesis is interested in law's objec¬
tivity as objectbood.
The second requirement concerning law's objectivity consists in the thesis that legal
entities are action-guiding (or normative). On this second thesis a 'full-blooded' claim con¬
cerning law's objectivity requires, alongside with an ontological underpinning of legal dis¬
course, an argument to the effect that legal entities, and in particular legal rules, are expli¬
cated as possessing genuine action-guiding content. In this respect the claim for law's ob¬
jectivity is recast as a claim for normativity. However, once law's objectivity is argued to
consist in the existence of action-guiding objects, a further dimension is introduced in the
discussion: the dimension of correctness or validity of legal entities (predominantly rules).
As soon as this further dimension is introduced, the content of objectivity is made in a
strong sense dependant upon the idea of normative correctness or validity. The result is that
the dimension of legal objecthood is tied up with the dimension of normative correctness.
Now, unless one would want to undertake the difficult, if not impossible, task to argue that
the standards for normative correctness vary with the 'domain' of action (law, morality and
so on), a uniform treatment of the concept of normative correctness for all domains of the
Practical seems to be the most appropriate way to tackle the issue of law's normativity. On
that supposition, the discussion of law's objectivity is inscribed within an analysis of the
standards for normative correctness tout court.
Reference to the importance of the interconnection between the aspect of law's
normativity and law's ontology is what distinguishes the present effort from other recent
endeavours which indeed undertake a much more painstaking analysis in making explicit
the ontological groundwork of legal discourse1) Whereas those endeavours hold it possible
f Vide in particular the detailed monographs of: Sean Coyle, 'On the Foundations of Legal Reasoning
in International Law', (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Glasgow, 1998); and Carsten Hei-
demann, die Norm als Tatsache. Zur Normentheorie Hans Kelsens, Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie
und Rechtstheorie: 13 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997).
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that an analysis of the ontological groundwork of legal discourse can be self-standing, the
present effort maintains that the action-guiding character of legal rules and objects requires
that law's ontology be explicated through an account of the concept of normative correct¬
ness, as a concept that can be specified only by using conceptual categories from the area of
practical reason.
Roughly, the reason for this conjoined treatment of objecthood and normativity
rests on the basic intuition that if there is something that can been known objectively and,
further, possesses the ability to guide one's action, then one has a fundamental interest to
know whether that thing guides one's action in a right or in a wrong way. If, in contrast,
agents are denied this self-reflective dimension concerning their action, they would figure as
being self-contradictory. Once the interest in (normative) correctness is granted, objectivity
concerning the existence of normative objects stretches towards including the criteria of the
correctness thereof. But then the criteria for the correctness of normative objects will obvi¬
ously lay down conditions or standards for the validity or the existence of those objects. As
a result, objecthood and existence in the domain of the Normative will depend on correct¬
ness/validity: existing norms will be those norms that are correct. This is not to say that it is
not possible to conceive of normative entities, say rules, that are wrong; of course we can.
The point is, however that those rules will be invalid, hence non-existent.
Alternatively the evaluative character of normative existence emerges through ref¬
erence to the notions of normative possibility/actuality. In this context there is a broken
analogy between the notions ofphysical possibility/actuality and those of normative possi-
bility/actuality(i.e. validity): in the domain of the non-normative, physical environment one
can refer, by employing non-normative vocabulary, to possible combinations of the material
blocks that put together the actual world. Then, admittedly, what could possibly exist some¬
how depends on what actually exists; but actuality does not really constrain the notion of
possibility; things could have been otherwise; 'actuality' is more a matter of convention that
derives from the fact that we happen to inhabit this combination of things (world) than an¬
other. Conversely, if one employs normative vocabulary in order to talk about possible nor¬
mative entities, one's imagination will be constrained by something like a notion of norma¬
tive actuality, where, this time, actuality stands for correctness or validity; to that extent,
actuality in this context is not a neutral concept; it is a concept that incorporates the evalua¬
tive dimension of correctness/validity. Connectedly the notion of normative possibility is
not neutral either: not any combination of normative building blocks would be equally good.
Only the combinations that amount to normatively correct results would do. The broken
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analogy merely points to a deeper difference between the concepts of physical and norma¬
tive existence: in the domain of the normative environment 'existence' incorporates the
additional parameter of correctness with the result that the concepts of possibility and actu¬
ality refer only to correct normative entities.
Resting on the implicit evaluative character of normative existence/objecthood the
dissertation will argue that legal phenomena cannot be reduced to other non-normative phe¬
nomena because they constitute an order whichfirst is real (existing) and second normative
(action-guiding). The reality of the legal order will be founded on an account of law's on¬
tology. The normativity thereof will emerge through an account of law's action-guiding
content. Using arguments from contemporary discussions in metaphysics and ontology, the
ontological structure of the legal domain will be identified with the semantic structures of
legal language (this is labelled the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis). Conversely, law's
action-guiding content will be accounted for through an analysis of the pragmatic level of
legal language. Throughout the dissertation the two levels of the semantic-ontological and
the pragmatic-normative analysis will be related to each other through the idea of anti-
representationalism about mental content. Along the lines of this idea it will be suggested
that the patterns of agency are constitutive in specifying mental content and its semantic
structure. Furthermore, in this context, the normative patterns of agency will be argued to be
constitutive for a semantic account of ontology. Transferred in the area of legal phenomena,
this thought will offer a robust underpinning of the thesis that an anti-reductionist account
thereof needs a combined account of law's objectivity and law's normativity. More specifi¬
cally the project unfolds in the following order:
Part I (Ch I) of the thesis serves as an introduction to the main themes along which
the anti-reductionist account of legal phenomena will unfold. Chapter I focuses mainly on
Hart's dissatisfaction with the pre-existing accounts of the concept of law which he dis¬
misses as reductionist. Hart's proposal of an internal or evaluative aspect of social rules that
would account for the irreducibility of legal rules is interpreted as suggesting the need of an
account of the evaluative/normative aspect of legal rules. However, Hart's idea of an inter¬
nal aspect of rules is dismissed on the grounds of being based on the subjective psychologi¬
cal category of commitment. In contrast, it is argued that the concept of law's normativity
refers to normative objects/facts that are mind-independent and can be accessed through
cognitive operations.
Connectedly part 2 (CHs II-IV) of the dissertation offers some basic insights into
the ontology of'legal' and generally 'normative' properties and broadly entities and objects.
4
It opens by arguing that normative concepts (and broadly expressions) are irreducible to
non-normative ones because they correspond to properties (and broadly entities) that are
genuinely normative. The argument concludes by stating that even if it were possible to use
non-normative vocabulary in order to refer to normative properties, as supervening on a
more basic 'physical' level, we would still have to presuppose the existence of legal rules,
as self-standing legal objects, in order to account for legal properties as supervening to more
basic physical properties of the one or the other sort. Thus in regard to legal rules it is dis¬
pensed with supervenience even in a weak form (Ch II).
The method employed throughout part 2 for the analysis of legal objecthood ex¬
ploits the possibility to account for 'what there is' through the semantic structures of our
sentences/propositions (this is labelled as the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis). Resting
on this possibility the account ascribes to legal norms the status of abstract normative ob¬
jects that form part of the environment, in a way analogous to that of concrete (physical)
objects. To that extent the analysis offers an account of the mind-independence and the
possibility for objective knowledge about legal norms without succumbing to some bold
form of metaphysical realism. On the other hand special effort is made not to succumb to
any form of idealism either: the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis is accepted on two
conjoined conditions: first that it is possible to individuate mental or intentional content (i.e.
the content of beliefs, desires and so on) via semantic or linguistic structures; and, second,
that mental content so individuated is about the environment and not any internal mental
representations (rejection of the mind-world dualism).
In all, part 2 of the thesis does not directly address the evaluative/normative aspect
of legal entities. In fact, it somehow takes it for granted and confines itself in delineating the
ontological status of legal entities. Along these lines, it develops a corroborative effect in
connection to Hart's claim for the irreducibility of legal concepts and normative proposi¬
tions by resting a case for the ontological autonomy of their counterparts. In contrast, part 3
attempts to articulate the special link between the fact that there are ontologically primitive
legal entities and Hart's idea that legal expressions/sentences incorporate an evaluative as¬
pect or dimension. The link is granted on the basis of the semantic account of the ontology
of legal entities: the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis consists of two aspects. The first
addresses the issue of the reference of legal expressions and the subsequent problem of re-
ductionism. The second relates to the issue of meaning or sense of legal expressions and
sentences. Any expression that, on a formal-structural level, refers to objects and properties
it does so only through its being intelligible as meaning, on a pragmatic-substantive level,
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something by the members of a linguistic community who employ that expression. Now in
order to account for meaning one needs to focus on the pragmatic conditions under which
an expression is employed or used (in this respect it is argued that Wittgenstein's theory of
'meaning as use' is perfectly adequate for an account of legal meaning). The conclusion is
that those pragmatic conditions will be constitutive for the account of the ontology of legal
expressions to the extent that the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis is valid.
Part 3 (CHs V and VI) of the essay devotes itself in making explicit the normative
(action-guiding) character of the pragmatic conditions of (legal) meaning. These conditions
are reconstructed as conditions for the validity or the correct use of legal expres¬
sions/sentences. To the extent that those pragmatic conditions are common for the correct
use of all normative expressions (moral, ethical and legal), the analysis will allude to
something like a connection thesis between law and morality (Ch V). The connection thesis
mainly holds that once a concept or expression is shown to be evaluative/normative, it can¬
not be treated separately from all other concepts and expressions that involve evaluations.
The analysis begins with the formal-pragmatic rule that introduces the claim to correctness.
This rule introduces, as it were, the evaluative dimension of normative discourse. According
to it all normative statements raise a claim to correctness as a condition for their proper
employment. The claim to correctness is a necessary pragmatic presupposition that applies
universally to all legal (and broader normative) propositions and whose necessity is argued
on the basis of a transcendental argument (Ch V). Thus, in a way, the claim to correctness
introduces the evaluative dimension by alluding to something like a practical bivalence
principle according to which all normative statements are either right or wrong.
The plausibility of a notion of practical bivalence depends on an additional, sub¬
stantive, condition: a corpus of action-guiding norms that provide for the substantive criteria
of normative/practical correctness tout court. These norms can be thought as putting to¬
gether an ultimate substantive point, a kind of 'point of all points', which is akin to the point
of view ofmorality or practical reason. In pursuing the content of the moral point of view I
will employ the methodology of Karl-Otto Apel's and Jiirgen Habermas' Diskurstheorie and
locate the rules that constitute it at the level of the bedrock of our every-day communicative
practice as intentional agents (CHs V and VI). The content of those rules will be recon¬
structed against the background of that practice, as a presupposition of its intelligibility (Ch
VI). Finally, the moral point of view will take the form of a Fundamental Norm of Auton¬
omy that treats all potential participants in the practice as autonomous persons (Ch VI). This
is the principle which every agent ought to, or rather, already presupposes when acting as
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participant of the communicative practice*.
X In order to anticipate any criticism of normative centralism, I would like to emphasise that the pro¬
posed concept ofpersonhood is not prior to moral/practical discourses. The relation between the two
is rather dialectical and the concept ofpersonhood is gained through a reconstruction of actual practi¬
cal discourse. In fact the concept ofpersonhood is a transcendental assumption that one has to make
for it all to make sense. But on the other hand this assumption is not entirely circular, because it is not
the case that we first need the assumption in order to have an intelligible picture of moral discourse,
but rather that we already are making sense of what is going on; hence, that the assumption is already
valid as we go along. At the same time the normative power of the transcendental conception of per¬
sons lies in its keeping us on track and prescribing the course of our moral practice. All these claims
are discussed in detail in CHs V and VI.
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Part One
Legal Concepts and The Concept of Law
CHAPTER 1
H. L. A. HART'S CONCEPT OF LAW
Introduction
Hart's reflections on the concept of law were initiated largely by his dissatisfaction with the
command theory of John Austin which at the time was the prevailing theoretical explanation
of law's normativity. Hart questioned decisively the ability of this theory to account for the
normativity of legal and social rules in general1. The explanatory formula 'command plus
sanction plus habitual obedience', stipulated by Austin, was not as sufficient a criterion as
to be able to distinguish legal norms from other imperatives of the form 'order plus threat'.
An order from a gunman to pass him the money could not, Hart's objection goes, be distin¬
guished from the obligation of the buyer to pay for the goods he purchased. This inability,
Hart pointed out, amounted to a conflation between the notion of'having an obligation' (i.e.
the point of view of normativity) and being obliged (i.e. the case of brute force). These con¬
siderations which mark the Concept of Law from its early pages2 encapsulate the reproach
of reductionism against command-type theories while, at the same time, launch Hart's at¬
tempt for a more appropriate account of law's normativity.
In contrast to those theories, Hart advances an account of normativity that rests on a
twofold claim: first that normativity cannot be put together along the lines of the description
of a series of empirical facts; second that normativity (and further law itself) has to be lo¬
cated within social practices which confer an evaluative component to legal rules, with the
effect that their addressees know to 'have an obligation' rather than to 'be obliged'. Both
these claims reflect Hart's belief that legal rules cannot be reduced to empirical description
because they possess an evaluative aspect which derives from their social context3. This
aspect of the rules, which Hart calls the internal point of view, is related to the critical re-
1 Vide H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), Ch II. For a brief
albeit accurate introduction to the main ideas of Hart's work, vide B. Bix, Jurisprudence. Theory and
Context, 2nd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 31-49.
2 Vide Concept, 6-17.
3 For a comprehensive discussion of these issues vide N. Stavropoulos, Objectivity in Law (Oxford:
9
flective attitude of the addressees of law and functions as a source of reasons for action,
criticism or justification.
Resting on those theses Hart pursues a critique of the existing semantic accounts of
legal expressions while endeavouring to offer a fresh account of legal and broader norma¬
tive meaning. His semantic considerations are mainly advanced through his open texture
thesis (and its earlier version, the so-called defeasibility thesis). This is a thesis about the
indeterminacy of the meaning of legal concepts and rules. It mainly aims against definition
or criteriaI model theories, or theories that try to capture the meaning of a concept by
'freezing' the 'nuclear' semantic components of the concept into a definition4. Those theo¬
ries, Hart believes, are intertwined with the bad ontology that underlies command-type theo¬
ries of normativity; namely the idea that rules are empirical entities that can be analysed
into their physical counterparts. In contrast to those theories, Hart's firm belief seems to be
that rules are not empirical entities and therefore lack physical counterparts since normativ¬
ity is an evaluative concept which relates to social contexts rather than to reduced empirical
facts'". On these grounds Hart advances a combined attack on both the levels of ontology
and semantics in order to block the reductionism of normative phenomena.
This chapter will argue that Hart fails to offer a proper account of rules' evaluative
aspect, proper in the sense of being able to account for normativity in the place of the re¬
jected models. One important reason for that is that the rejection of rules' objecthood
threatens^witKThe loss of their objectivity. Their insufficiency notwithstanding, it is a fact
that the command theory and the definition model by 'objectifying' rules attempt - even if
in vain - to capture an essential aspect of normativity, that of certainty/objectivity, as de¬
riving from the reducing properties which can be captured in indisputable definitions and
criteria. As a result, any attempt to replace the command theory and the definition model is
required to offer in their place a better alternative which would be equally capable of ac¬
counting for certainty and objectivity. Contrary to that Hart offers aprojectivist explication6
of rules' evaluative component, one that leads him to reduce the internal aspect of rules to
the addressees' internal subjective states (attitudes). Furthermore this reduction forces him
Clarendon Press, 1996), 52-82.
4 The term comes from N. Stavropoulos, Objectivity in Law, 2-5, 15-51. As he mentions the criterial
model is: 'not any particular philosopher's theory, but rather a set of semantic views that figure in
many philosophers' understanding of language', Objectivity, 2. In particular he associates it with
views ranging from Locke to Camap and the later Wittgenstein.
5 Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 53.
6 Vide Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 55-61.
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to pursue normativity by severely compromising his critique of the definition model. On the
one hand he upholds the definition model in those cases that seem to be easy, or the cases
that do not require any recasting of the criteria accepted hitherto by the legal community.
On the other hand whenever these criteria are defeated by new circumstances (hard cases)
rules become indeterminate, in other words, lose their regulatory force and their meaning is
left to the discretion of the judges. Thus normativity is constructed not as something internal
to the rule but as something which depends on the contingency of external circumstances.
The latter decide where the authority of rules starts and stops.
In contrast to Hart's solution I am going to argue in this chapter that an anti-
reductionist account of the evaluative aspect of rules can by no means be restricted to the
addressees' attitudes. On the contrary it requires an understanding of normativity as incor¬
porating an objective dimension. This objective dimension is capable of delivering a non-
reductionist account of rules in which the normativity of rules cannot be reduced to more
basic co-extensive components. At the same time this account is able to escape indetermi¬
nacy because it locates normativity as internal to rules; rules, it will be argued, incorporate
an evaluative point and new circumstances either fall under that point or they don't. Under
this account the semantic depth of concepts will depend upon the rule's point. As a result
there is no a priori fixed set of criteria for a concept's content. Semantic criteria are held
together by the rule's point. Therefore criteria are amenable to revision according to new
circumstances as long as they lie within the scope of the rule. New circumstances/empirical
facts do not defeat rules. They either present a case for revision of the semantic field of the
rule, if they fall under its point, or they are simply irrelevant, if they do not fall under its
evaluative scope7.
In alluding to the objectivity of rules' evaluative dimension the chapter will con¬
clude by pointing to the need for a fool-blooded anti-reductionist account of normativity.
This will be the topic of the second part of the thesis: in it I will be argue that the irreduci-
bility of normative concepts requires some sort of commitment to the existence of certain
normative objects, properties and facts which figure as self-standing or ontologically basic
in any account of normativity. This commitment to the existence of normative objects and
facts will be sharply contrasted from some nai've belief in the physical existence of norma¬
tive entities; instead normative objecthood will be explicated as the commitment to abstract
7 These views have been previously defended in different contexts; for the most comprehensive de¬
fence in the area of law see Stavropoulos, Objectivity, CHs II, III, V;
11
normative objects and facts which are intelligible withm the inferential structures of our
normative discourses.
The Internal Aspect of Rules
Austin and classical positivism
Presumably the greatest worry of the early positivists (Bentham, Austin) was to escape the
fallacies of platonic or metaphysical ontology in the realm of norms which, in the form of
natural law theories, was confusing the question of what the law is with that of what the law
ought to be. In the spirit of those theories positive law is grounded upon ideal law which
somehow exists independently ofwhat happens in the world. Hence what the law is depends
always on what the law in its ideal form is. The slack between the two dimensions of ought,
real and ideal, amounts to the rejection of the first in favour of the second, any time there is
a divergence between them. But, the objection of the positivists goes, this is a very confus¬
ing criterion since it is almost impossible to have any proof of, let alone to achieve an
agreement about, what the law in its ideal dimension is. This difficulty amounts as a result
to a total confusion about what the law is, at least as long as this last question is made de¬
pendent exclusively upon the first (i.e. what the law ideally is).
The only way out of this maze, according to the positivist critique, is to establish a
more or less objective ground for the existence of legal rules, a ground that would present
itself as an indisputable objective fact whose existence anyone could agree upon. Austin's
command theory of rules is the most successful example of this reasoning, which mainly
tries to reconstruct jurisprudence as an empirical science on the archetype of the hard sci¬
ences. Thus, in the command theory a rule exists whenever there is a habit of obedience
towards the sovereign's command which in its turn is backed by a sanction. In this picture
there are four necessary and sufficient elements which are postulated for the existence of a
rule: a habit, a command, a sovereign who issues commands and a sanction which backs the
command. Hence any statement about the existence of a rule is transformed into an empiri¬
cal statement about the existence of these four requirements. Provided that these four re¬
quirements obtain, the existence of a rule follows without any need to resort to any dubious,
occult metaphysical entities. In this way the eminent utilitarian distinction between 'is' and
8 Vide A. Takis, 'The Internal and the External' (unpublished master's dissertation, Brussels 1993),
30.
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'ought', is preserved and with it the confidence that, in Austin's own words,
the existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.
Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not con¬
formable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry9.
Clearly the positivist distinction between what the law is and what it ought to be owes its
intellectual power to Humean moral philosophy10. According to Hume it is impossible to
derive a 'ought-statement' from an 'is-statement'. This is the case because our faculty of
reasoning can only operate upon given premisses which, for Hume, are essentially empirical
and hence available to our sensual perception. Along this line of argument, practical rea¬
sons, to the extent that they are not available to perception, play a secondary role and rely
upon the evidence which is given through our various sense perceptions, while at the same
time they cannot be founded on perception. If, for instance, I endorse the norm 'every time I
buy something I undertake the obligation to pay the corresponding amount of money' as a
valid reason for action, then in the concrete case that I buy a new tie at Jenners in Edin¬
burgh, the moment the saleswoman hands me over my new tie, I ought to pass her the re¬
quired amount of money. The ought-statement 'I ought to hand her the right amount of
money' derives here, when the state of affairs 'the salesperson just passed me the purchased
good', is subsumed under the general norm 'I ought to pay the price of every good I pur¬
chase'11. Whereas the rationality of the subsumption is apparent, the foundation of the ulti¬
mate normative premiss, non-empirical as it is, cannot be demonstrated rationally. For
/C1
Hume, in other words, rational is merely what lies in the realm of the empirical and there-
^
fore is verifiable through our senses12. Practical ought-statements, on the contrary, seem to
resist any uniform criterion of verifiability through the senses and therefore their power
rests upon the existence of sentiments and emotions. What safeguards in Hume, as a result,
the distinction between 'is' and 'ought' is our inability to have empirical knowledge of
normative premisses. Conversely, normative premisses owe their power, non-empirical as
they are, not to reason, but to passions (sentiments, dispositions, etc.). Along these lines,
9 Vide John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, edited by W. E. Rumble (Cam¬
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 157.
10 The brief outline of the Humean philosophy that follows derives from MacCormick, Legal Rea¬
soning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 2-4.
11 For a detailed account of deductive reasoning, vide MacCormick, Legal Reasoning, Ch. II.
12 This seems to be the idea that is-statements correspond to sense data which relate to objective,
indisputable external objects, whereas ought-statements can never be objective because they depict
internal, and insofar subjective, emotional states.
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when one enquires about the force of a normative ought-statement, one is looking to a sen¬
timental or emotional ground which motivates an agent to act accordingly. Reason, there¬
fore, can never move agents to act; it is, in Hume's famous words, 'the slave of passions'13.
Under the weight of this philosophical tradition it is not very surprising that British
positivism located the reason for obeying law and the notion of legal duty in the 'kingdom
of passions'. But attempts like the command theory of law manifest also the concern to find
a compensation for this inevitable subordination of reason to passions: if the binding force
of law must, in the last instance lie within passions, it may still be possible to identify, on
another level, some indisputable elements which are empirical, ergo rational, and constitute
an important (external as it were) aspect of law's binding force. Of course neither Austin
nor any of the other early positivists ever expressed themselves in these terms, but one
could, I believe, legitimately project this line of argument upon their thinking. On these
considerations the existence of a rule is vindicated through the observance of a sovereign, a
command issued by him which is backed by a sanction and the habitual obedience thereof.
Accordingly, it may be indeed the case that, at the end of the day, 'the binding virtue of a
law lies in the sanction annexed to it'14; that in other words a law motivates agents because
they want to avoid the infliction of pain (sanction) upon them. At the same time, however, it
is also true that the existence of the sanction can be asserted in an objective way. Put in a
more Hartian terminology, a rule motivates agents internally on an irrational basis (disposi¬
tions, emotions) which can be rationally accounted for, externally, as the factual existence
of a sanction. But if this exchange of the internal with the external is possible, one need not
after all worry about irrational internal psychological states of affairs, one should just con¬
centrate on their external correlates, i.e. sanctions, in order to account for rules' binding
force.
Hart's reductionist dilemma
Roughly speaking, Hart's attempt to avoid the reductionist move of positivism can be de¬
picted along the following lines: he dismisses the irrationality of the internal and its con¬
comitant reduction to something empirical, by introducing an evaluative aspect of rules.
Hart believes that the following of a (social) rule is something rational which encompasses
two aspects: an external, empirical, factual aspect; and an internal, rational, evaluative as-
13 Vide, MacCormick, ibid. 3.
14 J. Austin, The Province ofJurisprudence Determined, 151.
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pect; these two aspects are not reducible to each other and, taken together, they constitute
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a rule. In this way he believes to
rescue the utilitarian distinction between 'Is' and 'Ought' while avoiding reductionism.
Be that as it may, his construction of the internal aspect does not do justice to his
endeavour. Hart maintains that it is the reflective attitude which actually constitutes the
evaluative aspect of rules rather than merely providing access to it. By taking that step,
however, he ends up identifying the evaluative aspect of rules with the internal subjective
states (attitudes) of the addressees. Rules on this view are prevented from possessing an
objective evaluative dimension and instead are taken to depend upon the addressees' actual
sharing of the same subjective attitude. Insofar the evaluative aspect of rules (or their nor¬
mativity) is reduced to the projection of 'subjective' attitudes onto value-free objects
(rules)13. By professing this view, however, Hart undermines his important initial intuition,
namely that normativity cannot be captured in empirical value-free terms.
The critical reflective attitude, as the pivotal element of the internal aspect of rules,
cannot escape Humeanism as it is taken to point towards the subjective attitudes of the
rules' claimants which are projected upon the external aspect of rules. Hart understands that
normativity must emanate from the internal point of view but he is not able to discover there
anything more than subjective attitudes, because he searches with a Humean compass. But
soon he has to face the fact that critical attitudes are as much subjective, in fact idiolecticlb,
as emotions and preferences. This poses for Hart the following reductionist dilemma: either
he has to agree with Austin and decree the External as the bearer of normativity; or he has
to reduce normativity to internal subjective attitudes. Either way Hart's initial anti-
reductionist move fails and rule-scepticism ensues.
Commentators sympathetic to Hart's theory, in an effort to avoid the reductionist
dilemma, have introduced, alongside the internal and the external aspect, a new, third as¬
pect, commonly referred to as the hermeneutic or detached point of view]1. For the moment
I will postpone the discussion of this concept until the fifth section of this chapter and give
only a brief outline of its rationale. By introducing the hermeneutic point of view these
authors try to reintroduce the lost premiss of Hart's argument: the objective dimension of
rules' normativity. The hermeneutic point of view is taken to represent a rational cognitive
15 Vide Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 55-61.
16 The term is used in connection to Wittgenstein's idea of a private language; for a further explora¬
tion of the content of this idea vide Ch VI, infra.
17 The terms belong respectively to N. MacCormick and J. Raz. Vide Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 55-
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aspect of rules which ranges over subjective attitudes, while it can not be reduced to the
external aspect. This endeavour will be interpreted as a first attempt to rest a case for the
existence of an evaluative point which resides within the rule and enjoys an objective status;
objective as opposed to being dependant upon the claimant's subjective attitudes and dispo¬
sitions. However, I am going to argue that contrary to the intentions of its authors the sug¬
gested 'third' point, which occupies a position between the external (or the extreme exter¬
nal) and the internal point of view, is already qualified for undermining the original Hartian
distinction: if, namely, rules' normativity and meaning is a cognitive or even perhaps a fac-
tive issue that one can account for without using subjective attitudes or reducing normative
phenomena, then the Internal - External distinction starts to loose its raison d' etre.
Habits and Rules
The internal aspect is employed by Hart in order to corroborate the distinction between
habits and social rules18. Habits account for a generalised convergence of behaviour; yet this
convergence does not establish habits as standards of behaviour that offer a good reason to
abide by them. Conversely, rules generate reasons for action and operate as standards which
offer grounds for criticism whenever cases of deviation arise. As a result, rules, contrary to
sheer habits, disseminate reasoned, as opposed to contingent, convergence amongst the
members of a group. Rules, in other words, are general standards which are to be followed
by the members of a group. The internal aspect is precisely the warranty of the 'general
standard' character of rules on behalf of the members of a group. In this way the differen¬
tiation between rules and mere habits lies in the general standard character of the former
which, nevertheless, depends upon the addressees' endorsement. Hart famously speaks
about a critical reflective attitude which validates a pattern of behaviour as a general stan¬
dard. Against the background of the critical attitude this standard is embedded in acts of
criticism or demands for conformity plus the further belief that such criticism and demands
are justified. All these functions of the internal aspect find their characteristic expression in
the normative terminology of'ought', 'must', 'should', 'right', 'wrong'.
When the members of a small church community urge the newly arrived foreigner
to remove his hat upon the occasion of entering their church, they do so with the conviction
that there is a rule prescribing that all male adults have to be uncovered in the church. Con-
61. For further discussion see this chapter, infra.
18 The discussion of Hart's concept of rules draws upon H. L. A. Hart, Concept, 55-58; 82-91; 100-
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versely Sunday afternoon theatre goers do not demonstrate any attitude of commitment to¬
wards their pattern of behaviour even if this pattern happens to be a generalised habit
amongst the inhabitants of a little provincial town.
Be that as it may, one feels the need to ask how much better does the reflective at¬
titude account for normativity than the discredited psychological states, dispositions and
emotions? Or, put in different terms, are critical reflective attitudes less subjective than
emotions and other 'private' internal psychological states? Hart definitely wants to demar¬
cate the domain of reflective attitudes by drawing a line between them and other psycho¬
logical states. In an account of obligation'9 he emphasises that the main difference between
being obliged and having a genuine obligation is that in the first case our statement refers to
psychological facts like beliefs and motives, whereas in the second case those facts are not
enough, in fact they are irrelevant and come analytically too late to be able to account for
obligation. Hart adds that even if one, like Austin, replaces internal psychological states
with the likelihood or the prediction of the possibility of suffering an 'evil', one still would
miss the point of what an obligation consists in. Bribing authorities or circumventing en¬
forcement of the law by any other means does not void one's obligation, though it might
very well help one avoid punishment, defeating thus the prediction of punishment. Legal
obligation is about offering reasons for the performance of some conduct and goes beyond
the actual enforcement of this conduct:
...where rules exist, deviations from them are not merely grounds
for a prediction that hostile reactions will follow or that a court will
apply sanctions to those who break them, but are also a reason or
20
justification for such reaction and for applying the sanctions" .
Of course Hart, rushing to anticipate any efficacy-based criticism, concedes that in any case
a certain amount of social demand for conformity is required for the existence of legal obli¬
gation. Distinct from morality as it is, a legal system must be backed by the general demand
for conformity and a sufficient amount of serious social pressure brought to bear upon those
who deviate2'. Only under this requirement can legal rules give rise to obligations. How¬
ever, notwithstanding the importance of'serious social pressure', the fact that rules of obli¬
gation are supported by serious social pressure does not entail that to have an obligation is
117; and 200-212.
19 Vide Hart, Concept, 82 n.
20 Ibid. 84.
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to experience feelings of compulsion or pressure22. Hart makes use of the internal and the
external point of view anew - this time it is the point of view of someone who makes state¬
ments about a legal system - in an effort to debunk the insufficiency of a predictive ac¬
count of rules. Thus external statements are statements which reproduce the legal phenome¬
non as a series of regularities of behaviour that are connected, in a casual relation, to sanc¬
tions that occur whenever behaviour deviates from the regular pattern. What the external
observer can offer, at best, is an account in terms of observable regularities of conduct, pre¬
dictions, probabilities and signs but not an account in terms of rules. For this he would need
to take the internal (to the rules) point of view, i.e. the point of view of the members of the
group who accept the rules as general standards of behaviour. This internal point could be
adopted without necessarily presupposing membership of the relevant social group, e.g. the
hat removers of our little provincial parish. One could retain the external point while shar¬
ing or trying to understand the content of the reflective attitude of the members of a group.
This non-extreme, as opposed to the pure, extreme external point, would give an account of
the normative phenomenon in terms of rules23.
The meaning ofnormative statements
Ingenious and elegant as it may be, Hart's external-internal distinction is not as safe or clear
a criterion, as he had probably thought. Hart, in his account of rules, seems to use two very
different notions of the internal point of view interchangeably. On some occasions, the deci¬
sive criterion for the differentiation internal-external derives from the physical as it were
positioning or placement of the one who makes statements about a rule in relation to that
rule or a system of rules, i.e. one's being or not under the authority of that rule. On other
occasions it is implied that what is important is not the actual position of the one who makes
the statement but one's participation-in and sharing-of the critical reflective attitude that
elevates a pattern of behaviour to the level of a rule. Now this could, in turn, mean two
things: either that attitudes are something distinct and additional to the position of the ut-
terer, in which case, one must be able to share what is in the minds (i.e. the attitudes) of
those who accept the rule as a rule24; or that each rule 'corresponds' to or incorporates only
one content which resides not in the head of those who abide by the rule but in the rule it-
21 Ibid. 86.
22 Ibid. 88.
23 Vide Concept, 89-90.
24 One could add here the problematic assumption that those who accept the mle/s as a standard in-
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self25 (and therefore does not consist in any particular person's attitude; hence attitudes are
not a safe criterion). Hart is not clear as to which version of the internal point of view is
authoritative in matters of normativity and meaning of rules. On a first estimation it would
seem that the second meaning of the internal, i.e. the 'position-detached' version, would be
more consistent with the Haitian anti-reductionist program. Given the fact, besides, of the
extreme implausibility of having any intuitive knowledge into others' internal attitudes, the
detached version would come as further incorporating the belief about an independent con¬
tent within the rule. Surprising as it may be, Hart's concern not to identify law as 'it is' with
law as it 'ought to be' is so fundamental that he does not hesitate to jeopardise his anti-
reductionist project.26. As a result, his account of rules seems to steer between the version of
the internal aspect as a locus-attached criterion and its version as consisting of subjective
attitudes. Hart hardly considers the third possibility of an independent content of rules as he
takes it to lead to an obscure Platonism.
Attitudes and the Internal - External Distinction
The whole discussion up to this point indicates that Hart is particularly keen on connecting
the meaning of normative utterances with their pragmatic or contextual conditions of per-
deed share already the same reflective attitude.
25 Beyond doubt, even in this case, what is 'in the rale' can be known only via the addressees' minds.
The case, though, of minds trying to grasp the single content of a rale, and the case, almost Procrus¬
tean, of a rale being forced to accommodate the contents of all minds, are two fundamental different
approaches. In the second case, even if the impossible ability to have access into others' minds was
granted, we would probably end up with something like a non-rale because it would accommodate
almost every possible course of action. To picture this situation recall Berkeley's discussion of the
idea of a triangle that would contain all actual triangles. This, he concludes, would not be the idea of
any triangle at all; vide Blackburn, Spreading the World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 46-47.
26 I am inclined to believe that Hart's picture of the mind-world relations is rather dualistic. Thinking
in these terms can certainly complicate things a lot, for one takes everything that belongs to the world
to be somehow material and external to the mind. And if one, like Hart, does not want to accept nor¬
mative entities while at the same time wants to save normativity from subjectivity and scepticism, then
one is not left with many choices: one needs to admit that normativity and the meaning of rales derive
from inner mental processes (attitudes, definitions, criteria) which validate external structures, i.e.
patterns of behaviour, habits, words, statutes, etc., as rules. However the fact that internal mental pro¬
cesses are highly indeterminate will, sooner or later, lead anew either to scepticism or to reductionism,
with the initial tension reviving in its full size. Conversely something akin to a so-called contextualist
understanding of the mind-world relations has the advantage ofmaking mental contents accessible qua
world. In such a picture normative concepts are shaped through social practices and therefore have a
determinate content which is cognitively accessible. At the same time world-phenomena are never
detached and value-free because they are constantly mediated through mental processes. The de¬
manding part in this model is that one has to presuppose some 'categories of reason' which generate a
synthesis of all that is happening around us into a meaningful whole; those categories will probably
need to be understood as enjoying a transcendental status. For a detailed account of this line of argu-
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formance. It is in this context that he constantly links up normativity to the position that
rules' claimants occupy within a legal system (force of utterances) or in relation to a legal
system (external-internal distinction). Hence, the connection of the internal (or evaluative)
aspect of rules to the performance of the legal sentences or, as he usually calls it, to their
'force' features throughout Hart's account27. In fact 'force' considerations, which dominate
Hart's earlier work, gradually are incorporated into the reasoning about the internal point of
view and for this reason I am going to use both terms interchangeably.
Obviously, the employment of the force of normative statements stems from Hart's
annoyance with theories that were analysing rules' meaning in terms of closed set of se¬
mantic criteria and/or identifying rules as 'queer' metaphysical objects. In locating the
meaning of rules into the conditions of the performance of normative statements about the
law, he purports to show that their meaning is not anything static or frozen or corresponding
to any pre-given entities; the meaning of rules has, rather, a dynamic character by being, as
it were, context-sensitive. Though the motive behind this strategy is justified, the strategy
itself ends up facing a series of problems, the most prominent being that by making rules'
content dependent upon the contingency of the context, one looses any notion of semantic
content and, worse, any notion of rules.
Hart offers a picture in which attitudes stand for the evaluative aspect of rules and
are further analysed in terms of the positioning of the utterer in relation to a legal system.
Accordingly, the meaning of an internal statement seems to amount to the position that its
utterer occupies28. Hence, the attitude which validates something as a 'general standard'
depends upon the positioning (internal-external) of the one who holds the attitude. But,
presumably, attitudes were initially appealed to in order to explain what the internal point of
view consists in. Now they come to depend on the 'locus of uttering'. Hart does not make
enough effort to avoid the criticism of circularity. This circularity, though, seems to be the
only possible/consistent outcome of a Humean-based account of normativity. As already
argued, Hart's Humean compass does not allow anything but subjective psychological states
ment, vide CHs V and VI, infra.
27 Vide Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 55.
28 The position of the utterer is important even within a legal system: Hart ascribes different value
and importance to a statement made by a judge than he does to the one uttered by the layman. Gener¬
ally Hart seems to connect a claim for lack of truth-values of legal statements with the fact of their
dependence upon the utterer's positioning. In this way internal statements do not have truth values but
are constitutive to the meaning of mles. Connectedly within a legal system statements bear no truth
values but merely draw their validity from the utterer's positioning in the system. Vide for a more
detailed analysis Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 55-58.
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to feature as bearers of normativity. If, nevertheless, one is dissatisfied with such an account
and wants to report some amount of normative objectivity (in the minimal sense of uni¬
formity of regulation for future cases), one is bound, as Hart does, to seek refuge in some
external features of norms. But in doing this one ends up endorsing a version of Austin's
command theory with all the serious problems pertaining to reductionism.
Once more the dilemma features in its full-blooded version: what can better account
for normativity? A reduction to external casual regularities or a reduction to internal sub¬
jective psychological affairs, i.e. critical attitudes? The answer is probably 'neither'. But
why allow the dilemma to emerge in the first place? Why consider at all the first horn of the
dilemma as a promising candidate, since, in the first place, the whole point of the critique to
Austin's conception of normativity was precisely to debunk his 'external' reductionism as
flawed. The answer, though not very complicated, is not straightforward within the Hartian
frame ofmind: One is bound to be infinitely entangled within the dilemma as long as one is
not decided to construct the evaluative aspect of rules on a different basis. Namely, not by
using subjective attitudes as the cement of one's account but by trying to account for the
objective dimension of norms29 and, therefore, by looking for something which is beyond
subjective psychological affairs while, at the same time, still internal to rules as opposed to
something that is connected with external regularities. In doing this, one will very soon re¬
alise that the distinction Internal-External loses its importance in an account of normativity.
This is because one needs to hold on to the External only as long as one cannot completely
rely upon an Internal that is based upon subjective attitudes. And vice-versa, one cannot do
without the Internal as long as the External cannot account for the evaluative aspect of nor¬
mativity which seems, anyway, to be ubiquitous and beyond dispute.
Overlooking the real cause of the dilemma, as in the case of Hart, can lead to the
familiar shortcomings in an account of normativity. As long as he shares the premisses that
produce the dilemma, Hart needs both the Internal and the External. Normativity becomes
for him a concept which heavily relies upon the context of uttering normative statements
(the Internal) while at the same time it cannot be sufficiently grounded without any refer¬
ence to the external regularities of habitual obedience (External). But, and this is probably
the main flaw of the whole project, as long as one inevitably has to shift to the External in
order to compensate for the Internal's insufficiency (context dependence), one loses the
29 At this point it is enough to consider objectivity of norms as an analytical feature of abstract stan¬
dards (i.e. norms) which aim to regulate in a uniform way future cases.
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most valuable element of normativity which was the (internal) evaluative aspect of rules.
The previously raised reproach of circularity is, therefore, just one of the shortcomings of
Hart's account. In fact it points to a deeper and more pivotal shortcoming, namely the con¬
text-dependent explication of the meaning of normative statements. It is a shortcoming of
the sort that threatens to undermine any notion of normativity. The circular definition of the
internal point of view through attitudes and vice-versa, does not disclose any additional
element that attitudes possess, by whose virtue normativity is illuminated. But beyond its
uninformative character this circularity denotes the more grave fallacy of the Hartian con¬
struction: attitudes cannot be anything more than internal psychological states because they
are meant to stand for the pragmatic conditions of the uttering of normative statements.
What Hart would have needed, instead, in order to uphold his External-Internal dis¬
tinction, would be attitudes consisting in something independent and prior to the distinction
Internal/External. Attitudes, that is, should be able to offer reasons for distinguishing an
internal from an external statement, hence, normativity from description. But Hart's account
of the content of critical attitudes does not seem to allow any space for such a corrective
interpretation. The reason lies in the way content is specified: it is a feeling of commitment
towards a ruleM). It is the commitment of the one who makes a statement about a rule, that
this rule is a required general standard of behaviour. Is it ever possible to understand com¬
mitment as offering an independent criterion for the internal/external distinction? Could, in
other words, an external observer adopt or 'simulate' the internal attitude, hence the com¬
mitment, in order to give an account of '...the way in which [a group of people] are con¬
cerned with [rules] from the internal point of view'31? Strangely enough Hart's answer is
both 'yes' and 'no'! According to Hart, it is possible to give an external account of the way
others view rules in the internal aspect, but not by sharing their commitment. Since com¬
mitment is the specific differentia of rules (from habits), it is by definition impossible to
grant the external point of view any access to it. But at the same time Hart seems pretty
confident that it is possible to externally refer to rules as they are viewed internally32 Ap¬
parently the acceptance of these two mutually exclusive answers shows Hart's discomfort
with his own construction of the internal aspect of rules. If one considers the negative an¬
swer as being more authoritative on the issue, then Hart's picture of rules and normativity
30 In introducing commitment as the main component of critical attitudes I endorse N. MacCormicks
clarification of the internal aspect of rules in his H.L.A. Hart (London: Arnold, 1981), 30-40. Vide
also the next section of this chapter.
31 Cf. Hart, Concept, 89.
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has a very restricted, almost trivial, scope which threatens to turn rules' meaning into a
subjective business. If, on the other hand, one takes the positive answer as a guideline then
there is only one conclusion to be drawn: namely that there must be something else which
differentiates rules and which is more fundamental and, therefore, independent of attitudes.
Hence Hart's construction of the Internal and his account of rules' meaning is at best irrele¬
vant.
Semantic content andforce
It seems that there are more reasons speaking against Hart's picture of rules. His assimila¬
tion of the semantic content of normative statements to the conditions of their performance
cannot really be assumed without any problems. Its most important shortcoming is, proba¬
bly, its failure to guarantee certainty in communication33. If every time that the position of
the utterer changes, the meaning of the statement changes as well, then normativity would
be unintelligible. This is, though, far from the case. People reason by using rules of a system
irrespective of their positioning vis-a-vis that system: so does the professor of Roman Law
in giving examples to his students, or the Comparative Law lecturer in her tutorials. But
even within the same legal system the performative force which is connected to a judge's
utterance does not entail any privileged access to the truth about the real meaning of the
statute than, say, the statement of the plaintiffs lawyer. All these modes of engagement in
normative reasoning make a rather strong case for the assumption that force considerations
fail to occupy a central position in the determination of the meaning of normative concepts.
Admittedly, Hart's initial, justified concern was to discredit the view about the existence of
closed sets of semantic criteria and analytic definitions for the application of legal con¬
cepts34. Still the importance he ascribed to pragmatic or 'force' considerations is clearly
overrated. Instead, pragmatic conditions seem to be peripheral to the determination of
meaning of legal/normative concepts. These concepts seem to retain a stable meaning irre¬
spective of the context of their fulfilment35, a fact that points to the existence of some sort of
32 Op. cit.
33 Vide Takis, 'The Internal', 34-38.
34 See the next section on Hart's open-texture considerations.
35 That is, the pragmatic conditions which feature in Hart's account and not any kind of pragmatic
conditions whatsoever. As I am going to argue in the last two chapters, there seems to be another level
of pragmatics which constitutes something like the (universal) context of all contexts of communica¬
tion. Under this term I attempt to capture the normative requirements of every form of human commu¬
nication which are pragmatic to the extent that they are practical or action-related, as opposed to being
ephemeral (as Hart's utterer's positioning is).
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genuine properties which determine the conditions of correct application of legal concepts
prior to the 'locus criterion' of the Internal-External distinction. Conversely, any attendance
to the priority of the pragmatic conditions for the meaning of normative concepts, as Stav-
ropoulos observes, will only lead to emotivism and its concomitant problems36. An emotiv-
ist who rejects the existence of genuine properties and conditions for the application of con¬
cepts would have to concede that only applications of a legal concept which emanate from
the competent user (e.g. the judge) are correct. Such a concession entails: first, that all ap¬
plications of other claimants are wrong; second, that all applications of the competent users
are correct. Both entailments clearly fail under the light of the possibility of determining
correct applications of concepts according to properties that transcend the contextual condi¬
tions of performance.
In all, these cases show that the content of a normative statement is to a certain de¬
gree detached from the conditions of its performance and the performer's feelings of com¬
mitment. The position/role of the utterer and the pragmatic conditions of the uttering are not
sufficient enough a criterion for the meaning of a normative statement37. As a result, it must
be the case that whatever gives a normative statement its normative meaning, it is more than
the positioning of its claimant or the pragmatic, ephemeral conditions of its uttering. A first
attempt to meet these objections to the Hartian conception of rules, without discarding the
external-internal distinction, is to be found in Neil MacCormick's suggestion for a third
non-extreme external point of view besides the external and the internal, which he labels the
hermeneutic point of view. In endorsing this view MacCormick claims merely to exploit
Hart's concern that no account 'in terms of rules' is possible from an 'extreme external'
point of view38. What is very interesting in his account is the suggestion of a cognitive ele¬
ment within critical reflective attitudes which transcends the external-internal distinction
and is able to account for semantic determinacy (or objectivity) of rules' meaning, irrespec¬
tive of the contextual contingencies of their uttering or the utterer's positioning. This having
been said, MacCormick does not think that the cognitive layer suffices in accounting for
rule's normative power which has in any case to be related to some sort of volitional layer
(commitment). As a result he constructs the hermeneutic point of view as being parasitic to
the Hartian internal point of view with all the problems of psychologism attending to this
36 Vide Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 56.
37 The ephemeral character of pragmatics does not apply to all levels of communication. It will be
later claimed that there is a sort of universal pragmatics which underlie all human communication and,
hence, determine meaning; cf. also with footnote 35, supra.
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move. This problem notwithstanding, I will suggest that MacCormick's valuable intuition
about the cognitive dimension of rules can be rescued if disconnected from the Hartian con¬
ception of the internal aspect of rules. Then it can be recast in suggesting that it is possible
to acquire knowledge of the evaluative aspect of some rule independently of the internal
psychological states of those that the rule addresses.
The Hermeneutic Point of view: Rules' Cognitive Aspect
The vegetarian who criticises others for eating meat surely does not do so with the belief
that he is following a general social standard that condemns carnivorousness. But even
within the realm of something like the corpus of rules of vegetarianism, one does not need
to feel committed to any of those rules in order to be able to appreciate their point and, say,
warn his vegetarian friend against eating a non-vegetarian dish. In those cases normative
uses of the words 'ought', 'should', 'should not', etc. cannot coherently be explained
against the canvas of the distinction external-internal. The required commitment of the Har¬
tian internal point is either missing, as in the second case, or it is a commitment to a subjec¬
tive standard, as in the first case. Such cases seem, as a result, to point towards a third, as it
were, 'detached' point of view which incorporates a cognitive aspect of rules. This aspect,
argues MacCormick, refers to rules as patterns of behaviour and ranges beyond the external-
internal distinction39. It is the capacity to appraise a course of action or of state of affairs
against the background of a pattern of behaviour and to register instances of conforming to
or not conforming to it40. This aspect is juxtaposed to the volitional aspect of a rule which
consists in some wish or preference that the relevant pattern prevails as a general standard
of behaviour. Whereas the volitional layer presupposes the internal point of view, the cog¬
nitive layer has a broader scope: it refers to the intelligibility of rules as patterns of behav¬
iour beyond one's commitment to them. This distinction, it is submitted, enables one to
accommodate the phenomena of detached statements like the non-vegetarian's warning to
his vegetarian friend.
MacCormick construes in this fashion a third, 'hermeneutic', point of view which is
capable of re-constructing the normative assumptions of the internal, the normative par
excellence, point of view. For one to occupy the hermeneutic point of view what is required
is a full sharing of a rule's cognitive layer plus the full appreciation, but not sharing, of the
38 Vide Hart, The Concept, 89-90; MacCormick, Hart, 33, 37.
39 Vide also MacCormick, Hart, 31-32.
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same rule's volitional element41. Thus, statements from the hermeneutic point of view admit
of truth-values independently of the utterer's commitment. With this move MacCormick
intends to rescue the distinction between Is and Ought. The hermeneutic point of view of¬
fers, namely, 'an account in terms of rules' which is, however, distinct from the internal
point of view. It is an external account (Ts'-account) only not as external (contains an
evaluative aspect) as to succumb to a blatant reductionism (or a full loss of normative
meaning). If this were to be true then Hart's aim for a descriptive non-reductionist jurispru¬
dence would be justified.
Unfortunately there is a sort of inconsistency lurking within the very conception of
the hermeneutic point of view. The inconsistency lies in the combination of the cognitive
and the volitional layers. In what follows I will abide by the suggestion42 that once the cog¬
nitive layer has been ascertained there is no need to supplement it with any volitional level.
If, nevertheless, one does so then one ends up with the familiar problems of projectivism
pertaining to Hart's internal point of view. Alongside these two options there seems to be
only one left: the extreme external point of view or the lack of both cognitive and volitional
elements which amounts to nothing less than the loss of any notion of meaning and norma-
tivity.
In order to appreciate the problematic character of the combination of the two ele¬
ments, the cognitive and the volitional, within the hermeneutic point of view, we have to
attend closer to the way they interrelate. If the point of MacCormick's construction is that
the volitional element is what makes rules what they are, then the only purpose that the cog¬
nitive layer serves is to declare that there is a way for someone, from an external point of
view, to re-construct or re-present the commitment of those who are internally related to
that rule, without one's necessarily sharing that commitment. But if this is the idea behind it
then the hermeneutic point does not really escape the problem of projectivism which was
ascribed to critical attitudes43. As long as commitment features as the point of reference for
the cognitive layer, it is not important for the criticism that the hermeneutic points requires
just an appreciation and not a full commitment. Besides there is always the problem of ac¬
quiring knowledge of the mental states of others, a fact that in effect makes it even more
difficult to talk about a common or uniform commitment within the internal point of view.
40 Vide ibid. 33.
41 Ibid. 38.
42 Vide Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 58-61.
43 Ibid.
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If, on the other hand, MacCormick means that the cognitive aspect is independent and prior
to the volitional element then what is really the point of adding a volitional element? In
MacCormick's case it could be explained from a strong Humean influence about the role of
sentiments in practical reason, but otherwise the featuring of the volitional level cannot
successfully survive scrutiny.
The Humean background of MacCormick's proposal left aside, the cognitive layer
of the hermeneutic point seems to incorporate a claim that actually renders the volitional
supplement futile, not to say detrimental. Stavropoulos44 successfully argues that grasping
the content of a pattern of behaviour comes analytically prior to any preference about fol¬
lowing it, hence preferences do not make any difference as to the content of rules. If indeed
patterns of behaviour are the starting point, as MacCormick seems to argue, then it can not
be preferences that turn them into rules because knowledge of a pattern implies already
knowledge of the relevant rule, hence preferences about its following or not cannot interfere
with the rule's content. In other words one should already know the rule in order to direct
one's preference for following or not following it.
Take the example of cars stopping at red lights and consider two scenarios43. In the
first scenario traffic lights are part of a broader practice (involving vehicles, pedestrians,
etc.) aiming to regulate traffic on the streets. In this scenario the upgrading of the traffic-
lights practice to a rule is already performed through the knowledge of the (broader) prac¬
tice. Such knowledge confers to the traffic-light practice already a point which is all that
matters for the existence of a rule. Commitment or any preference about following that
point does not alter the point's (the rule's) content.
On the second scenario traffic is generally regulated by other means (roundabouts,
traffic policemen, etc.) and the existing traffic lights are not directly involved in its regula¬
tion. Again here the volitional layer does not add anything to the existence of a rule. If, in
this case, a rule exists already then it exists by virtue of a different point conferred by an¬
other practice (e.g. the practice to abide by the Sovereign's commands46). It is the knowl¬
edge of that practice that generates the rule and not any additional preference about the
rule's following . But if attitudes are irrelevant to the content of a rule why not suppose that
they are also irrelevant to a rule's evaluative aspect? Conversely, if the object of the cogni-
44 Ibid. 58.
45 The example comes from Stavropoulos, ibid. 59.
46 As Stavropoulos comments, the command of the sovereign, despite expressing a volition, is in the
second scenario part of the point of a rule and not a preference about its following; vide ibid. 60.
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tive aspect of rules are not attitudes but patterns one might well be tempted to suppose that
the evaluative aspect of rules might also, after all, not lie in attitudes but in patterns of be¬
haviour and practices; hence, that by the same token the evaluative aspect of rules and their
components are accessible to knowledge.
These remarks corroborate the initial claim that rules have an evaluative aspect
which allows their claimants to engage in normative discourse by criticising and justifying
courses of action or inquiring about the right thing to do. To that extent the claim corre¬
sponds perfectly with Hart's intuition about the necessary existence of an evaluative aspect
of rules. However, the discussion has tended to suggest that what Hart considered to repre¬
sent rules' evaluative content, i.e. attitudes, does not do the work properly. On the other
hand MacCormick's proposal for a cognitive aspect of rules, if disconnected from the voli¬
tional supplement, seems to resist successfully the criticism that was directed towards
Hart's critical reflective attitudes. Moreover, there seem to be a series of reasons that sug¬
gest that the cognitive aspect is connected with the rules' evaluative aspect over patterns of
behaviour and practices. It may, therefore, be well the case that the evaluative aspect of
norms in general and legal norms in particular can be known by grasping the point that re¬
sides within certain practices or patterns of behaviour. But if the evaluative aspect of rules
is a matter of knowledge detached from preferences then a lot has been won. Contrary to
subjective attitudes, practices and their points are not in the heads and can be known in an
objective way. Restating the evaluative aspect of rules as involving a cognitive dimension
seems to avoid most problems emanating from the attitudinal conception which threatened
with the collapse of semantics into pragmatics and the subsequent loss of meaning.
At the same time, a recasting of the evaluative aspect of rules in cognitive terms
dovetails with an anti-reductionist account of legal rules and normative concepts, as Hart
intended all along. Legal/normative vocabulary is indispensable, hence non-reducible, if and
only if there are normative entities (objects and properties) to which we have cognitive ac¬
cess47. If rules and normative properties exist then they cannot be eliminated through other
more basic empirical properties or other entities, hence they are ontologically basic. Ad¬
mittedly this won't rule out the possibility that normative entities may supervene upon
physical properties or social facts and states of affairs48; this possibility, however, cannot
cancel the ontological autonomy of rules and evaluative properties as long as the level su-
47 For a more accurate formulation of the relation between the level of language and the level of ob¬
jects/properties, see Ch II, first section, infra.
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pervened upon is not sufficient without reference to those properties in accounting for them.
But this is all one needs in order to argue that it is not possible to dispense with the use of
evaluative concepts in our discourses concerning rules and evaluative properties49.
In relation to the distinction between Is and Ought the appreciation of the cognitive
bedrock of evaluative/normative concepts suggests a major restructuring. The sharp distinc¬
tion between what the law is and what it ought to be cannot be sustained convincingly as
long as the evaluative aspect is clearly an expression of the Ought. The collapse of the Is
into the Ought is, in effect, the major consequence of recasting the evaluative element of
normative concepts as being cognitively accessible. But that need not be a worrying effect.
The mingle of Is with Ought is indeed problematic only as long as the main fear of positiv¬
ism obtains. That is, as long as evaluations, normativity and the realm of ought lato sensu
are located within attitudes, feelings and other subjective mental states. On the contrary, if
the evaluative aspect of normativity is disconnected from the 'kingdom of passions' and
further understood as constituting part of the (social) environment then the content of
evaluations can be accessible to knowledge as any other worldly thing. It is, namely, posi¬
tivism's warped conception about evaluation which forces one to stick to the Is-Ought dis¬
tinction. Once shown that evaluation is of a different quality the distinction loses its ration¬
ale. Naturally, there are other problems that arise (like 'how is it possible to have objective
knowledge of rules as we have of, say, tables and other objects?'; or 'if normative contents
are about things belonging to the environment, how does our perceptive apparatus becomes
aware of those things?'). The persistence of those new problems notwithstanding, I would
like to suggest that some form of realist explication of normative properties and other nor¬
mative 'objects' has the immense advantage of offering a genuine solution to Hart's query
about a non-reductive jurisprudence, simply because it acknowledges that for something to
be non-reducible to other basic-level properties it has to enjoy some sort of ontological in¬
dependence.
On the other hand cognitivism about normative entities can generate the same de¬
gree of objectivity of knowledge as cognitivism concerning empirical entities does, without
being committed to ascribing to normative entities the ontological status of the empirical
ones (freedom does not need to be thought to have the same molecular structure as a glass,
48 For a more detailed discussion of the issue of supervenience, see Ch II.
49 This is the same with every evaluative concept. E.g. the fact that someone's brave behaviour su¬
pervenes upon a series of biological facts (high blood pressure, quick movements, etc.) does not imply
that these physical facts can capture the evaluative level of that behaviour without using the concept of
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in fact it not need have any molecular structure at all). The claim that values and other nor¬
mative entities are part of the fabric of the world links up with the broader claim that matter
is not the exclusive ingredient of the world, hence that physics cannot offer a complete pic¬
ture of the world without resource to evaluative sciences30. Besides, as far as the degree of
objectivity of knowledge is concerned, empirical concepts seem to be on a par with evalua¬
tive concepts. Contemporary science, that is, seems to operate very similarly to moral sci¬
ence by employing complex substantive theories which care to specify points for grouping
together components of concepts' content rather than adhering to the objectivity of the
given. It is to this extent that the degree of objectivity is more or less the same for empirical
and non-empirical concepts51.
Law's ontology and semantics
In all by alluding to the existence of a cognitive dimension the discussion of the hermeneu-
tical point of view iterates the need for an account of law's ontology. This account will have
to take seriously the possibility that there are evaluative (abstract) objects or facts such as
rules and normative/legal properties32. For the moment I will postpone such an account for
the next chapter and in the last section of this chapter I will discuss a slightly different issue
which, however, will turn out to be of great importance for the ontological account of legal
rules and legal properties. This is the issue of legal semantics, or of the meanings of legal
expressions. The importance of legal meaning for an ontological account of norms rests on
the fact that the evaluative aspect of legal rules and properties is conveyed through their
meanings. To that degree an appropriate account ofmeaning seems to be necessary in guar¬
anteeing that what is ontologically basic (rules, properties) is still evaluative. This is of par¬
ticular importance for an anti-reductionist account of law: such an account is interested in
establishing the ontological autonomy of evaluative entities as opposed to non-evaluative
ones (i.e. those properties that reductionism takes to be the only basic-level entities in any
ontological account). Connectedly I will argue that an anti-reductionist account of legal
entities has to be a two-tier account: an account of the ontological independence of legal
entities and an account of their evaluative content.
Under the proposed two-tier anti-reductionist account, ontology and semantics are
'bravery'. For a more extended discussion of supervenience refer to Ch II.
50 For a similar view, however without the broad implications adhered to here, see Fodor, 'Special
Sciences (or: the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)' in Synthese 28 (1974) 97-115.
51 See the analysis of Stavropoulos in Objectivity, 69-82.
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not two enterprises disconnected form each other. Rather ontology is taken to be exhaus¬
tively reported through semantics: normative entities are ontologically 'situated' according
to the way they are depicted by sentences53. In this picture the need for preserving the
evaluative character of legal entities poses increased demands on the semantics employed;
in other words not any semantics will do the job. One needs a semantics that not only satis¬
fies the formal-structural requirement of identifying ontological categories within or via
linguistic structures but, furthermore, a semantics that accounts for the evaluative meanings
which linguistic structures convey in communication. Judged from the point of view of that
requirement, Hartian semantics is not sufficient.
However justified Hart's critique of the semantic accounts of his predecessors may
be, it fails to account for the evaluative element of legal meaning in an objective way; that is
in a way that would avoid succumbing to the psychologism and subjectivism of speakers'
internal states. In the last part of this chapter, I will further argue that Hart's inability to
account for the evaluative aspect of legal expressions led him to tacitly endorse theories
about the meaning of legal expressions that he originally rejected (those theories that were
earlier referred to as criterial model theories""'4). I will advance the claim that whereas Hart's
intuition of rejecting those theories is, basically, justified their rejection can consistently be
J
performed only by rejecting altogether the sort of semantics that backs them and substitut¬
ing a semantics that takes into account the evaluative content of legal concepts. Such a se¬
mantics, call them substantive semantics, will be capable of successfully accounting for the
possibility of objective knowledge of normative/evaluative expressions, while avoiding
either the insufficiency of the criterial model or the fallacies of the Hartian criticism33.
In demarcating the discussion of substantive semantics in the thesis, it should be
noted that the essay's interest lies predominantly in making explicit the conditions for the
possibility of such a semantics rather than in offering a detailed account of their form and
structure. That possibility will be elaborated against the background of the conjunction of
two theses: first the thesis that the content of our normative expressions is about the envi¬
ronment (or the world), second the thesis that linguistic content is generated within different
52 Vide CHs II, III and IV.
53 This possibility will be argued against the background of two theses, when they are taken con¬
jointly: First that mental or intentional content is in the first instance about the world and not about
any mental intermediaries (infra, Ch II); and second that mental or intentional content can always be
individuated via semantic or propositional structures (infra, Ch II).
54 Vide footnote 4 in the introduction of this chapter, supra.
55 Stavropoulos in his Objectivity in Law undertakes a similar project though he carries it through in a
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instances of a process or practice of communication36. The conjuncts are not isolated from
each other: the environment is depicted via linguistic expressions according to the norma¬
tive standards that support the practice that generates communication. Those standards con¬
stitute the pragmatic dimension of semantic content and are, further, evaluative with the
result that content will be, generally speaking, evaluative (CHs. iv, v and vi). Furthermore,
to the degree that the practice that generates meaning and content is itself part of the envi¬
ronment, the evaluative standards that support that practice will also form part of the envi¬
ronment.
Whereas i will be arguing within the tradition of theories that advance claims for
the evaluative character of all semantic content, my aim is primarily to account for the
evaluative character of 'legal' and more broadly practical content. 'Legal' content will be
evaluative to the degree that it depicts instances of the normative standards that support the
pragmatic dimension of normative meaning and content (CHs iv, v). To understand this,
the reader will be asked to picture legal norms as being somehow 'fabricated' within nor¬
mative practices. This will entail that legal norms will be of the same quality as the prag¬
matic normative standards that in the first place support the normative practice within which
legal norms are depicted; namely they will be norms that guide action. On the other hand,
whereas the pragmatic norms that support normative practice will be postulated with a tran¬
scendental necessity, legal norms will only be valid relative to actual practices, and to that
extent contingent.
Defeasibility, Open Texture and Concepts' Content
Hart's defeasibility thesis evolves, as already argued, along two parameters: an ontological
thesis that rejects legal concepts' empirical status and the further, as it were epistemic, be¬
lief that legal concepts are anchored within social (legal) practices, this having something to
do with their containing an evaluative aspect. The defeasibility thesis, and the soon after
developed open-texture thesis57, is mainly a thesis about legal concepts' meaning which, in
a way, integrates Hart's ontological and epistemic beliefs: its underlying idea suggests that
since legal concepts do not refer to empirical kinds but are social artifacts, their meaning
cannot be captured by listing a set of criteria, as in the case of empirical concepts; instead,
rather different way.
56 This relates to the Wittgensteinian thesis for the impossibility of a private language; cf. with Ch VI,
infra.
57 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept, 121 n. at 127.
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in order to capture their meaning, one should try to refer to the relevant practice and the
evaluations that are embedded in it. As a result, any effort to imagine legal concepts as re¬
ferring to extant entities and to list criteria corresponding, as it were, to some counterparts
or, worse, ascribe to legal sentences truth conditions, would be absurd. Legal concepts can¬
not be explicated in this way because they are products of social practices. This is taken by
Hart to further suggest that, on the one hand, the content of legal concepts cannot be as de¬
termined as the content of empirical concepts can and, on the other hand, that legal concepts
contain some evaluation that does not allow one to treat them as empirical in the sense that
one would be reducing them, hence would be missing something from their content. In a
peculiar way Hart seems to endorse the idea that legal concepts cannot be reduced because
they are indeterminate, their indeterminability pointing towards their social/evaluative char¬
acter which cannot be captured in terms of truth conditions. Counterintuitive as it may be,
this reasoning is not incoherent when explained against the background of the previous dis¬
cussion of the Internal-External distinction. Hart seems to be convinced that evaluation is an
important feature of legal concepts but, at the same moment, that evaluation cannot be cap¬
tured in any objective terms58. Hence, evaluation is intrinsically connected to indeterminacy,
defeasibility of criteria and open-textured rules and, as a result, resists any reduction to ob¬
jective criteria. As long as objective criteria for Hart can only be non-evaluative facts his
thesis is sound; habits, 'external' facts about behaviour, or even definitions and sets of se¬
mantic criteria corresponding to 'queer' counterparts are nothing but objective reductions!
To the extent, though, that he insists holding evaluations as the most central component of
legal concepts, he is ironically himself forced to appeal anew to those reductions, as what
matters more in an account of rules and normative concepts is, apparently, objectivity.
Definitions and semantic criteria
Whereas in the case of the command theory of rules reductionism threatens to conceal the
specific evaluative aspect of legal-as-social rules, the case of semantic definitions and crite¬
ria is slightly different. Treating legal concepts as having fixed semantic counterparts which
feature in semantic definitions would be, according to Hart, absurd or even irrelevant. Legal
concepts are not empirical and therefore resist any treatment in terms of definitions, criteria
and truth-values. The main reason for this impossibility is, notably, the social dimension of
58 This is quite paradoxical, since, normally, any denial of reduction should imply that certain con¬
cepts are self-standing and that one could ascribe to them genuine properties.
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rules and more specifically the force or the internal aspect thereof. Hence the rejection of
those theories that base their account of legal concepts on definitions and closed sets of
criteria.
A feature common to many philosophical accounts of legal concepts, usually re¬
ferred to as 'positivist', is that they take more general concepts to be conceptually prior to
and independent of the more specific concepts39 trying, thus, to 'formalise' the concept of
law. These accounts are centralist60 in the sense that they try to establish 'what the law re¬
quires' (the legal 'ought'), not by reference to the specific legal practices and the associated
principles (about what is right, just, or appropriate), but in virtue of a formal ultra-rule, like
Kelsen's Grundnorm . Usually in these accounts the meaning of legal concepts is expli¬
cated through a definition or criterial model62. This provides a set of criteria or conditions
that enjoy the status of degenerate truths and crystallise as something like 'genuine' defini¬
tions. These sets of criteria form concepts' extension in an a priori way, independently of
the concept's application and the associated legal practices, by constituting something like a
logical formula . If for instance the criteria for something to be a contract are x, y and z then
everything that is a contract need by definition to abide by those criteria. Obviously the
power of the definition model lies in a simple idea: if all concepts can be represented
through a logical formula that is immune of all changes then one would secure a high grade
of rule-determinacy. Rule-determinacy would be reduced to a simple modus ponens argu¬
ment of the form: ' if... then...'.
Definitions are taken to be exhaustive with the result that there are only two possi¬
bilities for all states of affairs that need to be subsumed under the concept. Either they fulfil
the provided set of criteria and present an easy case - in another terminology: 'they fall
under the concept's core (Begrififiskernf63 - or they do not and constitute a hard case - 'they
fall under the concept's periphery {Begriffishof)''. The 'periphery' of concepts, the grey area
where definitions notoriously fail, is the reign of uncertainty and indeterminacy, the area
where disagreement ensues. Hard cases, thus, seem to be closely identified with those con¬
cepts that incorporate a large amount of 'grey area' or are, to use Hart's terminology, open-
59 S. Hurley, Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992),
16-17.
60 Cf. Natural Reasons, 11.
61 Vide generally H. Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems ofLegal Theoty, trans, by S. Paulson and
B. L. Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
62 Vide footnote 4, supra.
63 This term belongs to Ph. Heck as cited in K. Engisch, Einfuhrung in das juristische Denken, 9th
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textured64. According to a broadly accepted and main-stream classification63 these concepts
may be: vague legal terms, axiological terms, general clauses and concepts that allow for
discretion when applied. To this catalogue are often added legislative gaps that need to be
filled by the courts or other officials in order to regulate the relevant cases. Common to all
these concepts is a high grade of indeterminacy concerning their meaning. Usually these
concepts allow for more than one possible explications of the components that put together
their meaning according to different (some times even competing) considerations of practi¬
cal or other character66. The usual conclusion that positivist philosophers draw from hard
cases is that they can only be treated through discretion on behalf of the courts. The judge,
namely, will be forced to construct a new rule that will govern the novel case, without being
subjected to any restrictions posed by the open-textured rule. Though this account is very
rough and certainly does injustice to many positivist theories, it captures in some way their
main deficiency which is common to all centralist theories in ethics and law; namely the
fact that these theories cannot properly account for disagreement about the concepts' con¬
tent because they are context insensitive. Their inability to do so forces them in its turn to
opt for the rather arbitrary discretion-solution. This double deficiency seems to burden most
of the positivist accounts of law (Hart's own included, as I will argue in the next).
Criteria and how they are defeated
Apparently defeasibility of criteria and open-texture must have constituted for Hart the
strongest evidence that definitions and sets of criteria-as-analytic-truths are untenable as an
analysis of legal rules' meaning and legal concepts' content. Further, the phenomenon of
new circumstances defeating criteria and definitions clearly must have provided further
evidence for Hart's ontology of rules, i.e. the belief that rules are not empirical objects but
practice-dependent entities. Since all rules are about is community practice, new circum-
edn (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1997), 139.
64 Vide amongst others K. Engisch, Einfuhrung, Ch, 6. Vide also I. Aravantinos, Introduction to
Legal Science (in Greek) (Athina: Sakkoulas, 1983), 137 n.; P. Sourlas, Fundamental Issues in the
Methodology ofLaw (in Greek) (Athina: Sakkoulas, 1986) 82 n..
65 K. Engisch, Einfuhrung, 136 n. and 175 n..
66 These concepts have been termed essentially contested concepts and have been accounted for -in a
more technical way- as 'appraisive and applicable to objects of an internally complex character that
may be described in various ways by altering one's view of the significance of descriptions of their
component features' in S. L. Hurley, Natural Reasons, 46. As essentially contested concepts count
usually the concepts of what ought to be done, all things considered, both in the domains of law and
ethics. Vide S. L. Hurley, ibid. 46 n.; B. Bix, Law, Language and Legal Indeterminacy (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995), 53-59.
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stances are in the position to undermine or to alter past definitions or established sets of
criteria, backed by precedent up to that point. And, no doubt, there will always be an indefi¬
nite number of novel circumstances in which, 'despite the fact that the accepted set of con¬
ditions obtain, the relevant concept's application is defeated'6 . This account yields to the
assumption that rules' social dimension works, somehow, towards the direction of their
being constantly 'in the making'; that they have a dynamic side which, whenever new cir¬
cumstances arise, incorporates new instances of application. Hence, criteria and definitions
are incapable of accounting for rules' meaning and concepts' content.
Hart seems to locate the implications of his ontological thesis more specifically at
the level of the deficiencies of natural languages. Rules, void from any external empirical
content, cannot but exist within our natural languages and therefore to be 'trapped' in the
standard deficiencies of vagueness and indeterminacy that burden all species of natural lan¬
guage. It is not very clear what kind of relation Hart envisages between language and the
practice of a community and to what extent defeasibility or open texture must be understood
as emanating from two distinct sources (legal practice plus indeterminacy of language).
Anticipating the discussion that follows, I would like to suggest that this lack of clarity
might be highly suggestive as of the insufficiency of Hart's account of normativity. Appar¬
ently, to the extent that language is a (social) rule-governed phenomenon, Hart should be
treating general rules of meaning on a par with those rules that govern legal meaning. In
other words, meaning in general should be, as a normative concept, able to be reconstructed
along the Internal-External distinction that applies to all rule-govemed social activities. As
Hart fails to locate any objective standards at the level of the Internal, linguistic meaning is
doomed to be reduced to external regularities of the behaviour of a 'linguistic' community,
as much as legal meaning to those of a 'legal' community68. Then, of course, indeterminacy
of language features as a mystery whose causes lie beyond the evaluations of the community
practice, and might be misunderstood as obscurely emanating from some inherent properties
of linguistic symbols or the novelty of future states of affairs. Any failure to understand
normativity as objective evaluation connected to the question 'what ought to be done?', as a
question that makes practices essential in answering it, would threaten meaning tout court
and not just in legal contexts69. To conclude these brief remarks, the problem of mdetermi-
67 Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 62.
68 The terms 'linguistic' and 'legal' are, here, rather used as referring to different aspects of the prac¬
tice of the same community.
69 The relevance of the 'what-ought-to-be-done' question applies to all normative contexts including
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nacy of language, identified in Hart's terms, is not separate from the problem of indetermi¬
nacy at the level of legal rules; in both cases what is asked to be accounted for is normativ-
ity and normativity should be treated in a uniform way at any level, whether that be the level
of semantic or that of legal rules.
Going back to the reasons Hart offers for the phenomenon of indeterminacy, there
are a few points worth emphasising in order to illustrate Hart's unconscious use of substan¬
tive evaluations as being decisive for rules' open texture: according to Hart, indeterminacy
that is connected to the vagueness of natural language does not always need to be inter¬
preted as a deficiency. It may comply with the important demand of justice according to
which legal statutes should enjoy a high grade of generality in order to be able to regulate
justly or appropriately future or novel cases70. In any case, whatever the reason is (de facto
vagueness of natural languages or purposeful generality-as-appropriateness), legal language
seems to be incapable of ex ante anticipating all actual cases or facts that need to be regu¬
lated. One could add more complex requirements, like the teleological argument for the
certainty of law (securitas)71, according to which law should regulate some sectors of con¬
duct in an unambiguous way and in advance by means of general standards. This second,
apparently contradictory, demand perplexes things further and human legislators seem
hardly to be able to meet all these challenges successfully, since - according to H.L.A.
Hart's expression - they
labour under two connected handicaps...The first...[being their]
relative ignorance of fact [and] the second [being their] relative in¬
determinacy of aim72.
Clearly all these reasons for indeterminacy are rather connected to evaluative points
than merely to inherent deficiencies of language or the limited capacity of legislators to
anticipate future aims and states of affairs. Arguably, Hart's own position that indetermi-
rules ofmeaning. In the latter what is asked is 'what is the right way of saying this?' (say the meaning
of 'add 2'). Clearly this view envisages language/communication as a form of action that is performed
through the utterance of sentences (as speech-acts).
70 Vide for this reasoning H. L. A. Hart, The Concept, 129 n.; Vide further P. Sourlas, Fundamental
Issues, 84; vide also Hans Kelsen's discussion on intended and unintended indeterminacy and the gaps
in law, in his Introduction to the Problems ofLegal Theory, 77-89.
71 For the very important distinction between the stricto sensu certainty of law (securitas) as a teleo¬
logical argument of policy and the certainty of law (certitudo) as a normative argument of principal,
vide the interesting analysis of P. Vassilogiannis, 'Nullity and Annullability of Unconstitutional
Norms' (in Greek), Isopoliteia 1 (1997), 161-199 at 172.
72 Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept ofLaw, 125.
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nacy is to be valued in several cases, suggests that defeasibility may rest on autonomous
substantive points which rank above criteria and definitions.
Be that as it may, Hart's inability to build into his account of meaning objective
evaluations, imposes clear limitations upon his effort to undermine criterial and definitional
semantics. As a result, the defeasibility thesis can be pursued, only not too far: since defea¬
sibility is identified with the evaluative side of legal concepts (the Internal) it can be sus¬
tained only up to the point that evaluation, in Hart's terms, can be accounted for; when
evaluation threatens to collapse into subjective attitudes, defeasibility, in its turn, threatens
to amount to a total loss ofmeaning. The Hartian social scientist needs urgently to resort to
external regularities of behaviour and new definitions and criteria in order to rescue norma-
tivity and meaning respectively. In effect, defeasibility rejects the ideal of closed sets of
criteria only to endorse it at a later stage.
Criteria from the back door: a necessary evil
Hart's manoeuvre that purports to rescue normativity from the contingency of the Internal,
consists, notably, in an effort to reconstruct the External against the firm ground of objec¬
tively observable community practices. The Rule of Recognition (the ultimate rule in the
Hartian legal realm) propagates the possibility of an objective social science that observes
and records in an 'uncommitted' way social practices and lists criteria for the application of
legal rules73. As argued, this uncommitted understanding can only be too committed on pain
of otherwise slipping towards an extreme external point of view and the loss of any meaning
and understanding. But the only commitment Hart's account allows for, is the one to sub¬
jective attitudes. The threat of radical subjectivity pertaining to such a solution, forces Hart
to remain silent as to the content of commitment and to stay at the level of the practice, thus
emptying patterns from their contents74. Rules' extension is canvassed against the as-a-
matter-of-fact occurrence of patterns which are objectively observable73. 'What people did
until now' is considered to constitute a convention from which criteria for the extension of
73 For a comprehensive discussion of the Hartian programme of an uncommitted social science see
MacCormick, H. L. A. Hart, Ch 3. Similar ideas are to be found in P. Winch, The Idea of a Social
Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), to which Hart makes numerous references.
74 Vide Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 60-61.
75 Hart probably takes as a proof for the subjective quality of evaluations, the case when a community
member is committed to a mle that the community does not endorse. In this case Hart would exclaim,
'you see important is what the community does!' But the problem here is not on which grounds one
endorses or not a mle. The problem is to what extent rules are intelligible. On this level the example is
not really in support ofHart's position.
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rules and the content of concepts emerge. (As if the fact of the occurrence of some conver¬
gent behaviour could ever generate a convention prior to the convention's substantive
point). In this picture the Hartian scientist is in agony to gather from past behaviour as many
criteria as possible before divergence breaks out amongst the members of the community
and the content of the rule dissolves. His knowledge of the rule derives from a painstaking
collection of behavioural data. But, alas, he will never have enough data as to establish the
rule when disagreement will break out. It will always be too early to determine the rule pre¬
cisely because, in the Hartian realm, he is simply not allowed to know the rule.
Conversely, as I argued earlier, knowing the rule would be independent from the
quantity of the samples of the rule's instances of application. Such knowledge would merely
involve a substantive point able to group together new instances of application, as much as
past ones, without using analytic definitions and closed sets of criteria. In the face of lack of
any such point, Hart's theorist is doubly burdened: he appreciates the importance of evalua¬
tions for the meaning of normative concepts and rules, without being able to free himself
from the restrictions of traditional criterial semantics. As a result, he identifies the content
of legal concepts and the extension of legal rules through criteria that allegedly derive from
the communal practice, but are not in position to explain what the content of either the con¬
cepts or the rules is. When new circumstances arise, past, 'conventional' criteria, empty of
the 'point' of the convention that underlies them, are in turn defeated. When in the little
church community of our hat-removers, a part of the aisle collapses and a group of con¬
struction workers enters the church in their yellow safety helmets in order to fix it, the con¬
ventional rule ceases to have only one meaning76. Re-capitulation of the past applications
will not offer any answer as to what the meaning of the rule is or was. Conventional criteria
will not be able to offer a solution to the problem of which type of 'hats' the rule refers to,
unless the issue of the purpose of hat-removing is properly addressed. In other words, any
alleged advantage of conventional criteria vis-a-vis analytic truths and definitions will al¬
ways wither away as long as the substantive point of conventions is suppressed. In fact, just
to make things worse, conventional criteria, as patterns disconnected from their contents,
will just step into the role of analytic truths and closed sets of criteria.
In all, Hart's defeasibility thesis ends up defeating its own core, i.e. the seminal in¬
sight that closed sets of criteria are not suitable to capture rules' extension, hence that rules
76 Vide Dworkin, Law's Empire (Oxford: Hart, 1998), 46-49; 62-68; and for the paraphrase of the
example A. Takis, 'The Internal', 79-82.
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'cannot step forward to claim [their] own applications'77. In Stavropoulos' words:
Instead of concluding that application turns on substan¬
tive...judgements, [Hart] retreats into a position in which the mle
does step forward, only not far enough78.
This self-defeat is the result of the non-fulfilment of an implicit promise that the defeasibil-
ity thesis seems to make initially; namely that discredited criteria will be replaced through
an account of meaning that would exploit the way circumstances defeat criteria. Instead, it
ends up substituting a new species of criteria (empty patterns of social behaviour) which are
equally defeasible by circumstances. This move renders defeasibility, to say the least, trivial
since rules are going anyway to be analysed through criteria and will anyway turn out to be
indeterminate.
Having said that, a large part of the value of the insight that circumstances defeat
criteria lies, as argued, in its rejection of semantic or criterial definitions and closed sets of
criteria for meaning. In rejecting criteria, though, the defeasibility thesis should not be taken
to suggest that meaning will always be defeated, but merely that meaning has to be con¬
structed along different lines. Since the emphasis of the open-texture argument is placed
upon the power of novel circumstances to defeat definitions, the suggestion of an alternative
conception ofmeaning would have to exploit the idea of novel circumstances. Finally, since
the aim of defeasibility is not to defeat meaning in every case, novel circumstance should be
understood as playing a positive role, besides the negative function of defeating discredited
definitions; this should involve a contribution to a fresh account of meaning. These are
roughly the lines along which a context-sensitive account ofmeaning should be built.
Instead, Hart's account views circumstances as being external to the meaning of
rules and concepts. As a result, Hart's only chance to rescue meaning is to endorse tacitly a
definition model based on conventional criteria. Conventional criteria function anew as
conditions that yield support independently of circumstances. The meaning of a concept is
fixed prima facie according to the putative criteria and only at a later stage circumstances
are employed to the purpose of confirming the initial judgement79. To conclude, Hart fails to
see that conditions of meaning are revisable from within according to novel circumstances,
and retains that definitions are the only way to capture rules' extension. Easy cases are,
77 Vide Stavropoulos, ibid., 68.
78 Op. cit. 68.
79 Stavropoulos, op. cit., 64.
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thus, cases where conditions obtain according to the definition model, whereas hard cases,
mysteriously, show that definitions are just not always good enough! Clearly the most ap¬
parent implication of Hartian Semantics is widespread indeterminacy which, at the level of
judicial practice, leads to an extended discretionary application of rules (To that extent
Hart's account does not vary considerably from other positivist accounts of law which rely
upon definitional semantics).
But if Hart's defeasibility model were sound, its most disastrous implication would
be that definitions are never good as a means to explicate meaning. On the defeasibility
model, one cannot rely on any definition of a concept's content, since any component of the
definition is potentially, under the light of defeasibility, true or false for reasons that cannot
be accounted for in a rule-governed way. It is not hard to see how such a conclusion would
lead to indeterminacy and the loss of meaning tout court. Nevertheless this warning does
not aim to question the role that criteria play in a truth-evaluable account of meaning, as
after all Hart's account could be taken to be80. I would, by no means, wish to question the
possibility of explicating legal concepts through truth-evaluable components81. However,
the great value of criteria notwithstanding, I want to put forward the view that criteria are
not decisive for meaning in the last instance. The great lesson of the defeasibility thesis is
that criteria are defeated by circumstances to the extent that they are linked with concepts'
evaluative points. As Stavropoulos argues82, these points are appreciated and accounted for
through substantive theories that hold together criteria, conditions and definitions83. To the
degree that they are the conclusion of such theories, conditions or criteria are not exclusive;
they constitute instances of the property of a concept but there afe always other conditions
80 This claim might strike one as rather strange considering Hart's refusal to accept a truth-evaluable
account of legal concepts similar to that of natural kind concepts. It does not, however, seem to be
unjustified in view of Hart's actual treatment of legal concepts' meaning. Both the tacit endorsement
of definitions, as an undesired conclusion of the defeasibility thesis, as well as the very core of this
thesis -namely, defeat of criteria in the face of new 'facts'- seem to favour a somewhat realist treat¬
ment of legal concepts.
81 One should distinguish between those legal concepts that are genuinely normative (like 'obliga¬
tion', 'contract' and so on) and those that are empirical (like 'thing', 'payment' etc.). Clearly in the
latter case criteria will be much more reliable in determining meaning than in the former. Conversely
lists of criteria for normative concepts will be sensitive to the specification of substantive points. I owe
this remark to Carsten Heidemann.
82 Vide Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 62-68, passim.
83 It will be later argued (CHs V and VI) that the construction of theories that specify substantive
points is not unconstrained. Substantive theories are constrained by the content of the pragmatic
claims that are implied through the act of uttering sentences in a communicative process. Those
claims, it will be maintained, enjoy the status of transcendentally valid norms against whose back¬
ground communication is rendered possible.
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that can be instantiations of the same property. Which conditions belong to the content of a
concept at a given time can only be decided through the theory that accounts for the con¬
cept's evaluative point. On this account, new circumstances are not external but internal to
concepts' meaning84. Hence, the defeasibility-thesis does not after all show that meaning is
defeated qua defeat of definitions, but, conversely that definitions are amenable to revision
qua the dynamic perspective that substantive points confer upon meaning. This way of un¬
derstanding meaning has the advantage of reconciling a truth-evaluative account with Hart's
insight about rules'/concepts' evaluative aspect which relates to their social dimension,
without slipping towards reduction and indeterminacy.
Normative Objecthood: anAnti-reductionist Solution
The discussion has suggested that Hart's refusal to allow for any notion of 'objecthood' of
norms is entrenched in his beliefs about the nature of the internal or evaluative aspect of
legal/social rules, and vice-versa. Hart's account of the Internal reveals his conviction that
he has discovered the specific difference of normativity as opposed to all other non-
normative factors that influence action. Connectedly, instead of conceiving rules as empiri¬
cal entities akin to natural kinds, Hart confidently submits the view that rules are products
of the social environment and argues that in order to account for their (evaluative) content
one has to refer to the relevant social practice and the evaluations embedded in it.
So far so good. But then, as this chapter argued, Hart proceeds to reconstruct the
internal aspect of rules by taking the internal subjective attitudes of their addressees to be
constitutive for the rules' content. In doing so he loses hold of objectivity as a property of
the internal aspect of rules and normativity in general. This became acutely evident in the
discussion of the defeasibility thesis: normative meaning is constantly defeated as novel
cases point anew towards the fact that normative vocabulary does not 'refer' to any perma¬
nent feature of the rules that is external to the participants' subjective states and, insofar,
objective.
In contrast to Hart's picture a modified version ofMacCormick's hermeneuticpoint
ofview was appealed to in order to argue that normativity is better accounted for by assum-
84 Vide Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 62-69. For a more detailed discussion of the idea that circum¬
stances or generally context determines the content of our thoughts and the implications of this idea
for knowledge, see John McDowell, 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge' and idem, 'Knowledge
and the Internal', both in idem, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard Univer¬
sity Press, 1998), 369-394; and 395-413 respectively.
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ing the existence of some cognitive operation on behalf of those who appreciate a rule. In
connection to that operation the natural question to be raised is 'what objects is the cogni¬
tive operation directed to?'. The process of answering that question will more or less oc¬
cupy the rest of the thesis. It will unfold as an endeavour to purge an account of legal rules
and properties from Hart's psychologism and to arrive at a proper antireductionist account
ofnormativity.
Part two of the thesis opens with a more rigorous analysis of the reductionism of
normative properties and entities. The ensuing discussion argues for the need of a notion of
normative objecthood as a prerequisite for objective normative knowledge. The content of
this claim is the modest idea that the notion of objective knowledge requires an object of
cognition that is distinct from the knowers' internal psychological states85.
The dismissal of internal psychological states is tendered as part of a broader cri¬
tique ofpsychologism concerning semantic content and meaning (Ch II). This critique will
serve for preparing the ground for a semantic account of the ontology of legal norms and
properties (CHs III and IV). In it the objecthood of norms and properties will be explicated
through the objectivity pertaining to the semantic forms of our sentences, owing to the fact
that those forms display objective logical structures. In taking semantics to be objective I
will rest on a conception of semantics as being free form subjective psychological states, a
conception whose main tenets were first advanced by Gottlob Frege. Insofar the undertaken
effort for disentangling normativity from subjectivism will exhibit analogies with Frege's
dedicated interest in freeing semantics from psychologism.
85 Apart from internal states the anti-reductionist argument will also consider types of physicalist
reductionist moves (i.e. reductionist moves that rely upon movements, physical properties and so on).
However, reductionist moves that are performed through internal psychological states will be placed
in the centre of the discussion for two reasons: First because as the discussion in this chapter showed,
normative reasons can be very easily confused with internal psychological states; and second because
the dismissal of internal states dovetails with the ontological account of norms that is going to be ar¬





THE ISSUE OF REDUCTIONISM
Introduction
The discussion until now suggested that Hart's semantics was clearly directed against re-
ductionism concerning legal expressions. Disregarding its inherent weakness, Hart's anti-
reductionist move has pointed towards the fact that legal expressions cannot be reduced to
other co-extensive non-legal expressions if they are to pick out what is specifically norma¬
tive about legal phenomena. But if legal expressions are not amenable to semantic reduc¬
tionist moves then there is a strong presumption that they pick out, or refer to, properties
and entities that are 'primitive' and can not be reduced to other co-extensive non-legal
properties or entities. In that case the irreducibility of legal expressions will rest on the ontic
autonomy of their referents. For this reason the issue of reductionism offers itself as a good
way of tackling the semantics of legal expressions and the ontology of the entities or prop¬
erties they denote. Those semantic and ontological questions about legal expressions are,
further, tightly connected to the proof of the possibility of objectivity in law, which is the
main concern of this dissertation.
The chapter opens with a general account of the rationale and the main variants of
reductionism. Then i discuss some basic objections that have been directed against reduc¬
tionist moves. Frank Jackson's attempt to offer an account of the way ethical properties
supervene on descriptive ones is next discussed as the most serious attempt available hith¬
erto to account for normative discourse within a physicalist picture of the world. In rejecting
this account I argue that it is necessary to expand our ontological commitment to entities
that are normative and hence non-physical. In the remaining of the chapter I paint with a
broad brush the main tenets of an ontological account that is capable of admitting the exis¬
tence of normative (abstract) entities.
One last methodological remark: in the ensuing discussion I will refer interchangea-
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bly to two levels of reduction: reduction on the level of concepts' and/or names {semantic
reduction) and reduction on the level of properties and/or objects {ontological reduction).
Semantic reduction aims to show that normative terms can be reduced to non-normative
terms. The success of that claim relies heavily on the assumption that the properties picked
out by normative concepts or the objects referred to by normative names, are nothing more
than non-normative, physical properties and entities. It is on the latter, the level of ontic
commitment, that the autonomy of legal discourse is decisively challenged.
Normative Expressions and theirReferents
Regarding the irreducibility of normative expressions a lot will depend on the irreducibility
of their referents. The latter will in it turn depend upon whether every normative property is
identical with a non-normative property. The reductionist will typically try to argue that
every normative concept can always be reduced to a co-extensive non-normative concept to
the extent that both pick out the same property. This claim will usually be supported by the
thesis that the environment or the world is put together by one kind of entities/properties
only which are non-normative but descriptive or physical. Let me assume for a moment that
we don't know anything about the exact relation between normative and non-normative
properties, and remain on the level of the concepts that we employ in our every day dis¬
courses. At this level, it seems quite plausible that we can make fairly uncontroversial
claims as to which concepts are normative and which are non-normative. For instance, 'ob¬
ligation' can with safety be classified as being a normative concept whereas 'fear' as a non-
normative one. Now, if we suppose that concepts normally pick out properties2 then we can
1 Generally the term 'concept' will be used throughout the dissertation in a Fregean sense: according
to Frege's philosophy, 'concepts' or 'Begriffe' are something akin to 'empty' or 'unsaturated' predi¬
cates that are saturated by singular terms (or object-terms) like in the schema: F(x); this combination
of the concept-term with the object-term amounts to the existence of an object (Cf. With the discus¬
sion in Ch III, sec. 5, infra). For instance if F stands for 'horse' then the object horse will exist if there
is something that is 'horse'; or 3(x): F(x). To that degree an object will exist to the extent that a series
of properties - that are associated with it - obtain. For the purpose of the discussion of reductionism
in this chapter I will adopt a more flexible use of the term 'concept' as lying somewhere between
'name'/'singular term' and 'predicate'. Accordingly 'concept' will stand for the object denoted by an
object-term that falls under the relevant predicate/concept-term (with the result that a series of proper¬
ties obtain). For instance the concept 'contract' will refer to the object contract that has a series of
properties.
2 The claim that concepts pick out properties is not uncontroversial. A major objection to it (a so-
called anti-realist or non-realist) is that it is impossible to distinguish between a concept and the rele¬
vant property. On that view a self-standing definition of concepts would raise serious questions as to
whether concepts are specific categories of sign-series (and if they are then of which series)? And so
on. On the other hand an extra-linguistic understanding of properties would require a very demanding
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conclude that prima facie for a property to be normative a necessary and sufficient condi¬
tion is to be picked out by a normative concept, or:
(i): A property is normative (NP) if and only if it is picked out by a (at least one) normative con¬
cept (NC).
Automatically it follows that for a property to be non-normative a sufficient condition is not
to be picked out by a normative concept, or:
(ii): A property is non-normative (NNP) if and only if it is not picked out by a normative concept
(NC).
Now, following (i) and (ii) the reductionist will want to argue that if a NP is shown to be
identical with a NNP, then it is possible to be picked out by a non-normative concept
(NNC). This is possible since (i) allows that a NP can be picked out by at least one NC but
also by some NNC. The next step is to argue, on the basis of (ii), that NCs can be substi¬
tuted by NNCs: if every NP is after all identical to some NNP, then the best way to pick it
out is by using a NNC, as it is impossible for NCs to pick out NNPs. Clearly the premiss
that supports the reductionist move is the claim that every NP is at the end of the day non-
normative. This claim is usually put forward on the basis of an identity statement that con¬
nects some NNC with the relevant NC in the target area: if one can talk about NPs by using
NNCs then those properties can be taken to be non-normative. Conversely the reduction will
fail if it is shown that it is not possible to pick out NPs by using NNCs, hence, that there is
no identity relation holding between the non-normative and the normative properties.
Of course there is an issue here as to which is the actual level of reduction: that of
concepts or that of properties. Concepts are, arguably, merely terms for properties and, at
the end of the day, what is crucial for the success of reductionist moves is what really exists,
i.e. what kind of entities and properties there are. Nevertheless, as both (i) and (ii) imply,
the vocabulary we use to describe what exists, or the level of semantics, can be taken to be
of constitutive importance for the sort of entities and properties that we commit ourselves
ontology. These serious objections notwithstanding, I am inclined to believe that there still is room for
talking of concepts as picking out properties for the simple reason that our language still relates to
something that is not entirely in our heads/minds but external to them, i.e. in the environment. For a
more comprehensive discussion of these problems see Ch III, supra. I thank Carsten Heidemann for
pointing to me the complexity of the concepts-properties relations.
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to, in other words the level of ontic commitment. Accordingly, for the success of reduction,
even if a lot depends upon the 'discoveries' on the level of properties, the semantic level
(concepts) is constitutive in pointing towards what can be discovered and what not3. To that
extent the level of concepts and the level of properties are closely interrelated. Given further
the fact that reductionism aims to undermine the existence of normative properties, one
could safely conduct the investigation as to whether reductionism's claim is true, by focus¬
ing upon concepts: if it is possible to substitute a class of normative terms through non-
normative ones this can be readily taken as an indication for the possibility of the reduction
of the corresponding properties; and vice-versa. For that reason, anytime that I will allude to
the simplicity of identifying properties through concepts, I will still take it to be true that the
decisive level of reduction in the normative domain is the ontological level.
Reductionism aims at the level of the ontology of normative expressions. Accord¬
ingly, a large portion of reductionism's success will rest upon the possibility of identifying
normative entities and their properties with non-normative entities and properties. Those
could either be mental entities and their properties (some forms of expressivism or projec-
tivism in law and ethics) or other non-mental physical, yet descriptive, entities and their
properties (say something akin to the reducing properties employed by the command theory
of law)4. In both cases reductionism assumes, roughly, that normative concepts can be sub¬
stituted by non-normative ones because there is only one kind of properties available to be
picked out, namely physical properties. It is for this reason that the actual success of the
whole project depends largely on the reduction of the ontological level (properties, objects).
I will try to argue that reductionism's main assumption is wrong. Normative concepts are
irreducible because they pick out properties or refer to entities that are distinctively norma¬
tive and, hence, not identical to any other non-normative property or entity. Put it in a dif¬
ferent way, the normative vocabulary is not interchangeable with any non-normative vo¬
cabulary because normative properties and entities are not reducible to non-normative ones.
Along these lines, one would have to block reductions on the ontological level if one wants
to establish the relative mind-independence and autonomy of legal (normative) entities and
their properties vis-a-vis all physical entities and their properties. This could be readily
achieved by showing that the normative vocabulary cannot be restated in non-normative
3 In any case if there is any way of taking anti-reductionism seriously this is by assuming that, on the
ontic level, there are properties and generally entities that are not physical. Otherwise, by making our
starting point the assumption that what there is is only physical, we fix the issue of reductionism from
the outset.
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terms. Of course, a lot remains to be said on the ontic quality of normative entities; yet I
would like, at this point, to anticipate that legal norms and other terms can be understood as
referring to non-physical entities that are external to minds which, nonetheless, are intel¬
lectual products. Before investigating the possibilities for an ontological explication of legal
and generally normative referents, any possibility of reductionism has to be blocked. To this
purpose I am going to give a brief account of ontological reductionism and then offer a gen¬
eral argument against it, which is able - if not to fully rebut - at least to put in serious ques¬
tion its rationale.
Put in a general form, reductionism's aim is to show that where we thought we had
two sets of concepts, entities, laws, explanations or properties, we actually have only one
which is furthermore perspicuously characterised in terms of the reducing vocabulary5. The
general claim of reductionism is certainly one of ontological conservatism6, and can be re¬
stated as the 'physicalist' or 'naturalist' claim that all properties/entities are nothing more
than physical properties/entities and, as a result, can be described through predicates of the
sciences (with more basic those of physics). According to a standard classification7 there are
two sorts of reductionism depending on whether the reductionist move aims to eliminate a
class of non-physical properties by claiming that these properties are never instantiated
(eliminative reductionism), or to reduce a class of non-physical properties by equating them
to correlate physical properties (identity reductionism). Eliminative reductionism takes non-
physical concepts from different domains (psychology, ethics, metaphysics, etc.) as failing
to refer to any kind of properties. 'Cyclops', 'contracts, 'consciousness' and 'qualia', are
equally assumed as referring to non-existing entities, because there are no such things that
have the specified properties. This kind of reductionism goes beyond the sceptical claim
that it is impossible to know the truth about some area. It claims that there is no truth to be
known in the target area. In fact our use of terms like 'Cyclops' and 'contracts' rests on a
serious error that we commit when we ascribe a class of non-existing properties to the envi¬
ronment. Projectivism in ethics and, generally, in normative discourse, is a case of elimina¬
tive reductionism that denies the existence of truth-values in respect to normative properties
and endeavours to replace normative concepts with non-normative ones that refer to existing
properties. Typically, the eliminativist in the domain of normative discourse will aspire to
4 Vide the discussion in section 4 of this chapter, infra.
5 See D. Charles and K. Lennon, 'Introduction', in Charles and Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explana¬
tion and Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 2.
6 See Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 70.
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substituting normative concepts through (non-normative) concepts of a basic science that
refer to physical (non-normative) properties. (Of course the underlying assumption shows
that a strong view about what is capable of being a property is already built in into the re¬
duced terms' 'failure of reference'). The second sort of reductiomsm, identity reductionism,
does not deny the ability of a class of non-physical terms to refer to some properties or enti¬
ties, but observes that those properties/entities are 'nothing more than', i.e. identical with,
some physical properties/entities that are equally picked out by the concepts of some basic
science. In the domain of normative discourse, expressivism8 is an example of identity re¬
ductionism as it allows for normative concepts to refer to properties but comments that
those properties are always cases of disguised non-normative properties (psychological or
other mental properties, like emotional states).
Clearly both types of reductionism can be taken as departing from the same premiss,
namely the assumption that there is only one class of entities and/or properties that consti¬
tute the fabric of the world: physical entities and/or properties. The difference between the
two types of reductionism lies in the degree of 'purification' that they undertake in respect
to the area of the reduced properties/entities. While the eliminativist completely denies the
existence of any kind of properties/entities to which the problematic class of terms refers,
the identity reductionist prefers to take those terms to genuinely refer to some proper¬
ties/entities, only that those properties/entities are not of the sort expected but are disguised
physical properties/entities that can equally (and probably much better) be picked out by the
terms of a basic science. Eliminativism is a rather extreme view and therefore most of the
contemporary reductionist moves rely on the identity rationale9. Be that as it may, elimina-
tivsm can be taken to point towards the important fact that non-physical (normative in our
case) terms stand or fall together with their counterparts, namely the non-physical (norma¬
tive) properties/entities in the target area. That, in other words, one cannot allow for the use
of a vocabulary unless one allows for the existence of the corresponding properties/entities.
Notoriously, eliminativism's aim is to reject both each time the level of ontology ceases to
be physical. Nevertheless, if one were able to demonstrate that non-physical (normative in
7 See Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 70.
8 Contrary to this view S. Blackburn tries to reconstruct Expressivism (or Projectivism as he calls his
variant) about moral/ethical sentences as a non-reductive theory. For a brief account of this endeavour
see the entries 'emotivism', 'expressivism' and 'projectivism', in Simon Blackburn, Dictionary of
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). For a convincing criticism of those views, vide
Ronald Dworkin, 'Objectivity and Truth: you'd better believe it', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25
(1996), 87-139(110-112).
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our case) concepts cannot be taken to be dispensable in the description of some domains of
our discourse, one would be justified in inferring the existence of some corresponding non-
physical normative properties10.
The identityformula
Central in any reductionist project is the belief that any judgement of the various domains of
knowledge is identical with a judgement of natural sciences and, further, that it is about
physical things". This belief is formulated as an identity statement (I.S.) between predicates
(i.e. concepts) occurring within judgements of other 'special' domains of knowledge ('S')
and those occurring within judgements (laws) of natural sciences/physics ('P')12:
(I.S.): Sx<h>Px
The challenge of reductionism arises when, in the above formula, is interpreted as
bringing about the relation of identity13. It is only on this interpretation that reductionism is
combined with physicalism (or naturalism) or the belief about the ontological supremacy of
9 See generally the introduction in Charles and Lennon, Reduction, Explanation, and Realism, 1-18.
10 This formulation seems to agree with the aforementioned relation between concepts and properties.
Vide the 'Introduction' in this chapter, supra.
11 One should probably allow for a more subtle formulation here. Reductionists do not always strictly
postulate an one-to one correspondence between physical and non-physical properties. It is often the
case that they take the reducing property to be based on a disjunction of the different kinds of base
property on which the higher-level reduced property rests. This formulation is a reaction to the anti-
reductionist accusation of multiple realisation, or the claim that there is no unique natural property
which is coextensive with each non-natural one. See Fodor, 'Special Sciences (or: the Disunity of
Science as a Working Hypothesis)' in Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115, and Charles and Lennon, ibid., 7. I
thank Timothy Williamson for raising the point that reductionism need not be in any case physicalist.
12 For a similar formulation see Fodor, 'Special Sciences (or: the Disunity of Science as a Working
Hypothesis)', 97-115 (99). Fodor gives a more detailed account of the reduction of the laws of spe¬
cial sciences' to those ofPhysics:
Six —> S2x
(2a) Six <=> Plx
(2b) S2xo P2x
Plx —» P2x
Where SI, S2 are predicates of a special science and PI, P2 predicates of physics; the formulae (1)
and (3) are laws of a special science and physics respectively. The formulae under (2), the so-called
'bridging laws', express the central claim of reductionism which is the identity of predicates between
the reduced and the reducing domain. Fodor's account is still about the relation between special natu¬
ral sciences and the physics, but I think that it can readily be expanded towards other domains of
knowledge, like the so-called social sciences and the legal science.
13 Clearly in the above formula (I.S.) the reductionist relation could be substantiated in the opposite
direction: as the reduction of all physical entities/events to normative entities/events. However, apart
perhaps from some representatives ofNeo-Kantianism, this view is not tendered by anyone these days.
physical properties/events which, further, identifies physics as the basic science. We can
distinguish two versions ofphysicalism:
A weak version which takes I.S. to express event identities14, in the sense that every
event which falls under the predicate S is identical with some event falling under the predi¬
cate P (in other words, it is a physical event). Here the identity relation 'infects' only
events; properties are still taken to be in a sense irreducible and to belong to autonomous
domains of knowledge. In this weak version of physicalism (which Fodor labels token
physicalism15) the overall claim is, roughly, that 'every event which falls within the universe
of discourse of a special science will also fall within the universe of discourse of physics'16
and it entails the generality of physics as the basic science17.
A strong version of physicalism which holds that every property mentioned in the
judgements of any special domain of knowledge is a physical property (what Fodor calls
type physicalism)]S. An even stronger formulation of this doctrine occurs after adding the
assumption that in an ideally completed physics there are natural kind predicates which
correspond to each predicate in any ideally completed special domain of knowledge. Here
the identity relation 'infects' properties or even predicates.
Anti-reductionist Objections
The most common way to undermine reductionist moves of the ontological kind is by un¬
dermining the identity statement (I.S.). This is the case whenever one interprets the relation
denoted by as meaning 'bring about' or 'cause'. This interpretation amounts to re¬
nouncing physicalism. The main effect of such an interpretation is that the formula (i.S.)
ceases to be an identity statement and the relation between Sx and Px becomes asymmetric.
Here the formula's claim is, at the most, 'that...x's satisfaction of a P predicate and x's satis¬
faction of an S predicate are causally correlated'19. The essential difference of this claim
from a genuinely physicalist one is that S and P predicates apply to the same things without
Cf. with fn 50, infra.
14 More accurately, to express 'contingent event identities', since the identity is between an event
falling under S and some identical event falling under P; see Fodor, 'Special Sciences', 100. It seems
quite controversial, though, whether one can talk about contingent identities, since the notion of iden¬
tity involves already some form of necessity, as Timothy Williamson pointed out to me.
15 Ibid. 100.
16 Ibid. 101.
17 A stronger version of'token-physicalism' is materialism, which in addition to the former says that
every event falls under the laws of some science or another; see Fodor, 'Special Sciences'.
18 Ibid. 100.
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its necessarily being the case that S predicates are physical (or reducible to P predicates).
According to such a modest claim a legal predicate (S) ('being under a contractual obliga¬
tion') could be directed to the same thing (x), say an agent or an action, as a psychological
predicate (P) would ('being under the fear of sanctions'). But the event of x's satisfying S
should not in any sense be other (psychological or physical) than a legal event20.
The relation ofSupervenience
Instead of talking about a causal link, a more appropriate way to present the asymmetry
between normative and non-normative properties, is by introducing the notion of superven¬
ience. This is justified on the remark that a causal relationship usually requires that there is
an antecedent and a consequent ofwhich the former is temporally prior to the latter. Clearly
such a requirement would not correspond to the way things are since, in most of the cases, a
normative property occurs simultaneously with some corresponding non-normative prop¬
erty. Regarding this problem, the relation of supervenience seems to offer a satisfactory
answer. The claim of supervenience is, roughly, that indiscernibility in all physical respects
between two events, worlds or situations requires indiscernibility in all non-physical (in our
case normative) respects21. This claim was initially formulated by Donald Davidson in con¬
nection with the relation between mental and physical properties but can safely be expanded
in order to include other non-physical, higher level properties. By unveiling the indis¬
cernibility relation between physical and non-physical properties, the claim concludes that
non-physical properties are supervenient on physical properties. There are two ways to in¬
terpret the reality of the higher-level normative properties within the supervenience claim22.
The weaker way is to say that whenever we discover indiscernibility on the level of physical
properties between two situations, we are required to attribute indiscernible normative
predicates to them, however without being committed to regarding those predicates as
picking out genuine properties (ascriptive supervenience). This is commonly the strategy
followed by some eliminativists in the domain of ethics (projectivists) who do not want to
allow for any normative properties on the level of ontology but want to guarantee some
19 Ibid. 99.
20 A legal event would be something like the application of a normative predicate to an agent x, on
the basis of a legal rule R: x's fulfilling R's conditions for being negligible. I owe this thought to some
related remarks of Carsten Heidemann.
21 See Charles and Lennon, 'Introduction' in Reduction, Explanation and Realism, 14.
22 Ibid. 14-15.
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objectivity within normative discourses23. Regarding the earlier remarks on the ontic com¬
mitment of eliminativism, it seems that the most consistent conclusion on the level of con¬
cepts or predicates would be to substitute them through non-normative ones and, therefore,
perform a full reduction on both the level of properties and that of predicates. To that extent
the strategy of the ascriptive version of supervenience can been criticised as a disguised
version of reductiomsm. A much more promising way of interpreting the supervenience
claim is by taking indiscernibility of non-normative properties to necessitate indiscernibility
of the normative properties of a situation or an object (ontological supervenience). Accept¬
ing this kind of supervenience requires one to adopt a realist view concerning higher-level
properties. As a result the necessity involved does not merely depend on our practices and
conventions (as it, roughly, does in the case of projectivism), but is taken to derive from the
features of the environment. Still the autonomy of normative higher-level properties is
merely relative in the sense that they are determined by the lower-level properties. Accord¬
ingly, the statements of an account of higher-level properties will be true in virtue of the
truths of natural science.
The ontological version of supervenience clearly offers the basis for a more robust
underpinning of the ontology of normative properties. As a result it is able to block reduc¬
tions of the Normative to the Non-normative in a successful way. However it may be, it still
remains an open question, within the scope of supervenience claims, how strong one takes
the interconnection between the higher-level and the lower-level properties to be. Whether,
namely, one takes normative properties to be over and above lower-level non-normative
properties, endorsing thus a radical form of property dualism; or whether one takes them to
be resting upon physical properties in a way that the latter retain the exclusive right to fea¬
ture in causal explanations. In any case, the claim of supervenience favours a broadening of
the basis of our ontic commitment towards accommodating a wide spectrum of non-physical
properties, events and, further, facts and objects24. Such an expansion to non-physical ob¬
jects/facts might seem controversial in the light of Fodor's remark that all entities should be
accommodated within the class of physical things; but, I believe, such a constraint is not
entirely tenable in an extra-scientific context; the idea of an ontological monism on the level
23 Vide Simon Blackburn, 'Moral Realism', in idem Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford Uni¬
versity Press, 1993), 111-129 (first publ. in J. Casey (ed.), Morality and Moral Reasoning (London:
Methuen, 1973).
24 In the next section I am going to discuss a strategy of 'objectification' of legal/moral norms in
which norms feature as 'modal meta-facts'; against the background of that discussion it is not really of
much importance if one talks about events or objects (as facts).
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of things/objects combined with a pluralism of properties or events presupposes, first that
there are only physical things and, second, that those things accommodate all kinds of prop¬
erties owing to their basic-level ontological priority.
The untenability ofontological monism: the asymmetry ofentities
Both these convictions are too strong and could be undermined. To the first point: a closer
examination of the referential function of sentences seems to allow for the existence of non-
physical (abstract) objects and facts, besides physical ones25. A normative object or fact, say
a rule about negligent conduct, can certainly be taken as referring to and grouping together
some physical entities26, e.g. a series of movements, or brain states of some sort, or other
non-normative entities, like certain psychological states; nevertheless, the relation of the
rule-as-entity to those physical and non-normative referents will be asymmetric, the rule
will always group all these physical things together by disclosing what was earlier referred
to as 'the rule's point'. However, this does not work the other way round: those physical
entities will not be able to account for the rule's point independently or prior to the rule.
Insofar it is true that on the physical level rules (taken to be something like, say, tokens of
agency) are nothing more than the physical entities they group together. Yet, if one isolates
those things, one loses the rule from one's sight given the fact that those physical entities
cannot account exhaustively for the whole thing (i.e. rule). This happens each time one em¬
ploys, instead of N(ormative) terms, P(hysical) terms, with the effect that one fails to refer
to the rule.
To the second point: Fodor's idea that all kinds of properties apply to the same
things27 corresponds, roughly, to the belief that physical things exclusively form the build¬
ing blocks of our environment and therefore can accommodate all kinds of properties. This
would be taken to entail that some physical things, say 'red cheeks', have the property of
25 For a detailed discussion see CHs III and IV, infra.
26 These physical entities can be depicted on two levels: on the level of the rule's creation, as the
physical events that lead to a rule's enactment (as positive law or as valid moral rule within a social
practice); second, on the level of the rule's scope, as the physical events that fall under the rule's
'normative field'; at the latter level rules can be taken to constitute 'tokens of agency'.
27 This belief appears to be very similar to something like Davidson's so-called 'anomalous monism'
about mental events. By this term Davidson puts forward the claim that mental events, like all events,
are physical, while mental properties are different from and non-reducible to physical properties (in
his 'Mental Events', in idem Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Similar
seems to be the claim of Stavropoulos about legal and physical properties, when he accepts a plural¬
ism on the level of properties but not on that of events, see Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 71, 74; also see
the discussion in this chapter, sections 5 and 6, infra.
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redness but also properties of some non-physical quality as those of embarrassment (psy¬
chological property), or of breaking a rule, or of unlawful conduct (normative/legal proper¬
ties), etc; such a claim sounds rather counterintuitive unless one presupposes the existence
of a normative entity that ascribes normative properties to physical things. To that extent a
physical entity can be taken to form part of a rule's 'normative field', as indicated earlier. A
further case of normative predicates applying to physical things occurs every time that the
latter form counterparts of normative entities other than rules like, say, contracts (e.g. the
predicate 'valid' to a sequence of physical acts that put together a contract). Admittedly,
these distinctions are not very sharp or definitive; one could, anyway, add that normative
entities like contracts are constituted on the basis of rules, hence, that there are no normative
entities other than rules. What one cannot deny, though, is the existence of any normative
entities, by claiming that all predicates apply to physical things, because even in this case
the attribution of a normative predicate will involve a rule (which is a normative entity).
On Frank Jackson's Analysis of the Supervenience of the
Ethical on the Descriptive
The story told by the supervenience thesis serves a double purpose: first to safeguard the
indispensability of our normative vocabulary while, second, making clear that, at the end of
the day, all claims about normative properties are true in virtue of the true claims about
physical properties. To that extent supervenience is an elaborate way to guarantee the onto-
logical primacy of physical properties or physical nature without sliding towards reduction-
ism. My premonition is that supervenience cannot save the physicalist programme. In fact
its endorsing the relative independence of the domain of normative concepts will, sooner or
later, have to lead to an endorsement of normative properties as non-identical to physical
properties. In asking whether this is the case I will focus on one of the most well-argued
contemporary attempts to account for the supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive
(lato sensu physical) level, the one put forward by Frank Jackson in his From Metaphysics
to Ethics 8. Jackson's interest is clearly materialist and aims at safeguarding a monism of
properties ('every normative property is necessarily identical with some descriptive prop¬
erty'), while admitting an asymmetry (hence an independence) between a normative and a
descriptive account of how things are.
28 Vide Frank Jackson, From Metaphysiscs to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), Ch 5, 113-
138.
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This is, roughly, Jackson's account: first he adopts a global supervenience of the
normative (which he labels 'ethical') on the descriptive. This is captured in the following
thesis (S):
(S): For all w and w*, ifw and w* are exactly alike descriptively then they are exactly alike ethi¬
cally (where w and w* stand for different possible worlds).
This thesis he takes to be a priori true and necessary. In other words one could rephrase it
as:
(S'): w and w* are exactly alike ethically if they are exactly alike descriptively.
Against the background of (S) he forms the following argument; He takes E to be a sentence
about ethical nature in the sense that: (a) E is framed in ethical and descriptive terms, (b)
every world in which E is true has some ethical nature and (c) for all w and w*, if E is true
at w and false at w*, then w and w* differ ethically, (a), (b) and (c) more or less assume that
E is about ethical nature since its ability to be true or false presupposes the existence of
some nature of that kind (i.e. ethical) while any alteration of its truth-value must mean that
it is possible to modify that ethical nature.
At this point Jackson introduces a premiss which is not as self-evident as he takes it
to be. He maintains, namely, that:
(P): ethical nature is impossible without descriptive nature.
and from that premiss he concludes that each world at which E is true will have some de¬
scriptive nature which will be fully accounted for by a sentence that contains only descrip¬
tive terms. Accordingly, ifwl, w2, etc are the worlds at which E is true, then Dl, D2, etc.
will be the purely descriptive sentences that capture the full descriptive nature of those
worlds. Then the disjunction ofDl, D2 etc. will also be a purely descriptive sentence, call it
D. Framed in those terms, the argument proceeds to say that every world where E is true is a
world where one of the disjunctives of D will be true, hence E will entail D. And the other
way round: every world in which one of the disjunctives ofD will be true, will be a world in
which E is true, on pain of contradiction with the global supervenience thesis (S) ['worlds
that are descriptively exactly alike, are exactly alike in their ethical nature']. The conclusion
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of all this is that E will entail and be entailed by D, or E <-» D. This leads Jackson to infer
that for any ethical predicate there is a purely descriptive one that is necessarily co¬
extensive. This amounts further to the claim that ethical properties are descriptive.
After having exposed this strong materialist version of global supervenience, Jack¬
son proceeds to reassure the reader that the identity on the level of properties neither implies
that that there is no asymmetry between the ethical and the descriptive accounts of how
things are nor that the ethical vocabulary is dispensable in practice. Under the asymmetry
claim, despite the fact that ethical properties are descriptive properties, it is argued that a
rich account of the ethical nature still leaves open many very different possibilities con¬
cerning descriptive nature. A full story about the ethical nature of a world w is consistent
with indefinitely many different descriptive natures, conversely, a full account of the de¬
scriptive nature of a world w in a way exhausts ethical nature (because of the supervenience
of the ethical on the descriptive). On the other hand the claim that the ethical vocabulary is
indispensable acknowledges the fact that, when we try to tell the ethical story, it is very
difficult to handle (i.e. make any sense) the long disjunctions that Ds usually incorporate
without using the ethical vocabulary.
Jackson's attempt to rescue materialism, in the form of a monism of properties,
while guaranteeing a relative autonomy of normative nature, in the form of an asymmetry
between the descriptive and the normative vocabulary and the latter's indispensability, is by
far the most elaborate of its kind. The fact that it fails can only mean that the project is in
itself unworkable rather than that we are lacking, as of now, a more complete account. I will
try to shed light on the main flaws of Jackson's argument with the purpose of corroborating
an older claim ofMoore, which Jackson thinks to have dismantled in his discussion. This is
more or less the thesis that what is left of language after we cull the ethical terms is inade¬
quate to the task of ascribing the properties we ascribe using the ethical terms (or the inade¬
quacy thesis)29. In doing this I will start by exposing a tension within Jackson's own ac¬
count; this tension will lead to the conclusion that Jackson's effort to reconcile property
monism with a relative autonomy of normative discourse is not workable.
The inadequacy thesis
Jackson's account rests, as already indicated, on the premiss (P), according to which ethical
nature is impossible without descriptive nature. (P) seems to be not just a premiss for argu-
29 For Moore's claim, see Jackson, ibid. 121.
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ing further implications of his global supervenience thesis (S), but, moreover, the basis for
formulating the very claim of (S). In principle nothing would have been wrong with that, as
long as Jackson had provided a justification for accepting (P). But the thesis is accepted,
more or less, unargued. But even so, one would not be asking for more, if Jackson's account
was a crude reductionist story about normative properties. However, his account purports to
take seriously normative vocabulary by allowing first for an asymmetry relation between
normative and descriptive concepts and, second, for the indispensability of normative con¬
cepts.. At this point the tension arises: to put it in a nutshell, the tension emerges by holding
both that:
(P): 'ethical nature is impossible without descriptive nature',
and that:
(PI): 'ethical concepts and descriptive concepts are asymmetrical'.
Let me first expose the tension briefly: P, as the underlying assumption of the global super¬
venience claim, led Jackson to argue that E (the ethical sentence) entails and is entailed by
D (the disjunctive descriptive sentence), or that E <-> D. Conversely, his asymmetry as¬
sumption, captured in PI, led him to argue that 'whereas a rich account of descriptive nature
exhausts ethical nature, a rich account of ethical nature leaves open many very different
possibilities concerning descriptive nature' or else that ethical nature entails always de-
scriptive nature but not the other way round (E does entail D, but D does pitail E)/. Evi¬
dently what seems to be the case here is that, whereas every particular account of E-nature
entails a particular account of D-nature, it is not the case that a complete account of E-
nature entails a complete D-account. This conclusion constrains the scope of the equiva¬
lence statement by taking it to mean that for any E there is an equivalent D which is going to
entail that same E (given the E); but not that for any D there is an equivalent E that could be
used instead of that D; this Jackson takes to mean that there is no problem with thinking
equivalence and asymmetry as being perfectly compatible. But if this is Jackson's story, he
has by no means shown that it is not the case that no account of D-nature entails an account
of E-nature independently of the latter. By taking E-nature to be 'more specific' than D-
nature any D-account of it always rests on an E-account of that nature. In other words the
30 This is the case since the expression 'a rich D-account exhausts every E-account but not vice-
versa', can be taken to mean that the set containing all E-accounts is a genuine subset of the one con¬
taining all D-accounts.
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equivalence E <-> D works only when the E is specified. Hence there is nothing to guarantee
that any D-account which purports to capture some E-nature will always either fail to do so
or to do so in a complete way, unless the relevant E-account is employed. But if this cannot
be guaranteed then it is not any longer self-evident that there are no distinct normative or E-
properties or, according to P, that ethical nature presupposes descriptive nature31. Construed
in this way, Jackson's holding both P and PI might end up supporting the contradictory
claim that 'E-sentences and D-sentences are and are not equivalent', depending on the in¬
tensity of the asymmetry relation between Es and Ds.
I am inclined to believe that normative or ethical nature does not (always) presup¬
pose descriptive nature. Roughly, there are two levels of arguing for that claim. On thefirst
level what is addressed are concepts, predicates, expressions, or else the vocabulary we use
when we form E-sentences and D-sentences. On that level the antinomy of holding simulta¬
neously that 'E-sentences and D-sentences are and are not equivalent' can be resolved only
by dropping one of the two claims that support it, i.e. either P or PI. In this respect I will try
to argue that the asymmetry claim (PI) has to prevail over the materialist claim (P).
The second level concerns the relation between the vocabulary we use in our ac¬
counts and the properties we want to account for. Roughly, what I am going to deal with on
this level is whether, given the fact that we have endorsed P1, there is a further issue to be
addressed before concluding that normative properties are distinct from descriptive ones.
There the discussion will investigate whether the relation between E-terms, D-terms and the
denoted properties can be reconstructed as a relation between different modes of represen¬
tation of the one and the same kind/class of properties, where this class will only contain D-
properties (this will correspond to the relation between different senses and the one refer-
31 Timothy Williamson, in his 'Ethics, Supervenience and Ramsey Sentences' (forthcoming in Phi¬
losophy and Phenomenological Research, 2001) advances a formal point against Jackson's global
supervenience thesis: even if we take (S) as saying that worlds exactly alike in X-respects are exactly
alike in Y-respecls, this does not imply that X-predicates are co-extensive with A-predicates. He rests
his case on the observation that (S) attempts to establish co-extensiveness between classes of proper¬
ties that adhere to individuals merely by drawing information from comparisons ofworlds. William¬
son notes that comparisons of worlds cannot substitute comparisons of individuals. The fallacy at¬
tached to such moves becomes clear when we take a class of predicates whose satisfaction is not con¬
tingent, like for instance mathematical predicates. Mathematical predicates will be satisfied in the
same way in all possible worlds, i.e. all worlds will be exactly alike in respect to them. Now, if in
addition to this similarity, says Williamson, two worlds happen to be alike in some other respect,
described by, say, velocity predicates like 'fast' or 'slow', then these two worlds will be exactly alike
in both their mathematical respect and the velocity respect. Be that as it may, there is nothing in this
statement that could support the conclusion that mathematical properties are co-extensive with veloc¬
ity properties. In the same way, Jackson's (S) does not offer any reason why ethical properties will be
co-extensive with descriptive properties.
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ence of a term). In this context I hope to show that this reconstruction is not workable be¬
cause the existence of normative properties rests always on the existence of a class of nor¬
mative objects, central amongst them being all kinds of action-guidmg norms (i.e. moral,
ethical, legal and so on). This claim will provide for a robust ontological underpinning of
the thesis that ethical nature is possible without descriptive nature.
The Level of Discourse
When we look at the level of our discourse, Jackson's antinomical construction can be re¬
solved either by jettisoning the premiss 'E-terms are asymmetrical with D-terms' (asymme¬
try premiss) or by dropping the premiss 'E entails D and vice-versa' (equivalence pre¬
miss)32. By sustaining the equivalence premiss we allude to the robust claim that reduction
of E-terms to D-terms is possible and, therefore, we somehow set up a positive answer to
the issue of property monism. However, as noted, this is not what one should take as the
starting point of the inquiry. Whether the equivalence premiss can be accepted, will mainly
depend upon whether the asymmetry premiss allows it (probably by failing itself). That is,
one will have to examine the arguments that support asymmetry before alluding to the con¬
clusion that E-concepts and D-concepts are equivalent, hence that there is only one kind of
properties available to be depicted by our vocabulary. One further point: taking the asym¬
metry premiss seriously means that we prefer to postpone an answer about how many kinds
of properties there are; it means, moreover, that we choose to make this answer dependant
upon the outcome of our investigation regarding the asymmetry premiss. To that extent and
with the caveat that we discover that there are no good reasons for accepting the autonomy
of E-vocabulary, we have to assume, at least provisionally, a plurality of properties (since if
we accept a property monism we would be eschewing the asymmetry thesis from the out¬
set). Besides, since in our every-day vocabulary we clearly distinguish between E and D
terms, it is quite plausible to say that those who want to cast doubt upon the asymmetry
premiss (and, further, to claim that all properties are of one kind) will carry the burden of
proof.
The asymmetry argument
Are E-sentences equivalent with D-sentences? Do E-sentences entail and are they entailed
32 I take the equivalence premiss to be the conclusion of P; in this sense any demonstration of the
untenability of the former will apply also to the latter.
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by D-sentences (as Jackson believes)? If this were indeed the case the relation between E-
sentences and D-sentences would be expressible in terms of the general physicalist identity
formula (I.S.). This should not come as a surprise. Both physicalism and Jackson's strong
materialist version of supervenience rest on the same unspellt premiss, or the belief that all
properties are physical (which is another way to put our materialist premiss P). Any attempt,
therefore, to contest that premiss will have to contest the equivalence or identity relation
between E-sentences and D-sentences. This can be done by offering some compelling rea¬
sons in favour of an asymmetry account between E-sentences (concepts or accounts) and D-
sentences (concepts or accounts). All these reasons can be taken together as offering a com¬
plex asymmetry argument. I will start by considering an older claim advanced by W. P. Al¬
ston33 and reintroduced by C. Wright34 which aims to show that a biconditional of the form
E <-> D can only establish an explanatory priority of D-concepts over E concepts and not a
ontological one. In this sense, E-concepts will always be picking out in a better way some
properties in the target area, a fact that can be employed as proof for the existence of inde¬
pendent E-properties on the ontological level. Hence, there is nothing in the biconditional
that makes it compelling to concede that E properties should be D properties. The second
part of the asymmetry argument will consist of a few strategies that demonstrate the indis-
pensability of normative concepts in picking out or describing properties in the domain of
practical and legal reasoning. Here, any attempt to pick out normative properties by using
concepts referring to non-normative properties will fail to properly pick out the right prop¬
erties in the target area. This will be taken to imply that the right properties are not those
that are picked out by non-normative (descriptive) concepts.
The asymmetry ofconcepts: Crispin Wright's argument
In order to corroborate ontological pluralism it need to be argued that the evoked asymmetry
of concepts is more than a possible interpretation within the scope of the equivalence state¬
ment that connects normative and descriptive concepts (both in the reductionist argument
and in Jackson's supervenience version). This reasoning seems to be supplied by Wright's
antireductionist argument concerning properties of numbers35.
33 See his 'Ontological Commitment' in Philosophical Studies 9 (1958), as mentioned in Wright,
Frege's Conception ofNumbers as Objects (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1983), 32.
34 See Crispin Wright, ibid. 25-36. I would like to thank Sean Coyle for drawing my attention upon
Wright's argument; see also his PhD thesis, 'On the Foundations of Legal Reasoning in International
Law' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Glasgow, 1998), Ch. 3.
35 See C Wright, ibid. 25-36 (29-32).
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Wright takes a class of statements which deals with apparent objects of some kinds:
Q's. Further, he supposes that the meaning of each of these statements is such that it can be
reconstructed as a statement containing only apparent singular terms36 for other kinds of
thing. Then the reductionist case is that Q-terms are not genuine singular terms, or, on an
ontological level, that there are no Q's 'over and above' those entities to which one is com¬
mitted by using the restructured statements. To put it in more concrete terms: Let us sup¬
pose that the Q-terms are direction terms of the form 'the direction of a', where 'a' is a term
standing for a line. Then it is easy to form identity contexts for these terms of the form:
D(a)=D(b) iff a//b (i.e. a is parallel to b)
Next we introduce a series of predicates, cpl,... cpn which are direction predicates that apply
to the D-terms (like 'east-west', 'south-west', etc.). These predicates are introduced in such
a way as to observe the condition:
The truth conditions of each statement of the form 'cpkD(a)', are given as those of the state¬
ment of the form, 'Fka' where Fk is a property of lines.
In other words it is stipulated that a singular term for direction, say 'east-west D(a)' is true
if and only if a//EW, where 'EW' names a paradigm east-west line (hence, is a singular term
for lines). As a result, the reductionist claim is instantiated in the claim that 'everything we
say...using an apparent singular term for a direction....can be systematically paraphrased
without loss of content in such a way that the terms for directions disappear in favour of
terms for lines'37. This can be formalised into the following equivalence:
cpkD(a) iff Fka
The biconditional entails that since its two sides are equivalent, then any reference to an
object effected by one is also effected by the other, and vice-versa. But is this equivalence
enough to support reductionism's identity claim38 that 'there are no Q's denoted by 'direc¬
tion' singular terms over and above the entities denoted by the right-hand-side singular line
36 Singular terms are the terms that refer to objects other than universals like this, that, horse, etc.
37 Cf., Wright, ibid. 30.
38 As the one instantiated in the identity statement, section 2, supra.
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terms'? Or to put it alternatively, 'why should the priority of the right-hand side be taken for
granted'? Wright says39:
Which form of expression has priority? No doubt that the right-
hand side has epistemological priority, for it is by reference to it
that the meaning of the left-hand side was explained. But which
side has ontological priority? The reductionist idea was that since
the right-hand side contains no apparent direction-denoting singular
term, we can take it that the apparent reference to a direction on the
left-hand side is mere surface grammar, a misleading stylistic nu¬
ance. But why should we not turn that way of looking things on its
head? What is there to prevent us saying that, since the left-hand
side does contain an expression referring to a direction, it is the ap¬
parent lack of reference to a direction on the right-hand side which
is potentially misleading, or 'mere surface grammar'?
It is precisely an argument for ontological priority or identity that both reductionism and
Jackson's materialism need and, apparently, cannot establish through equivalencies of the
form discussed above. Wright's argument for direction-denoting terms and their corre¬
sponding properties can be readily expanded towards normative terms in law and morality:
any non-normative or descriptive concepts that were thought to be equivalent to some nor¬
mative concepts can, at the most, claim epistemological priority but not ontological priority.
With this move reductionism in the normative realm is seriously undermined, since it is not
as obvious any longer that normative nature is impossible without descriptive nature.
The indispensability thesis
After having established the fact that the equivalence/identity formula cannot necessarily
imply an ontological priority of descriptive properties, I will try now to show in more detail
why the asymmetry between E-sentences and D-sentences entails a pluralism on the level of
properties. Since I take the premiss P to underlie both Jackson's version of supervenience
and the reductionist account, my discussion will be directed against both of them. Further,
the discussion will be conducted in the domain of law and its main endeavour will be to
show that in that domain reductionist moves fail for the same reason: whenever, in order to
refer to normative phenomena, we employ a descriptive concept in the place of a normative
concept, we pick out a descriptive property that is not able to account for the same phe¬
nomenon without making reference to a property picked out by a normative concept40. This
39 Cf., ibid. 31-32.
40 For a similar formulation, see Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 71.
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will entail that the relation between descriptive and normative properties is asymmetrical
and, moreover, that pluralism on the level of properties is a compelling alternative.
In law and morality the target of reductionism are normative properties and, in a de¬
rivative way, normative (legal/moral) concepts. A typical reductionist move would attempt
to substitute in normative concepts, concepts that carry no commitment to normative prop¬
erties, on the assumption that the latter are identical with some descriptive non-normative
properties. Here the reductionist will mainly try to establish the existence of some non-
normative property that is nomologically41 coextensive with each normative property.
Against this general form of reductionism one can put forward the general objection of
multiple realisation, or the claim that there is no unique, individual non-normative property
corresponding to every normative one42. This objection can be met by the reductionist by
pointing out that there is not just an individual reducing43 property but that the reducing
property is generated on the basis of a disjunction of the different kinds of non-normative
properties on which the normative property may rest. In this case the anti-reductionist ob¬
jection has to be modified in the direction of pointing out that not any disjunction can form
the basis for a genuine reducing property. In particular, in order to be able to perform a
proper reduction, the disjunction should not contain simply a list of lower-level properties,
where the criterion for deciding what should be included required the employment of
higher-level normative concepts. In other words for any disjunction-based reduction to be
successful, it should not be shapeless from within the resources of the lower-level theory
(the shapelessness objection)44. The shapelessness objection is usually supplemented by the
further requirement that the reducing property should be able to do the explanatory work of
the property it purports to reduce. In the case of legal and other normative properties this
explanatory work will, clearly, be non-casual. The anti-reductionist claim here is that the
higher-level normative properties are indispensable since they provide explanations that
depend on normative relations which cannot be captured by the physical vocabulary that
cannot pick out anything but physical kinds. Hence the reductionist move will either end up
41 As Stavropoulos says, 'For coextensiveness to be nomological, there must be a law correlating the
properties corresponding to two sets of concepts expressible in those terms, i.e. describing one class of
properties by the concepts of the reducing set and correlating that to the other class of properties de¬
scribed by the concepts of the set to be reduced, and justifying the claim that the correlation expresses
a law of nature', in Objectivity, 71. This law that correlates the properties (events or entities) over the
predicates can be readily taken to have the form of the aforementioned identity statement (I.S.).
42 Vide Charles and Lennon, ibid. 7-8.
43 By 'reducing property' I refer to the property that is used in order to perform the reduction.
44 Ibid. 8-9.
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using the very concepts it attempts to reduce (circularity) or will fail to pick out the proper¬
ties aimed at in the first place (because of the asymmetrical relation between the proper¬
ties/facts)45.
Of the above kind will be any attempt to reduce the normative concept of 'obliga¬
tion' by assuming that it picks out properties which are identical to some psychological
properties (fear or other compulsive feelings) or physical events (e.g. movements). It will
either have to resort back to 'obligation'46or will end up picking out irrelevant properties
like 'being obliged47' or 'being in fear', etc (shapelessness objection). Similar are the cases
of American Legal Realism (ALR)48 and the Command Theory of Law (CTL) in respect to
the concept of law. In the former, the concept of law is reduced to what the judges say it is,
whereas in the latter to the Sovereign's commands and the habit of obedience thereof. In the
case of ALR the reductionist move aims to reduce legal properties by substituting in their
place properties relating to the judges' behaviour. The move fails in the familiar double
way: either the concepts employed pick out behavioural, hence, non-legal properties (since
those two classes of properties are not identical); or the Legal Realist has to recur to legal
properties as being decisive for the determination of the concept of law (shapelessness ob¬
jection and failure to perform the required explanatory work); Hart's critique ofALR seems
to substantiate precisely this point by demonstrating that judges can go wrong in their deci¬
sion49: their going wrong is only possible if legal concepts refer to genuine legal properties
which constrain judicial behaviour. In the case of the CTL rules are reduced to commands
that are backed by sanctions and are usually obeyed. The attempt to reduce legal concepts
by assuming an identity between legal properties and some other, as it were, empirically
observable properties alluding to a class of social facts cannot, again, be carried through as,
sooner or later, the account will have to re-introduce legal concepts that depict genuinely
legal properties; otherwise, it will fail to capture the phenomenon of law, as the discussion
in the last chapter tried to establish (failure to perform the required explanatory work).
All the above cases point towards something like an indispensability thesis, or the
45 To rebut any connotation of circularity the argument could be rephrased as involving a proof that it
would be impossible to reconstruct adequately the normative language-game of law unless one pre¬
supposes irreducible normative terms and predicates. I owe this refinement to Carsten Heidemann.
46 This is similar to the circularity that ensues when trying to identify 'French citizen' in a France-
neutral way (see Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 71-72.). In that case the property of 'being French' is as
irreducible as the property of 'being under an obligation' in our example.
47 See the discussion in chapter I, supra.
48 For the reductionist program of Legal Realism, see the discussion in Stavropoulos, ibid., 72-73.
49 Ibid., 72.
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thesis that normative predicates and concepts are indispensable in order to refer to norma¬
tive properties and entities. The indispensability thesis implies, in its turn, the impossibility
of eliminating evaluative (legal/moral) concepts through non-evaluative ones a fact that,
further, suggests that the relation between them is, to say the least, asymmetric. This asym¬
metry seems to emanate from the autonomy of the normative concepts' referents, i.e. nor¬
mative properties. This autonomy can be readily taken to endorse, beyond a mere pluralism
of properties, a pluralism of events, facts and objects50. Such a pluralism would accept enti¬
ties like rules (legal and moral) and properties or events like 'something being right, lawful,
criminal, etc'.
Before the discussion moves to the level of properties I would like to briefly refer to
an objection that could be raised from Jackson's account. Jackson might claim that he never
presented the antinomy between the equivalence premiss and the asymmetry thesis in the
sharp way that I took him to have done. In fact, his objection might go on, he made perfectly
clear that his supervenience thesis entails that the normative supervenes upon the descrip¬
tive and not vice-versa. In other words the transcription of S to S' as well as my reading of
his equivalence relation between E-accounts and D-accounts as an identity statement are
seriously flawed. Instead what he really did all the way through was to endorse asymmetry
between the E-concepts and the D-concepts. It is, besides, for this reason that supervenience
had to be evoked in order to account for the asymmetrical relation between the two kinds of
concepts. To such a possible objection one could make the following comments: first de¬
spite his verbal commitment to the asymmetry of the discussed concept Jackson is bound to
undermine it since he strongly subscribes to the premiss that 'ethical nature is impossible
without descriptive nature' (the aforementioned P-premiss). In doing this his supervenience
thesis does not (or cannot really) seriously differ from a reductionist thesis about normative
properties. This is clearly demonstrated when he formulates the thesis 'E entails and is en¬
tailed by D', or E D. This very formula refutes Jackson's claim of asymmetry in a quite
straightforward way. Of course it would produce a rather spectacular effect if Jackson could
show that despite the asymmetry being in place, ethical/normative nature cannot exist with-
50 This claim seems to be more radical than the one of Stavropoulos, who restrains ontological plu¬
ralism at the level of properties (see his Objectivity, 74; also see footnote 27, supra). Pluralism on the
level of events/facts and/or objects seems to be consistent with an ontology that does not take the
world as being put together exclusively by matter, but allows normative entities to feature as compo¬
nents of its fabric. This ontology is particularly favoured by a Kantian metaphysics, in which reality is
revealed within judgements; see the discussion on the Kantian strategy and on realism/anti-realism in
Ch III, infra.
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out descriptive nature. But my point was precisely that those two theses are incompatible:
once asymmetry is in place the reductionist formula E <-> D cannot hold".
The Level of Properties
The discussion until now has roughly assumed that terms and properties stand in a one-to
one 'correspondence'. The reason for this was, as noted earlier, that if one is not allowed ex
ante to assume that all ethical nature boils down to being descriptive, then one has to take
concepts to be referring to distinct properties. The analysis showed further that there are
good reasons for treating normative concepts as being asymmetrical to descriptive concepts,
with the result that for any normative concept there is no co-extensive descriptive concept.
Both the asymmetry argument that was based on Wright's analysis, and the indispensability
thesis amounted to the claim that normative concepts are indispensable for picking out some
properties that cannot be picked out by any descriptive concept. To that extent, the indis¬
pensability of normative concepts and their asymmetry to descriptive concepts was based on
their ability to pick out properties that no descriptive concept is able to pick out. As a result
the main assumption of the normative concepts' correspondence with normative properties
has been corroborated.
Before concluding that normative properties are distinct from (in the sense of being
over and above) descriptive properties, I want to consider one more possible objection that
could undermine that conclusion. The objection says that despite the fact that, on the level
of discourse, normative concepts are distinct from descriptive concepts, things look very
different on the level of properties, or rather, that of the relation between concepts and
properties52. On that level what we have is just one kind of properties, namely descriptive
properties. The claim is based on the following analogy. Concepts are taken to occupy the
level of Fregean Senses (Sinne) whereas properties that of Fregean Reference (Bedeutun-
gen)53. Accordingly, it is perfectly possible (moreover necessary) that an E-concept is dis¬
tinct from a D-concept, albeit both pick out (or correspond to) the same property which is
more likely to be a descriptive rather than a normative property54. In this case E and D be-
51 Even if one, like Jackson, models D as a huge disjunction in order to allow for E <-» D to work, the
shapelessness objection will block the equivalence.
52 This objection is probably the fundamental idea behind reductionism.
53 The Fregean terminology is clarified in fn. 1 in this chapter, supra, and in Ch III, infra.
54 This is probably the most uncontroversial part to concede: given the fact that property monism can
be established, only a few people would argue that all properties are of the normative kind. Having
said that, there are representatives of Neo-Kantianism who tender the idea of a monism based on nor-
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have like two distinct senses, SI and S2, of a word that correspond to the same reference R.
The objection clearly purports to undermine the conclusion that was based on the asymme¬
try argument. The asymmetry discussion tried to establish the existence of more than one
kind of properties, by arguing that normative concepts are indispensable because they pick
out properties that descriptive concepts cannot pick out. The objection starts by conceding
the point of the indispensability of normative concepts, albeit on totally different grounds:
normative concepts are indispensable owing to their different mode of representation of a
property (which can always be represented differently by a descriptive concept)". In other
words, concepts of different levels (normative/higher-order or descriptive/lower-order) need
not be but different modes of representation of the same property, in the same way that dis¬
tinct senses correspond to the same reference. This objection, call it the mode of represen¬
tation objection, is quite serious and certainly calls for a more direct defence of the plurality
of properties. In the previous section the plurality of properties was, in a way, established
only indirectly, as a consequence of the fact that normative concepts seem to pick out
something which is not the same as the thing that is picked out by descriptive concepts.
Now, it might be necessary to argue that that thing which is picked out by normative con¬
cepts is not just 'an angle of representation' but a genuine property. Having more or less
established that, in any case - be it either genuine property or mode of representation - what
is picked out by E-concepts is different from what is picked out by D-concepts, the further
demonstration of the E-concepts' picking out a genuine property will lead to the conclusion
that there are E-properties which are distinct from D-properties. This will be enough to sup¬
port a property pluralism.
The mode of representation objection can be undermined by showing that the anal¬
ogy it alludes to, does not work. Specifically, if it were true the different concepts stood in a
sense-reference relation to a property, then this would contradict some of the conclusions
that were established through the asymmetry argument and the indispensability thesis. That
is, if E and D stand to a property P in the same relation that S(ense)l and S(ense)2 stand to
the reference R, then E and D should be interchangeable at will. Because any SI and S2,
notwithstanding their ability to correspond to different aspects of R, can at any time be em¬
ployed interchangeably without failing to refer to the same R. However, this is far from
mative properties, along the following lines: 'an object is red if and only if one should apply the
predicate 'red' to if. I am indebted to Carsten Heidemann for drawing my attention upon this possi¬
bility.
55 To that extent the objection seems to be closer to the thesis that earlier was refereed to as ascriptive
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being the case in respect to E-concepts and D-concepts. Whenever one employs the D-
account 'piece of paper bearing signatures....etc.' certainly fails to refer to the same thing as
one does by employing the E-account 'the contract between the parties X and Z'. Moreover,
the two accounts are by no means interchangeable without failing to achieve a complete
description of the properties in question. And this failure cannot be cured by supplying the
kind of empirical information that would associate two distinct senses. What I mean is this:
it is not that the failure has to do with the fact that we don't know that an E (concept, ac¬
count) refers to the same thing as a D, in the way that people in older times did not know
that 'evening star' and 'morning star' had the same reference. In the latter case, it is true, the
two different senses appear to be conveying knowledge about two different things. How¬
ever, as soon as it was established, through astronomical observation, that both 'evening
star' and 'morning star' refer to the same thing, the difference between the two senses be¬
came perspectival. Conversely, our knowledge that a contract x is embodied on a piece of
paper cannot cure the failure of referring to x by employing terms that refer to the material
paper.
The asymmetry between D-concepts and E-concepts generates a further criticism to
the mode of representation objection. As argued before, E-concepts might prove to be indis¬
pensable in the description of some domain of normative discourse or in handling long D-
disjunctions. Once though this point is taken, and Jackson certainly would agree with it, it
looks rather odd to take Es and Ds to relate to each other as two senses, SI and S2, that
correspond to the same reference. Taking them to do so would amount to accepting that S2
is a mode of representation which rests on S1. However, the sense of the term 'evening star'
does not seem to rest in any way on the sense of the term 'morning star'.
Accordingly the difference between normative and descriptive concepts is not just
perspectival. Normative concepts refer to a different kind of properties than descriptive
concepts do. Having said that, one might object that even in that case normative properties
are not autonomous because they 'sit on top' of more basic descriptive properties which at
the end of the day determine the truth or falsity of our descriptions and explanations of how
things are. This objection could be taken to follow from the background belief that all prop¬
erties apply to physical objects/entities whose basic structure consists in physical properties
and can only be captured in descriptive terms. I will attempt to refute the objection and its
background belief by arguing that there are at least three kinds of objects/entities that are
supei-venience. See section 3 of this chapter, supra.
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specifically normative: normative properties, normative entities (like contracts), and norms
on whose basis properties are ascribed.
The variety ofNormative Nature
Let us for a moment suppose that normative or E-properties do indeed 'sit on top' of other
descriptive properties the way supervenience wants them to do. This cannot readily be taken
to imply that those properties cannot be attributed as distinct properties to certain ob¬
jects/entities of the environment which are located in space and time56. The reason for that
is their ability to provide for explanations that cannot be supplied by any other descriptive
property. To that extent, normative properties are not very different from colour properties.
Being red might indeed 'sit on top' of more fundamental properties of spacio-temporal ob¬
jects which are properly described only by physics. Be that as it may, 'being red' is a dis-
r\ \ tinct property that provides for a distinct explanation of how things are, in a way that phys-
-.1 ics cannot do. This is so because 'being red' is not analysable in more basic physical prop¬
erties. The same is the case with normative properties: they are indispensable in explaining
some features of things which cannot be captured by attributing to them other descriptive
properties. Now, one might ask, to what extent does their explanatory role vest normative
properties with ontological independence? It is true that by acknowledging the indispensa-
bility of normative properties one has not, as yet, decided about their ontological status. In
fact, taking E-properties to 'sit on top' of other more fundamental descriptive properties
could just be implying that there is still only one class of things, namely physical things
existing in space and time, to which all properties apply. There are, however, two further
reasons that block this line of reasoning and, instead, force us to account for normative
properties in a way that would broaden our ontological commitment towards including nor¬
mative objects and entities. First, the fact that normative properties, like all properties, are
themselves abstract objects of normative quality57. Second, and more important for the pres¬
ent account, normative properties can only be attributed if one presupposes the existence of
a class of normative objects and/or facts. This class will typically include legal norms, both
as rules and principles, as well as some other objects, like for instance 'contracts', that, nev¬
ertheless, are constituted on the basis of some legal norm.
It is indeed a bold claim that I am making here and it will be qualified a lot more in
56 Vide Donald Davidson's account in his recent 'Objectivity and Practical Reason', in Edna Ull-
mann-Margalit (ed), Reasoning Practically (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17-26.
57 See Davidson, ibid., 23.
71
the course of the dissertation. But the idea that it rests on is rather simple: normative prop¬
erties are attributed to (physical) things not solely on the basis of 'how things are', but pre¬
dominantly on the basis of how things 'should be\ The 'should be' modality is usually the
content of a norm. Therefore, normative properties are 'introduced' into the physical envi¬
ronment in connection with norms which are normative entities. To that extent anyonc^jjaC
who is not a crude eliminativist and accepts the explanatory role of normative properties
and their concomitant asymmetry towards descriptive properties, needs to accept the exis¬
tence of some normative entities. That has to be the case independently of whether one
wants to attribute to normative properties the status of ontological independence. To put it
slightly differently, even if one, like Jackson, would rather conceive of normative properties
as identical with some physical properties, one would still have to admit the existence of
some other normative entities, i.e. norms. But if one takes the step towards admitting norms
as distinct normative entities, it is not easy to reconstruct them as not signifying such enti¬
ties. A reductionist move on the level of norms would have to undertake an analysis of legal
rules and principles into some class of properties that would be easy to reduce anew to a
class of non-normative properties. For example: instead of admitting the existence of a rule
about the obligations originating from a valid legal agreement between two parties (a con¬
tract), the reductionist would like to say that the rule is nothing but the ex post collection of
the different obligation-properties (E-properties) that anyway apply on some physical enti¬
ties (the parties). Clearly this move fails as any attribution of those properties will require
the existence of the relevant rule.
Conclusion
The reductionism discussion showed that there are no non-normative expressions that are
co-extensive to normative expressions (concepts, predicates). This was taken to imply that,
on an ontological level, those expressions correspond to properties which are genuinely
normative and irreducible to any co-extensive descriptive properties. The autonomy of nor¬
mative properties suggested the admittance of normative objects/entities that cannot be re¬
duced to any physical objects (or bundles of descriptive properties). In this last respect, the
anti-reductionist argument did justice to Hart's claim that rules are something beyond and
above, an aliud, to a mere aggregate of physical facts of some sort (social and/or psycho¬
logical).
But Hart's discussion has also suggested that this aliud rests on an internal or
evaluative aspect pertaining to rules. Insofar, to put it figuratively, the idiosyncratic nature
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of legal discourse seems to consist of two distinct aspects: an ontological and a practi¬
cal/evaluative. Hence, any attempt to offer a complete account of the legal phenomenon will
eventually have to address both aspects as well as the interconnections between them. For
the moment I will postpone a discussion of the issue ofnormativity and, instead, spend some
time (the remaining of Ch II, CHs III and IV) on developing an appropriate account of law's
ontology, as the prerequisite for any antireductionist treatment of legal discourse. Later
(CHs V and VI) I will attempt to supplement the ontological account with an account of
law's normativity.
In the remaining of the chapter I will develop the main tenets of the philosophical
framework in which the account of law's ontology will be given. This will consist in an
account of the connections between thought (language), the mind and the world which will
advance the thesis that semantics-exhausts-ontology. This will roughly be taken to mean
that an account of what exists (i.e. in terms of physical entities) in the environment, can
instead be given through an account of the semantic structure of our language (or the gram¬
mar of thought). Another way to put it, is to say that a meaningful or coherent account of
the material 'building blocks' of the world requires us to presuppose, a priori, a normative
pattern (grammar) that 'maps' the world in its order. Then, all we need to do in order to
account for the ontological categories are we committed to is to consult this grammar (this
is going to be labelled the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis).
A First Encounterwith the Metaphysics of Content
The fact that we possess mental content enables us to acquire knowledge about the world, to
draw conclusions about the past, plan our behaviour for the future and, generally, appreciate
the patterns that underwrite the world and the behaviour of other human beings. In other
words, content gives us both knowledge and intentionality. For this reason, any talk about
content will have to elucidate the connections between the mind (thought, language) and the
world, in a way that can best account for meaningful human behaviour. In my discussion, I
will take the philosophy of content to occupy a central position or, even, to be prior to the
other domains of the philosophy of mind, ontology and metaphysics. Following many phi¬
losophies after the linguistic turn, I take priority of content to show that the query into the
patterns of the world and the mind is only meaningful through (or mediated by) the explica¬
tion of the patterns of thought and content. On a first judgement the priority of thought and
content follows from the trivial fact of the existence of human intentional behaviour. Any
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attempt to comprehend this behaviour as being intelligible (or rational), will lead to the
endorsement of some sort of intentional realism5*, or the idea that intentional states (e.g.
beliefs) are real. In a further stage, it will be shown that those real intentional states are
mainly embedded within linguistic structures. To that extent the discussion of content will
turn into a discussion of the patterns of propositional content. The latter will, further, reveal
something like an a priori (logical) grammar. I will take grammar to indicate more than the
formal-syntactic grammar that linguistics deals with. 'Grammar', in the context of the pres¬
ent discussion, will stand for the normative patterns that regulate thought (within language)
and whose existence can be demonstrated transcendentally.
Now, because of the assumption of the priority of content, this grammar is not go¬
ing to be merely a grammar of thought, but, what's more, it is going to be taken to map the
whole domain both of metaphysics (ontology) and the philosophy of mind. Questions and
answers about what objects or facts exist, or about which brain states and events are brought
about, are all answerable to the normativity of the grammar of thought. This is not to say
that what exists in the mind/brain"9 and the world, exists in virtue of the grammar of thought
(idealist presumption); the claim is, rather, that the patterns of grammar are (transcenden¬
tally) necessary in order to map the mind/brain and the world.
The ensuing discussion is going to tackle the issue of the priority of intentional
content and its underlying grammar by tacitly endorsing the structure of a two-stage tran¬
scendental argument:
PI: (intentional) human behaviour is a fact.
PI': for intentional behaviour to be possible, one has to assume the existence of intentional states.
CI: there are intentional states (intentional realism).
P2: there are intentional states (CI).
P2': for intentional states to exist, they have to exhibit certain patterns of logical structure (gram¬
mar).
C2: there is a logical grammar of thought.
58 The term comes from Luntley, Contemporary Philosophy of Thought and Language (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1998), 4. The use of the concept 'realism' in this context serves merely the purpose of
stating that intentional or mental states or phenomena exist as distinct from brain states.
59 The physical aspect of the mind (brain) can readily be taken to be part of the physical world. The
non-physical part of the mind apparently contains the principles that put together the a priori grammar
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Alternatively, one could take the fact of the existence of human intentional behaviour as
already containing the claim of intentional realism about beliefs and other states, thus sim¬
plifying the structure of the transcendental argument. This would probably be relatively
uncontroversial in the face of a widespread agreement on the issue amongst philosophers60.
In either case, the discussion will have to clarify two issues: first the 'self-evident' reality of
intentional states; and second the nature of the underlying grammar.
The shift from the philosophy ofmind to the philosophy ofcontent
Intentional realism is the view that there is such a thing as intentional content61. This claim
enjoys the status of a necessary presupposition 'projected' upon the trivial fact of the exis¬
tence of human behaviour that interrupts, as it were, the causal flow of the physical universe
(see the given premiss PI). It is this necessity to account for human behaviour coherently or
meaningfully, as an-intervening-in-the-world factor, that forces on one some version of re¬
alism about thoughts, beliefs and other intentional states. If, in other words, one wants to
account for human behaviour then concepts like 'believing that...', 'hoping that...', or
'wishing that...' cannot be eliminated from one's explanation.
Put in those terms, the claim of intentional realism, robust as it may be, does not
proceed to say how content is individuated. That is, it does not prejudge the way one is go¬
ing to account for what content is, or what kind of entities beliefs and other intentional
states are. It does, though, pose an outer limit on what content can be: namely that however
content is going to be individuated it has still to be related to the explanation of human be¬
haviour. That is no less than saying that content has to be able to support a rational account
of human behaviour62. This constraint adds to the initial need to provide for an account of
behaviour the further requirement of rationality: content is necessary not only in order to
understand the way we experience the world, but also in order to rationally account for our
behaviour (or intervention in the world); whereas 'experience of the world' might be taken
to constitute something like the passive side, or the information-background of behaviour,
the rationality requirement seems to directly flow from focussing upon behaviour as such.
Thus, both claims incorporated into the doctrine of intentional realism are still within the
of thought.
60 See Luntley, ibid. 3-11.
61 Cf. Luntley, op. cit. 1-11.
62 Ibid. 4.
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triviality scope63 of the initial transcendental argument (the fact of human behaviour).
As soon as one endorses the two minimal requirements of intentional realism, ema¬
nating from the fact of the existence of human behaviour and its impact upon the causal
network of the world, one has a response to the so-called constitutive task, or the task of
characterising the role of content in rationalising explanations of behaviour. Yet, what one
still lacks is an answer to the way of individuating content. This seems to fall largely under
the subject matter of the so-called engineering taskM, or the task of connecting the material
side of content, i.e. brain states, with the environment by using causal concepts. Strictly
speaking, this second task is not on the same level of neutrality as the first, the constitutive
task; in fact it presupposes that one has already opted to individuate content in a specific
way, namely by holding that content is individuated by entities which are independent of the
environment and which possess some (mysterious) representational abilities.
Be that as it may, I take the engineering task to express, in a more general way, the
important task of the connection between thought and the world which is independent of the
method of content individuation. Admittedly, if one treats this problem as an 'engineering
task' that postulates the re-connection of intentional content with its environment through
causal concepts, one is already 'biased' as to the method of individuation of content. Con¬
versely, the 'engineering task' can take a completely different content if one individuates
content in a non-representationalist way. In all, whichever way one chooses, the issue of the
connection between thought and the world will be present; what is not obligatory, however,
is that it will always take the form of a physicalist program. In fact, I am going to argue that
the more general issue that the 'engineering task' addresses can be better resolved if one
avoids representationalism and the affiliated forms of physicalism. Since the problem of
representationalism is going to reappear later65, I am going to offer a brief account of the
way representationalism individuates content, with the aim of demonstrating some serious
problems whose need for a solution will lead the discussion to a non-representationalist
model of content individuation.
63 With this term I refer to the starting premiss of any transcendental argument which has to be a
fairly uncontested, or trivially apparent, fact.
64 Vide Luntley, ibid. 7.
65 The problem of representationalism is going to reappear in connection with Lockean Ideas and




Representationalism has, by and large, been taken to be synonymous with intentional real¬
ism. Representationalism responds to the constitutive task, or the task concerning the inter¬
vention of human behaviour in the causal flow of the world, by assuming the existence of
content-possessing entities of some kind that are independent from the environment66. Pro-
positional attitudes like 'believing that', 'hoping that', 'wishing that', etc. are attitudes to¬
wards such entities. This 'reification' of content is achieved through entities like, say, the
Platonic or the Cartesian Ideas. Clearly, the claim of the existence of independent entities is
a powerful expression of the idea that content is self-standing and necessary in order to
account for human behaviour: it rests upon the simple thought that something can be con¬
ceived as intervening in the flow of the world only if it is independent of it. The more inde¬
pendent this 'something' is, the better is the explanation it offers. And indeed one could
hardly imagine anything more independent than entities that are revealed by a mysterious
faculty (Platonic Ideas), or by introspection (Cartesian Ideas). Alas, the aftermath of those
strong claims is the impossibility to establish any connection of those entities with the
world, since in order for them to be representations of the world, they need somehow to be
in some causal relation to it: hence, the 'engineering task' is doomed to fail from the begin¬
ning, as there is no way of offering any explanation that would connect these non-physical
entities with the environment on an account that would be in accordance with the way the
world works, that is, without assuming an obscure metaphysics. If, however, the engineering
task fails, so does the constitutive task, for explanations of human behaviour can no longer
be modelled in a satisfactory way.
Intentional realism, in the form of representationalism, has more chance to survive
if one is able to provide an account that respects the engineering task by endorsing a physi-
calist ontology. This is the road that modern representationalist theories take. Here, thought
is individuated by entities which are characterizable independently of the world, albeit, they
can be connected to it causally. These entities are perceived as intentional states (beliefs,
wishes, desires, etc.) that intervene between the environment and our behaviour. These
states feature in causal explanations of behaviour while, on the other hand, they are them¬
selves causally connected with what they stand for (bits of the world). In order to be able to
engage into causal relations, intentional states must be shown to pick up the physical enti-
66 Vide Luntley, Contemporary Philosophy, 7-11.
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ties postulated by the engineering task, namely brain states. Thus, much of the success of
the physicalist program depends on the possibility of reducing belief or other intentional
states to the level ofphysical brain states.
Disregarding objections stemming from arguments that block the possibility of re¬
duction, as they were discussed earlier67, the program of physicalism seems to undermine
intentional realism by subordinating the constitutive to the engineering task. Even in their
occult metaphysics, Platonic and Cartesian Ideas capture the central claim of the constitu¬
tive task which is the 'reification' of thoughts as normative entities that can account ration¬
ally of behaviour. Conversely, physicalism, driven by the fear of succumbing to idealism, or
to an obscure metaphysics, seems to arrive at the other extreme: by focusing upon the engi¬
neering program it seems to bestow explanatory priority on the reducing brain states over
the normative concepts (beliefs, etc.): since it is more important to have entities that can
feature in causal explanation, one should be able to disguise the normative states as physical
states. After this move has been performed the constitutive and the engineering task can no
longer be treated as being on a par. As a result, some amongst the physicalist philosophers
choose to abandon the program of preserving both tasks and, instead, embark on an elimi-
nativist program that gives up the constitutive level68. Yet any attempt to get rid of the latter
is bound to bring about the cancellation of intentional realism.
But is the dilemma compulsory? Is it true, in other words, that one can either hold
intentional realism to be true, or undertake the task of naturalizing content, but not both at
the same time? On the assumptions of representationalism, this seems to be inevitable.
However, besides representationalism there seems to be one more way of individuating
content which might be able to preserve both the intuition of intentional realism and the
idea that thought has to fit in the physical universe (naturalization of content).
Thepriority of the normativity ofthought
The main problem of physicalism becomes apparent with the reductionist move. This move,
besides being powerless to establish the priority of brain states over normative states, dem¬
onstrates a further deficiency. In a counterintuitive way, it contravenes the rationale of its
employment: reduction is allegedly employed in order to save the autonomy of thought by
offering a workable, that is naturalised, explanation of human behaviour. Despite its noble
67 Vide, section 3, supra.
68 Amongst those philosophers count Paul and Patricia Churchland and Stephen Stich in his earlier
work. See Luntley, ibid. 8, 9.
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intentions, it ends up declaring that intentional realism, or the normative autonomy of
thought, is untenable. The roots of this failure lie deeper, though. They lie in the whole idea
of representations as being independent of what they represent (the world)69. The reification
of thought through entities that possess representational powers requires such strong as¬
sumptions that it ends up undermining the normativity of thought and the idea of intentional
realism. The way representationalism is set up yields an understanding of the constitutive
and the engineering task as being antithetical: either thought is independent and cannot be
analysed (or reduced) to causal categories, or thought has no independence and is under¬
stood only through the categories of physics; in the first case there is no hope of ever estab¬
lishing any connection between thought-as-blueprint and the environment whose blueprint it
is. In the second, there is no way of adequately explaining human behaviour. In fact elimi-
nativism, or the full reduction of the constitutive level, shows precisely the aporia con¬
nected to the dilemma. As soon as one realises that the categories of thought cannot be re¬
duced to physics, one prefers to ignore them altogether, as being unreal, or instrumental70
and, instead, concentrate on what is palpable: the picture of the world through our best sci¬
entific theories.
These thoughts point e contrario towards the 'ingredients' that could produce an
alternative viable account that would be in a position to uphold the intuitions of both the
constitutive and the engineering tasks. Such an account would have to rescue the normative
level of thought while giving a description of how thought fits in the world without presup¬
posing reduction. Clearly, against a representationalist background, it might seem extremely
difficult to combine these requirements. Things seem totally different if one discards the
notion of representation and alludes to the idea of a non-reductionist theory of naturalised
content. Such a theory would rest on the assumption that the whereabouts of the normative
entities of the constitutive level do not need to be remote from their worldly surroundings.
Put in those terms, a theory of content will still be normative, while conceiving content as
being shaped in the world. At the same time, it will hardly need to appeal to any kind of
reduction of content-concepts, precisely because content will have already been conceived
as being in touch with the environment. Obviously, reductionism seems to wither away, as
soon as representations are disposed of.
69 See also the discussion of the role of representations as ultra-interpretations in the context of
meaning and understanding, Ch VI, infra.
70 This is a more subtle version of eliminativism in which the constitutive level is not fully eliminated
but treated instrumentally as a way of talking that one finds useful to employ, which, though, carries
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A non-reductionist, naturalized theory of content exploits the impossibility of ana¬
lysing the normative concepts of the constitutive level in causal terms, by endorsing the
thought that the constitutive and the engineering tasks stand side by side71. Such a theory
contemplates the possibility of autonomous intentional content conceived in a way that is
not cut off from its environment. In doing so it endeavours to show that thoughts are not
reducible to causal terms, i.e. they are autonomous, while, at the same time, they are not
mysterious entities isolated from the world. Such a view establishes the autonomy of the
normative constitutive level of thought through transcendental argument, while it proceeds
to declare that the constitutive categories are characterizable only in an externalist way, that
is by showing that the natural world is necessarily implicated in the constitutive account of
content72. By performing this double move, the non-reductionist naturalised theory of con¬
tent achieves threefold: it rescues intentional realism; it holds to the idea of a naturalized
intentional content; it reconciles the constitutive with the engineering task by rejecting re-
ductionism. In fact, the third achievement is made available because naturalized content is
compatible with a causal account of the world. What it does not any more require is a re¬
ductive account ofmental content in causal terms, since, from its constitution, it is involved
in the world.
AnAnti-representationalist Theory of Content
A non-reductive theory of content, like the one just sketched, can be taken to be of Fregean
inspiration73. The most central claim of such a theory is that it identifies the structure of
thought with the structure of language. This claim is not unqualified; it aims to capture the
fact that the structure of thoughts can be, on the whole, individuated through linguistic
structures74. As such it is narrower than the claim that the structure of language is constitu¬
tive of the structure of thought, or that language exhausts thought. The investigation into
whether this stronger claim is true or not, need not occupy us in the present context. Instead
of offering a definitive answer as to which is prior, language or thought, one could charac-
no real significance. See Luntley, Philosophy of Thought, 8-9.
71 Along these lines evolves the account of content offered by Luntley, ibid. 11 n.
72 Vide Luntley, ibid. 10, 11.
73 The term is used by Luntley (ibid. 11 n.) in order to summarise externalist, non-reductive theories
of content whose roots lie in the work of Gareth Evans and which were further developed by Lynne
Rudder-Baker and A. Clark. Similar ideas are to be found in the work of D. Davidson, as well as in
more contemporary philosophical work with Davidsonian aspirations, like that of S. L. Hurley (see the
preface of her Consciousness in Action (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998)).
74 See Luntley, Contemporary Philosophy, 11.
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terise the connection between the two in a more neutral way, by alluding to something like
the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis15. This thesis contends that, to the extend that the
world (ontology) can be captured through the structure of thought, it can also be captured
through the structure of language (semantics), avoiding thus a direct confrontation with the
language/thought issue.
The semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis substantiates the idea that the study of the
structure of thought precedes that of the structure of the world or, more cautiously put, that
the 'burden ofproof as to what exists' is inverted between semantics (thought) and ontology
(the world); it says, more or less, that one could come to know what exists by attending to
the structure of thought rather than by scrutinising the molecular structures of Matter. To
that extend, the Fregean strategy presents itself as an alternative to eliminativism and re-
ductionism in general. Eliminativism, as discussed earlier, trusts physics and its picture of
the world to such an extent as to postulate the harmonisation of the theory of content with
an ontology deriving from physics; in doing so it fails to account in a satisfactory way for
the rationality of human behaviour. Conversely, the Fregean strategy exploits the a priori
necessity of thought for the explanation of behaviour and goes on to proclaim that seman¬
tics, as a level of individuation of thought, comes in importance before ontology in the pro¬
cess of content formation. This comparison shows, in a rather instructive way, that if one
wants to rationally account for behaviour, one has to admit the priority of thought and the
concomitant priority of semantics.
'Semantics' in the Fregean strategy stands for that theory of content which is de¬
signed to make, in the best way, rational sense of behaviour76. In this sense it is juxtaposed
to ontology as a theory of the scientific picture of the world which rejects the autonomy of
content and, hence, cannot adequately account for behaviour. As a theory of content, Fre¬
gean semantics is broader than formal semantics, though the two might overlap to some
extent. Though this issue touches upon the more general issue of the relation between
thought and language, which is not going to be dealt with, it is purposeful to offer some
brief remarks. The relation between formal semantics (or, broader, the structures of lan¬
guage) and Fregean substantive semantics (or, broader, the structure of thought) can be
conceptualised in the following way: formal semantics are not as such a theory about inten¬
tional content. A theory about intentional content aims to elucidate the formation of beliefs,
75 Ibid. 12.
76 For the idea of semantics as a theory of content see Luntley, ibid. 14-18
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desires, etc. and other prepositional attitudes in connection to the world in a way that can
account for rational behaviour. It should, in other words, account for both the constitutive
and the engineering tasks. Formal semantics may be the medium to put content into some
symbolical structure (linguistic structures), nonetheless, it cannot on its own explain why
this content is about the world or why it explains rational behaviour. Formal semantics will
always be in need of some theoretical account as to the way the world is conceptualised
within thoughts and as to the way this conceptualisation affects rational behaviour. Take,
for instance, a theoretical account of content which identifies formal with substantive se¬
mantics (like Fodor's 'Language of Thought'77). Within such a theory content will be prima
facie identified with syntactic or linguistic structures; unless it is further connected to an
account of how linguistic structures make contact with the world, it will not be able to ex¬
plain properly human behaviour. It is, actually, this further concern, to offer an explanation
of human behaviour, that makes the difference between formal and substantive (in our case
Fregean) semantics. Of course, insofar as substantive theory understands formal semantics
as the medium of expressing the structure of thought, the two will overlap; but they will
never be identical. This would, for the moment, suffice as a rough sketch of the relations
between thought and language and the question whether the latter exhausts the former.
Normativity ofContent
A Fregean theory of content takes intentional realism seriously and endorses the autonomy
of thought. To that extent, it attempts to give a description of thought-content which is non-
reductionist. But, in doing this, it does not presuppose that intentional content is independ¬
ent of the mind and the world. In fact, it wants to offer an account of content which will be
compatible with our being physical creatures in a physical world; an account that will not be
necessarily carved in a physicalist vocabulary. This account of content will be also an ac¬
count of the mind and the world, precisely because, mind, thought and the world are envis¬
aged as being interconnected, as opposed to a reductionist account that takes them to be
independent.
In discarding the physicalist vocabulary, the non-reductionist account of content fo¬
cuses mainly upon the normativity of meaning (content) as it is revealed through the pat¬
terns that underlie our use of expressions. Meaning and understanding place obligations
upon speakers to use the relevant expressions in a patterned way. Those patterns can be
77 For an account of Fodor's project, see Luntley, ibid. 12-13.
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described independently of the physical mechanisms that underwrite our way of dealing
with expressions (i.e. various brain states). Furthermore, they enjoy an a priori status since
they constitute the necessary presuppositions of meaning and understanding and can be
described in a non-empirical way.
The elementary pattern within which meaning and understanding unfold is, for an
account of Fregean aspiration, the sentence. Words have meaning only in the context of
sentences. This claim is conceptualised as the context principle78. The context principle
narrows ontology down to the patterns expressions exhibit within the structure of sentences
(as the elementary semantic structures). As a result objects are revealed through the patterns
that certain words (names) exhibit within the context of sentences79. This is the case not
only with names that denote concrete objects, but also with those that denote more abstract
objects [like legal concepts (e.g. contracts), numbers, musical compositions, a game of
chess, etc.]. Let us take the case of arithmetic which was also Frege's main concern.
Whether numbers are objects depends upon the claim that numerals are names80. To
establish this claim it is not enough to look at whether numerals point towards objects. One
reason for this is, of course, that numbers are abstract objects and hence not available to our
senses. But to hold this as the decisive reason for our inability to establish the fact that nu¬
merals are names simply 'by looking around' is to miss the whole point. This is so because
for something to be a name (i.e. name for an object) is not about its standing in a special
relation to an object (as an ontological category). Rather, a sign is a name only to the extent
that it demonstrates the appropriate pattern of use within the context of a proposition (sen¬
tence). Consequently the question whether numerals are names, and hence whether numbers
are objects, turns upon the question whether they exhibit the appropriate pattern of use
within the relevant propositions. Ifwe refer to the patterns of use as the grammar, the claim
can be furnished as saying that numbers are objects if and only if numerals exhibit the
grammar of names81. In this way, in engaging in the a priori study of grammar, we unveil
what sort of objects there are. This study of grammar is a study of the patterns of thought
and to the extent that thought is individuated through language, a study of language. The
78 For a brief account of the Frege's context principle and the primacy of the sentence/proposition see
Luntley, op. cit. 16-18.
79 The context principle can be combined with the following idea of Wittgensteinian origin: objects
do not exist independently, but are integrated with other objects within certain arrangements of events
(the Wittgensteinian facts). Now the structure of the sentence depicts precisely the level of facts,
whereas names occupy a position similar to that of objets.
80 See Luntley, ibid. 17.
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whole program of studying semantics or the grammar of thought before or instead of ontol¬
ogy boils down to the claim that there is no non-conceptual or transparent experience of
reality82.
The fact that the sentence is the elementary unit of grammar/meaning should not
remain unqualified. Sentences are never single-element units but composite ones, usually
exhibiting a complex structure that contains several parts (names, predicates). Frege ac¬
knowledged this fact by endorsing the thesis that the meaning of a sentence (or thought) is a
function of the meaning of its parts, or the compositionality thesis83. The compositionality
thesis should not be taken to overrule the context principle or the idea that the sentence is
the context within which names acquire meaning. Were it the case, the result would be
something like the claim that it is possible to offer an account of names independently of
their grammar which is tantamount to saying that meaning presupposes a queer sort of con¬
nection between mind and object. Instead the compositionality thesis should be interpreted
as giving expression to the idea that sentences are structured because they embody judge¬
ments (or assertions) about structured bits of reality (facts). Being about facts judgements
are amenable to the binary evaluation truth/false, whereas isolated names can never be ei¬
ther true or false. Judgements, to put it bluntly, can be true or false because they depict bits
of the world and it is the case that something is truth-evaluable only in relation with how the
world is (what is the case), whereas isolated names do not say anything about the world.
Thus in order to establish what a name stands for (its reference) it is necessary to
attach that name to a true judgement which depicts a bit of reality. The semantic priority of
the judgement over its parts is, in a sense, established on the composite structure of the
world that is depicted by the composite structure of judgements: yet, in a trivial way, the
formation of judgements, as of every 'whole', presupposes the understanding of its parts. Be
that as it may, understanding those parts need not be independent of their being embedded
in judgements: using predicates (concepts) and names in judgements requires that we under¬
stand the way they function within (other or several) judgements: saying that a (the table) is
F (red) implies that we already understand both how the name a functions in judgements of
the form Ga, La, etc. ('the table is blue', '...is yellow', etc.) and how the concept F functions
in judgements of the form Fb, Fc, etc. ('the chair is red', 'the door is red', etc.). In other




ment, yet, once understood, our knowledge is about those names and the objects they denote
and not just about the judgements that contain them and the states of affairs (facts) they
denote84.
A further important aspect of the priority of truth over reference is the fact that in
uttering a judgement one places oneself under the normative requirement of the binary dis¬
tinction true-false. If the judgement is false one should be ready to withdraw it. Conversely
something that looks like a judgement but is not uttered under the obligation of withdrawal
is not really a judgement8'. Thus the caveat of withdrawal captures the very essence of the
normativity of meaning and grammar (or the structure of thought). Grammar is shaped ac¬
cording to the dichotomy true/false in so far as its elementary units are sentences. Conse¬
quently when we talk about grammar we refer to the logical structure of judgements that
makes them truth evaluable. Grammar (or the structure of thought) is logical. It is logical as
opposed to linguistic, because the grammatical structures of ordinary languages cannot nec¬
essarily account for the way sentences are truth-evaluable. Luntley puts in an acute way:
The study of grammar involved is...seen to be the study of that
structure of our thought and language that makes it truth-evaluable.
That is to say, the priority of semantics over metaphysics amounts
to the claim that it is by studying the structure of our thought neces¬
sary for it to be aimed at truth that we uncover the structure of the
world. Semantics provides an account of the structure of thought. It
provides an account of the structure of language that makes it suit¬
able for thinking and saying things that can be true or false. In so
far we restrict metaphysics to what can be thought about or talked
about, then a study of thought and talk will, ipso facto, be a study
of the general structure ofwhat is. On such a view, semantics gives
us the outline structure of what is thinkable. The only metaphysical
issues left untouched by such a study will be the issues concerned
83 Ibid. 18.
84 See Luntley, ibid. 22. Also Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), CHs 4 and 5. On the formation of judgements and the connections
between linguistic patterns of use and ontology see the classic and exemplary treatise of Quine,
'Speaking of Objects' in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia Univer¬
sity Press, 1977), 1-27 (1-16). Quine shows, in the best way, how the structures of language manage to
'reveal' the objects around us by demonstrating that the more complex judgements one is able to form,
the more refined one's ontology is. Of course Quine's purpose is to undermine the objectivity of con¬
ceptual schemes by showing how tightly they are connected to the various linguistic structures. His
demonstration has, nevertheless, been exploited in the opposite direction, the one I am also using; for
such an account see the bulk of Donald Davidson's work and for a quick summary his recent 'Seeing
through Language' in J. Preston, Thought and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 17-27.
85 See Luntley, ibid. 20, 21; the obligation of withdrawal can be taken to express the passive side of
what Habermas and Alexy call the claim to correctness that is raised anytime one utters an assertion.
For a detailed discussion of the claim to correctness vide CHs V and VI, infra.
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with the unthinkable. It is not clear that that amounts to anything at
all86.
In all the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis amounts to the idea that the semantic evalua¬
tion of sentences has an explanatory priority over the semantic evaluation of sub-sentential
expressions with the result that truth is the primitive semantic concept and not reference.
Our grasp of what it is for a name to refer is the grasp of the role it plays in true judgement.
The Menace ofIdealism
Favouring the philosophy of thought over ontology is prone to create the impression of re¬
butting realism for a certain sort of linguistic idealism. This allegation is connected, in par¬
ticular, with the traditional prejudice that any rejection of representationalism is tantamount
to a refutation of realism. If content is a priori connected with our way of conceptualising
the world how can it be anything more than a subjective account? Moreover, the objection
goes, if semantics-exhausts-ontology, how can any talk about the world amount to anything
more than an account of signs and the way we use them?
The value of these worries notwithstanding, it is not as straightforward that a
grammar-based account of content in refuting representations and the mind-world dualism
necessarily makes a move towards denying realism. Frege, in juxtaposing thoughts (the
content of judgements) to ideas (the main unit of mental representations) never misses an
opportunity to say that thoughts are objective entities whereas ideas are subjective. For
Frege the subjectivity of ideas reflects in the fact that we cannot communicate with them,
since what we communicate with has to be shared by everyone. Conversely, thoughts are
what we communicate with, hence they are shared by everyone. This is one reason that sup¬
ports the claim about the objectivity of thoughts. A second lies in the fact that thoughts and
not ideas are the bearers of truth/falsity. And for Frege truth is always objective1.
Those Fregean remarks indicate already the line of argument that can refute the ac¬
cusation of the denial of realism: Thought is truth evaluable, hence objective; it is not about
something that is internal to the mind as opposed to, say, something external that lies out
there(i.e. the environment). That is to say, grammar does not step into the place of ideas,
while the world still occupies the other side of the representationalist's dualistic universe.
Were it the case, the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis would, of course, be neglecting the
86 Luntley, op. cit. 23.
87 See for an accurate summary of these claims, Luntley, ibid. 26-28.
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world-side in an unforgivable way. But this nai've picture makes sense only if one sees the
claim for the priority of thought through the prism of representations and the concomitant
mind-world dualism. The priority-of-thought thesis should not be understood just as an in¬
version of the dualistic picture that favours intentional activity (judgement formation) over
perceptive activity (sense-data, the world). Such an inversion is, indeed, 'introvert' in the
sense that it falls short of explaining the aboutness of language by alluding to something
like the priority of the Giving (intentional activity/judgement formation) over the Given
(perceptual activity/the world).
Instead what the semantic-exhausts-ontology thesis is really about is the idea that
neither the Giving nor the Given enjoys ontological priority in accounting for content which
is another way of putting the refutation of the mind-world dualism. Further, this refutation is
not self-standing, an axiom that is accepted without further evidence. It is, as discussed ear¬
lier, the only consistent conclusion of the effort to account for content in connection with a
rational explanation of human behaviour. Though the issue of realism and idealism will be a
recurrent issue in the course of the dissertation and it will not be solved until later (if at
all!), some further remarks seem appropriate at this stage.
The priority of the grammar of thought, as an integral part of the rational explana¬
tion of behaviour, builds upon the idea that it is impossible to give an account of the refer¬
ence (of a sign) independently of (its) grammar. In pleading for this it endorses the claim
that grammar has an explanatory priority over reference and not that reference is non¬
existent. This claim lies at the heart of the anti-dualist argument for the relation between the
mind and the world and does not purport to refute reference in favour of grammar. Now, in
this 'monistic' picture, grammar and the reference of names are inseparable and the only
asymmetry that occurs is the explanatory priority of grammar which rests upon the need to
account for behaviour. Still, intentional activity (grammar), insofar as it reveals the onto¬
logical structures of the world, has to be supplemented by the inputs of perceptual activity.
It is precisely at this point, the point of the interconnection of the mind, the thought and the
world, that the monistic picture needs a non-dualist vocabulary that would avoid concepts
which might foster any impression of dichotomy. In a non-dualist account of content the
world is not really an input into something (the mind) which is later neatly organised into a
pattern (the grammar). This vocabulary is indeed misleading to the extent that it nurtures an
introverted ontology. Here is a more appropriate way to put it: 'input' is already part of the
a priori account of content; that is, content is (about) the world and grammar plays the role
of something like a 'pilot' who navigates through the world and 'cuts' it according to the
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need to account for rational behaviour88. When I point towards the Chrysler building saying:
'the roof demonstrates a fine example of art-deco architecture', the grammar of my judge¬
ment cuts the world to fit the judgement's content89. Here my judgement's content is not
about something different (e.g. an idea) from the Chrysler building; nor does the Chrysler
building have any relevance to my judgement's content other than the one dictated by its
grammar. Once dualism has been defeated there is no gap left between intentional activity
and the world and, hence, no need to succumb to any kind of 'ranking' between them be¬
cause both coincide in content-formation the way grammar prescribes. That is to say,
grammar or the structure of thought offers the transcendental justification for an equal par¬
ticipation of intentional activity (the Giving) and the world (the Given) in the process of
content-formation. Luntley makes this point with eloquence:
Suppose that the metaphysical input to grammar is transcendentally
justified; that is, it is not a gratuitous metaphysics plugged in just to
get the right results, it is there in order that we cut content at just
the points necessary to get that which rationally explains behaviour.
That, then, is anti-representationalism, for it is the idea that the in¬
dividuation of thought and its logical grammar is world-involving.
The logical grammar of thought, the structure by which it is truth-
evaluable, is not, then, a linguistic structure. It is a structure of how
we are in the world. The possession of content is the possession of
the world. Furthermore, if in our responsiveness to reasons, we take
ourselves to be responsive to contents (beliefs, etc.), this means that
our responsiveness to reasons can be a direct responsiveness to the
world. The world comes within the province of our thoughts, it falls
within the space of reasons90
All in all, the idea is that content is world-involving and grammar is the structure of the
world (hence of the content) to the extent at least that the world is viewed through the prism
of the need for a rational explanation of human behaviour.
Agenda
In chapter ELI will discuss in more detail the issue of the objectivity of thought-content in
T
the contcxt^an anti-representationalist semantic theory of content, like the one sketched in
the second half of this chapter. In doing so I will outline an account of thought-content that
escapes the sharp boundaries of the distinction between realism and idealism. For that pur-
88 Compare with Luntley, op. cit. 26-30.
89 See the identical example of S. L. Hurley in Consciousness in Action, 16.
90 Luntley, op. cit. 27.
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pose I will refer to the Fregean notion of the objectivity of thought as the objectivity that
rests upon the logical structure of grammar. I will further maintain that this semantic/logical
notion of objectivity is fully qualified in offering a mind-independent account of objec-
thood. The result will be that realism's interest in mind-independence and objectivity will
be satisfied without evoking an ontology that transcends the limits of language (semantics).
Finally, resting on the notion of objecthood-as-objectivity, I will embark on a rough account
of the objecthood of legal entities which will be completed in Ch IV.
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CHAPTER III
LEGAL AND OTHER ABSTRACT OBJECTS
Introduction
The semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis rests upon two pillars: the idea that representation-
alism is false and the idea that the structure (or the grammar) of thought is, more or less,
linguistic and can be represented by the structure of the (assertive) sentence. The first idea
implies the rejection of a dualistic picture in which the mind and the world make contact
through representations or some other sort of interface. The rejected assumption was further
supplemented by the thesis that the mind (thought) and its contents are shaped within the
world while the world is revealed in the grammar of thought. Hence, the story goes, the
structure of the thought is the structure of the world, or at least of this world, the one inhab¬
ited by our minds. At the same time, the second idea holds that the structure of the thought
is nothing more and nothing less than the structure of the language. Taken together, these
two ideas amount to the belief that the structure of the world is (via the structure of the
thought) roughly identical with the structure of the language. Hence, anytime we want to
know to what kinds of entities we are ontologically committed, the most appropriate thing to
do is to inquire into the grammar of our statements about the world and the patterns of our
reasoning with those statements. 'What objects there are' depends upon whether some terms
exhibit the appropriate pattern in true statements. This structure of the statement depicts the
structure of the world. This structure is objective owing to its being a priori, and hence it
does not depend upon subjective inner psychological states.
Connectedly, when we want to account for mental/intentional content we need to
look into the objective structure of thought which is the objective structure of the world.
When we form statements about the world, objectivity (of mental content) comes, so to
speak, in 'one move' without involving any act of comparison between representans and
representandum. Circular as it may appear, this conception of objectivity is firmly founded
on the ground of a mutual constraint: the grammar of the thought will be objective to the
extent that it succeeds in forming (truth-evaluable) judgements about the world, whereas the
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structure of the world will be objective to the extent that it is depicted by objective thought-
structures (judgements). In a sense objectivity states the conditions for an equilibrium be¬
tween the world and the thought in a similar way that a physical body, by performing a
turning move, signifies the harmonisation between two complementary forces (centrifugal
and centripetal). The world and the thought stand in an analogous complementary relation
rather than in an antagonistic one. And the formula of this relation can be revealed in what
has repeatedly been called the structure of thought (grammar).
Two Concepts ofObjectivity
The notion of objectivity in the context of a Fregean theory of content certainly calls for
some further elucidation. Objectivity, here, refers to the logical form (or the structure) of
thoughts and the patterns of (inferential) reasoning as opposed to the subjectivity of inner
psychological states. Both the structure of thoughts and the patterns of reasoning are the
subject matter of logic. The juxtaposition between logic and psychology emerges, in Frege's
own work, as a product of a rigorous effort to reject the view that logic is a psychological
(hence empirical) category'. One of the main shortages of a psychologistic explication of
logic is that the content of logic is empirically conditioned and therefore contingent: there
could always exist some novel situation where new or different logical principles or laws
might emerge, as it is always the case with different sorts of pain, pleasure, and so on. Frege
opposed this picture by alluding to the fact that our judgements and the inferences upon
which they rest do enjoy a degree of objectivity that makes it possible to ascertain if they
are correct or not independently of our inner psychological operations2. To that extent the
objectivity of logic initiates from the way things are: take for instance the principle of iden-
1 For a very clear exposition of the issue of objectivity in Frege's work, albeit in a clearly Kantian
spirit, vide T. Ricketts, 'Objectivity and Objecthood: Frege's Metaphysics of Judgement' in L.
Haaparanta and J. Ilintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized, Synthese Library, vol. 181 (Dordrecht: Reidel,
1986), 65-95.
2 Think the objectivity of grammar as referring to the structure of a judgement minus what Russell
called the propositional attitude or our disposition towards the judgement's content (the attitudes of
assuming, wondering, asserting, etc.). Vide Also Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 67, where he mentions Bolzano's distinction be¬
tween objective representations on the one hand and subjective representations and the reality on the
other. According to it objective representations consist neither in the object itself for '...the object is
located in space and time', nor in any subjective representation for subjective representations perish
with the passing of the time whereas the objective content of the judgement persists (Coffa, ibid. 67).
The analogy between the objectivity of representations and the objectivity of grammar is quite
straightforward (though in our case the talk of representations is not particularly appropriate consid¬
ering our rejection of dualism).
4
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tity that says that every object is identical with itself ('t = t')3. Independently of the psy-
chologico-empincal mechanisms that underlie an identity judgement, there is a further ne¬
cessity for the validity of that principle which has to do with the fact that every object is
indeed identical with itself. This is a property of objects that is, in some objective way, in¬
dependent from the psychological groundwork of judgement-formation but nevertheless
essential to the content of the judgement on self-identity. Put this way the issue of objectiv¬
ity expresses mainly the idea that the objectivity of our judgements is linked with the way
the external world is rather than with the inner mechanisms that support judgement forma¬
tion. Frege says:
Thus I can also acknowledge thoughts as independent of me. Other
men can grasp them just as much as I: I can acknowledge a science
in which many can be engaged in research. We are not owners of
thoughts as we are owners of our ideas4.
Now, given this notion of objectivity, there are two ways of interpreting it5. The first is the
more crude way of Platonism. It rests on the somewhat naive contrast: external world (ob¬
jective) - internal states (subjective). According to this unrefined classification if we want
to find things that are objective we have to look into the realm of objects; hence if thoughts
are to be objective they have to be themselves placed, as mind-independent abstract objects,
next to the other concrete objects of the external world, according to the way Platonism
prescribes. Seen this way the Fregean project amounts to no more than an attempt to bridge
the mind-world gap which reopens through Platonism. Ontology re-assumes priority over
grammar and the logical structure of judgements becomes dependent upon an ontological
account of what exists (which, at the end of the day, might end up being equally empirical
as a psychological account of inner states). Here, the distinction objective-subjective is de¬
fined through the background of (Platonist) ontology.
An alternative way to interpret the notion of objectivity is to abide by Frege's inter¬
est to ground the objectivity of logic in an a priori way within the structure of judgements
and the patterns of reasoning that aims to the formation of true judgements. Seen this way
objectivity refers to the a prioricity of the logical structure of inferential reasoning. This
3 Vide Ricketts, 'Objectivity and Objecthood', 68.
4 Vide Ricketts, 'Objectivity and Objecthood', 72. The passage originally appears in Frege,
'Thoughts' in P. Geach (ed.), Logical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), 24. Note that Frege
uses the word 'ideas' to refer to subjective psychological inner states.
5 For a more or less similar distinction, vide Ricketts, ibid. esp. 65-74.
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structure is a prerequisite in order to refer to objects (abstract or concrete) and therefore the
notion of objecthood makes sense only against the background of judgements and the pat¬
terns of reasoning with them. To put it more vigorously, if thoughts need to be objective in
the last instance, they have to claim an a priori objectivity which is prior to the notion of
objecthood. Rather it is the latter that rests on the former. On this account objectivity lies in
the logical structure of judgements as they are employed within patterns of reasoning. In
other words, what is objective is something akin to the matrix of the thought and retains
some priority towards both our internal states and the way things might turn out to be (as
depicted in true judgements). This structure reveals what kind of terms or building blocks
can potentially form the content of a judgement irrespective of the judgement's truth or
falsity. Admittedly, the grammar of thought is especially interested in the formation of true
judgements and therefore not every combination of blocks will be satisfactory. This fact
notwithstanding, truth and falsity depend upon the structure imposed by the grammar of
judgements6. That is to say, before anything can be judged as being the case or not, as ex¬
isting or non-existing, it has to be incorporated or 'translated' into a judgement according to
the way and under the restrictions grammar prescribes.
On theObjectivity of the Grammar of Thought
In a Fregean context, when we talk about the objective grammar of thought we refer to those
patterns that govern the formation of judgements and the inference of valid (true) judge¬
ments from other valid (true) judgements (this is the process of reasoning). These patterns,
or laws are, trivially, identified as belonging to the realm of logic, i.e. as being laws of logic.
The laws of logic have to be general laws that apply universally to the process of reasoning
that enables us to connect the content of thoughts with truth-values (by forming valid
judgements). Only by complying to those standards may the laws of logic form the basis of
communication which otherwise cannot be achieved through subjective inner psychological
states. Put in this way, the objectivity of the grammar of thought consists in the objective,
general and universal laws of logic. Those laws have as their subject matter the formation of
correct judgements. To that extent they are the standards for the formation of correct
6 This notion of objectivity shows a certain affinity to A. Marmor's conception of logical objectivity.
This is the objectivity that applies to some type of discourse if it is possible to ascribe determinate
truth values to the statements comprising the discourse (vide A. Marmor, 'An Essay on the Objectivity
of Law' in Bix (ed.), Analysing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998),
3-31 (6, 7)). One could say broader that the objectivity of judgements lies in the fact that their seman-
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judgements. Depicting this connection between logic and truth Frege says:
Just as 'beautiful' points the way for aesthetics and 'good' for eth¬
ics, so do words like 'true' for logic. All sciences have truth as their
goal; but logic is also concerned with it in a quite different way:
logic has much the same relation to truth as physics has to weight
or heat. To discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic
to discern the laws of truth7.
At this point, the most crucial question for the issue of ontological commitment is where
one is going to locate the standards of truth or else correct reasoning. A Platonist explica¬
tion which reifies truth (-values) and other standards of correctness as objects that can be
associated to thoughts according to a name-bearer relation, would undermine the central
importance of the judgement. Such a move would signify a backwards move towards the
undesired mind-world dualism with the effect that the judgement would lose its ability to
depict the world (which is the same as saying that it is objective). Besides being undesir¬
able, the Platonist move seems also to be unfounded within the Fregean project. Not the
least so, because any Platonist move would imply the unacceptable, within the Fregean
project, claim that the standards of correctness are detached from the judgement. Making
this last point the starting point of a Kantian interpretation of Frege's conception of objec¬
tivity in judgement-formation, let me illustrate the impermissibility of the Platonist argu¬
ment.
A judgement-focused8 explication of Frege's program resists the idea that logic, as
consisting of the standards of judging, is about judging itself in a pure form. It is not the
case, in other words, that the laws of logic generalise over the forms of statements as re¬
gards their truth, thus amounting to the use of schematic letters and a truth predicate9.
Within the Fregean project logic seems to realise a more substantive role. The basic laws of
logic generalise over everything and every property. They do not mention the one or the
other specific thing nor they generalise over things in relation to the one or the other prop¬
erty. The point is namely that in Frege the laws of logic, or the standards of reasoning, do
tic/logical structure makes them truth-evaluable.
7 Vide Gottlob Frege, 'Thought', in M. Beaney, The Frege Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 325-
345 (325).
8 For a very interesting exposition in this spirit, vide H. Ricketts, 'Objectivity and Objecthood', as
well as his 'Logic and Truth in Frege' in The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. LXX (1996),
121-140. Instead of judgement-focused one could say Kantian. I think, though, that using the former
leaves less room for misconceptions.
9 As Ricketts notes this a more contemporary idea of logic, vide 'Objectivity and Objecthood', 76.
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not substantiate externally to the concrete judgements in a way that would involve a meta¬
language which would describe the way those standards apply to the judgements in order for
them to be true (correct). Instead, the more substantive conception of logic which resides in
the Fregean program, endeavours to reveal the standards of reasoning within the context of
the judgement.
Thepredicate 'true'
A very good way to elucidate this point is by taking the predicate 'true'. For Frege the at¬
tachment of this predicate to our statements is not required because truth is not an (external)
property that we need to attach to our thoughts through judgements. Any definition, in a
meta-language, of the concept of truth taking it to be a property of thoughts, say in the way
that the correspondence theory takes it to be, would imply that we need a judgement in or¬
der to connect thoughts with the property of truth in the same way that we need some other
recognitional capacity in order to connect a chair with the property of being red. But the
capacity to recognise anything as having some property is not more than making a judge¬
ment. If this is the case then it seems that judgements are of two kinds: those that assign
properties to things (as the property of being 'red') and those that assign the specific prop¬
erty of being true specifically to thoughts. Such a conclusion is absurd. Its absurdity derives
from overlooking that any judgement of the form 'the chair in front of me is red' does not
assign any property to the corresponding thought but merely fulfils the requirements for a
true thought by associating it with a whole network of inferential reasoning10.
In a way, truth is not a property to be assigned to something (a thought) but relates
to the method that properties are assigned to things through judgements. If the judgement
assigns the property in a successful way then the corresponding thought is true. And the
success of such an assignment is constituted through the valid inference of the judgement
from other judgements and not on the basis of an extra judgement that aims to connect the
original judgement/thought with the property of truth (the way truth is specified by a meta¬
language). On the contrary, supposing the latter would lead to an infinite regress: every time
we would form a judgement in order to connect a thought with the property of 'being true'
according to the conditions set in some definition of truth, say 'correspondence with real-
10 Truth is in a way connected with the process of judging through reasoning. If thoughts can be
viewed as isolated propositions 'corresponding' to some 'frozen' bits of reality, judgements are incor¬
porated in chains of reasoning and are connected with other judgements in a way that makes them
permissible (true) or false (impermissible).
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ity', we would need a further judgement in order to connect the thought that the first
thought is connected with the property of truth ('corresponds with reality') anew with the
property of truth (as a 'correspondence with reality'), and so on".
The important lesson to be drawn from the hitherto discussion is that truth and the
other standards of correctness of judgements cannot be given on a meta-level, externally to
judgements. Of course, this is not to say that there are no standards or that they are in some
way ineffable. Frege takes those standards to be of the maximal generality and not to be
inferred on the basis of the laws of any other domain of knowledge (or discipline)12.
Amongst those standards for the correctness of judgements are the laws of logic and the
principles of inference (like, for instance, the modus ponens argument) which Frege takes to
be distinct from the former. Be that as it may, in the Fregean system, the standards of cor¬
rectness are not provided by statements about the judgements of a domain of knowledge,
but are demonstrated through the judgements within the domain of knowledge. Meeting or
failing those standards is not a property that is ascribed to our thoughts through judgements;
it is the appreciation within our reasoning of the limitations that this standard sets to our
reasoning:
The recognition of a thought to be contradictory is not a judgement
to the effect that a thought has some property. It is rather an appre¬
hension manifested by the refusal to affirm the thought while af¬
firming the opposite. Similarly to recognise that one thought im¬
plies another is to be prepared to accept the second on the basis of
the first13
This conception of truth and the other standards of correctness as being made explicit
within judgements, yields a picture of the grammar of thought according to which the latter
is realised within the process of our inferential reasoning. To locate the grammar of thought,
as containing the standards for making judgements, within the process of reasoning has the
seminal effect of locating objectivity within language. This is one of the most important
transformations that the so-called linguistic turn achieved during the transition from the 19th
11 Vide Ricketts, 'Objectivity and Objecthood', 77-79; and for a more detailed account of the infinite
regress, his 'Truth and Logic', part II. Having said that, a judgement-immanent account of truth would
not be impossible. In fact chapter IV will attempt to mould such an account under the label of a 'se¬
mantic theory of truth'. A semantic theory of truth will provide for a definition of truth yet in such
terms that the definition will remain within the requirements of the present reading of Frege's concep¬
tion of truth.
12 Vide Ricketts, 'Objectivity', part II.
13 Vide Ricketts, 'Objectivity', 84.
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to the 20th century. After taking this step the environment is no longer conceivable in terms
other than those of language. If what is true or false, consistent or inconsistent, depends on
criteria which are made explicit within our reasoning, then truth and falsity are not a matter
of correspondence to, or description of something external, that lies 'out there' but, instead,
a matter of reasoning. Moreover not only truth, but, as we will see in a moment, also exis¬
tence becomes a matter of reasoning. The patterns of inference set the framework within
which the ontological segmentation of things into objects (as names) and properties (as con¬
cepts) takes place, or, to say with Quine, where 'to be is to be the bound of a variable'. This
paradigm-transformation of philosophy, as already stressed in many previous occasions, is
precisely the opposite of the subjectivism and the scepticism fostered by the idea of a radi¬
cal mind-world dualism. It rests on the conviction that judgements are not combinations of
(subjective) ideas in our heads whereas the criteria of truth lie 'out there'. That our judge¬
ments are subjective until they come to match (how then?) the world. Rather, the underlying
assumption of the linguistic transformation, is that we escape from our subjectivity at the
moment we succeed to form valid judgements and to reason successfully. At that point we
start participating in the world.
Truth and correctness are, thus, interwoven with the way the grammar of the
thought unfolds as we go along making valid inferences and, broader, reasoning success¬
fully. Let me illuminate two further aspects of the way grammar (or the standards of cor¬
rectness) is enmeshed with the process of judgement-formation. The first aspect concerns
the fact that grammar enables us to distinguish between the grasping of a thought and its
being true or false. It is often the case that despite being not in a position to ascertain a
judgement's truth or falsity, we still can understand or grasp it. Here grammar provides
something like the intelligibility conditions for our sentences. The second aspect refers to
the fact that our judgements, when taken together as a whole, impose a handful of standards
as to the truth or falsity of any new judgement. In this second function grammar generates
something like criteria for coherence. In this context the truth of a judgement will always
depend upon the inferences that previous valid/true judgements generate. Both in its intelli¬
gibility and coherence roles grammar determines in an a priori way a great portion of the
truth conditions of our judgements. It is the case, in other words, that the combination of
intelligibility and coherence as emerging from the structural requirements of grammar lay
down in an a priori way the truth conditions of a new judgement. Take for instance the fol¬
lowing two judgements:
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J1: All Mediterranean countries are warm,
And
J2: As a Mediterranean country Greece is extremely cold.
As they stand those two judgements are logically (that is a priori) incompatible. Even if we
do not have any other information about their truth-values, their combination forces us to
say that one of the two is false. This conclusion can be based merely on the structural fea¬
tures of the two judgements: on a first level we are able to grasp the two corresponding
thoughts without having any information about their being true or false. This ability derives
merely from the fact that both J1 and J2 are 'codified' in the same way, i.e. the way gram¬
mar prescribes. This codification is the inescapable condition for their intelligibility. Notice
now how the code (the logical structure) generates substantive conclusions: since both
judgements are captured in the same structure a kind of unity appears between them. It is no
longer enough that J1 and J2 are individually intelligible, they have to exhibit a joint intelli¬
gibility, or else coherence14. Now coherence, postulated by the a priori character of gram¬
mar, is in a position to allow or block, in an a priori way, potential inferences concerning
the truth of the two judgements15 Assume for a moment that J1 is a true judgement and that
14 In a normative context the requirement of coherence can not be satisfied by mere inferential or
deductive reasoning as further evaluations are needed. In legal reasoning it is the case that coherence
requirements are met by a two level reasoning. There the first-order or internal justification concerns
the syntactical intelligibility and the inferential coherence of legal propositions, whereas the second-
order or external justification is more about their practical appropriateness (vide Neil D. MacCormick,
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), Chs 2, 5, 7 and Robert Alexy,
Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des ratinalen Diskurses als Theorie der ju-
ristischen Begriindung, 2nd edn (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 273-347. For a very compre¬
hensive review of coherence theories in philosophy and law, as well as for an original statement, vide
Susanne Bracker, Koharenz und juristische Interpretation, Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie und
Rechtstheorie vol. 27 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000). One of the aims of the present dissertation is to
establish the fact that the two levels of justification do not represent anything more than an analytical
distinction. This is going to be argued on the basis of the assumption that the pragmatic presupposi¬
tions of normative/legal meaning contain an a priori principle of practical reason which supplements
the a priori logical principles that are to be found in the structures of legal language (semantics); vide
part III of the dissertation, infra.
15 One should be careful to avoid any misunderstanding: what is a priori here is the structure of
thought and the postulated coherence and not truth itself. Were it the case that the truth of our judge¬
ments is a priori true there would not be any need for further reasoning! The claim is rather that the a
priori structure of grammar recasts the problem of truth as a matter of inferential reasoning in a way
that avoids the representationalist vocabulary of reference. This having been said, it is still the case
that our empirical judgements about the world will be synthetic: there is an endless number of novel
judgements on what is the case. It is just the truth of those judgements that is going to be decided
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we inquire on the cognitive content of J2. The intelligibility and coherence conditions
would a priori render invalid an inference of the form J1 J2, without requiring any fur¬
ther information about J216. In a way, namely, the structure of grammar transfers knowledge
about the content of J1 to the content of J2 through (inferential) reasoning. Understood in
this way logical patterns impose standards according to which we are able to determine the
truth or falsity of our judgements on the basis of inferential reasoning. They enable us to
appreciate inconsistencies, agreements or analogies between the premisses of our reasoning
without resorting to the notion of reference. Inasmuch as reasoning is more of a form of
reason-giving rather than of comparing signs (or groups of signs) with correlating objects,
truth and falsity become the object of justification. Truth is no longer a question of deciding
in a crude/direct way if something of the mind's making refers (corresponds) to something
else that exists out there in the world. Once reference has been substituted, under the aegis
of the 'semantic-exhausts-ontology' thesis, with the notion of truth, truth cannot be expli¬
cated by evoking reference anew. Grammar provides a different means of deciding matters
of truth (and, no doubt, reference): this is justification through valid inferential reasoning.
Thus, the talk about truth and falsity can be already re-stated as talk about justified or not
justified (inferential) reasoning, as already tendered in the previous chapter. Hence, what is
not justified will also be not the case (will be false) and vice-versa17.
Attendance to the forms of inferential reasoning is in the position to reveal the
structure of the world which is identical with the structure of the thought and which is, fur¬
ther, inescapable (a priori). The realisation of the existence of a common underlying struc¬
ture implies that this structure is also public in the sense that it is intelligible in an objective
way, independently of inner mental processes. It is this assumption that led Frege to distin¬
guish between the process of causal explanation of a person's beliefs (psychology) and the
justification of those beliefs (logic)18. It is the latter, justification through inference, and its
underlying structures that are objective and with which Frege's interest exclusively lies.
Construed this way judgement formation is based on our ability to appreciate logical pat-
against the background of our hitherto valid judgements (this is not odd considering the fact that all
this is said on the basis of the non-dualist assumption that the world is the thought and vice-versa. On
this assumption anything that does not exist or is not the case can only amount to a false judgement).
16 The underlying symmetry between the world and the thought emerges here quite graphically. True
facts will block inferences that lead to false conclusions.
17 Clearly this point requires detailed argument in order to be established, argument that escapes the
scope of the dissertation. Perhaps a suitable line of argument is to suppose that some notion ofjustifi¬
cation that includes possible along with actual judgements would be able to accommodate the ten¬
dered point.
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terns, inconsistencies and implications within a process of reasoning. Making or using
judgements amounts to no less than mastering the ability to agree and disagree, to reason
with others and, to put it in a nutshell, to communicate19.
In all, in the second of the two surveyed interpretations, the notion of objectivity is
not about a distinction between (subjective) mental entities and (objective) external objects.
More than that, objectivity refers to the conditions that are common both to the thought and
the world (and hence to objecthood). These conditions are in both cases common and a
priori. Objectivity so portrayed sets the framework within which both communication and
knowledge are realised. The conception of a common and objective structure for the thought
and the world ensures that meaning and ontology, hence communication in language and
knowledge of the world are just two sides of the same coin. That is, knowledge will always
be canvassed against the background of successful dissemination of meanings and, vice-
versa, meanings will always be assembled on the basis of what is (or is not) the case. Con¬
versely private judgements or private insights into the substance of the forms of the Being
are not eligible to produce either meaning or knowledge, hence we cannot communi¬
cate/know anything about them20.
An Outline of a Semantic Explication of Ontology
The judgement-centred explication of truth and correctness amounts to a relocation of ob¬
jectivity from the realm of ontology to that of inferential reasoning. In response, one can
analyse ontological categories as being supervenient on logical ones21. This is made avail¬
able on the appreciation of the fact that the grasping of inference patterns involves thinking
of statements as logically segmented into significant parts. By applying the inference pat¬
terns one comes to realise that statements are segmented into names and predicates. Those
inference patterns involving quantification, different levels of generality, and so on simply
show that names and concepts make, respectively, always the same contribution to the truth-
values of the statements they belong to (Frege says for names that 'they refer to objects',
18 Vide Ricketts, ibid. 74-75.
19 The idea that judgement formation is embedded in a communicative enterprise will be further de¬
veloped in part three of the dissertation. For the moment it will suffice to say that the idea of commu¬
nication will be reconstructed as the telos of judgement-formation in language. Connectedly the idea
of communication will function as a normative constraint for our judgements.
20 These ideas will be further developed in CHs V and VI in the context of a discussion of L. Witt¬
genstein's private language considerations.
21 Vide Ricketts, ibid, part III.
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whereas predicates 'refer to concepts')22. Hence referring to an object or a concept, depends
on the role a word plays within the context of a statement and broader within an inference
scheme (this is the so-called Context Principle)23. In this sense the expression 'referring to
an object/concept' cannot be ascribed to the realm of ontology since its real purpose is to
state the semantic role that a word (name and predicate respectively) plays towards contrib¬
uting to the truth-value of a statement. It is noteworthy that Ricketts reconstructs Frege's
talk of statements' 'meaning' (referring to) truth-values as analogue to the way 'Venus'
means (refers to) a planet. Ricketts argues that this analogy should not be interpreted as re¬
introducing the primacy of ontology through the name-bearer relation. Instead Frege's talk
c
about statements 'meaning' (referring to' truth-values should be interpreted according to the
way 'meaning' was explicated through the context-principle, namely as the way something
contributes to truth and objectivity. Only in this way can one retain the idea that the stan¬
dards of correctness are judgement-immanent, as well as the related idea that truth is not a
property of the contents of judgements24. This reconstruction can be taken to capture the
insights of the 'semantic exhausts ontology' thesis that was introduced in chapter II.
Evidently the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis delegates the authority for an¬
swering the question 'which objects there are' to grammar. In particular it is the structure of
the judgement which will reveal which objects are depicted by the various terms which form
the parts of a judgement. Things are not very different with legal terms and legal rides25.
Any inquiry into the nature, existence, etc. of legal entities (rules, principles or other legal
terms like, say, 'free movement of goods' or 'mitigating reasons') will turn into an investi¬
gation of the appropriate judgements that contain the relevant terms. I am going to make
references to two different strategies for accounting for the ontological status of legal
terms/objects. The first is strictly Fregean and makes use of Frege's account for abstract
objects, a species of which legal objects are considered to be26. Measured against the real-
ism-anti-realism debate, this strategy seems to vest legal objects with a more robust onto-
22 In the vocabulary of modem analytic philosophy Frege's 'Bedeutung' ('meaning') stands for 'ref¬
erence'; whereas Frege's 'Sinn' ('sense') stands for 'meaning'.
23 For a very clear presentation of the way language is segmented into ontological categories, vide
Frege, 'On Concept and Object', in M Beaney, The Frege Reader, 181-193.
24 For further analysis vide Ricketts, op. cit. 90-91.
25 It can already be anticipated here that legal rales can feature as nominalised terms in judgements of
the form 'it is a fact that 'R(ule)". Vide the discussion in Ch IV; and for a detailed analysis, Carsten
Heidemann, die Norm als Tatsache. Zur Normentheorie Hans Kelsens, Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie
und Rechtstheorie vol. 13 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997), 324-336.
26 Along these lines runs the account in S. Coyle, 'On the Foundations of Legal Reasoning in Interna¬
tional Law' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Glasgow, 1998), CHs, 3 and 4.
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logical texture, in an effort to remain faithful towards Fregean Platonism about objects.
Figuratively put, this strategy appears to allude to the first notion of objectivity 'as objec-
thood'. Conversely the second strategy, that is going to be labelled Neo-Kantian27, can taken
to be more anti-realist or non-realist, to the extent that it fully subscribes to the subordina¬
tion of ontology to semantics inasmuch as it talks about the world being made available to
us through prepositional structures (the language). This strategy appears to exploit the sec¬
ond interpretation of objectivity 'as a prioricity\ Though the difference might seem to be
important on a dualist picture of the mind-world relations, under a non-dualist or contextu-
alist assumption it seems to loose much of its edge and becomes more of a difference in
emphasis. Moreover it is going to be shown that the rejection of dualism will render the
realism/anti-realism juxtaposition inadequate as a metaphysical distinction. The reason is
roughly that in a contextualist universe the reality of the world as put forward by the notion
of reference of signs is perfectly compatible with the epistemological priority of semantics
as substantiated by the grammar of signs. Under this assumption the two strategies will be
much closer than one might have initially thought.
the Background of the Fregean Program28
Now, it would seem appropriate to pinpoint the connections between the semantics-
exhausts-ontology thesis and Frege's original effort to give an account of the structure of
thought.
In his Begriffsschrift Frege put forward a program in order to achieve in philosophy
what Kant thought to be possible only in the domain of arithmetic: a symbolism that por¬
trays not the things it is about but what we say about them, a symbolism that gives a picture
not of the things thought but of thought itself, in an objective way29. (Insofar Frege's logical
symbolism was more about what nowadays would be taken to be part of semantics than of
symbolic logic). Accordingly Frege tried to isolate the objective from the subjective element
in semantics. Again, here, the program of locating objective contents unfolds in the envi¬
ronment of judgement. Frege thought that the meanings (the Fregean 'Sinne' or 'senses') of
the words we encounter in a judgement are objective representations. Those objective rep-
27 This is the method developed in C. Heidemann, ibid.
28 In this section I attempt to paint with a broad brush the tenets of Frege's philosophy that concern
the present discussion. The presentation that follows - which is far from being exhaustive - relies
mainly on Coffa, The Semantic Tradition, CHs 4 and 5.
29 Vide Coffa, The Semantic Tradition, 64.
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resentations can be either concepts or objects. In other words the meanings of words are one
kind of those two objective representations. Now these representations matter not for their
own sake but for the things we can do with them by linking them. The various combinations
of concepts and objects produce different judgements. Hence a judgement is a linguistic
entity composed by different combinations of objective meanings that are either concept or
objects. In juxtaposition to Kant, who thought that judgements are combinations of concepts
and (sentential) intuitions, Frege managed to 'purify' the environment of the judgement
from any subjective elements (intuitions)30, rendering thus his program the most important
challenge to the Kantian conception of the judgement.
In this purified environment of the judgement Frege locates the process of under¬
standing human knowledge. Any account of knowledge will have to 'pass' through an ac¬
count of the semantic structure of judgements, with the further effect that all theory of
knowledge will, at the end of the day, be a theory of meanings (semantics)31. This theory of
meanings will, clearly, involve a study of the three pivotal notions of the judgement, the
concept and the object. Frege takes judgements and objects as given and focuses on the
study of concept-terms. Contrary to the philosophical mainstream of his time32 he rejects the
belief that concepts occur through a gradual process of abstraction of features from particu¬
lar objects33, by employing abstract thought experiments independently of the formation of
judgements. Against this idea of concepts' being something whose content is already fixed,
Frege fully locates concept formation within judgement formation. As a result the content of
any concept will occur through its employment in multiple judgements. In fact, in what can
be taken to be one of the most revolutionary moves in modern philosophy, he equates the
30 The problem of intuitions and their subjective character would require an extensive analysis. For
the purposes of the present discussion I will offer a couple of remarks: intuitions in the Kantian sense
are a psychological category because they refer to the way our nervous system deals with signals from
the environment. Now if one, like Kant, takes such a category to constitute one of the building blocks
of judgements, one cannot avoid introducing into one's account a subjective element. That is, if one
makes intuitions more basic than objects, then one makes the metaphysics of intuitions, and its con¬
comitant flaws, more basic than the things that object-terms mean. But think of the following: if the
subjectivity of intuitions can be eliminated through the objectivity of object-meanings whenever one
takes object-terms to be more basic, that will not necessarily be the case under a reversed order of
things. Intuitions, in other words, can be made to be uniform when projected upon objective meanings
but not vice-versa. To put it simply, it is of great importance which of the two we choose to make our
regulative ideal, the intuition or the object. Taking the former to inform our judgements could easily
lead to the acceptance of phenomena of private meaning which would be totally inappropriate to ac¬
count for meaning, understanding and rational human behaviour.
31 Vide the discussion of anti-representationalism in Ch II, supra, passim.
32 For a detailed account vide Coffa, ibid. CHs 1, 2, 3.
33 Vide Coffa, The Semantic Tradition, 68-69.
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transition from the judgement to the concept with the step of linking a mathematical func¬
tion F with its values (Fa, Fb, Fc,...etc.). Flere concepts are taken to play the role of func¬
tions (e.g. F) while values are equated to objects (a, b, c, etc.). Frege ingeniously realised
that as it is possible to isolate a function by excluding its values, in the very same way it is
possible to capture the content of a concept by subtracting the one or the other object from
the environment of the judgement. After taking this step concepts are shown to be 'unsatu¬
rated', or in need of completion and could be easily represented as 'valueless' functions [as
in F()].
As implied, objects for Frege do not constitute a special problem since he takes
them as given. Hence he uses them in order to specify the content of concept-terms. Be that
as it may, his account of concepts can, due to its coherentist/holistic structure, be equally
exploited towards an understanding of objects. On this assumption it is possible that objects
be specified through the connection of object-terms with concept-terms in the formation of
judgements. The structure of the judgement points towards the fact that the meanings of
object-terms are dependent upon the meanings of concept-terms. Since both kinds of mean¬
ings stand for objective representations of respectively objects and concepts, it follows that
objects and concepts are closely interrelated. Objects, in other words, exist only in connec¬
tion with concepts. Hence, at the level of judgement, an object exists whenever there is an
object term which is subsumed under a predicate (concept-term). The object-term will be
then taken to play the role of a name (singular term) and will stand for an existing object.
Accordingly, the judgement 'the table is red' (F is G) can be analysed as being put together
by the two judgements: 'there is something that is a table' (a is F) and 'there is something
which is red' (a is G). Here the singular term 'a' (or in the composite judgement the name
'the table') will stand for an existing object34. Under this conditions any account of the ex¬
istence of an object will amount to nothing more than the observance of the semantic role
that certain expressions (singular terms, names) exhibit in the formation of judgements.
With the help of this rough template of definitions, I would like now to give an out¬
line of an account of legal terms (rules, concepts35) as denoting abstract objects.
34 The existence of an object can be illustrated even clearer when an object's falling under a given
concept is explicated by employing the existential quantifier. In our example this would imply the
following transformation: a is F ('this is a table') 3x : Fx ('there is a something which is a table'; or
'there is a table').
35 In order to avoid any confusion, it would be appropriate to note that by using the term 'concept' for
some legal entities I am not equating them to concept-terms that stand for universals (like 'red',
'round', etc.). It is rather the case that legal concepts are a species of object-terms; I prefer though to
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Abstract Legal Objects
The a priori grammar of thought makes available the possibility to reconstruct legal dis¬
course as a discourse about (legal) objects. Considering the grammar-dependent notion of
objecthood, as portrayed earlier, this is not a very surprising or in any sense particularly
'robust' claim: the fact that legal discourse consists of propositions containing terms or
expressions which exhibit the pattern of object-terms, allows one to infer the existence of
legal objects. Accordingly, when the talk is about 'contracts', 'rights', and so on, it seems
pretty clear that these terms refer, at least in a trivial sense, to those objects. Admittedly, on
a closer look, those objects are not the same as tables, chairs or oranges. Other than those
concrete objects, legal objects seem to be products of intellectual activity and hence non-
material and non-concrete, i.e. abstract (like numbers)36. On the other hand those legal ob¬
jects seem to share with concrete objects, like apples, the same logical objecthood which
points towards a certain externality in relation to mental entities (like beliefs or other inten¬
tional states); by virtue of this objecthood legal objects are not dependent upon, though they
originate from, intellectual activity, in other words they enjoy a considerable degree of ob¬
jectivity.
Legal (abstract) objects and mind-independence
Now there seem to be several issues arising from the understanding of legal objects as ab¬
stract objects. Mind-(in)dependence can be taken to be the first one: if legal objects are
mental constructions how is it possible that they can claim objecthood in the way other non-
mental and mind-independent objects do? This concern is closely interrelated to the issue of
realism: if legal objects are indeed mind-independent is it also the case that they are verifi¬
cation transcendent (or better, that the truth of the propositions that contain them, is verifi¬
cation-transcendent)? And what happens if one denies verification-transcendence? Does it
amount to denying mind-independence altogether, or merely a very strong version of it?
Further, would it be possible to accept some version of objecthood that combines abstract-
ness with mind-independence while rejecting verification independence? Before tackling
any of those complicated issues, it might be useful to lay down the guidelines for an argu¬
ment for the existence of abstract objects that is no more than a generalisation of Frege's
talk about them as concepts rather than names because of their abstractness (it seems to me that it
would sound a bit odd to talk of 'breach of contract' as being a name).
36 Cf. Coyle, 'On the Foundations of Legal Reasoning', Ch. 3, 82-86.
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claim that numbers are objects37. Here are the premisses that support the Fregean argument
about abstract objects:
(pi) if a range of expressions function as singular terms in true statements, then there are objects
denoted by expressions belonging to that range38
(p2) Numerals, and many other numerical expressions besides, do so function in many true state¬
ments
therefore:
(C) There exist objects denoted by those expressions (i.e. there are abstract objects).
This argument works roughly for the existence of all abstract objects including legal ones.
Clearly its power lies in the semantic role that singular terms assume within the context of
statements39. This role consists in determining the truth-conditions of the statement in the
sense that the statement's truth values can only be stated if the referential role of the rele¬
vant singular term is taken seriously (in Hale's words if '... the singular term discharges its
referential function'40). Stated in this way, the semantic role of singular terms appears to
have a robust ontological implication: namely that there must exist objects to which the one
or the other singular term refers. This picture gives the impression that the required objects
have to be endorsed in a strong externalist/referential way if the inference from the semantic
role of singular terms to existence statements about objects of some kind (in our case ab¬
stract legal objects) is to be valid. That need not be a problem as long as this requirement is
understood under the cupola of the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis and its concomitant
rejection of representationalism. If, though, the claim goes as far as to maintain that actually
the existence of objects can be separated from the semantic role that the relevant terms ex¬
hibit within judgements, then the Fregean argument collapses and in its place re-emerges the
barrier that keeps the mind apart from the world.
To avoid such undesirable effects, one will have to argue that the semantic role of
37 Vide Coyle, ibid. 89-90. Vide also Hale, Abstract Objects, Philosophical Theory Series (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1987), 10.
38 1 use the argument as stated in Coyle, ibid. 89, however without limiting the conclusion to numeri¬
cal expressions.
39 Vide Hale, Abstract Objects, 12.
40 Ibid. 12.
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legal singular terms is adequate for grounding existential claims about legal objects without
any additional allusion to the primacy of reference. This conclusion can be established by
showing first that the semantic-role argument is self-sufficient without being circular and,
second, by addressing the issue of realism in the light of the rejection of the mind-world
dualism. Of course, these two issues are not independent of each other. Any explication of
objecthood that is motivated by the assumption that the logical structure of judgements 'su¬
pervenes', as it were, upon the referential function of object-terms is postulated or, stronger,
only makes sense, against the supposition of a realist ontology that is essentially dualist. Put
this way the referential explication of objecthood and some sort of robust dualistic realism
will always go hand in hand. That we do not really need to buy into this problematic pack¬
age is going to be the conclusion of a two-part argument discussed under the label of the
issue of circularity and the issue of realism respectively. This will essentially show that the
rejection of the mind-world dualism and the attendant idea of mental interfaces is sufficient
in dismantling both the necessity for a strong realism and the idea of a reference-based ex¬
plication of objecthood.
The issue ofcircularity
In this section I attempt to tackle in more detail a problem that was first addressed in sec¬
tion 3 of this chapters concerning the possibility of a semantic explication of the concept of
reference that does not rest on that concept (circularity). Put in other words the problem
identified here refers to the degree to which it is possible to explicate the notion of objec¬
thood and reference by using only the objective logical structure of judgements. Since this
structure is what makes judgements truth-evaluable, the problem can be restated as involv¬
ing the possibility of an explication of reference through the notion of truth that, in its turn,
is not informed by the notion of reference! If such an explication is possible we will have
made a decisive step towards establishing the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis and the a
priori status of the structure of thought. In arguing for such an explication I will refer to a
formal-logical way of dealing with the problem of circularity.
The issue of circularity can be thought as involving two levels. The first, somewhat
formal, level concerns the ability to account for something's being a singular term without
resorting to the notion of reference. The second level deals with the preliminary question
whether reference can be captured in terms which are independent of the structure of
thought, and hence whether it can provide for a more primitive notion of objectivity than the
one supplied by the logical structure of thought. This is the issue of realism/Platonism in its
107
various forms.
As indicated the Fregean argument on abstract objects needs to be supplemented by
an account that would provide a means for identifying singular termhood for a term t inde¬
pendently from the notion of reference41. Hale bases this independent means on a series of
criteria supplied by Dummett in his Frege: Philosophy ofLanguage42. The underlying idea
in those criteria is that there are certain patterns of inferential reasoning which are valid
when singular terms occupy certain positions in their premisses or conclusions, whereas
they are invalid if this is not the case43. Here are the original criteria formulated by Dum¬
mett:
t is a singular term if and only if,
for any sentence A(t), the inference from A(t) to 'There is something such that A(it)' is valid
for any sentences A(t) and B(t), the inference from A(t) & B(t) to 'There is something such
that A(it) and B(it) is valid
for any sentences A(t) and B(t), the inference from 'it is true of t that A(it) or B(t)' to 'A(t) or
B(t)' is valid
Though these criteria are adequate for a large number of cases it appears, as Coyle observes,
that they involve serious problems in choices of A(t) and B(t) that contain opaque con¬
texts44. These are, roughly, contexts of utterance in which transparency of reference and
transitivity of identity are not preserved. These contexts involve propositional attitudes like
believing, wishing, etc. Imagine someone's, say Nigel's, belief 'that Santorini is an island in
the Aegean sea'. This belief is true; but unbeknownst to Nigel, Santorini is identical with
Thira. From these true premisses it does not really follow that 'Nigel believes that Thira is
an island in the Aegean sea'. Here the opacity of the context of Nigel's belief does not pre¬
serve transitivity of identity. Cases of opaque contexts are not a rare phenomenon, particu¬
larly in the domain of legal discourse, and since they are prone to undermine an account of
singular termhood concerning legal expressions, a more refined account ofDummett's crite-
411 owe this part to Sean Coyle and his analysis in his dissertation, 'Foundations of Legal Reason¬
ing', 90-93. Without his help I would certainly have missed the importance of this aspect of the argu¬
ment, as it exceeds by far my competence in logic.
42 Vide Coyle, ibid. 90.
43 Coyle, ibid. 90.
44 For a more comprehensive discussion of the problems that arise form opaque contexts, cf. Coyle,
ibid. 91.
ria is called for; Such an account, however, escapes the limits of the dissertation45.
The Issue of Realism
The Fregean argument for the existence of abstract objects depends, to a large degree, upon
our ability to formulate true normative statements (premiss (p2) of the Fregean argument).
Clearly this ability relates to the question 'what makes legal/normative statements true?', or
the question about the truth-makers of normative statements. We need, in other words, to
account for the things (referents) via which normative terms 'discharge their referential
function', as noted earlier. At this point emerges the issue of realism: if we want to argue
for the existence of abstract normative objects, we need to be able to account for the refer¬
ents of normative expressions as being mind-independent, or as being outside the mind,
belonging to the environment and, thus, possessing a fact-of-the-matter nature. Conversely,
if the things at which normative statements target (i.e. their truth-makers), are of the mind's
making, then there is nothing that could make normative statements in an objective way
true. Put in this way, the issue of realism seems to be largely about mind-
dependence/independence of the referents of legal statements. It seems, in other words, that
some form of realism or Platonism is an inescapable condition for the success of the Fre¬
gean argument about the existence of abstract normative objects.
Be that as it may, a closer look at the mind-independence issue will reveal that the
latter does not need to go hand in hand with a realist ontology. This conclusion will be es¬
tablished mainly upon the remark that the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis can guarantee
objectivity (as mind-independence) without presupposing a realist ontology and the con¬
comitant verification-independent notion of truth. In arguing for the above thesis I am going
to distinguish between two conceptions of mind-independence, out of which only the sec¬
ond will be inexorably connected with a realist ontology and therefore will be considered as
incompatible with the semantic transformation of ontology. There are two ways to lay down
the claim for mind-independence:
(a) according to the first, the claim for mind-independence is the rejection of the idea that we
have internally represented necessary and sufficient conditions that determine the extension
of a term/concept. This is roughly the claim that was attained by the externalist theory of
45 For a series of modifications in Dummett's criteria in order to deal with the problem of opacity
vide Coyle, ibid. 92-93.
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meaning of Putnam and Kripke in the 1970s for names and natural kind concepts46. For the
legal theorist the problem that arises from this notion of mind-independence in relation to le¬
gal concepts, is whether legal concepts can be thought as natural kind concepts, or concepts
whose referents are part of the external environment as a matter of fact. Normally the objec¬
tion the legal theorist is confronted with, is that legal concepts are stipulative concepts, or of
the mind's making, with the effect that there is no real difference between what we think le¬
gal properties are and what they in fact are47. This notion of mind-independence reconstructs
truth and objectivity against the background of the antithetical pair: intention-extension,
(b) The second notion of mind-independence is much more radical: here independence is con¬
ceived in relation to our way of gaining knowledge about the environment. On this stipula¬
tion, something is mind-independent if its being the case, is independent (hence beyond) our
ability to verify it. Basically the issue here is that mind-independence means that truth is 'ex¬
ternal to our judgements/language', whereas mind-dependence means the opposite. On this
conception truth and reference are conceived against the background of an environment
which in principle extends beyond our ability to verify it, in the sense that our ability to ver¬
ify things is not a sufficient condition for the existence thereof. This conception of mind-
independence reconstructs truth and objectivity as signifying verification transcendence.
On a first glance the two conceptions of mind-independence seem to entail each other: that
is, only if we presuppose that the extension of, say, a concept is independent of/lies outside
our judgements it is possible to have an objective or mind-independent notion of truth; and
the other way around: all concepts whose truth conditions can be laid down in definitions,
are products of our intentional apparatus and therefore not true as-a-matter-of-fact. But this
coupling of the two senses of mind-independence, and derivatively of truth and objectivity,
is by no means necessary. One reason for this is that the first meaning of mind-
independence includes merely an epistemological claim, namely the claim that it is possible
to distinguish between analytic and synthetic truths. Conversely, the second notion of mind-
independence entails a much stronger metaphysical claim, namely the claim that truth re¬
quires the existence of an external (to our judgements) world. Apparently one can attain to
the first conception of mind-independence without succumbing to the metaphysical aspect.
For the next couple of sections I will try to show first that the metaphysical version is in¬
compatible with the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis and, second, that we still need to
46 For a quick survey of those theories vide E. Margolis and S. Laurence (eds), Concepts (Cambridge
Mass., MIT Press, 1999), 21-23.
47 Vide Stavropoulos, ibid., Ch 4.
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preserve the epistemological distinction between the extension and the intension of con¬
cepts.
Which realism?
More or less, the line of argument against the realist ontology draws upon thoughts already
discussed in relation to the objectivity of the structure of thought. The idea of an external
world whose existence lies beyond our ability to verify it, relates to the desire to account for
something that makes our statements true in an objective way. According to this longing the
objectivity of our knowledge follows from the existence of objects that are located in an
environment that is external to our minds and our intentionality (transcendental or meta¬
physical realism). This somewhat nai've version of realism takes objectivity to supervene on
objecthood with the result that truth relies on reference. Accordingly, the metaphysical re¬
alist is someone driven by the common-sense intuition that our thoughts and our linguistic
structures can be objectively true only if there is a distance or 'slack' between them and the
things that make them true. Justified as this idea might appear to be, it has an unexpected
detrimental effect: it undermines objectivity by inducing a radical gap between the mind and
the world. In other words, we can never be sure if our intentional states, beliefs, desires and
so on, ever succeed to make contact with the environment. Notoriously this gap will, sooner
or later, require some form of representationalism in order to be bridged48. Either that or one
will have to abandon any effort to account for intentional human behaviour and the norma-
tivity of thought. In either case the price to be paid is high: it is the loss of any possibility
for objectivity.
To this version of realism is usually juxtaposed some form of anti-realism as being
more successful in accounting for objectivity in the domain of truth and knowledge. An
anti-realist candidate which appears particularly promising in this respect, is some variant of
(Kantian) transcendental idealism413. According to it the existence of the physical world is
rendered relative by its subjection to pre-given categories and schemata of experience and
its subsequent incorporation into the form of Urteile (judgements). The categories and fur¬
ther the Urteile (judgements) constitute the conditions for the existence of the physical
world (Gegenstande or objects) which cannot exist independently of them; up to this point
transcendental idealism implicates an ontological relativism. However, relativism at the
48 Vide the detailed discussion in Ch II, sections 7 and 8, supra.
49 For a critical presentation of (Neo-) Kantian transcendental idealism, vide C. Heidemann, Die
Norm als Tatsache, 266-272.
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ontological level does not amount to relativism at the level of truth and knowledge: the re-
lativisation process that experience undergoes through the implementation of the categories
or the Urteile seems to amount to a non-sceptical conception of truth and knowledge, since
- according to what can be alleged to be the implied premiss - the transcendental conditions
of experience are taken to constitute a common denominator, or something like the objec¬
tive limits of truth and knowledge, for all perceivers. According to this Kantian or rather
Neo-Kantian view it is absolutely consistent to accept both the thesis that objects cannot
exist independently of their incorporation into experience or into the form of valid Urteile
and the thesis that truth is not at all relative50. Truth in this case will be constructed along
the lines of the Tarskian convention T (as, for instance, in the sentence 'the earth is round'
is true, if and only if the earth is round). This verificationist version of anti-realism need not
be very strong51; an anti-realist could accept the possibility of true sentences that are not
(yet) known. What the anti-realist would object to, however, is the existence of true sen¬
tences that are, in principle, unknowable (this second thesis is considered to be accepted by
a realist). According to this explication transcendental idealism presents itself, on the level
of knowledge, as a case of empirical realism. From a Neo-Kantian point of view this version
of antirealism is advanced as an attractive alternative to transcendental (or metaphysical)
realism, which holds that the conditions of experience (space and time) exist as such, a fact
which further amounts to the belief that objects exist independently of the perceivers' expe¬
rience (the Kantian 'Ding an sich')52. The challenge which the realist must meet is to find a
way to bridge the gap between his private world of sensations and the objective independent
reality constituted by the independent co-ordinates of experience. The strong notion of real¬
ity, in other words, which transcendental realism nurtures increases by far the possibility of
private sensations failing to grasp the external reality. Insofar ontological realism amounts
to empirical idealism and scepticism about the external world.
50 Vide, ibid. 271.
51 Verificationism in this context means simply that understanding a sentence consists in grasping the
sort of information states that would verify it. As such this version of verificationism is weaker that the
one tendered by Logical Positivism; the latter contains the claim that a sentence is true only and only
if there is actually evidence that warrant its assertion.
52 It is worth noting that Kant's talk of the D.a.s is a very ambiguous part of his philosophy and in¬
deed provides the ground on which Kant could be judged as being a realist. However, the sort of real¬
ism that could be ascribed to Kant is only of the metaphysical sort, since he denies the possibility of
ever having epistemic access to the D.a.s. On the other hand it is questionable if even this sort of real¬
ism could be associated with Kant. It seems rather that the interpretation of the D.a.s. that fits best
with the rest of Kant's work is one that takes it to express an abstract schema: the object that is ab¬
stracted from all its features and properties, about which the only thing that can be said is that it is the
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Metaphysical realism in this nai've version seems to completely succumb to the
Myth of the Given53 or the idea that the external world can guarantee the justification of our
judgements on an objective, external ground, hence that our judgements do not fail to make
contact with the world. In reality what this sort of realism amounts to is, as indicated, ex¬
treme scepticism and the loss of any chance of establishing any connection to the external
world. But if this failure is clear in the case of nai've realism it does not seem to leave intact
any form of antirealism either. In a more subtle form antirealism, or transcendental idealism
has also to succumb to the Myth of the Given at the end of the day (in the form of verifica-
tionism). Antirealist epistemology needs also to get a reassurance that our judgements make
contact with the world in a way that their justification has to incorporate 'non-conceptual
impacts' from the external world into the space of the justifying reasons. This is where the
Myth of the Given is revived again in the form of verificationism. However the interesting
issue is whether the appeal of antirealism to external constraints, or the causal impact of the
world, differs from the earlier, may be more direct and primitive, appeal of naive realism.
Or, put in different terms: 'to what extent does this appeal constitute a proper justification'?
John McDowell puts it very elegantly when he says that what this appeal to the Given
amounts to is a brute impact of the exterior for which we cannot be held responsible:
But it is one thing to be exempt from blame, on the ground that the
position we find ourselves in can be traced ultimately to bmte
force; it is quite another thing to have a justification. In effect, the
idea of the Given offers exculpations where we want justifica¬
tions54.
According to this critique, all antirealism can offer are exculpations instead ofjustifications.
Insofar antirealism does not seem to constitute a better alternative to nai've realism (or what
has previously identified as rampant Platonism). Both positions seem to be trapped in a
fruitless dualism which needs to be compensated by the appeal to the Myth of the Given.
In contrast to both metaphysical or naive realism and some form of anti-realism, a
transformation of ontology performed along the line of a non-representationalist intentional
realism which upholds the normative significance of the structure of thought, is in the posi¬
tion to maintain objectivity and truth without retreating to a radical mind-world dualism that
is unable to account for truth and knowledge in an objective way. This transformation of
object. For a detailed discussion of these issues vide Heidemann, ibid. 261-266.
53 Vide J. McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 4 n..
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ontology through the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis re-locates the criteria of objec-
thood within the objective structure of inferential judgement formation. Thus the criteria for
correctness of our statements about the environment are given through inferential reasoning.
This is so, not because we cannot have anything better than a judgement-related objectivity,
on the supposition that we can not make contact with the world. It is rather so, because in a
non-dualist picture, the natural environment is necessarily implicated in the constitutive
account of content as being generated through judgement-formation. That is, the content of
our intentional states already is shaped in accordance with the way the world is (as revealed
through other intentional states within chains of reasoning). To make use of a somewhat
audacious expression, the standards of truth and correctness are at the same time external
while already in-the-judgements. Now the difference is that this externality has to do with
what is objective (as opposed to subjective) in a logical sense, as Frege tried to imply.
'Logic', or the structure of thought, seen this way, is no more than the structure of the world
which impinges upon us 'from outside' and which we need to master in order to reason and
learn to form judgements properly.
Mind-Independence anyway
The move towards grounding objecthood and reference on objectivity and logic renders the
second of the two senses of mind-independence obsolete or even mistaken. Be that as it
may, the semantic explication of reference is still perfectly compatible with the first notion
ofmind-independence, the one which is based on our ability to distinguish between some¬
thing's being of the mind's making or not. To be more precise, the talk is here of the ability
to distinguish between terms whose meaning is fixed by their intension and those whose
meaning is fixed by their extension. Accordingly, 'bachelor' is a term, whose meaning can
be given through an analytic, intentional definition ('unmarried man'), whereas 'Moon' is a
term whose meaning is fixed by its extension, i.e. the actual body in space which revolves
around the earth. This distinction is perfectly intelligible and necessary within the frame¬
work of a semantic transformation of ontology. It is intelligible because a judgement-based
explication of reference still makes the distinction between judgements that are about things
that are mental constructions or mind-dependent and those that are parts of the environment
or mind-independent. An ontology which is exhausted in semantics still can tell apart the
mind and its artifacts from the environment and, for this reason, can make the distinction
54 Ibid. 8.
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between the extension and the intention of a concept/term. Cyclops are certainly creatures
that do not exist as part of the environment, and for that reason the meaning of 'Cyclop' will
be given by an (intensional) definition. On the other hand the meaning of the concept
'horse' will depend on the way horses are. 'The way horses are' will be laid down in a se¬
ries of judgements which succeed in articulating the perceptual data about horses into co¬
herent knowledge and, in this sense, they will be true. It is not false to depict the whole pro¬
cess by saying that a true judgement about elements of the environment is no more than the
way of uttering perceptual data according to the structure of the thought and without contra¬
dicting previous judgements. Nevertheless, in a judgement about the environment there will
always be something like data involved, whereas this is not going to be the case when we
talk about the features of Cyclops (unless we include here the information derived from
mythology books). It is, more or less, this difference that makes the first notion of mind-
independence also necessary, besides making it intelligible.
The foremost intention of non-representationalist theories about intentional content
is to account for the direct impact of the environment upon the formation of our intentional
states and not to ostracise it from this formation-process. The emphasis that such theories
put on the a priori elements of intentional activity is not based on an effort to 'purge' those
a priori elements of intentionality form the 'imperfect' environment; it is rather based on
the belief that those a priori elements are part of the world. To that extend these theories are
indeed realist in the sense that they accept that truth and reference are world/environment-
involving. What they contest is the possibility of the world's being conceived other than
being structured in our objective judgements. In this context we still need a notion of mind-
independence which, even if it does not amount to a claim of verification-independence, it
can still show that meanings are 'not in the head' as mental constructions, but have an ob¬
jective dimension as they are connected with the way the world is made. For this purpose I
am going to refer to the semantic explorations of Kripke and Putnam in the 1970s on the
meanings of names and natural-kind words. Using an extension of the Kripke-Putnam se¬
mantic arguments over the meanings of legal and, broader, normative concepts, advanced by
Nicos Stavropoulos in his Objectivity in Law, I further hope to establish the necessity of the
notion ofmind-independence within the context of any theory that subordinates ontology to
semantics without abandoning the claim to objective truth and knowledge. In this way the
objectivity of judgements as emanating through their structure will always imply that this
structure is not a mental construction but has to be presupposed in order to make sense of
our knowledge of a mind-mdependent world. In this sense the a priori element of thought
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could be couched as constituting a part of reality.
(Legal) Meanings are not in the Head
In the 1970s Kripke and Putnam elaborated a series of arguments with the intention to un¬
dermine the up to that moment standard semantic views on the meaning of proper names
and natural kind terms55. Those views can be labelled as the descriptivist or the definitional
model and contain, roughly, the claim that in order for one to be linguistically competent
with a term, one must know a description/definition that counts as the meaning of the term
and picks out its referent. This linguistic claim amounts, on the level of thought, to holding
that for every concept we possess internally a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that
determines the extension/reference of that concept. These sets of conditions work, more or
less, like analytic definitions, that determine in a somewhat a priori way the extension of
every single concept. Thus, the definition model maintains that the meaning not only of
concepts like 'bachelor' or 'triangle' but also of others like 'lemon' or 'tiger', in fact of any
concept, can be given through analytic definitions that determine the extension thereof. Put
in this way the meaning of any concept will be exhausted in its intension without any need
to go and Took' at its extension. In fact the later will always be given by the former.
Putnam and Kripke advanced a series of arguments against this counter-intuitive
way of accounting for conceptual content. Their point was that the understanding of a large
portion of concepts (natural kind concepts and proper names) does not result (c|rm analytic
definitions but from our association with the referents (or the extension) of those concepts.
The reason for this is that those concepts refer to things that are mind-independent, as op¬
posed to mind-dependent sets of definitions. The arguments of Putnam and Kripke can be
grouped in three categories56:
(a) An argument from error: often we are in the position to possess a concept in spite of being
mistaken about the properties that we take its instances to have. For instance people in the
20th century take very different properties to form the instances of the concept 'thunder' than
the properties that people in the 10th century took to do so. This fact notwithstanding, the
ability to compare between what people believed to be the properties of the concept 'thunder'
then and now, presupposes that their concept was about the same thing as ours. To that extent
55 The two most important texts are S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) and
H. Putnam, 'The Meaning of Meaning' in idem Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975). I mostly base my discussion of those views on Stavropulos, Objectivity in
Law, CHs 1 and 2; and Margolis and Laurence, ibid. 21 n.
56 Margolis and Laurence, ibid. 21-22.
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what is essential for the meaning of a concept is its extension rather than its intension. Ac¬
cordingly, the intensional definition of 'thunder' in the 10th century might have been radically
different form our definition, while the concept remains the same. This 'objective' dimension
of the concept enables us to accommodate the possibility of error without the need to discard
our concepts every time we discover we were wrong about the properties that we took to be
instances of a concept57.
(P) An argument from ignorance: this is closely related with the argument from error and purports
to show that ignorance of a series of properties corresponding to instances of a concept does
not determine the extension of the concept. The fact, for instance, that people in the past were
ignorant about a series of cmcial properties of thunders, owing to the lack of the appropriate
scientific knowledge, is not in the position to undermine or to alter the meaning of the con¬
cept 'thunder'. Here, again, the fact that a flaw at the level of intension of the concept, i.e. ig¬
norance, fails to distort the meaning of the concept, is taken to point e contrario towards the
conclusion that extensions rather than intensions are crucial for the determination of mean¬
ing.
(y) A modal argument: this argument purports to show that if an internally represented definition
were to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept, it
would determine not just what the concept applies to as things actually stand, but also what it
would have applied to in various possible counterfactual circumstances. The problem here is
that often the conditions that people associate with the content of a concept are ones which,
by their own lights, fail to do justice to the modal facts. Thus one could perfectly imagine
circumstances under which a metal would not have its characteristic colour or other proper¬
ties that we associate with that metal, but would still be picked out by the same concept. To
take an example, gold in a gaseous state would loose many of its characteristic properties, yet
gold-as-gas would still be picked out by the concept 'gold'.
In all, the driving force behind Putnam's and Kripke's work is the intuition that our con¬
cepts are amenable to revision because their content/meaning is fixed not according to in¬
ternal psychological definitions, but in reference to the mind-independent things that those
concepts are about. And there is always space for discovering new facts about those things.
This is particularly the case with natural kind concepts. For those concepts definitions can¬
not be used as a definitive criterion in order to determine their content-as-extension (even if
in many cases definitions correctly do so). Instead Putnam and Kripke put forward a theory
57 Extending this argument to legal and other normative concepts, presents us with a solution to
Hart's radical indeterminacy thesis which he took to be the only possible conclusion of the open tex¬
ture discussion. Vide the discussion in Ch I, supra.
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which attempts to give an account of concepts' content by acknowledging the importance
that extensions play in determining meanings. Their model is, roughly, that a natural kind
term exhibits a causal-historical relation to a kind and that the term refers to all and only
members of the kind. Thus, to take the case of 'gold' again, the assumption is that gold con¬
stitutes a kind and that, having introduced the term and having used it in connection with
instances of gold, the term refers to all and only those pieces that are out of gold, regardless
of the beliefs of the speakers who use it.
Artifact Kinds and Legal Kinds
In trying to expand Putnam's and Kripke's arguments to normative and evaluative concepts,
legal or moral philosophers typically face the objection that the properties picked out by
those concepts are mind-dependent with the effect that they do not constitute part of the
world 'as-a-matter-of-fact'. Contrary to natural kind concepts, the objection goes, normative
concepts' meaning derives through definitions which are products of human minds (con¬
ventions, etc.) and not through their picking out any real or objective properties. This gives
rise to the reproach that in the case of normative or evaluative concepts we cannot distin¬
guish between correct and wrong application of the relevant concepts in an objective way,
as it is the case with natural kind concepts. This criticism appears to presuppose a realist
standpoint of view that endorses a view according to which truth and reference are verifica¬
tion-transcendent and are located outside mind's cognitive efforts58. However, to the extent
that the previous discussion located the distinction mind-dependent/mind-independent
within the context of a judgement-furnished conception of reference, the above criticism is
also available within that context. Because even in the context of a judgement-dependent
notion of truth and reference it is possible to distinguish between correct and wrong appli¬
cations of a concept, or between correct and wrong attributions of properties to concepts
through judgements.
According to a common objection, mind-dependent normative properties or entities
are conceived as 'artifacts'59, or constructions of the human mind. The argument runs here
as follows: Putnam's and Kripke's extensionalist theory of meaning cannot be applied to
'artifacts' because their essence or nature does not depend on anything external to the pur¬
pose they are created for. This purpose, further, is totally mind-dependent and can be ex-
58 This is, to my understanding, the way Stavropoulos discusses the objections from mind-
independence in his Objectivity in Law, Ch.4.
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haustively reported of by an analytic definition. Thus, the meaning of the concept 'um¬
brella' is not answerable towards any facts other than a definition 'X Y Z' that accounts for
its purpose. Hence the extension of any term concerning an artifact will be sufficiently
given by the relevant definition and not the other way round.
Putnam is not unaware of this line of argument. In fact he contends that artifacts are
well within the scope of his extensional semantics. In order to demonstrate this he con¬
structs a thought experiment60. He imagines a universe which is in all respects like ours with
the exception of pencils (an artifact kind). In this universe, which he famously labels 'Twin
Earth', pencils are living organisms rather than manufactured objects. Now Putnam's claim
is that though speakers on both Earth and Twin-Earth use the same intensional definition in
order to pick out the objects 'pencils', the extension of the term 'pencil' is not determined
by that definition: pencils on Earth are manufactured objects whereas on Twin-earth they
are living organisms. Accordingly, an Earthian is expected to say that pencils on Twin-Earth
are not really pencils, if he ever were to observe closer a Twin-Earthian pencil. With this
move Putnam purports to show that even if on both Earth and Twin-Earth speakers' inten¬
tions are the same, the extension of the concept they use might vary according to how things
are as-a-matter-of-fact.
But even if one takes the Putnam-Kripke semantics to accommodate the objection
from the artifacts, there is another objection lurking, as Stavropoulos mentions61: The ob¬
jector might concede that the extension of a concept might be 'determined' by the underly¬
ing nature of the artifact concepts, yet proceed to observe that this nature is 'functional' in
the sense ofbeing always answerable to a definition. Thus, whatever serves a purpose or the
function of, say protecting from the rain will count as an umbrella. Of course, the objector
will admit, there are many ways to realise this function and, given the complexity of the
forms of interaction between the environment and any purpose, many new ways of realisa¬
tion will arise. The point is, though, that the underlying nature of the artifact-concept will be
exhausted through the relevant definition. Hence any novel way of realisation will be an¬
swerable to that definition. As a result, all one needs to know in order to grasp the meaning
of an artifact-concept or other mind-dependent concept is its underlying purpose which can
59 Vide Stavropoulos, Objectivity, 85-86.
60 Vide Putnam, 'The Meaning of Meaning' in idem, Mind, Language and Reality. Philosphical
Papers volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 242 n. (first publ. in K. Gunderson
(ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minessota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VII (Mpls:
University ofMinessota Press)).
61 Stavropoulos, ibid. 86 n.
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be captured in a lexical definition: '...the compliants of artifact terms are answerable to the
definition, rather than the other way round'62. But a Putnam-like theory of meanings does
not really need to resist this line of argument in order to sustain that definitions are answer¬
able to concepts' extension. Even if the extension of some concepts can indeed be specified
by an underlying function there still remains to be examined if individual cases satisfy that
function. If a case of what passes as an umbrella turns out to be a living organism then we
would stop calling it 'umbrella'. In other words, the criterion that will decide whether a
concept's meaning can be sufficiently accounted for in terms of a functional definition (arti¬
fact-kind concept) or, instead, by looking into the properties of its compliants (natural kind
concept), will always depend on the concept's extension and not on an a priori definition.
In defending this line of argument, Stavropoulos remarks that the crucial point re¬
garding the content of artifact-concepts or other mind-independent concepts is not whether
they might have been introduced through a definition but whether that definition captures
some properties about which discoveries and corrections are possible63. Insofar it is true that
'murder' or 'contract' are not mind-independent entities the way natural kinds like stones or
apples are; this does not entail, however, that they are 'of the mind's making' to the effect
that they cannot 'fail to be transparent to minds' efforts'64. In order that the artifact argu¬
ment establishes the desired dependence of artifact kinds from minds it is not enough to
employ merely a concept of casual dependence. That artifact kinds and the relevant con¬
cepts' content are causally depending on the beliefs of their designers or inventors does not
amount to their being exhausted in those beliefs. For that one needs to deploy a more robust
notion of dependence (some form of constitutive dependence) whereby artifacts' nature is
constituted by their designers' beliefs to the effect that this nature cannot fail to be what we
think it is63.
Normative Judgements and Mind-independence
The preceding discussion has made clear that normative properties and generally entities
can be mind-related, or mind-dependent lato sensu, without being of the mind's making, or
mind-dependent stricto sensu. Even if it is possible to introduce normative concepts through




65 Vide Stavropoulos, ibid. 89.
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analytic. It will always depend on their picking out certain properties and therefore it will be
responsive to any new discoveries concerning those properties. Put in the context of a
judgement-furnished ontology, mind-independent properties/entities are disclosed only
within judgements as opposed to being beyond our ability to verify them. But those judge¬
ments are not analytic definitions or, in any other sense, statements about things in minds66.
Treating them as such is a major misunderstanding that owes its origins to the mind-world
dualism and the concomitant need for intermediaries that allegedly secure some kind of
contact between the two. According to this idea67 content is individuated by some form of
mental images (ideas, etc.) which are faithful representations of things that exist outside
minds. Some of those representations correspond to genuine counterparts in the environ¬
ment where others do not. Thought (and language) can access directly only the representa¬
tions and therefore have only an indirect contact with the environment. Clearly in this pic¬
ture our judgements are not very reliable since they are indeed 'trapped' in the mind, and
the whole issue of content turns upon the way representations make contact with the world.
In that case it is indeed true that certainty about what exists independently of our minds
depends upon the way the intermediaries 'hook on' to the environment. The problem with
this whole way of picturing content is that representations and other mental images are
themselves located in minds, hence there is no reliable way to find out which of them are
merely of the mind's making and which are faithful representations of the environment. As
a result, our judgements will be unreliable not only with regard to those representations that
correspond to nothing 'out there', but also with regard to those that do correspond to some¬
thing.
Conversely if one does away with the dualist model, judgements are conceived as
being about the environment. And in this case it is, of course, possible to distinguish be¬
tween a definition that captures some functional or other features of a concept and a judge¬
ment that refers to extensional properties picked out by the same concept. The criterion here
is that a judgement of the second kind will always provide us with additional or genuine
66 Definitions can be taken to perform a semantic reduction of normative concepts in a way similar to
that other non-normative psychological concepts do (like in the case of emotivism or even projectiv-
ism). All these semantic reductionist moves rest normally on some form of eliminativism that holds
that there are no genuine properties in the target domain of normative concepts. Very often those
forms of eliminativism amount to the complete elimination of normative concepts and their substitu¬
tion through concepts that are able to pick out genuine properties (in this case properties ofmental or
psychological states). All these moves can blocked through the anti-reductionist arguments that were
discussed earlier. Nevertheless it is purposeful here to address the issue of definitions separately to the
extent that it relates to the subjectivity objection from mind-independence.
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knowledge concerning the content of the same concept. This can be demonstrated by using
an example from the area of colour. Colour concepts are often compared with normative
concepts to the extend that colour properties constitute secondary qualities of objects, or
properties that do not exist independently of perceivers' powers but are conceptually linked
to experience. Imagine someone, say John, who spent all his life in a black and white room
studying all aspects of colour in great detail to the effect that he came to know all defini¬
tions and descriptions of how and in what way different surfaces reflect light in order to
produce the different colours and their variations68. One day John exits his room and the
first thing he comes across is a patch of green grass. And he exclaims 'Ah! This is 'green".
Such a judgement which involves the environment is adding a new portion of knowledge in
John's colour expertise, regardless of the fact that he already knew all definitions concern¬
ing 'green'. This case can easily be transferred to the field of normative experi¬
ence/knowledge. Regardless of whether one has the most perfect definitions for legal con¬
cepts, a judgement about something's being a contract or someone's conduct being 'lawful'
or 'unlawful' or someone's being a 'successor' or 'beneficiary', will increase one's amount
ofnormative knowledge. Insofar normative judgements are not about things in the head.
Further objectives
Chapter IV continues the discussion on the mind-independence of legal (abstract) objects. In
thefirst halfof Ch 4 I offer a more detailed account of the referents of legal expressions and
the truth-makers of legal sentences. For that I employ a semantic explication of the truth of
legal sentences within the spirit of the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis. Accordingly
legal referents and truth-makers will be accounted for in the context of true legal sentences,
where truth will be given along the lines of a semantic theory of truth (akin to Tarski's se¬
mantic theory of truth). In that context whole legal norms, as corresponding to legal sen¬
tences, are explicated as constituting normative facts, as opposed to the single normative
objects that are denoted by legal concepts like 'contract' or 'person'.
In the second halfof Ch IV I will introduce the issue of the interconnection of on-
67 Vide the discussion in Ch II, supra.
68 The example paraphrases a similar example from F. Jackson 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', in idem
Mind, Method and Conditionals, International Library of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), 57-
69 (first published in Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982), 127-136); vide also in the same volume his
'What Mary didn't know', 70-75 (first published, in The Journal ofPhilosophy, 83 (1986), 291-295).
And the anti-reductionist argument based on the same example in Michael Tye, Consciousness, Col¬
our, and Content (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 2000), 4-5.
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tology and agency which will be the prevailing issue for the rest of the dissertation (part
three). This will be canvassed against the background of three interlocking issues:
The idea that our linguistic structures can account for 'what exists' (semantics-
exhausts-ontology thesis) is only tenable if the content of our thoughts (intentional or men¬
tal content) is world involving (the idea of anti-representationalism or non-dualism).
I will argue that for thought-content to be world-involving a required condition is
that it is shaped through intentional agents' interaction with the environment. This require¬
ment bestows the concept of interaction with fundamental importance for the account of
thought-content, hence ontology, for at least one reason: what will be possible in the domain
of thought and ontology will be normatively constrained by what will be permissible in the
domain of the interaction with the environment (or broadly the domain of agency69).
Put in those terms the issue of the interconnection between agency and ontology
will play a central role in demarcating the ontology of normative objects. Normative objects
(rules and other abstract entities) trivially refer to the guidance of action. Hence any investi¬
gation into the concept of agency will be essential for specifying what normative objects
exist. In conjunction to this point, I will further argue that any investigation into the concept
of agency will amount to disclosing the pragmatic requirements (rules) that conceptually
constitute 'agency' both in its various local forms (particular practices or institutions) as
well as in its more far-reaching form of a universal practice of communication which is
anyway presupposed by those local forms (part three of the thesis).
69 I prefer 'agency' to 'interaction' because the former concept incorporates the substantive aspect of
the interaction with other intentional agents. This kind of interaction is precisely what generates the
normative (in the sense of action-guiding) constraints of intentional action. For further clarifications of
these concepts refer to Ch IV.
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CHAPTER IV
LEGAL TRUTH, NORMATIVE FACTS AND AGENCY
Introduction
Chapter III suggested that the notion of mind-independence can be conceived as merely
signifying our ability to distinguish between that which exists beyond our will and our
minds' inventive powers and that which is 'of the mind's making'. Further, it was argued
that this ability is readily available without any need to presuppose a robust metaphysical
realism that conceives the environment or the world independently from our thought and
language (as representationalism does).
This chapter continues the effort to demarcate the issue of mind-independence in
law by accounting for the concept of reference in the context of a semantic conception of
truth. The semantic conception of truth is in a position to explicate reference within the
inferential structures of language and therefore dispenses with a direct account of the refer¬
ents of legal expressions and the truth-makers of legal sentences. The semantic conception
of truth is elaborated within the framework of a version of the semantic theory of truth. This
takes the environment of the sentence (or the judgement) to be decisive for an account of
reference in general along the lines of the Fregean conception of truth and objectivity that
was discussed earlier on1.
In contrast the usual alternative for a theory of truth is the so-called correspondence
theory of truth2. A correspondence theory of truth takes sentences to be true in virtue of
their correspondence to facts, where facts are considered to be parts of the environment that
are characterisable independently of language and grammar. To that degree correspondence
theories of truth are usually employed in the context of representationalist theories of
thought and content. Hence, the main problem that any correspondence theory faces, is to
explain why the world is made out of facts, while maintaining that those facts are charac-
1 Vide Ch III, section 3, supra.
2 For a brief account see Luntley, Contemporary Philosophy of Thought, 60-63. And for a more de¬
tailed accounts, vide Kenneth Taylor, Truth and Meaning (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998),Ch III.
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terisable in a non-semantic way. The problem emerges because facts are not natural entities
but 'entities' that are suited to be related to true judgements. Therefore facts presuppose that
we have categorised the world in a way appropriate for making true judgements; but if the
world has been 'cut' into facts then it has been already subject to the same categorisation as
that of judgement, namely the categorisation of grammar. As a result the correspondence
theory, in its representationalist version at least, will already rest on language, despite its
claim to the contrary.
Contrary to what the correspondence theory of truth alleges the semantic explica¬
tion of truth needn't make any concession towards idealism if thought-content is conceived
as being world-involving, according to the idea of anti-representationalism. Anti-
representationalism assumes that thought-content cannot be characterised independently of
what it is about, i.e. the environment or the world. At the same time thought-content is
structured according to the logical patterns of grammar. Hence it is possible to account for
content (the world) through grammar. But in doing so one already accounts for what is the
case. To that extent grammar aims to truth. Truth is the justificatory reason for the concept
of logical grammar. Judgements are truth-evaluable in virtue of their embeddedness in pat¬
terns of inference which reveal the judgements' segmentation into distinct logical parts. As
a result, the concept of truth can be analysed through the logical structure of grammar, as a
semantic concept. In fact truth can be taken as constituting the basic semantic concept
which mediates between logical grammar and the environment, to the effect that ontology
may be taken as supervening on logic.
A BriefOutline of a Semantic Theory of Truth
The basic idea of a semantic theory of truth is that the truth of judgements can be systemati¬
cally computed from an account of their semantic structure. A semantic theory aims to show
that the combinatorial structure of judgements, as revealed through the inferential patterns
in which they are embedded, determines their truth conditions. Hence the definition of truth
at which the semantic theory arrives is a recursive definition of truth3.
A semantic theory of truth aims to demonstrate how the truth-conditions of any
3 A semantic theory of truth will typically be modelled against the background of Tarski's theory of
truth. For an account of the latter see Alfred Tarski, 'The Semantic Conception of Truth and the
Foundations of Semantics' in S. Blackburn and K. Simmons, Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), 115-143; for further analysis vide Scott Soames, Understanding Truth (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), CHs 3 and 4; also Luntley, Contemporary Philosophy of Thought,
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judgement expressible within first-order predicate calculus can be derived from an account
of the structure of the judgement in conjunction with an assignment of semantic values to
the judgement's components. Any judgement in natural language which is expressible in
first-order predicate calculus, will be amenable to a transparent display of the judgement's
logical grammar. To that extent the semantic theory draws upon the syntax ofa language, or
the logical rules according to which something is a well-formed sentence in that language.
For any sentence S of a language L the semantic theory will provide a systematic
account of what it is to say of S that it is true in L. This account will be recursive in the
sense that it will give the truth conditions of the sentence by ascribing semantic values to
the atomic components of the language. A further condition is that the account of what it is
for S to be true in L will be given on the meta-level of a meta-language ML. That is, the
sentences within which the truth conditions of S will be specified will be sentences not of L
but of ML. Thus for any S in L the conditions of its being true will be given in the ML
according to the clause:
(1) 'S' is true if and only if p,
where p are the conditions specified in ML. Here both the name 'S' as well as the predicate
'is true' do not belong to L but to ML. Further the condition given in p will be a way of
expressing in ML what is for any sentence of L to be true. This would roughly amount to a
translation of each of the sentences of L into the ML. In that way clause (1) will provide an
explication of the predicate 'being true in L' for any sentence of L by drawing upon the
recursive definition of the syntactic structures of L-sentences.
Let us take L to be a fragment of, say, German whose atoms are whole sentences
and ML to be English. Then the specification of the truth-conditions of the L-sentence 'der
Tisch ist schwarz' will be given by:
(1)' 'der Tisch ist schwarz' is true if and only if the table is black.
Along these lines, clause (1) provides the basic assignment of the conditions under which
the atoms of a language possess a semantic value. When those atoms are taken to be whole
sentences (as here 'der Tisch etc.'), then the assignment of the conditions under which they
60-88.
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possess a semantic value is already an account of truth-conditions, since in that case atoms
are sentences and the semantic value of sentences is truth (or falsity). But the point of the
semantic theory of truth needn't be as trivial as that. A semantic theory can gain the truth-
conditions of any sentence recursively, by deriving them from the semantic conditions of
sub-sentential units, that is without presupposing the concept of truth4. As a result, the truth-
conditions of any sentence will be derived from the semantic conditions for singular terms
and predicates. The semantic conditions for a singular term will be the conditions under
which the term has a semantic value, namely the conditions under which it stands for an
object (or, the conditions under which it refers). Similarly the semantic conditions for a
predicate will be those under which it has a non-empty extension. Those conditions nor¬
mally will have to be assigned on the base-level of the theory in an extensional way, namely
by establishing a certain relation between the atomic units of L and the world. According to
a standard characterisation, the assignment of semantic conditions will be given through the
concept of satisfaction . Along these lines, the concept of truth will be defined via the se¬
mantic conditions of sub-sentential units which, in their turn, will be satisfied in an exten¬
sional way on the base-level of the theory.
The 'extensionaT satisfaction of the semantic conditions of sub-sentential units
needn't be radically different from the 'satisfaction' of the truth-conditions of any sentence
according to clause (1). Take for instance an atomic, sub-sentential unit: the name 'Tisch'.
On the base level of our semantic theory, the name 'Tisch' will acquire a semantic value
along the lines of the clause:
(2)' 'Tisch' refers to table,
or, in the general form:
(2) 'F' refers to F
By ascribing a semantic value, clause (2)' discharges the referential function of the name
'Tisch' in a way that can make true the statement 'der Tisch ist schwarz'; namely by pre¬
supposing the existence of the object table. In this sense it can be said that the formal con-
4 Vide Luntley, ibid. 64n..
5 Cf. ibid. 69-70.
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dition for any expression F to refer, or for clause (2) to be true, is the possibility of formu¬
lating an existential sentence of the form (3x)(Fx) [or in our example: 'there is something
that is a table']6. Hence the formal condition of the possibility to refer to an object can be
stated as:
(3) 'F' refers to F o (3x)(Fx).
Whenever it is possible to write an existential sentence of the above form there is an object
denoted by the expression F. Further, it is the case that any assertive sentence which con¬
tains expression F can be taken as having a referential relation towards the object denoted
by expression F, in virtue of which the sentence is made true. Therefore one could skip, as it
were, clause (2)' and simply say that an assertion 'refers' to an object to the point that it is
possible to restate the assertion as an existential sentence.
As a result, a semantic account of truth that is recursive will contain an account of
reference for the sub-sentential units which will further amount to an account of the exis¬
tence of the objects referred to. According to this account, any expression F (e.g. table) is
thematised as an object through the use of its name 'F' (e.g. 'Tisch') within an assertive
sentence (like in 'der Tisch ist schwarz'). If, further, the sentence is true then there exists an
object that is denoted by the expression. The formal conditions for that are exhausted in the
possibility to rewrite the assertive sentence as an existential sentence within which the ex¬
pression F functions as a predicate [in our example: 'there is something that is a table']. Put
in more general terms: the existence of an object will be established through the employ¬
ment of any assertive sentence which implies, lato sensu, an affirmative existential sen¬
tence. This method for accounting for the existence of an object can be regarded as com¬
plementary to the Fregean strategy that was exposed in the last chapter. In the Fregean strat¬
egy the existence of an object is granted when an expression exhibits the appropriate role
(that of a singular term) within the context of a true sentence. Under the light of the present
account one can add: an expression exhibits the appropriate role when it is possible to re¬
state the original (assertive) sentence as an affirmative existential sentence in which the
expression under consideration functions as a predicate. This extension is perfectly con¬
sistent with the listed criteria for singular termhood7 since the latter imply the possibility of
6 Vide the detailed analysis in Heidemann, ibid. 309-317.
7 Cf. with Ch III, sec 6 ('Abstract Legal Objects'), supra.
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forming affirmative existential sentences in which the candidate-terms for singular term-
hood function as predicates.
Regarding the 'extensional' definition of reference in clause (2) there are two fur¬
ther issues that are worth commenting on: the first concerns the alleged fundamental char¬
acter of a definition of reference within a semantic theory of truth; why, in other words,
should clause (2) be more 'basic' than the truth-clause (1), in the sense of being more suit¬
able to establishing some sort of correspondence between language and reality? Prima facie
it doesn't seem to exist any reason for that differentiation. But if this is the case then a fur¬
ther issue arises: do both (1) and (2) fall short of accomplishing the task of linking language
with the world? The answer one is going to give to those two questions depends upon the
stance one chooses to adopt towards representationalism. If we accept representationalism,
then we assume that it is possible to characterise the language and the world independently
of each other. If we do so, then it doesn't really matter at which level of the theory we un¬
dertake the task of re-establishing a link between the two (when defining truth and refer¬
ence). Any level would be as futile as any other. Conversely, if we reject representational¬
ism then, again, it does not really matter at which level we undertake to define truth and
reference; this time, though, the reason is that the link between the language and the world
is already there! It is the idea of anti-representationalism: that there is no such thing as a
world or an environment that is not mediated by thought (language) and its categories.
When we see through the looking glass of anti-representationalism two things strike us as
natural:
First, that any account of reference or truth cannot but be semantic, as the only way
to 'cut reality' is through grammar. Accordingly, it does not really matter which of the two,
reference or truth, we are going to make the basic level of our account of how language and
the world make contact; Because in anti-representationalism, the issue of contact has been
settled at an earlier point, through the concept of grammar. Of course, as the previous
chapter argued, it is probably more suitable to set truth at the basic level since the structures
of grammar unfold predominantly on the level of sentences. Besides, the Fregean strategy
demonstrated that a range of expressions denotes objects to the extent that they function as
singular terms in true assertive sentences; this was further supplemented with the remark
that the existence of an object rests on the availability of restating the assertions as existen¬
tial sentences in which the singular terms function as predicates.
Second, not everything that is formulated in linguistic structures is a linguistic en¬
tity. In clause (1), the right-hand side is the fact of the table's being black, rather than being
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a linguistic structure which is in need of making contact with something that can be cap¬
tured independently of the structures of thought and language. The fact that the table is
black is what makes the sentence 'der Tisch ist schwarz' true. Regarding this, a semantic
account of truth does, after all, deliver a kind of correspondence theory, in a very different
sense, however, than the traditional definition of the term. What is depicted by the right-
hand side of the base-clauses are indeed facts; not in any metaphysical or representationalist
sense, i.e. as being independent from grammar and language, but 'facts' as a category that
makes sense only in the context of the structures of thought: 'the facts appealed to are the
facts as categorised by human thought and language, but so what? There is no other kind'8.
Further, it is possible to recast those facts as higher-order (or abstract) objects through
nominalisations of the sentences that depict them. This possibility will foster an account of
legal norms as constituting objects available to legal science.
To summarise: a semantic theory of truth accounts for truth and reference on the
basis of the semantic structures of language (grammar). To that extent, truth and reference
are subjected to the constraint ofgrammar. The constraint of grammar is consistent with the
idea of 'anti-representationalism' that chooses to individuate content through the structures
of language. The constraint from grammar is the first constraint on truth and reference.
For the next few paragraphs, the constraint from grammar on truth and reference
will inform an attempt to identify the ontological counterparts of legal sentences, singular
terms and predicates. These counterparts will, roughly, include legal norms, legal objects
and legal properties. The account will be guided by the thought that legal norms (as a spe¬
cies kind of legal objects) occupy a prominent position amongst the rest of the legal entities.
This is upheld on two grounds: First, it is a central claim of the Fregean programme and the
semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis that the structures of grammar are revealed within the
environment of the sentence/judgement. Those structures can further generate, via a seman¬
tic theory of truth, a semantic account of the referents of the sub-sentential units. As a re¬
sult, on the ontological level, facts will be more basic than objects and properties. Hence
norms, to the degree they are delivered in sentences/judgements, will be more basic than
other legal objects. The second, and perhaps more important, justification stems from the
idea that any effort to reduce legal/normative entities to non-normative ones is blocked on
the level of legal norms. That is, even if it is possible to reduce contracts and other legal
objects or legal properties like 'being under obligation', to some non-normative entities or
8 Luntley, Contemporary Philosophy of Thought, 71.
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properties, this is not possible for legal norms. Instead, any reductive account of legal prop¬
erties or legal objects has to presuppose as non-reducible some legal norm in order to be
able to make sense of the reduced objects and properties, as argued earlier9. Along these
lines legal norms, as constituting a species of legal objects, are taken to be much more cen¬
tral for legal discourses than other legal objects (e.g. contracts or marriages or persons) or
legal properties (like 'being under contractual obligation'). In fact those objects and proper¬
ties can be understood as existing only against the background of some legal norm. In other
words, legal norms are what constitutes the ontological bedrock, as it were, of legal dis¬
courses. Any talk about law, that is, will have to presuppose at least the existence of legal
norms as belonging to our environment.
The Objects of Legal Cognition
The possibility of denoting legal objects is fundamental for our ability to acquire legal
knowledge. What performs the function of denoting are linguistic entities, in particular ex¬
pressions and sentences; what is denoted are non-linguistic entities, in particular norms and
other legal entities. The things denoted are the objects of legal cognition. Therefore an ac¬
count of norms and other legal entities as constituting objects is central for legal knowledge.
An expression refers to a legal object if it functions as a singular term (names are
included) within the context of a true sentence. Normally, on the supposition of a semantic
theory of truth, a sentence will be true when there is a fact that makes it true. This fact will
be stated in the right-hand side of a clause of the form 'S' is true iff S. When this is the case
the relevant expression will also refer according to the clause: 'F' refers to F. The formal
condition for that will be given through an affirmative existential sentence of the form:
(3x)(Fx). Take for instance the sentence 'the contract between X and Y is valid'. In the
correct use of this sentence, that is if the sentence is true according to the schema 'S' is true
iff S, the existence of the object contract will be granted. It will be possible, in other words,
to create the affirmative existential sentence: 'there is something that is a contract'. This
will be mutatis mutandis the case for all legal expressions that denote (abstract) legal ob¬
jects.
Things are more complicated for norms. Norms are embedded in whole sentences,
and sentences do not refer to objects the way singular terms do. Thus the problem of objec¬
tifying norms will relate largely to the problem of objectifying whole sentences. This is
9 Cf. Ch II, sec. 6 ('the variety of normative nature'), supra.
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where the account should begin10:
Sentences are the environment within which object-terms refer; moreover, they are
the environment in which the existence of objects is articulated: an object exists in the cor¬
rect use of an assertive sentence. This is granted through the correct use of an assertive
sentence which entails the possibility of its restatement as an affirmative existential sen¬
tence. But can a whole sentence be considered as being an object in itself, according to the
same method? Does in other words an objectivation take place if we insert a sentence(l)
into another sentence(2) in a way that sentence(l) occupies the role of the object-term?
Take, for instance, the sentence(l): 'the contract between X and Y is valid'. The correct use
of sentence(2) establishes the existence of the object contract. Now let us insert sentence(l)
in the following sentence(2) of a meta-language:
sentence(2): "the contract between X and Y is valid' is true iff the contract between X and is
valid'.
On a first blush, sentence(l) might be taken to function as an object-term within sen¬
tence^): in this case, the object denoted by sentence(l) is the contract between X and Y.
However, this solution seems to give rise to a discrepancy that is not easy to dispense with:
if we take the contract between X and Y to be the object denoted by the objectivation of
sentence(l), then what is the object denoted by the actual object-term 'the contract between
X and Y' in the correct use of sentence(l)? In other words, it cannot be the case that both
the term 'the contract' and the objectivation of sentence(l) refer to the same thing. Moreo¬
ver, to say that sentence(l), a whole sentence, refers to the object contract is not very con¬
vincing. The problem emerges from the fact that sentences do not refer like object-terms but
are merely used in a referential way, namely as providing the appropriate environment for
singular terms to refer.
Heidemann11 suggests an alternative way for arriving at a nominalisation of an as¬
sertive sentence that would allow to treat it as a singular term: this involves restating it as a
'that-clause'. In our example this would amount to the sentence 'that the contract between X
and Y is valid'. This nominalised sentence can be easily inserted within a reference schema
of the form 'S' refers to S:
10 The discussion follows, Heidemann, die Norm als Tatsache, 320 n..
11 Heidemann, ibid. 309-336; vide also idem, 'Hans Kelsen's Conceptions of Normative Cognition
and Legal Norms' (unpublished seminar paper, University ofEdinburgh, 24/2/2000).
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'that the contract...is valid' refers to (the fact) that the contract...is valid.
The role of the 'that-clause' in this schema is not merely to refer to a linguistic entity, i.e.
sentence S, by constituting nothing more than the name of that sentence. Rather, it should
be considered as referring to a non-linguistic entity or object. This becomes clearer if we
employ a sentence on a meta-level, say, the sentence: 'I am glad that the contract.. .is valid'.
Here my being glad cannot really be associated with the linguistic entity 'that the con¬
tract...', but should be associated with some object denoted by the 'that-clause'. In fact, the
'that-clause' can be taken to denote the same object that the noun-term 'the validity (of the
contract)' would denote. This object is the fact that the contract.. .is valid. Thus my being
glad is associated with the fact that the contract is valid. Put in more general terms, the ob¬
jects denoted by nominalisations of assertive sentences in the form of 'that-clauses' can be
called facts.
This analysis elucidates adequately the way facts are disclosed in the use of asser¬
tive sentences. To the extent that those assertions are about legal entities we are entitled to
talk about legal sentences and legal facts respectively. Now, norms present us with a further
peculiarity: besides being embedded in legal sentences they further express the modality of
'ought'. Heidemann suggests that any normative sentence can be reconstructed as a second-
order sentence in which the modality of 'ought' is related to some fact expressed in the
terms of a 'that-clause', along the lines that the modalities of possibility and necessity do.
Accordingly any normative sentence can be rephrased as:
(NS): It is required that x.
The second part ofNS is a that-clause which depicts a fact. To that extent NS can be under¬
stood as being already a second-order sentence that states a modal meta-fact. A modal
meta-fact consists in the fact that the relevant modality (here the modality of 'ought'), is
related in a specific way to a fact which is named by the 'that-clause'. More specifically, to
the degree that normative sentences were taken to correspond to norms, it can be argued that
norms are modal meta-facts which consist in the fact that a first-order fact is placed under
the modality of'ought'12.
12 This is the solution that Heidemann opts for. Vide Heidemann, die Norm als Tatsache, 309n..
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Overall, the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis has generated an account of legal
norms as constituting facts or objects of a higher order that are available to lawyers' cogni¬
tive powers. This explication of norms' ontological quality seems to make justice to Hart's
account of the concept of law, as well as to the subsequent discussion of reductionism,
which assumed that legal norms enjoy some degree of ontic autonomy. The semantic ac¬
count tried to work out the metaphysical conditions for a perception of legal norms as irre¬
ducible or ontologically primitive. To the degree it succeeded to do so, normative sentences,
and in particular their nominalisations, have to be envisaged as revealing norms as objects
that belong to the environment. However, what the account has claimed is that norms are
abstract objects and as such of a very different quality from concrete objects like chairs and
tables, trees and mountains.
Norms as Abstract Facts and Norms As Institutional Facts
The present effort to account for the referents of legal expressions and broader to underpin
law's ontological groundwork, shares some important insights with other contemporary
accounts from the field of legal theory13. Prominent amongst them, owing both to its pio¬
neering character and its widespread influence, is the so-called Institutional Theory of Law
(ITL henceforth) which was launched through the work of Neil MacCormick and Ota
Weinberger14. The ITL seems to be compatible with the main premisses of the philosophical
programme of accounting for the ontological basis of legal discourse, that this thesis under¬
takes. To that extent, even if the thesis does not raise the claim to offer a detailed philo¬
sophical defence of the ITL13, it could be understood as advancing in more detail some
philosophical points that are of focal interest to the ITL.
13 All these programmes appear one way or another to be efforts for offering detailed philosophical
reconstructions of major positivist theories of this century: thus the Institutional Theory of Law and
the account put forward by Sean Coyle stand in the tradition of Hart's theory of Law, whereas Carsten
Heidemann's account advances a reconstruction of Kelsen's theory of law along the lines of some¬
thing akin to a Neo-Kantian metaphysics of norms. An exception in this tendency is Nicos Stavro-
poulos' recent monograph, which attempts to offer a realist account of legal properties. For all these
accounts vide, respectively, Sean Coyle, 'On the Foundations of Legal Reasoning in International
Law', (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Glasgow, 1998); Carsten Heidemann, die Norm als
Tatsache. Zur Normentheorie Hans Kelsens, Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie: 13
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997); Nicos Stavropoulos, Objectivity in Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1996).
14 Vide Neil D. MacCormick and Ota Weinberger, An Institutional Theory ofLaw: New Approaches
to Legal Positivism, Law and Philosophy Library, vol. 3 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986).
15 For that one should consult the detailed work of Sean Coyle, 'On the Foundations of Legal Rea¬
soning', fn 13, supra.
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The similarities between the two programmes notwithstanding I believe that a se¬
mantic account of norms' ontology, one that presumably the ITL will want to agree with,
cannot be reconciled with the positivist premisses that inform the philosophical programme
of ITL. Instead, I am going to argue, the semantic account ofnorms' ontology has to amount
to an account of norms' normativity (i.e. their action-guiding character) that is non-
positivist, in the sense that it advocates that it is possible to acquire knowledge about law's
evaluative or practical side. Accordingly the position argued for in this dissertation rejects
the positivist separation between law and morals while endorsing a cognitivist attitude to¬
wards (legal) values. To put the difference in a condensed form, whereas the ITL claims that
an account of the referents of legal discourse is possible independently of any specific val¬
ues or substantive action-guiding principles that enjoy an ultimate justification, the account
I advance will claim the exact opposite.
Having said this, I would not like to be interpreted as claiming that the ITL is insen¬
sitive to values or the principles of practical reason. On the contrary, ITL is a theory which,
especially in its mature formulations16, takes great care to account for rules as facts that are
'created' within or by social practices that 'brim with value'. However, the ITL adopts a
quasi-instrumental stance towards the evaluative element of norms in the following sense: it
claims as a principal, that an account of legal rules and other legal facts, however informed
by value it may be, it does not require the acknowledgement of any specific fundamental
values or principles but just of those values and principles that currently inform social ac¬
tion. Hence the evaluative element in rules, or their internal aspect, is accounted for in the
ITL only relatively to some current value-system, which does not raise any claim to cate¬
gorical or universal validity17.
16 Vide in particular, MacCormick, 'Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Facts' in Law and Philoso¬
phy 17 (1998), 301-345.
17 In this respect the ITL is close to the Weberian ideal of a value-free analysis of values. In Max
Weber's understanding, values are never a matter of knowledge but of decision. Scientific analysis in
relation to values can only formulate objective judgements in respect to the specific connections be¬
tween the values of a given value-system, but can never offer a rational justification for the ultimate
values that support a given value-system. In Weber's words 'die wissenschafltliche Weltbetrachtung
(vermag) zwar zu lehren, was man kann und was man will, nicht aber was man soil'; vide Weber 'Die
'Objektivitat' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis' in idem, Schriften zur Wis-
senschaftslehre (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1991), 27. It appears further that this view was dominant in the
work of other German social and legal philosophers of the mid-war era; vide for instance, G. Rad-
bruch, Rechtsphilosophie (Stuttgart: Koehler, 1973), 96; and, H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, reprint of
the 1960 2nd edn (Wien, 1983) 1, 84.
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Institutions and the space ofnormativity
In a nutshell, the idea behind the ITL is that it is possible to allow for the existence of non-
material facts (or objects) against conceptual time-spaces (institutions) whose co-ordinates
are set by normative commitments between agents. In those time-spaces one can locate all
those non-material facts that render our normative discourses intelligible by fulfilling the
referential function of normative language. The programme of uncovering the ontological
foundations of legal discourse advanced by the ITL rests, roughly, on the following meth¬
odological premises18:
a. The task of explaining and accounting for the existence of norms and legal institutions tries
to steer between the Scylla of idealism and the Charybdis of reductionism. To that extent the
ITL allows for the existence of abstract or ideal entities (institutional facts) but only in cor¬
relation with the material background of human action in specific social contexts. Thus the
ITL endeavours to offer an ontology that is useful both for the explanatory work of the legal
sociologist and the normative-doctrinal analysis of the legal scientist.
b. Values are not excluded form the ontological account of institutional facts. ITL understands
institutional facts as resting (or supervening) upon tokens of meaningful human action. To
the degree that meaningfulness of action can be accounted for in reference to specific aims
and values, institutional facts are taken to be invested with evaluative content. Hence the the¬
ory, in accounting for institutional facts, takes a Verstehen attitude towards those facts and
tries to unpack the specific evaluative point that holds together the concrete institution(s)
within which abstract normative facts substantiate. Having said that, ITL is far from being
cognitivist in relation to values; it appreciates the need for taking values into account, but
does not go as far as to endorse the possibility of an objective knowledge of values. In the
context of ITL, values are understood more as a matter of attitude towards specific patterns
of human behaviour than as something which it is possible to have knowledge about19.
c. The central idea of ITL is that there are legal and social facts which are intelligible as non-
material institutional facts. Institutional facts are facts in virtue of being statable as true
18 In offering a brief account of the aims and objectives of the ITL, I will mainly refer to the intro¬
duction co-authored by MacCormick and Weinberger from their An Institutional Theory ofLaw, 1-30.
For any subsequent additions and improvements of the theory I will refer to MacCormick's 'Norms,
Institutions and Institutional Facts', Law and Philosophy 17 (1998), 301-45. As a result Weinberger's
view is not represented in this context. Furthermore the whole discussion has more the character of
highlighting the main similarities between the ITL and the present account, rather than of exhaustively
discussing ITL.
19 This view is already present in MacCormick's earlier monograph, H. L. A. Hart, as discussed in
Ch. I, supra.
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statements. What makes them true is not simply a part of the physical environment, but an
interpretation of the physical environment in the light of human practices and their underly¬
ing rules. Here belong also certain abstract features or properties (labelled also 'facts' in the
terminology of ITL) of material objects that are ascribed against the background of practices
and the rules that support them (for instance the property ascribed to some piece of metal of
'being the World Cup'; or the property of 'being married' ascribed to some person; or even
the property of 'being a person' ascribed to some individual). Institutional facts are non-
physical facts that, however, are endurable in time in the same way that material facts are.
d. Institutional facts exist in the context of institutions. Institutions are instances of human ac¬
tivity that are grouped together in correlation to some body or set of valid rules20. Those rales
do not exhaust institutional reality but allow for the realisation of new institutional facts and
combinations of instances of human activity.
e. Finally the most interesting task that ITL undertakes is the attempt to offer an account of
those rales or norms that put together an institution in whose context institutional facts can
exist. There are, roughly, two cases considered by the account: first the easy case, when rales
are themselves instances of an institution that is already in existence. In that case one can re¬
fer to some higher-level rales in virtue of which the lower level (or institution-internal) rales
are understood as facts. Second the harder case, when the inquiry addresses directly those
higher-level rales which exist independently of any institutional foundation. These are the
rales that ultimately group together occurrences of physical facts and brute movements into
forming various institutions. In tackling the nature of those foundational or framework-rules
the ITL strives to deliver an explication of the normativity (i.e. the action-guiding character)
of norms as such. Consistent with its programmatic objectives, the ITL explicates the concept
of normativity by adopting an interpretative stance towards the agents that share the founda¬
tional rales; this stance requires that those rales are understood in the terms in which they are
intelligible to the relevant agents, a view not very different from Hart's idea of the internal
aspect of rales. This enterprise of understanding seems to unfold in a rather holistic manner
in that it takes into account the way agent's behaviour is guided by the relevant rales. Hence,
an explication of normativity aspires to establishing a connection between the framework-
rales and the concept of human action/agency. A further aspect of this explication is ITL's
requirement that norms are expressible as containing reference to some possible human ac¬
tion (better token of action) or state of affairs. In earlier formulations of the ITL its authors
seem to require that in order to understand or group together something as an institution there
must exist some norms which are anterior to it, thus evoking some sort of normative central-
20 For the diversity and the different degrees of institutionalisation, vide MacCormick 'Norms, Insti¬
tutions and Institutional facts'.
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ism in the account of the interconnection between normativity and agency2': namely the idea
that there might be some ultimate norms that exist before any token of agency or any form of
practice. Later formulations correct this impression and render ITL a non-centralist account
of normativity that adopts a genuinely pluralist stance towards the sources of normativity22.
On this more mature understanding norms and rales, either as instances or as foundation of
an institution, are delivered simultaneously with instances of agency or practices. In particu¬
lar MacCormick advances an understanding of normativity in which practices and further in¬
stitutions stand in a dialectical relation to the implicit or explicit rales that support them: one
is able to depict the appropriate norms that regulate some practice only as participant of that
practice. Accordingly, normativity is explicated as the ongoing process of reflecting upon our
commitments and aims as well as upon the means for their implementation, always in refer¬
ence to the tasks and the 'puzzles' that our actual interaction with the environment and other
agents poses to us.
However, despite of the suggested refinements, the ITL does not seem to be able to deliver
an adequate justification of the 'constitutive' rules that provide for the foundation of insti¬
tutions. The reason is that the ITL embraces a strict distinction between fact and value from
which follows a non-cognitivist stance in respect to values. This commitment prevents ITL
form offering a full-blooded account of the action-guiding character of norms (or of the
phenomenon of normativity as such) when it comes to explaining the level of the 'constitu¬
tive' norms. In contrast, such an account would have to refer to a series of objective evalua¬
tions or normative requirements that provide for the link between agency and normativity in
a non-reductive way, and in whose light 'agency' would feature as an evaluative concept
that conditions action-guiding rules. Unless one employs such an evaluative account one's
explication of normativity will have to retreat either to something akin to Hart's attitudinal
account of normativity or to some even more blatant form of reductionism that rests on
'brute-fact' accounts.
Insofar as the ITL neglects the evaluative aspect of normativity, it fails to deliver a
full-blown anti-reductionist account of legal and broadly social norms. This will be argued
despite the fact that the ITL dovetails with the semantic account of law's ontology that was
employed so far. In arguing for that claim in the remaining of this chapter, I will gradually
21 Centralism in practical philosophy is the view that the ultimate source of normativity derives from
a unique ultimate principle. It is that principle from which all other norms and principles derive their
power or validity. Cf. With S. L. Hurley, Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 10-20.
22 Compare in particular with MacCormick, 'Norms, Institutions and Institutional Facts'.
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introduce the thesis that a semantic account of the ontology of norms is not sufficient in
order to block reductionism. Its (very important) role consists in pointing out the fact that
legal (normative) discourse 'rests' on a domain of ontological categories that are dis¬
tinct/independent from and hence non-reducible to the ontological categories that 'support'
non-normative discourses. However, there is one more issue to tackle, which lies beyond the
power of the semantic account. This is the issue of the evaluative character of normative
entities. Owing to the suggested semantic explication of ontology this evaluative character
can be conceived as the evaluative content or meaning of the semantic units, usually sen¬
tences, in whose environment normative entities are depicted.
For a sufficient account of the evaluative content of normative sentences, I will ar¬
gue, a distinct pragmatic account is needed. This account will refer to the pragmatic rules
that necessarily regulate the validity of our assertive sentences about legal/normative enti¬
ties. Additionally I will advance the thesis that those pragmatic rules comprise of two fea¬
tures: first they are a priori necessary (in a slightly different terminology, 'transcendental-
pragmatic'); second they state a minimum amount of substantive standards for
agency/action (hence they are action-guiding)23.
The significance of the proposed combination of a semantic with a pragmatic ac¬
count of normativity lies in the fact that the pragmatic account is not conceived as a mere
supplement to the semantic-ontological one in a manner, say, that one could opt for dis¬
pensing with it. Rather the claim is that insofar as the semantic account of ontology makes
sense only within an anti-representationalist conception of content, then the prag¬
matic/evaluative aspect of normative content is automatically imported by the modus in
which anti-representationalism 'organises' content-acquisition: i.e. through the interaction
of content-possessors with the environment and each other. It is on the level of that interac¬
tion that certain evaluations (embedded in pragmatic norms for the use of sentences) come
into play and constrain normative content. In particular, the kind of interaction that 'reveals'
those significant evaluations is not any type of interaction with aspects of the environment
(for instance with stones or trees) but specifically interaction with other agents. To put it in
a - perhaps - oversimplified form, the underlying idea will be that the content (and further
knowledge) we acquire in respect to normative entities, not only in the domain of law but
also in that ofmorality, is constrained by certain pragmatic rules that are transcendentally
presupposed by the interaction between agents as part of the process of acquiring content
23 Vide CHs IV and V, infra.
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about the environment.
In discussing ITL's compatibility with the semantic aspect of an anti-reductionist
account of normativity, the following section outlines the reasons for which a semantic
analysis of law's ontology should intertwin^with a pragmatic account of normative mean¬
ing.
Anti-reductionism, ontology and value
In its endeavour to offer an account of normativity, or of the property of norms that renders
them action-guiding, the ITL endeavours to adopt an anti-reductionist strategy in respect to
social and legal norms: the justification of action/agency requires that our normative vo¬
cabulary refers to normative objects lato sensu, amongst which count normative properties
and facts. Insofar the program of ITL dovetails with the account of the 'objecthood' of
norms that was offered until now. In fact it looks that the semantics-exhausts-ontology the¬
sis might be close to an ideal method for accounting for law's ontology, without falling back
to some form of occult Platonism, and the acceptance of metaphysically problematic entities
whose explication would require a great deal of appeal to intuition.
In the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis the structure of language exhausts the
structure of thought, with the result that thought content can be readily represented through
semantic structures. Furthermore, within the context of an anti-representationalist philoso¬
phy of content, the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis has the power to account for the
ontological structure of the world through semantics without any further supplements; this
follows from the next two ideas when taken conjointly: that, first, if our thoughts and gener¬
ally our mental states are about the world and not about any mental interface, then the
structure of the thought depicts that of the world; and that, second, the structure of the
thought is exhausted by the structure of the language.
Although ITL does not use the philosophical vocabulary previously employed it
seems almost certain that it would subscribe to anti-representationalism as much as it would
subscribe to the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis. Because if the latter safeguards ITL's
concern to avoid Platonism, the idea of anti-representationalism is necessary for evading the
bad effects of Idealism and the subsequent scepticism that any dualism between the mind
and the environment entails. Indeed, it looks like the whole point of the analysis of how
norms enmesh with practices, customs and institutions24 is nothing more that an effort to
24 Vide MacCormick, ibid..
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secure ITL's firm grounding on (social) reality or on 'how the environment really is'. Thus
legal statements are not about things that only exist in our heads but about things that, to a
larger or lesser degree, are part of our environment. My thought about a valid norm or a
signed contract is about something outside my mind, and clearly it is different from a
thought I enjoy about a norm that is not valid or a contract that was never signed (or perhaps
a contract whose existence I hallucinate)! Hence non-dualism and anti-representationalism
are necessary prerequisites for the semantic explication of ontology: the privileged role of
language or semantics in ontology can only be established under the supposition that the
structure of the mind is identical with the structure of the world23.
A strong case for the plausibility of this view is to be found in some recent, power¬
ful accounts of knowledge26. In those accounts the factive state of knowledge is analysed as
constituting a state of mind; this analysis contravenes the standard view that knowing
something derives from the conjunction of some mental or internal element (belief) plus the
appropriate external, non-mental component (truth)27. On the non-standard view one knows
p if and only if one is in a mental state S\ hence S is necessary and sufficient for knowing p.
In short, knowing on the non-standard view is merely a state of mind. Now, since knowing
is a factive state, a state about some aspect of the environment, the only way to sustain that
knowledge is a state of mind is to fully rebut the mind-world dualism and the associated
idea ofmental representations or intermediaries. Only if the mind is located within the envi¬
ronment can factive states be understood as being mental states.
The discussion in Ch II showed that when placed in the environment of anti-
representationalism the semantics-exhausts-thought thesis amounts to the semantics-
exhausts-ontology thesis. From that derives an account of ontology, of what there is, over a
semantic account of the structure of propositions and the inferential relations between them.
This method comes across as being particularly appealing when the objects of cognition are
25 As was maintained in CHs II and III.
26 Vide instead of others T. Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000),
Ch. I. Also J. McDowell 'Knowledge and the Internal' in idem, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality
(Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), 395-413.
27 This is the traditional, so-called, hybrid account of knowledge according to which knowledge
equals true belief plus some other internal to the mind components. This understanding of knowledge
was first put in serious question by Gettier, who stated counterexamples on which knowledge does not
obtain even if its alleged compound parts do (locus classicus for that argument is E. Gettier 'Is Justi¬
fied True Belief Knowledge?', Analysis, 23 (1963), 121-123. Since that article the battle for an ac¬
count of knowledge has been fought along the lines of either offering refined accounts of the internal
components of knowledge that would meet the Gettier challenge, or by offering new counterexamples
that would anew defeat the refined accounts of knowledge.
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abstract normative objects, facts, and other entities in the spirit of the ITL. To that extent
the ITL can be readily reconciled with the basic tenets of a semantic account of ontology.
However, as I pointed out earlier, a semantic account of normative entities, in the context of
an anti-representationalist theory of content, will be required to take into account the
evaluative groundwork that underlies the interaction between agents. This requirement rests
prima facie on the following two grounds.
The first is the issue ofmeaning. Any semantic explication of ontology, will require
some account of the meaning of the words and sentences that compose the structure of
thought: if thought-content, which is about the environment, is exhausted by the semantic
structures of language, a basic condition of understanding what it is about is to understand
the meanings of the symbols. Trivially the two basic options for an account ofmeaning are:
a truth-conditional theory ofmeaning; and a meaning-as-use-theory ofmeaning. In the sec¬
tions to follow, I will allude to a series of reasons for which the second option is more at¬
tractive. However the main reason for opting for the use-theory has to do with the way one
chooses to understand the second interlocking issue.
The second issue relates to the way the contents of thought are taken to depict the
environment. Let us call this the operational part of the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis.
The operational part deals roughly with the question of how the mind meshes with the
world. Of course, the question is raised on a normative level; what is required is an account
of the principles that guide the structuring of thought towards reflecting the structure of the
environment. Already in earlier chapters a version of the same question guided the analysis
towards locating the syntactic-logical principles that govern the relations between ontologi-
cal categories on the level of the basic semantic unit of the sentence/proposition28. The pre¬
sent task is slightly different, yet it should be understood as being complementary to that
earlier one. What is inquired about presently are the normative principles or the normative
patterns that underlie our interaction with the environment, where this interaction is taken
to be constitutive to the 'mechanism' of placing thought (the mind) in the world. To that
extent those normative patterns should be understood as unfolding on a pragmatic level, as
opposed to the logical-syntactic level that was referred to earlier.
With this move the basic assumption has been cast: namely that non-dualism can be
rejected only if we perceive knowers (and broadly content-possessors) as agents who inter¬
act with the environment (and other agents). In short, the suggestion is that the route to-
28 Compare with CHs II and III.
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wards forming thoughts and acquiring knowledge and other factive states necessarily passes
through the innumerable ways of interacting with the environment or the infinite forms and
shapes that our agency acquires. Put in a sketchy manner, the mind reacts to the way the
physical environment impedes or enables our movements29. When I form a thought about a
cup being on the table, I somehow have to take account of the way the cup interferes with
my agency. All the information that my senses report about the cup is somehow organised
against the normative matrix of a proposition; this will amount to grasping the cup as being
an object with certain properties. The same picture will be roughly adequate in grasping
also abstract objects or facts like normative objects and norms. When I run into a queue in
front of the counter, I grasp the rule that regulates the behaviour of those who stand in the
queue30. Even in that case the environment somehow impedes my agency or, at least, de¬
lineates the space within which my agency may 'expand'.
Now every portion of new knowledge concerning action-guiding norms (like the
rule of queuing) will add up to the network of action-guiding norms that regulate one's
agency. To that extent, past and new norms will form a network of action-guiding patterns
that delineate agency and hence demarcate future content-formation. However beyond the
level of all contingent31 past, present and future normative patterns for action or agency -
whose knowledge we acquire by immersing into everyday situations - there seems to be a
non-contingent normative meta-level which we need to presuppose in order to make sense
of the meanings of the semantic symbols and units (words and sentences) that individuate
thought-content (both normative and non-normative)32. Thus a sentence which individuates
a thought about a cup can be asserted along the same rule that regulates the assertion of a
29 Compare with Luntley, Contemporary Philosophy ofThought, 342-346.
30 The example comes from MacCormick's account of queuing, in 'Norms, Institutions', 303-309.
31 Though the use of the adjective 'contingent' might be misleading I will allude to it for the follow¬
ing reasons; what I want to emphasise here is that the richness of normative abstract entities is deeply
embedded in the every-day interaction of the agents with the environment, and could never fully be
anticipated by pure theoretical reflection. To that respect the proper way to account for norms or nor¬
mative system is by using non-centralist theories that avoid deducing norms from an ultimate principle
by pure reflection. In this context norms can be understood as being 'contingent' in the sense that we
arrive at their knowledge only by entangling ourselves in specific action-guiding contexts, i.e. prac¬
tices, institutions and so on. Having said that, no norm or other normative entity is contingent in the
sense that it is created in an unprincipled way as for instance positivism takes a judge to stipulate a
rule in a hard case. It is rather the case that in being able to appreciate or come to know a new norm,
we rely on a deeper-level normativity: this normativity is put together by some norms or principles
that offer the possibility to grasp normativity as such. Those deeper norms offer the metaphysical
possibility for normative knowledge. Further to the degree that this kind of knowledge is mediated by
language, the deeper-level norms can be reconstructed as pragmatic norms that regulate meaning and
understanding (Ch IV, infra, and Ch V).
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sentence that individuates a thought about a norm33.
The norms that put together the normative meta-level referred to, can be understood
as pragmatic norms that regulate the validity of thought-formation via sentence formation.
Validity in this context can be conceived in relation to a series ofpragmatic or interpersonal
claims that speakers raise by bringing about different illocutions (questions, assertions and
so on). The pragmatic rules that contain those claims transcend specific speech-contexts and
provide for general guidelines for the use ofwords and sentences34. Against the background
of those rules it is possible to account for the meanings of words and sentences along the
lines of some version of a use theory ofmeaning35. But, as already suggested, in the seman¬
tics-exhausts-ontology thesis thought-content is individuated according to the meanings of
the relevant semantic units that individuate content. Hence the normative-pragmatic patterns
that regulate the validity of illocutions and derivatively the meanings of words and sen¬
tences can readily be taken to regulate content formation.
An understanding ofmeaning and content as being regulated or constrained by a se¬
ries ofpragmatic normative presuppositions only makes sense in an action-mediated context
where content-formation is explicated as being generated through agents' interaction with
the environment: in this context semantic units individuate content according to their
meanings; those meanings are fixed by the pragmatic norms which govern the use of the
semantic units. Clearly, the concept of the pragmatic norms can only be accounted for in
connection with the agents' interaction with the environment and each other. Those norms
are pragmatic to the extent that they emerge from the constellation between speakers/agents
in the every-day process (or practice) of tackling the environment. Their validity cannot be
explained in connection to any other superior as it were norm but rests on the observation
that their non-following or ignoring would involve some sort of contradiction (transcen-
32 This is going to be argued in a detailed way in CHs V and VI.
33 Having said that, the present essay is particularly interested in the pragmatic presuppositions of
normative content. As CHs IV and V will argue those aren't entirely identical to the presuppositions
of non-normative content.
34 The idea is common to many philosophers in both the analytic and the continental tradition; for
instance in H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge Mass: Harvard 1989); Austin, How
to do Things with Words 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). The pragmatic level of meaning
and communication has especially been developed in the German-speaking contemporary philosophy;
vide the pioneering work of K.-O. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie vol 2: das Apriori der
Kommunikationsgemeinschaft, 4th edn (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); also idem, From a
Transcendental-Semiotic Point of View (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press,
1998); vide also J. Habermas, Moralbewufitsein und Kommunikatives Handeln, 5th edn (Frankfurt am




Connectedly the transcendental-pragmatic norms that regulate meaning and content
are primarily norms that are substantiated in relation to action. Insofar they are foremost
norms for the regulation of agency and derivatively norms for the regulation of meaning
and content'1. Furthermore, in virtue of their transcendental validity, the pragmatic norms
function as something like the normative bedrock upon which agency rests. Hence any val¬
ues that those norms bring into expression transcend specific action contexts and, instead,
are located on the level of the bedrock that supports agency tout court. As a result the net¬
work of all action guiding norms that come to light in every-day contexts of interaction with
the environment and other agents needs to be in accord with the transcendental pragmatic
norms that support agency. Connectedly the pragmatic bedrock of action contains standards
for the validity of all action-guiding norms past, present and future, including legal norms.
Conclusions andfurther objectives
In a more ITL-relevant terminology, the correct task of a semantic account of norms' ontol¬
ogy is to show that beyond the specific institutions in whose framework an account of nor¬
mative facts can be given, there is a need to account for a more far-reaching 'institution',
something like a practice ofcommunication38. The reason for the admittance of such a 'su¬
per-institution' is the need to account for the 'framework' or 'constitutive' rules of particu¬
lar institutions: it is the idea that when one comes to grasp the rules of a particular practice
or other action-guiding context, one seems to be already participating in a more general
practice that enables one to adopt the internal point of view, to grasp in other words the
normative (action-guiding) meaning of the framework rules that constitute particular insti¬
tutions prior to one's actualparticipation in them.
As a result, the proposed account adopts an expansive conception of 'institution' in
general and the institution of law in particular, as opposed to ITL's restrictive understand¬
ing. In explicating law the ITL seems to postulate the existence of a space that is more or
less strictly demarcated from other practices; in that space law's meaning is specifically
legal and legal agency is a specific domain of agency that abides by legal rules predomi¬
nantly. Conversely, on the expansive conception of 'institution', law is the social practice in
35 Vide this chapter, sec. 5, infra.
36 Vide Ch. V.
37 This claim will be refined in CHs V and VI, infra.
38 Communication is here understood as comprising elements of agency with elements of cognitive
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which legal content/meaning-as-use is generated. Furthermore, insofar as legal meaning is
normative, legal practice will be guided by the same pragmatic-normative presuppositions
that regulate general normative meaning. Connectedly any restrictions imposed upon legal
discourses, giving thus the impression that the legal system is a closed system that obeys an
internal rationality, are at the end of the day restrictions that can make sense only against
the background of the norms that support the overall practice of communication.
In all the discussion of ITL suggests that an anti-reductionist account of normativity
comprises two levels of analysis: a semantic-ontological and a pragmatic-normative (nor¬
mative in the sense of action-guiding). On the first level, the semantic-ontological, the infer¬
ential structures of language offer us the ability to constitute rules as normative facts (or
abstract objects lato sensu). For that an anti-representationalist theory of thought is presup¬
posed. The second level, the pragmatic-normative, endeavours to offer an account of the
action-guiding content/meaning of legal sentences by making reference to a non-reductive
account of agency. For that an account of the evaluative bedrock of agency is required. It
was further suggested that in the context of anti-representationalism this account can be
generated by focusing on the analysis of the pragmatic presuppositions that regulate the
validity (meaning) of normative sentences.
The remaining of this chapter will offer a more detailed inquiry into the intercon¬
nections between the two levels and, thus, prepare the ground for an analysis of the tran¬
scendental-pragmatic conditions of normativity.
Ontology and Agency
Whereas the semantic account succeeded in providing for an adequate account of the onto-
logical puzzles that pertain to norms' nature, there is a further important issue that remains
still untouched. This relates to the observation that the semantic story might have fallen
short of accounting for one fundamental intuition concerning norms, namely their evaluative
character. As early as in the discussion of Hart's understanding of the concept of law39, it
was made clear that the (ontological) irreducibility of norms is somehow connected with
their evaluative character. Indeed, Hart claimed that the basic feature of the internal aspect
of any rule is its understanding as incorporating an evaluation (revealed through the critical
reflective attitude). The shortcoming of the semantic account becomes rather acute upon
activity, in the spirit of the previous discussion.
39 Vide Ch I, supra.
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reflection on the fact that the evaluative aspect was taken to be the specific difference of
rules from other commands or imperatives. Thus, unless the ontological account is ex¬
panded or supplemented towards explaining rules' evaluative aspect, it will be incomplete.
One could argue that the semantic account has generated a description of the ontol¬
ogy of norms in which the evaluative element was indeed accounted for by the 'ought' that
every norm contains in virtue of its being a modal meta-fact. This is not besides the point;
but it is not a satisfactory answer either. The semantic account has indeed captured norma¬
tive sentences as signifying 'oughts' and their counterparts - i.e. norms - as being abstract
objects that 'crystallise' instances or tokens of the modality of 'ought', to allow a somewhat
figurative expression. In doing so, however, the semantic story did not fully explain what
this modality or its meaning consists in. In other words, it didn't provide an explanation for
what it is to understand a rule as expressing a normative meaning and, hence, as incorpo¬
rating an evaluative aspect. Until this explanation is made available the ontological auton¬
omy of norms will not stand on a firm ground. I will suggest that such an account is possible
within the context of the semantic anti-representationalism that has presented in Ch II. This
will be argued on the basis of two interlocking issues:
The first issue relates to the claim that semantic anti-representationalism optimally
amounts to an account of human agency as constituting our conceptual boundary when we
attempt to enumerate 'the things that exist' (ontology). A lot for the soundness of that claim
rests upon the way semantic anti-representationalism already takes semantic units, like
words and sentences, to individuate content, namely according to the aspect or portion of
the world that they reveal to us (as content-possessors)40. Now the aspect of the world that
sentences or words reveal to us turns on the way we grasp or understand their meaning (or
'sense' in a more Fregean vocabulary41). So far, an account of ontology will mesh with an
account of the way we understand meanings. In addition to that, I will take, in a somewhat
axiomatic way at this stage, an account of meaning to unfold along the lines of a 'meaning-
as-use' theory42. Such a theory aims to make explicit the normative guidelines (rules) upon
40 Vide the discussion in CHs II and III, supra.
41 For a clarification of the Fregean termini vide CH III, supra (cf. in particular with the text corre¬
sponding to fn 22).
42 I hope that the arbitrariness of this choice will be counterweighted by two reasons: first by the fact
that some form of the 'use-theory' of meaning seems to be the standard view amongst contemporary
philosophers of language; second by the fact that the 'use-theory' ideally dovetails with intentional
realism's claim that the semantic-propositional structure of our intentional states is necessary in ac¬
counting for human agency: in other words, as intentional realism accounts for the normative con¬
straints of action, the use theory of meaning accounts for the normative constraints (rules) to which
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which the employment of our words and sentences rests to the effect that it is valid. Those
rules refer to the way content-possessors employ or use linguistic structures in order to ac¬
quire content about the environment. The act of employment of linguistic units unfolds as
an act of interaction of content possessors as agents with the environment in the process of
content acquisition. To that degree, the rules for the validity of sentences have a pragmatic
character and can be expanded into addressing agency altogether (CHs V and VI). Hence an
analysis of the pragmatic norms that govern meaning-as-use will simultaneously be an
analysis of the norms that govern action. As a result this move will elucidate the claim that
ontology is constrained by agency.
The second issue broadens the scope of a theory ofmeaning as use by focusing spe¬
cifically on the meaning of normative (amongst them also legal) expressions and sentences:
the claim here is that since an account of the normative requirements ofmeaning amounts to
an account of agency, the specific account of normative meaning, as action-guiding meaning
par excellence, will have a special impact upon the normative constraints of agency. More
specifically: the meaning of normative propositions, or better, the normative-pragmatic re¬
quirements for understanding them as signifying 'oughts'43, generates a very concrete ac¬
count of human agency; As a result the content of 'agency' is conditioned upon, or even put
together, by the instances of 'ought', spelled out by all normative propositions, at least to
the degree that agency embraces norm-regulated conduct. What this line of argument
amounts to is the thesis that the concept of agency that is evoked by semantic anti-
representationalism cannot be different from the one generated by the account of the mean¬
ing of normative propositions. In fact the account of agency will be constituted on the basis
of an account of the meanings ofnormative propositions and their counterparts (norms).
To substantiate these claims I will next embark on a more detailed discussion of a
version of the theory of meaning as use which will provide a minimum theoretical back¬
ground for the discussion of the normative groundwork that supports meaning and under¬
standing. After that I will briefly discuss the impact of an analysis of normative meaning on
the account of agency.
meaning-as-use (or action) abides.
43 What is implied here is that a proposition will, usually, express an 'ought' and, hence, depict a
valid norm only if there is another norm which empowers it to do so. Later it will be argued that for
any 'ought' to be valid, one will need to presuppose an ultimate irreducible substantive norm, some¬
thing like a principle which guarantees the autonomy of agents.
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Meaning as Use
Under the rubric 'use theory of meaning' one can group together a plethora of theories
which, roughly, attempt to explain the meaning of linguistic expressions through their use or
function in language as a medium of communication. The idea was initially put forward by
Wittgenstein during the later phase of his work and since then it has had an increasing influ¬
ence on philosophers of language44. Disregarding the differences in detail and elaboration
the various theories share a common core: the thesis that use exhausts meaning (call it the
use-exhausts-meaning thesis). On a first glance the content of that thesis is that in account¬
ing for the meaning of words and sentences one has to attend to the ways those linguistic
units are actually employed or used within a language. In doing so one comes to grasp the
rules that govern that use. Those use-rules constitute the meaning of the relevant words and
sentences. To that degree meaning is a concept that can be explained within language (it is
language-immanent).
Consequently in our effort to understand meaning we have to focus on the way
words and, particularly, sentences are employed within language with the aim to make ex¬
plicit the underlying rules that govern that employment. Those rules constitute something
like a normative bedrock which is the last instance of explanation in respect to meaning and
understanding. It is, hence, maintained that understanding those rules does not require refer¬
ence to any additional rules or other extra-linguistic entities. Rather, the idea in respect to
the rules of use is that intentional beings who are able to apply rules have a spontaneous
normative response about the right way to apply a rule in a given case45.
Asserting a Sentence
The elementary level of sentence use which the analysis of meaning takes as its starting
point is the assertion of a sentence46. The rule which specifies the conditions for correctly
asserting a sentence S in language L takes the form47:
44 For a brief albeit comprehensive survey, vide John Skompski, 'Meaning, Use, Verification', in B.
Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999)
29-59. For a contemporary version of a use theory of meaning see P. Horwich, Meaning (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998), Ch 3.
45 Vide Skompski, ibid. 31; also Ch. VI, infra, where I discuss the Wittgensteinian notion of the 'bed¬
rock' of a language.
46 The discussion will stay on the level of sentences since the rules that govern the use of words are
determined in connection with the way a word contributes to the assertion conditions of a sentence;
see also Skompski, ibid. 32.
47 In the formulations of the mles for assertion I follow roughly Skompski, ibid. 32-40. Later in the
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(Rule ofAssertion): S is correctly used in order to make an assertion in L if and only if one is
justified in believing, of the proposition that is expressed by the use of S, that it is true.
Thus to correctly assert a sentence means that one is justified in believing that the sentence
is true, in the broadest sense of the word 'true'. Accordingly, assertion and truth are con¬
nected within a rule that specifies the conditions for the correct use of affirmative sentences.
As a result the rule of assertion provides for a notion of correctness that relies on some form
of epistemic justification48: one undertakes a correct use of a sentence as long as one is jus¬
tified in believing that the corresponding proposition is true. Put in this way, however, the
notion of correctness (and the relevant rule of assertion) appears to refer to propositions as
some entities of some extra-linguistic nature, different from that of sentences. On a first
look this creates a difficulty: taken conjointly, the premises 'the meaning of a sentence is
exhausted by its correct use (or the rule that governs that use)' and 'the correct use of a
sentence relates to the truth of the corresponding proposition', yield the conclusion that the
meaning of a sentence turns on the truth of a proposition. Were one to conceive propositions
as being extra-linguistic entities, the project of the use-theory of meaning, i.e. to explain
meaning in a language-immanent way, collapses.
Therefore, in order to avoid this conclusion, a use theory of meaning proceeds to
explicate the notion of the proposition in a language immanent way. In other words, propo¬
sitions as corresponding to sentences (and concepts as corresponding to concept-words),
have to be associated themselves with the way we use language. But this is not something
novel or contradictory for a use theory ofmeaning. In fact the whole program of explaining
meaning and understanding through use, rests on the assumption that there are no entities
external to language that are meaning-intrinsic or self-interpreting and, thus, can account for
the meaning of linguistic signs49. The only 'source' of meaning is the use of an expression
or a sentence according to some normative standards. Understood that way, to talk of con¬
cepts and propositions is simply to talk indirectly of the use of expressions and sentences
within particular languages. To grasp a proposition or a concept is to normatively respond to
thesis (CHs V and VI), I will discuss the pragmatic aspect of the mles of use for a language. That
aspect consists in the raising of specific claims on behalf of those who use sentences and words. Those
pragmatic mles support the communicative dimension of language, as it has been suggested in the
work ofK.-O. Apel, J. Habermas and R. Alexy.
48 Vide Scorupski, ibid. 32-33.
49 This is a characteristically Wittgensteinian idea and is in detail discussed in Ch. VI.
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a rule according to which some sentence or expression is employed in a language. Along
these lines, talking about propositions and concepts is nothing more than talking about lan¬
guage-understanding in an abstract way, i.e. without specifying the particular language.
Which is to say that concepts and propositions have no explanatory role in an account of
meaning as use.
Specified in that way, the use-theory of meaning is, to talk with Michael Dum-
mett50, a fulll-blooded theory ofmeaning which does not rely on extra-linguistic concepts or
propositions in order to account for meaning, but proceeds to explain what it is to possess a
concept or grasp a proposition as part of the account ofmeaning. It is for that reason that the
use-theory incorporates an epistemic claim: the priority of language in the explanation of
meaning yields an account of what it is to be justified in believing that a sen¬
tence/proposition is true. This account is epistemic in that it contains an analysis of what it
is to know that a sentence/proposition is true: in a full-blooded theory of meaning-as-use,
this consists in a 'practical ability to tell when it is right to utter [a sentence] assertorically:
to recognise information states as warranting or not warranting that kind of utterance of the
sentence'51.
Meaning and truth
The satisfaction of the epistemic claim of the use theory ofmeaning requires some account
of the truth conditions of a sentence-as-proposition. Such an account can be given by a se¬
mantic theory of truth as the one discussed in the first part of this chapter. According to a
semantic theory of truth the truth conditions of a sentence will be given by the conditional:
(truth-conditional formula): Sentence S is true in language L if and only if it is the case that
proposition P.
This formula discharges the epistemic claim raised by the rule of assertion: S is correctly
used to make an assertion if and only if one is justified in believing that the sentence is true;
and the truth-conditional formula provides the truth-conditions for S in L. Stated in those
terms the truth-conditional explication ofmeaning needn't be incompatible with a language-
immanent explication of propositions and concepts. However, the claim raised by a 'full-
50 Vide Dummett, The Seas of Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), and the discussion in
Skorupski, ibid. 38 n..
51 Skorupski, ibid. 39.
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blooded' semantic theory poses some further constrains upon the truth-conditional explica¬
tion ofmeaning. Those constraints refer, as mentioned before, to the way one is allowed to
understand the relation between propositions and sentences. In particular, the concern arises
in connection with the way one is going to demarcate the epistemic issue of 'grasping a
proposition' or 'possessing a concept'. There are at least two ways to conduct such an en¬
terprise:
The first way is to explicate the epistemic issue as exceeding the boundaries of a
theory ofmeaning. To abide by that option entails that one distinguishes, more or less, be¬
tween two phases in one's account of the meaning of a sentence S. Accordingly, to know
the assertion of S in L is, first, to know its truth-condition and, second, know the epistemol-
ogy which links with that truth-condition32. While the first issue belongs to the subject mat¬
ter of a theory of meaning, the latter doesn't. On this understanding what the theory of
meaning, and its truth-conditional part, account for is merely the 'things' of which linguistic
expressions are true of (namely the propositions ofwhich sentences are true). However, the
theory of meaning seems to remain silent in respect to the epistemic question 'how does one
come to know the truth-conditions of a proposition'. This question will have to be answered
by an epistemological account that goes beyond the boundaries of any theory of meaning
and will account for extra or pre-linguistic entities or connections53.
I take it to be pretty obvious that such a solution is not what a full-blooded use the¬
ory ofmeaning aims for. Therefore I will consider the second way of tackling the epistemic
issue of 'grasping a proposition' to offer a more satisfactory solution. The second way
holds, roughly, that the theory of meaning has to go beyond a truth-conditional part that
'.. .merely stat[es] what expressions of the language are true of and deriving from that truth-
conditions for sentences of the language'54. In fact it has to explain what it is to know the
truth-conditions of a sentence. But in doing so it merely evokes the assertion conditions of a
sentence. This is perfectly consistent with the point of a full-blooded theory of meaning;
namely, that grasping truth-conditions is never over and above mastering assertion condi¬
tions. Thus, knowing the truth-conditions of a sentence consists in a practical ability to 'tell
when it is right to utter it assertorically: to recognise information states as warranting or not
warranting that kind of utterance of the sentence'35.
52 Skorapski, ibid. 37.
53 This is, roughly, the solution that Skorupski suggests, ibid. 48-54.
54 Skorupski, ibid. 38.
55 Ibid. 39.
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Arguably, this furnishing of truth-conditions suggests a Verificatonist understanding
of the assertion conditions and, derivatively, of the concept of meaning56. Having said that,
verificationism in respect to meaning is to be distinguished from verificationism in respect
to truth. The first version says that understanding a sentence consists in grasping what in¬
formation states would verify it irrespective of those states' actual existence or availability.
(Put in slightly different terms, it is the idea that a sentence is meaningful if and only if one
is able to conceive or 'simulate' what sort of evidence would be adequate for asserting a
sentence). In contrast, verificationism in relation to truth holds that truth is verifiability. A
sentence is true if and only if there actually is evidence warranting its assertion. Leaving the
second conception aside, some version of verificationism about meaning could be made
compatible with a flexible pragmatic account ofmeaning as use. For that to work one needs
to evoke a looser version of verificationism about meaning which, roughly, holds that a
sentence is verifiable if one can describe, at least in principle, what it would be like to en¬
counter in experience the state of affairs which makes a sentence true.
This version of verificationism escapes the narrow or stricto sensu verificationism
about truth that was endemic in the thought of Vienna Circle and the work of the early
Wittgenstein. Verificationism stricto sensu holds that the meaning of a sentence is deter¬
mined by the actual availability of a state of affairs for which the sentence functions as a
picture or mirror. For that an ontology is presupposed which postulates reality as consisting
of a totality of states of affairs57. In this context understanding a sentence implies that one is
able to experience in a direct way whether the relevant state of affairs obtains. In contrast to
this idea a more flexible version of verificationism about meaning can be taken to share
insights with the later work ofWittgenstein. On this approach the meaning of a sentence is
related with the methods of verification rather than some picturable state of affairs that
would verify it. Linking the concept of meaning to the method of verification bestows
meaning with a significant amount of flexibility: meaning is made dependent upon the
method of verification; further, since there are many different methods to verify a sentence,
meaning becomes perspectival or context-related. This yields a pluralistic understanding of
the assertion-conditions of a sentence which eventually leads to a rather liberalised concep¬
tion of meaning58. The assertion conditions as consisting in the method of verification
56 For a detailed discussion of the topics in this and the next paragraph, vide Skorupski, ibid. 40-45.
57 For the affinity with the ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, see Skorup¬
ski, ibid. 40-45.
58 Cf. with Luntley, Contemporary Philosophy of Thought, Ch 12.
153
eventually are taken to incorporate the consequences of an assertion for practice as well as
the operations which licence it. This broadening of the concept ofmeaning towards incorpo¬
rating practical consequences is particularly acute in the late work ofWittgenstein. There,
understanding an assertion is more than to be told when one is licensed to make that asser¬
tion; one needs to know what consequences flow from that assertion for action.
In this liberalised conception of meaning action becomes constitutive for the deter¬
mination of meanings. Understanding a word or a sentence is knowing what can be done
with it in communication and action. Connectedly the liberalised conception of meaning
transcends verificationism (as a method for establishing assertion conditions) and is recast
as a practical concept (as emanating from the consequences that the use of words and sen¬
tences entail in our everyday practices of communication). Meaning as a practical concept
dovetails with a picture of intentionality that is radically externalist or informed by the envi¬
ronment39. In this picture, thought is directed to the environment not via mental representa¬
tions but through the way action/agency is impeded or enabled by the environment: my
thought concerning the book being on the table, commits me to holding true claims about
how my movement will be impeded by that particular book, or how the movement of other
objects will be impeded or enabled by it60. On this approach intentional content is generated
according to the (normative) patterns of action. To put it differently, the normativity of
content does not flow from the environment as such, as there are hardly any physical things
with intrinsic normative properties. In contrast normativity comes from another direction:
from the patterns ofour actions, where actions are causal encounters with the physical envi¬
ronment and other agents. Thus, in a way, the environment is mapped by our thought ac¬
cording to the way it 'impedes' or 'interferes' with the network of our actions.
The dimension of the (inter)action of agents with the environment invests meaning
with an evaluative aspect: as meaning is generated along the way action 'meets' the envi¬
ronment, the various instances of this 'meeting' are interpreted in the light of the evalua¬
tions that underlie action. In this sense it is action that provides for the evaluative character
ofmeaning considering that the environment, as such, is valueless. In the light of the values
that underlie action the consequences of understanding a sentence in one rather than another
way become significant for the determination ofmeaning. To that extent, meaning becomes
dependent upon the consequences that understanding, in the light of action, entails. For
59 Vide supra, Ch. II; also for a concise discussion Luntley, ibid. Ch. 12 (342-346).
60 For this idea see Luntley, ibid., 345.
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instance the consequences that the act of asserting entails for action points to the rule that
one should be truthful when asserting something (imagine asserting untruthfully to a blind
person that the staircase he is about to descend has 10 instead of 12 stairs - just to use an
example where the consequences for action are fairly clear!). Hence consequences for ac¬
tion point to the normative constraints of meaning and demarcate meaning as a normative
concept throughout.
Those constraints appear to be twofold, according to the normative reasons in
whose light they are instantiated: constraints that emanate from the way the environment is
(constraints from natural or physical normativity); and constraints that emanate from inter¬
action with other agents (constraints from practical reason or morality). The constraints
from practical reason can be distinguished in two further groups: those that flow from the
norms ofmorality stricto sensu (ethics, law and other social normative systems); and those
that flow from the pragmatic norms that render practical norms intelligible. The latter, rules
ofmorality lato sensu, contain basically the necessary validity rules for the formation of the
sentences that contain the norms and the expressions of the stricto-sensu morality61. Taken
together, the norms of morality stricto sensu and the morality lato sensu constitute agency
as an evaluative concept by demarcating the domain of what is 'allowed' and what is 'for¬
bidden', what is a right and what is a wrong action. Moreover understanding the meaning of
the practical sentences that contain the rules ofmorality stricto sensu already commits one
to an explication of the concept of agency as resting upon the pragmatic rules that enable
practical meaning, or the rules of morality lato sensu. That being the case, the pragmatic
rules that make practical sentences intelligible can be taken to demarcate the territory of
human agency as a whole, to the extent that they are antecedent to all practical meaning.
Normative Meaning and Agency
Notably the rejection of mental representations and of the idea of mind-world dualism leads
to an account of content in which agency plays a central role. Agency becomes constitutive
to the formation of intentional content, owing to its ability to 'place' the mind in the world.
What we understand or even know as being or being not the case is grounded on the way we
interact with the environment. Conversely, the criterion for ascribing intentional states to
others is whether those states are suitable in offering a rational account of the agents' be¬
haviour. In both cases action or agency seems to be the standard against which correctness
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of content is measured. To that extent, in the environment of an anti-representationalist (and
non-dualist) conception of the mind-world relations, action and agency develop a normative
impact upon intentional content. Content is informed by the context of particular instances
of agency (practices).
One of the implications of recasting intentional content as being contextually de¬
termined is that content becomes dependent upon the perspective or the angle of the world
that is revealed within particular actions, instances of agency or practices. Connectedly the
semantic structures of thought are not self-interpreting structures that state, as it were, eter¬
nal truths but stand for bits of the environment according to the way they convey meanings.
Further, they convey meanings according to the way meaning is shaped within practice (or
the way we employ/use words and sentences upon interacting with the environment62). But
then the practice that determines thought-content and linguistic meaning is one and the
same, at least under the supposition that thought is exhausted in language: semantic units
are capable of individuating content according to the way they acquire meaning, according
to the way they are used upon agents' interaction with the environment. This offers the pos¬
sibility of re-stating the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis as the meaning-exhausts-
ontology thesis.
On the understanding just sketched, meaning and content seem to be inconceivable
outside the context of agency, seem to somehow presuppose agency. Connectedly, agency
appears to pose a series of requirements on content and meaning: content and meaning need
to be able to account for the rationality of agency. It was earlier argued that both anti-
representationalism and the idea of logical grammar rest on the requirement of intentional
realism, or the tenet that rational human behaviour can be explained adequately only
through the appreciation of the existence of contentful intentional states. According to this
suggestion, the restrictions that anti-reperesentationalism and grammar pose on truth and
reference are supplemented by a third (perhaps more fundamental) constraint: the ability of
content to rationally account for human behaviour. This can be rephrased as the requirement
that true sentences and referring terms contain the appropriate rational significance in the
sense that they are capable of bringing about the appropriate impact on human action. Along
these lines, a sentence is true and a term refers according to the way they have a rational
61 For a detailed discussion of those topics, vide infra, CHs V and VI.
62 It is clear that in a non-dualist environment where thought is more or less exhausted by language,
an account of thought-content is already equivalent to some account of the use of semantic units
within a specific context. To that degree it is almost impossible to keep a semantic account of content
156
impact on the behaviour of an agent. Insofar their impact becomes dependent upon their
meaning (or the Fregean 'sense'63). Consequently, the concept of meaning can be taken as
bringing into expression the idea of grammar as the individuation of world-content which
further stands under the restriction of rational impact upon agency: in the semantics-
exhausts-ontology thesis, grammar is the means that serves towards individuating content.
Contentful intentional states are individuated via the structure of grammar in sentences,
singular terms, and predicates. Individuated in this way, contentful states are linguistic
structures. Now, these structures explain our behaviour according to what they mean. In
other words, their rational impact upon our behaviour is given by their meaning. The issue,
namely, of the rational impact of grammar upon our behaviour becomes tantamount to the
question about the impact our sentences, terms, etc. have upon our agency, through their
meaning. Hence meaning is the structure of thought that meets the requirement of rational
impact upon behaviour.
The rough equation of grammar with meaning, implies that meaning (like grammar)
exhausts ontology. In other words, it implies that it is not possible to give an account of the
world independently of meanings (as incorporating intentional states) and vice-versa. The
implications of this tenet are rather notable: by qualifying grammar as being composed put
together by meanings, our account of ontology is subjected to a constraint of rationality.
This rationality is a rationality under the light of human agency. Hence, ontology will re¬
quire, via an account of meaning, an account of human action/agency. This account will
characterise the way the mind meshes with the world, in arguing that an account of what
exists need to be incorporated into an account of what rationally exists, where the content of
the rationality proviso will be given through an account of human agency. To that degree,
any account of the referents of singular terms and predicates as well as the conditions under
which sentences are true, will have to backed by the account of human agency.
However, this picture calls for clarification of the issue of the 'rationality' of ac¬
tion/agency. Apparently any attempt to refer to the requirements that action poses on con¬
tent, meaning and finally ontology, will depend upon the way one understands rationality as
a property of agency/action. One way, one that I am not going to pursue further, would be to
try to give an account of rationality as an agency-immanent property, as a feature (probably
irreducible) of agency out of which flow the normativity of content and meaning. A more
perfectly immune from a pragmatic account of the way meaning is acquired.
63 For the content of the Fregean concept 'sense' cf. with Ch. III.
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plausible alternative is to connect rationality with the normative patterns of action, which
are responsible for fixing content (and meaning). In a way this second method takes the
concept of rationality to follow from whatever normative patterns govern action. The idea is
simple: the more formal notion of rationality makes sense only as being consequent to the
more substantive notion of the normative pattern. The latter should be conceived as con¬
sisting in some rules or norms that are action-guiding. In specifying those norms a simple
solution is to identify them with whatever action-guiding maxims and rules belong to mo¬
rality lato sensu. The simplicity of the solution is rather convenient: it dovetails with the
earlier suggestion that (inter)action with other agents is 'impeded' or better informed by the
norms of practical reason and morality. Since those norms are the most competent entities
for regulating any form of action, why should some domain of action (the one responsible
for the constitution of content and meaning) be exempted from them?
Be that as it may, the simplicity of the answer might suggest an unusual complica¬
tion: until now ontology has been grounded on the way content is formed according to se¬
mantic structures and meanings. Furthermore, the discussion has established that meaning is
exhausted in the way we use words and sentences. And finally the use of words and sen¬
tences has been identified with the way we interact with the environment, i.e. with the way
content is produced. All that appears to point to some sort of circularity: if norms are onto-
logically accounted for by meanings and if the latter are merely imaginable within the con¬
text of practices and instances of agency, how is it possible to conceive normativity of ac¬
tion as resting on some norms that are antecedent to agency?
Let me pause for a moment and reconsider the picture I have been canvassing in the
last few paragraphs: in it, the environment is mapped by the meanings of semantic symbols
according to the way agents interact with the environment. Thus, agency maps the environ¬
ment according to the way the latter interferes with the former. But there is a further con¬
straint emanating from the interaction with other agents. In this interaction with others
agency maps the moral environment as generating moral meaning. The moral environment
is put together by those (abstract) 'objects' which impede agency as interaction with others
(this a very figurative way of representing things, but it will do for the moment). However,
upon a second look one realises that those normative 'objects' actually refer to agency, be¬
cause their content is about the regulation of the conduct of agents. Earlier it was claimed
that meaning and content rest on the normative patterns of action/agency. What one sees
now in addition to that, is that the normative patten! of action are themselves revealed
through the meaning of normative sentences and words.
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This is the point where the identified tension emerges: whereas, originally, I alluded
to the idea that meaning is constituted through practice, now it looks for a moment that I
take some specific sort of meaning, i.e. moral meaning, to be antecedent to practice. The
inconsistency is levelled on the following consideration: namely that the idea of any norms
for practice/action is normatively antecedent to the practice/action they regulate. Accord¬
ingly practical norms as expressed in normative sentences precede, in the sense of being
normatively antecedent to, specific tokens of action: for that reason we need to 'presuppose'
a norm or a set of norms in order to understand, for instance, that John and Daniel agreed to
move John's desk from his room into the dinning room. Admittedly the meaning of 'agree¬
ment', 'desk', 'move' and so on depends on the way those words are employed in a sentence
and, further, upon the way the whole sentence is in turn employed by the speakers upon
interacting with the environment. However, the normative pattern underlying John's and
Daniel's agreement to move the table is laid down by an action-guiding norm that has to be
presupposed in order to grasp the act of moving as the result of an agreement in that par¬
ticular case. Hence although normative meaning is a category that is normatively antecedent
to some token of agency, specific norms are, generally, made explicit only in connection to
specific tokens of agency or practices. Therefore one way to understand the claim of priority
is by interpreting it as saying that whereas we need an action-guiding norm in order to indi¬
viduate specific tokens of agency the opposite is not the case.
Arguably, 'being normatively antecedent' in relation to action implies that action-
guiding norms enjoy the status of necessary presuppositions for grasping tokens of action.
In putting forward that claim I do not purport to argue that norms are somehow analytic
truths that are knowable a priori. Such a claim is definitely too strong and does not seem to
account properly for how things are. Norms individuate tokens of action but they are also
made explicit or iterated through agent's interaction with the environment. Normative
meaning and content is shaped through the use of normative words and sentences and along
with them so do norms (the meamng-exhausts-ontology thesis). Up to this point one can
take norms and agency as being the two sides of the same coin. However, since no particle
of the environment - including movements, sequences of movements or other physical as¬
pects of agency - is self-interpreting in the sense of being able to generate meaning by it¬
self, the need for accounting for normativity will remain unsaturated if one chooses to ex¬
plicate normativity of action as perfectly depending or supervening upon tokens of agency.
In response to that need, I am suggesting that there is a more basic level of norma¬
tivity which is common to action and (normative) meaning and which enjoys the status of a
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necessary or transcendental presupposition for grouping together movements as tokens of
agency and linguistic entities as normative sentences and further norms64. That level of nec¬
essary normativity can be thought as containing some fundamental or bedrock-norms which
empower normative meaning and derivatively validate every single action-guiding norm. By
alluding to normative meaning (and the corresponding norms) the bedrock-norms refer
equally to action, as the conjunction of the meaning exhausts ontology thesis with the use
theory of meaning, have established. The bedrock-norms are pragmatic norms that refer
equally to normative meaning and action. Insofar, whereas action-guiding norms are deliv¬
ered simultaneously with tokens of action, their pragmatic presuppositions enjoy some sort
of normative priority in relation to them. Along these lines, normativity is accounted for
without assuming that action-guiding norms are analytic propositions that are knowable a
priori. What is analytic and knowable a priori are the transcendental bedrock-norms that
guarantee the intelligibility (or rationality) of meaning and agency. Simple action-guiding
norms (of morality, law and ethics) are revealed within every-day contexts of interaction
with the environment and other agents, and there is no way of an a priori exhaustive ac¬
count of their contents. Nevertheless, it makes sense to talk of those norms as being 're¬
vealed' or 'discovered' rather than 'constructed' for the simple reason that their content
meets an outer conceptual limit in the form of the transcendental bedrock-norms.
This is more or less the idea that it is not up to us to construct any norm we like or,
by slightly changing the point of view, the idea that it is possible that individuals or whole
communities might go wrong in abiding by false/wrong norms. Besides, one should not be
disturbed by the use of verbs like 'discovering' or 'revealing' in relation to norms. If the
same vocabulary does not evoke complaints in connection with other abstract objects, like
for instance numbers, it shouldn't in connection to norms either . In the case of numbers,
'objecthood' is also granted through a semantic analysis of number-terms. There exist also -
at least after Godel's incompleteness theorem65 - some true propositions that escape our
power of construction (i.e. proof) and pose some outer limits to what we can do with num-
64 In suggesting this I will follow the general line of argument that underlies Discourse-theory, or the
philosophical programme that K.-O. Apel and J. Habermas developed in order to depict the norma¬
tive-pragmatic presuppositions of meaning. Notwithstanding the many similarities between my con¬
ception and that of discourse-theory, there are several important differences. Vide the discussion in Ch
V, infra.
65 Godel's so-called first incompleteness theorem roughly says that in any consistent theory there will
always be true but unprovable sentences to the effect that the formalist hope of identifying true with
provability collapses. For an introductory account in the rationale of the theorem, vide James Robert
Brown, Philosophy ofMathematics (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 71-78.
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bers. Hence, introducing a differentiation between normative and number meaning which
would justify a different treatment of their ontology, would need a special reason that does
not seem to be readily available. Hence, either normative meaning is not amenable to ran¬
dom constructivist moves or all meanings are. Since there are firmly established counterex¬
amples to the latter disjunctive the former should be true.
The proposed explication of normativity rests on the intuition that it is possible to
reconstruct the meaning of norms in order to arrive at the fundamental pragmatic-normative
presuppositions of meaning and agency tout court. It is supported by the fact that normative
meaning is both generated by agency (as all meaning does) while it is about the regulation
of agency. Connectedly the presuppositions for normative meaning apply equally to agency.
In a way, those presuppositions constitute the groundwork of the normative patterns of
agency which, roughly, consists in the conglomeration of the normative objects (norms of
morality, law and so on) that are revealed in every-day practices. Along these lines, it is
possible to grasp agency as incorporating irreducible normative patterns.
A non-reductionist conception ofagency.
The existence of irreducible norms for action dovetails with an understanding of agency as
an irreducible normative concept. It is only possible to conceive agency as generating nor¬
mative patterns for intentional content (and, in particular, intentional normative content) if
we explicate it as resting upon an irreducible normative groundwork. Explicated in that
way, the concept of agency is able to account for both normative and non-normative con¬
tent. In that case, however, normative content and meaning will have a privileged access to
the normative groundwork of agency, for the reasons already stated. The normative
groundwork will then consist in the pragmatic norms that 'authorise' normative meaning.
The understanding of agency as a non-reducible normative concept is informed by
the reasonable idea that human conduct is not a contingent but a regulated or 'normal' ac¬
tivity. Indeed, as indicated earlier66, much of the plausibility of the tenet of intentional real¬
ism itself rests upon the idea that intentional action interrupts the causal chain of natural
events in a non-contingent way. This should be taken to suggest that agency is not subjected
exclusively to the principle of causality as phenomena in the physical environment usually
do (being, thus, contingent). Instead, agency can be reconstructed as obeying to a different-
than-causality normativity, say, a normativity for action. On a first account, one can take
66 Supra, Ch II.
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this normativity to consist in the network of the action-guiding norms that are depicted by
all normative propositions we deploy. Besides, it is a fact that we cannot refrain from de¬
ploying them because otherwise, as the idea of intentional realism and the discussion of
normative reductionism suggested, we cannot fully account for action/agency.
Up to this point, a formal/semantic account of action-guiding norms, like the one
pursued throughout CHs. II - IV, suffices for reconstructing them as ontologically irreduci¬
ble abstract objects which warrant the existence of a distinct normative realm for action. To
that degree the formal account is sufficient in blocking any reduction that would occur if
one were to explicate agency as merely being a contingent natural/physical phenomenon
which unfolds along the lines of the (contingent) laws of physics. Nevertheless, the seman¬
tic account cannot block contingency on the level of normative content or meaning. This is
the contingency delivered in the form 'whatever we pronounce and has the structure of a
normative proposition is a valid norm'. Clearly a strictly semantic account of norms and
normativity is not able to prevent norms from acquiring contingent meanings. For that one
would have to undertake an analysis of the pragmatic conditions of normative meanings and
argue that those meanings entail a series of transcendental normative presuppositions
(norms) which, in the one or the other way, are connected with or point towards the (sub¬
stantive) concept of autonomy. Through this move, agency can be linked up with the con¬
cept of autonomy as a substantive, irreducible concept that is able to account for the non-
contingent character of agency. In this context irreducibility of agency is generated by the
transcendental character of the concept of autonomy.
This way of setting up the relations between autonomy and agency, stands in line
with the Kantian idea that the first causes which set in motion the causal relations between
the phenomena are to be found in the noumenal world, or the world inhabited by 'things-in-
themselves'. In that world, first causes are identified as undetermined or free agencies that
are responsible for setting in motion the phenomena in the world of the appearances (or the
world we inhabit). Hence things in the noumenal world, or 'things in themselves', are free.
Our ability as intelligent agents to reflect upon our actions leads us, according to the Kan¬
tian picture, to allocate noumenal existence to ourselves and, hence, to regard ourselves as
free. The upshot of this argument says that, even though our actions are unavoidably em¬
bedded within the causal flow of phenomena, we know that we have a noumenal existence
and that nothing is antecedent to the determination of our will67. Chairs or stones, on the
67 For contemporary views containing a Kantian conception of agency vide, Christine Korsgaard,
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other hand, do not have the ability to reflect upon their 'agency' or the chain of events in
which they participate, with the result that they cannot attribute to themselves a noumenal
existence, hence they are not free. Clearly, this is also the case for all entities that do not
possess self-reflective capacities.
Normative meaning and autonomy: an outline
The picture just sketched can adequately shed light upon the importance of the meaning of
normative propositions in the determination of the content of the concept of agency. Let me
give a bold sketch of a possible account: meanings of normative propositions and, further,
norms presuppose the meaning of a Principle or Norm of Autonomy (NoA), in order to be
intelligible as signifying 'oughts'. This can be argued against the background of an analysis
of the pragmatic presuppositions of normative meaning in general. NoA will be an abstract
normative object which will lay down the substantive conditions of normativity or the gen¬
eral meaning of 'ought'. All other particular meanings of particular norms will be instances
of the meaning of NoA. Moreover, all norms will be tokens or instances of NoA (as par¬
ticular realisations of autonomy). On the basis ofNoA and all other action-guiding norms, it
will be possible to pick out bits or tokens of agency as constituting non-contingent facts.
That is, facts of agency will always presuppose the existence of the one or the other action-
guiding norm in order to be intelligible as facts of agency. Finally, NoA and the other ac¬
tion-guiding norms will be irreducible because they will feature as non-eliminable abstract
objects in any account of instances (or facts) of agency, along the lines that were suggested
in the discussion of the reductionism ofnormative concepts68.
Having said that, one should bear in mind that there is still a large difference be¬
tween the way normative meanings contribute to an account of agency and that in which
non-normative meanings do. Non-normative meanings play an instrumental role in the ac¬
count of human agency, namely the role of explaining agency whenever it is subsumed un¬
der the principle of causality capturing, as it were, the phenomenal aspect of agency. If, for
instance, I want to spent my holiday on Santorim and I don't know that Santorini is Thira, I
will buy a ticket to Santorini and not to Thira; hence, the meaning of 'Santorini' and not that
of 'Thira' will account for my behaviour. This explanation might be enough for accounting
'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' in eadem, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 188-221; also Onora O'Neil, Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cam¬
bridge University Press, 1996).
68 Vide Ch. II.
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rationally for my behaviour; however, it does not really offer any insight into the normative
presuppositions of action tout court. The reason is that the content ofmy belief about 'San-
torini' does not have any impact upon the content of the concept of autonomy, at least not in
a straightforward way; but it is that content which is decisive for the determination of the
normative groundwork of agency.
Things are different in the case of the meanings of normative expressions and sen¬
tences. In order for those to make sense as having normative meaning, as being action-
guiding in other words, one will have to presuppose a principle of autonomy in order to
make this normative meaning intelligible. Doing so will have a direct impact on one's ac¬
count of agency, since the principle of autonomy touches upon the issue of rational action
tout court. As a result, the possibility of an account of normative meanings will be constitu¬
tive for the concept of rational agency. In fact the two accounts will amount to the same
account of a principle of autonomy which will allow for the intelligibility of agency as a
normative concept.
Overall, the important point is that in asking how normative meanings fit in an ac¬
count of agency, we actually ask in a radical way the question about the normative ground¬
work which supports the notion of agency. The reason is that the meaning of a normative
sentence cannot simply explain in a causal way bits of human behaviour, as it is the case
with non-normative meanings; it must further agree with that account (along the lines of
being correct): take, again, the meaning of the non-normative sentence 'I wish to spend my
holiday on Santorini'. This is enough for explaining my booking the relevant flight to
Greece. In contrast, the meaning of the normative sentence: 'whenever someone offends me
I punch them', cannot really back my punching someone who called me 'stupid'. The reason
is that one's freedom in formulating normative sentences and, thus, depicting valid norms, is
constrained already by the content of the concept of rational agency, which rests on a series
of pragmatic normative presuppositions. To put it more figuratively, there are only so many
valid norms to be depicted: those that are 'approved' or empowered by NoA and the corre¬
sponding substantive conception of agency.
The issue ramifies in the area of legal discourse: legal (normative) sentences will
disseminate knowledge about the environment according to their meanings. Accordingly, as
already suggested, those meanings will signify instances of autonomy and, therefore, will be
relevant for picking out tokens of human agency (facts of agency). In order to accomplish
the task of accounting for those meanings and their ontological counterparts (legal norms),
one will have to include them into a general account of human agency (and its rationality),
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as already mentioned. This account amounts in explicating agency through the pragmatic
prerequisites of normative meaning and the subsequent introduction of a Norm of Auton¬
omy. To that extent an account of legal meaning (and, further, of legal norms) will be part
of a broader account of general normative meaning (and, further, of the norms ofmorality).
Moreover, such an account is suitable for explaining the evaluative dimension of
normative propositions and corresponding norms, in accordance with Hart's initial postula-
tion of an internal, evaluative aspect of rules. In doing so, the account of rules' evaluative
dimension will play a corroborative role in connection to the anti-reductionist argument for
normative entities that was offered earlier on: the reductionism account suggested that nor¬
mative entities are not co-extensive with any other non-normative entities, hence that they
are ontologically autonomous. However, the semantic account which was employed in order
to explicate norms' ontology, subsequently suggested that an account of norms' ontology
needs to be in accordance with an account of agency, owing to the fact that the semantic
units which individuate normative content have an impact upon agency according to their
meaning. Consequently the ontological autonomy of norms is subjected to a higher-order
requirement: an account of normative meanings, and through it an account of agency. Inso¬
far the anti-reductionist claim will be only partially satisfied unless it is supplemented by an
account of the pragmatic-normative conditions of the meaning of normative propositions.
Agerida
The main purpose of Chapter V will be to flesh out an account of the pragmatic presupposi¬
tions which render normative meaning possible. In doing so I will refer to the philosophical
programme that has been elaborated since the early seventies in the writings of K.-O. Apel,
J. Habermas and, later, R. Alexy, mostly under the label Discourse-theory (from the Ger¬
man Diskurstheorie). Put loosely, Discourse-theory sets out from an understanding of sen¬
tence meaning as deriving from the validity-conditions of the corresponding acts of uttering
those sentences (speech-acts). To that extent meaning is treated as being dependent upon the
pragmatic rules that regulate larger units of speech activity (discourses).
The analysis of the pragmatic rules that regulate normative speech will point to the
necessity for a uniform treatment of all types of normative meaning. Resting on this neces¬
sity I will attempt to explicate legal meaning (and broader legal discourses) as a species of
general practical/moral meaning (and broader practical/moral discourses) along the lines of
Alexy's so-called Special Case Thesis (Sonderfallthese).
The rest of the chapter will be spent in an effort to highlight the need for explicating
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the pragmatic rules for legal/normative meaning as substantive action-guiding norms.
Resting on the discussion of the first part of the chapter I will argue against the thesis,
mainly tendered by Habermas, that the discourse presuppositions consist merely in rules for
the regulation of argumentative procedures via which speakers create or construct the actual





THE PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITIONS OF COMMUNICATION: A
CASE FOR DISCOURSE-THEORY
Introduction
In this chapter I undertake an inquiry into the pragmatic-normative presuppositions of nor¬
mative meaning. The inquiry is situated within the overall philosophical programme of dis¬
course-theory which has been elaborated in the writings of Karl-Otto Apel and Jiirgen
Habermas1. Even though Habermas reserves for the specific analysis of normative meaning
the term discourse-ethics, I will not allude to the reasons for that distinction and, instead, I
will use the terms 'discourse-theory' and 'discourse-ethics' interchangeably to refer to the
analysis of normative meaning2.
I will use the intuitions of discourse-theory in order to account for the pragmatic-
normative groundwork of normative, and more specifically legal, meaning in our every day
communication. It will be argued that normative meaning is conditioned by the pragmatic
rules that regulate communication between speakers when they use normative expressions
1 Amongst the texts that formed the philosophical groundwork of discourse-theory the following have
acquired the status of the locus classicus: Jiirgen Habermas, 'Was heiBt Universalpragmatik?' In Jiir-
gen Habermas, Vorstudien und Erganzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995) 353-440; idem, 'Wahrheitstheorien', in Habermas, Vorstudien und Er¬
ganzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 127-
183; idem, 'Erlauterungen zur Diskursethik' in Habermas, Erlduterungen zur Diskursethik, 2nd edn
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 119-226; idem, 'Diskursethik-Notizen zu einem Begriindung-
sprogramm', in Habermas, Moralbewufitsein und kommunikatives Handeln, 5th edn (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 53-125; idem, 'MoralbewuBtsein und kommunikatives Handeln', in Haber¬
mas Moralbewufitsein und kommunikatives Handeln, 5th edn, 127-206. And for Apel's work vide K.-
O. Apel, Transformation der Philosophic vol. 2: das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft, 4th
edn (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); and his more recent Auseinandersetzungen im Erprobung
des Transzendental-pragmatischen Ansatzes (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998).
2 The reasons for that distinction are, on the one hand, marginal in connection to the present discus¬
sion and, on the other hand, they have been contested by other proponents of discourse-theory; K.-O.
Apel, for instance, seems to object to such a distinction, on the grounds that it weakens the pragmatic-
ethical background of communication by implying that normative meaning rests on a different kind of
pragmatic conditions than non-normative meaning does. Vide Apel, 'Auflosung der Diskursethik?', in
idem, Auseinandersetzungen, 727-837 (731-742).
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and sentences. Resting on this conclusion I will further advance the thesis that legal mean¬
ing (and broadly law) is a special case of general practical/moral meaning (and broadly mo¬
rality).
Finally the pragmatic rules that regulate communication via normative expressions
and sentences will be claimed to have three features: to be necessarily valid rules; to be a
priori knowable (via transcendental reflection); and to be substantive, in the sense of ad¬
dressing action apart from speech.
Transcendental-Pragmatics, Universal-Pragmatics and the
Normative Basis of Communication
The broad idea that underlies discourse theory is the thought that sentence meaning cannot
be accounted independently from the pragmatic-contextual conditions of the employment of
sentences by speakers who aim to communicate with each other. This thesis is argued for in
the general linguistic-philosophical part of discourse-theory that consists in the two closely
related programmes of Transcendental- and Universal-Pragmatics, developed in the work
ofK.-O. Apel and Jiirgen Habermas respectively3.
Transcendental- and Universal-Pragmatics originate from ideas and thoughts which
can be detected in the tradition of the analytical philosophy of language and especially in
the speech acts theory of Austin and Searle4. For the sake of economy, i am going to use the
term Universal Pragmatics (henceforth, U-P) for both programmes, as Habermas' project
has been worked out in more detail over the past three decades; to that extent the discussion
will not, as a principle, take into account the numerous differences between the two variants
of Apel and Habermas unless they are important for the present project.
U-P assumes that certain pragmatic features of utterances admit of rational recon¬
struction in universal terms in the same way that phonetic, syntactic and semantic features
3 Cf. Fn. 1 and in particular Habermas, 'Was heiBt Universalpragmatik?' and Apel, 'das Apriori der
Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Grundlagen der Ethik', in Apel, Transformation der Philoso¬
phic, vol. 2, 358-435.
4 For a general discussion of Habermas' receprtion of Searle's ideas see Keuth, Erkenntnis oder
Entscheidung: zur Kritik der Kritischen Theorie (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1993), 43-111. It should
be mentioned that Habermas' reception of Searle's ideas has not been left uncritisised (for a quick
review of the criticisms, refer to Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die Theorie des
rationalen Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begriindung, 2nd edn (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1986), 142-146. For Searle's own view cf. with J. Searle, 'Response: Meaning, Intention-
ality, and Speech Acts' in E. Lepore and R. van Gulick (eds), John Searle and his Critics (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1993), 81-102 (89-96). The correctness of those criticisms notwithstanding, they cannot
annul Habermas' project (cf. with Alexy, ibid. 143, fn 328.).
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of sentences do. In other words U-P thematises the elementary units of speech (utterances)
in the same manner as linguistics does the elementary units of language (sentences)5. These
pragmatic elementary units of speech are further reconstructed as transcendental presuppo¬
sitions of the speech as a whole. In this sense, according to Habermas6, every act of utter¬
ance situates the relevant sentence in relation to: i) external reality, ii) inner reality (the
speaker's own world) and iii) the normative reality of the society (what Habermas describes
as life-world, i.e. the shared values and norms within a specific social context). In this con¬
text, whenever a speaker is uttering a sentence, one necessarily (implicitly though), makes
the following pragmatic validity claims [Geltungsanspruche]: One claims that what one
states is true [Wahrlieitsanspruch], that one's manifest expression of intentions is truthful
[Wahrhaftigkeitsanspruch\, and that the utterance is itself right or appropriate [Richtigkeit-
sansprnch\ in relation to a recognised context7.
In this respect, U-P seem to constitute a simple analogy to the formal analysis of the
language which is performed by linguistics. U-P acquire their normative dimension only
when associated with the speech acts theory. The main intuition of the speech acts theory
consists in its attempt to work out normative standards for the speech by treating utterances
as complex structures containing elements both of speech and action8. The whole project
has a pragmatic character, precisely because it endeavours to derive the normative ground¬
work of the speech from certain 'contexts' of human action. Searle has tried, for instance, to
determine rules for the act of 'promising'. These rules include, amongst other things, the
honesty of the one that promises, as well as their intention to relate their promise to a moral
obligation9. These rules are derived from the 'act-related' part of a speech act ('I promise
that...'), which is also called the illocutionary forcew. The illocutionary force seems to have
a strong influence upon the locutionary meaning, or the second part of a speech act, which
mainly indicates what has been said ('.. .that tomorrow I will pay you back'). The influence
consists mainly in the lllocutionary force's prescribing of the validity conditions for a happy
employment of the locutionary meaning of the speech act: according to this picture, what is
said (the locutionary meaning) ought to abide by the criteria which the illocution pro-
5 Habermas, 'Was heiBt Universalpragmatik?' 359.
6 Habermas, 'Was heiBt Universalpragmatik?', 388-389.
7 Op. cit., 389
8 For a concise presentation, vide Keut, Erkenntnis, 49-54.
9 Keuth, ibid., 49.
10 This is the terminology used by Austin; Habermas' prefers to call the same part of a speech act the
performative part. For a discussion of the relevant terminology, see Alexy, Theorie, 143n.
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nounces, otherwise there is the danger that something else or nothing at all is said. In this
sense the illocutionary force has a determining impact on the meaning of what is said. The
impact consists in a series of validity criteria that are generated by the illocutionary force of
speech acts.
These criteria are pragmatic in nature and are embedded into rules which are con¬
ceived as the (necessary) conditions of a concrete acting-context (for instance, promising).
The method for grounding those rules is that of transcendental deduction". Those rules are
further articulated as a corpus of discourse rules that envisage communication via language
as a (rational) discourse with a minimum moral/practical content. The discourse rides con¬
sist in a series of pragmatic rules (Robert Alexy lists 29 rules of the general practical dis¬
course12), amongst which count the claim for correctness (i.e. the claim that necessarily
accompanies any act of asserting a sentence), a group of formal rules which guarantee co¬
herence and consistency, as well as rules that contain substantive criteria for the equal
treatment of persons and situations13. Against the background of this pragmatic normative
network, discourse-theory proceeds to ground a principle of universalisation14 that deter¬
mines the validity of the sentences that contain substantive action-guiding norms that are
generated by the discursive procedure. The status of the discourse rules is not uncontrover-
sial: Habermas prefers to explicate them as pure speech-norms that regulate argumentative
procedures which aim to ground correct (true/right) sentences". However, as I will argue in
several occasions in this chapter, a strict procedural explanation of the discourse rules
seems to fall short of providing a sufficient ground for discourse-theory.
Clearly a lot of the persuasive power of the philosophical programme that rests on
U-P depends on the grounding method of the discourse rules. In offering an analysis of the
main argument for the validity of discourse rules I will limit the discussion to the most ele¬
mentary of the discourse rules, i.e. the so-called claim to correctness [Anspruch aufRichtig-
11 Vide the discussion on the claim to correctness in the next section, infra.
12 Vide, Alexy, Theorie, 234-255.
13 Ibid. 234-255. Vide also Alexy, 'A Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason', Ratio
Juris, 5 (1992), 231-251.
14 Instead of the term 'universalisation principle' Habermas prefers to use the term 'discourse-
principle' (Discursprinzip), or <D> in connection to practical discourse. The content of <D> is; 'valid
are precisely those action-guiding norms, about which all potential persons affected could agree as
participants in rational discourses', cf. Habermas, Faktizitat und Geltung. Beitrdge zur Diskurstheorie
des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, 2nd edn (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 138.
For his discussion of the connections between the universalisation principle and the discourse-
principle cf. with Habermas, 'Diskursethik - Notizen zu einem Begriindungsprogramm', 103n.
15 Vide in particular Habermas, 'Discursethik - Notizen', passim.
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keit]. The reason for that is, roughly, that this claim constitutes the most elementary prag¬
matic rule against whose background all other discourse rules can be developed16. I will
further confine myself to an analysis of the claim to correctness only in connection with
practical/normative sentences (sentences of law and morality), despite the fact that dis¬
course-theory takes it to equally apply on both theoretical and practical assertions.
Two reasons support this choice: first the fact that a detailed discussion of the va¬
lidity of theoretical sentences would escape the scope of the present dissertation. Second,
and more important, the fact that contrary to the uniform treatment of theoretical and practi¬
cal discourses undertaken by the proponents of discourse-theory, the claim to correctness
seems to incorporate a distinctly substantive (in the sense of action-guiding) dimension
when raised in the context of practical sentences17. This observation will be polished as the
thesis that the validity of normative sentences implicates questions of material correctness
(or even justice) which can be dealt with appropriately only if the concept of correctness is
related to some substantive moral theory (in which discourse participants feature as
autonomous agentsn). Connectedly the claim to correctness concerning practical sentences
cannot be taken to merely correspond to a claim to truth in the spirit of the semantic theory
of truth19, as perhaps it is the case with the claim to correctness regarding theoretical sen¬
tences.
One further methodological remark concerning the ensuing discussion: in the con¬
text of discourse-theory, the pragmatic rules that underlie speech are usually referred to as
standards for the validity of certain utterances. Broadening the scope of this idea I will refer
to the pragmatic rules as constituting rules for the regulation of the meaning of the uttered
sentences. This will dovetail with the understanding of the concept of 'meaning' in the
context of the theory ofmeaning-as-use that was advanced in Ch IV. As it was argued there
the meaning of a sentence is exhausted in its use or in the conditions for its employment.
Insofar as the conditions for the use of sentences can be legitimately taken to constitute
validity conditions for the corresponding utterances, I will hereafter refer to the pragmatic
rules for speech as rules for meaning.
16 Cf. Alexy, Theorie, 165-168. Also Habermas, 'Diskursethik - Notizen', 96n.
17 Vide Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts (Freiburg i. Br.; Miinchen: Alber, 1992) 126-136;
idem, 'Probleme der Diskurstheorie' in Alexy, Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs. Studien zur Rechtsphiloso-
phie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 109-126 (120-121); also cf. with G. Pavlakos, 'Persons
and Norms: On the Normative Groundwork ofDiscourse-Ethics', ARSP, 85 (1999), 7-22 (7, 8).
18 The concept of autonomous persons will be debated in Ch VI, infra.
19 For the main tenets of the semantic theory of truth vide Ch IV, supra.
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The Claim to Correctness: the Core of Pragmatic Rationality
Robert Alexy has advanced a transcendental argument for grounding the claim to correct¬
ness regarding legal propositions20. The argument's scope refers to legal sentences and
terms but can be applied mutatis mutandis to any normative sentence. Alexy's argument for
the claim to correctness is a type of the more general argument that the act of uttering a
normative proposition (Np) presupposes a series of pragmatic rules which render Np intelli¬
gible. Since, de facto, we utter normative propositions in our every day communicative
practice, the conclusion to be derived is that those pragmatic rules must be necessarily valid.
Alexy, like many other proponents of discourse-theory, employs the apparatus of
performative contradiction in order to show that the connection between a pragmatic rule R
and the meaning of a normative proposition Np is compelling: according to the performative
contradiction, any Np that does not respect the content of a valid pragmatic rule R entails a
contradiction of the form Chp. The contradiction is, further, performative - or pragmatic -
because rule R is evoked through the uttering of Np. Let me specify the transcendental con¬
struction in relation to the claim to correctness.
The transcendental argument
A transcendental argument concerning the claim to correctness has, roughly, the following
form:
PI: We employ legal propositions (statements).
P2: The act of uttering them necessarily presupposes the rule R: 'normative propositions raise a
claim to correctness'.




P2: Np -> OR
C: □ R
20 Vide Alexy, Begriff 64-70; and for a summary of the argument in English idem, 'On Necessary
Relations Between Law and Morality', Ratio Juris, 2 (1989), 167-183 (177-183). It should be noted
here that there are several authors who accept the conception of legal discourse as a rational argu¬
mentation without explicitly referring to the claim to correctness and the connection between rational¬
ity and practical reason that is inherent in the work of Habermas and Alexy . For instance see Manuel
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Clearly P2 introduces too much content in what can be taken to be a contestable way; this is
where the devise of performative contradiction is employed. This develops its justificatory
power by exploiting the feeling of absurdity or inconsistency, as it were, that we experience
whenever we explicitly deny the pragmatic rule R, which is implied through the act of ut¬
tering Np. Thus, the counterintuitive effect of any normative proposition of the form '<t>
ought to be done, though <t> is wrong', functions as an indication or proof for the fact that
the act of uttering a normative proposition entails the pragmatic rule R: 'normative proposi¬
tions raise a claim to correctness'.
In particular in the context of legal discourse a pragmatic contradiction would be in¬
stigated if a legislator were to pronounce the constitutional norm21:
(1) 'X is a sovereign, federal and unjust state',
or a judge were to issue the decision22:
(2) 'The defendant is - wrongly, because the valid law was interpreted incorrectly - sentenced to
life imprisonment'.
Both these propositions imply a performative contradiction to the extent that their content
contravenes the claim that is raised through the act of their pronouncement23. The contra¬
diction establishes, indirectly, the necessary validity of the claim to correctness in relation
to any legal proposition. This conclusion is used in order to support the further thesis that
legal propositions are practical to the extent that they raise a claim to correctness. This the¬
sis is put forward as the Richtigkeitsargument (rightness argument). It is based on the fol¬
lowing implicit syllogism:
Atienza, 'For a Theory of Legal Argumentation', Rechtstheorie, 4 (1990), 393-414.
21 Vide Robert Alexy, Begriff, 63-70. Also his 'On Necessary Relations', 167-183 (178).
22 Alexy, 'On Necessary Relations', 179.
23 It should be noted that in the second case, of the judicial decision, the contradiction needs to be
more than a legal contradiction, i.e. of wrongly applying a statue contrary to the requirements of a
legal system. This can be granted, if we assume that, despite proclaiming so, the judge erroneously
believes that he or she misapplied the statute, where actually the case is that the interpretation was
legally correct. Only in this case (2) entails more than a contradiction within the scope of a legal sys¬
tem, one that can be taken to constitute a performative contradiction. See Alexy, 'On Necessary Rela-
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a. A proposition is practical if and only if it raises a claim to correctness24.
b. legal propositions necessarily raise a claim to correctness.
c. legal propositions are necessarily practical.
Hence the fact that the claim to correctness is a necessary condition for legal propositions
makes them a species of practical propositions. Accordingly the pragmatic rule of correct¬
ness constitutes something like the formal aspect of the Tightness argument, as it prescribes
that legal propositions need to raise a claim to correctness. On this level the content or the
standards of correctness are not further specified.
This formal aspect of the Tightness argument is supplemented by a second substan¬
tive aspect which is advanced as the morality thesis [Moralthese]25. According to this thesis,
the correctness of normative (legal) propositions is measured against the idea of a right
morality. In advancing the Moralthese Alexy adheres to the idea that correctness regarding
standards for action (normative utterances) cannot but itself refer to action and hence to
designate material criteria for acting correctly. Contrary to what one would expect, the idea
of a right morality is elaborated as a procedural notion; Alexy seems to designate it as a
justified morality26. This justification takes place within rational discourses, which operate
according to certain pragmatic rules which, along with the rule of correctness, are conceived
as necessary presuppositions of the act of uttering practical propositions. Those rules are not
yet themselves action-guiding standards, in the sense of providing reasons for action, but
constitute the pragmatic presuppositions of the discursive procedure, whose outcome are
justified (moral) action-guiding norms27. This conception yields a picture of the right mo¬
rality as the outcome of procedural Tightness28.
tions', 179-180.
24 Of course the point of discourse-theory is to establish that the claim to correctness is entailed by
the act of uttering both theoretical and practical propositions. Interpreted this way, the stated argument
is rather trivial. It merely says that a sub-class of propositions raises a claim that, anyway, all proposi¬
tions do! Accordingly the conclusion should just be that 'all legal propositions are propositions' or
that 'all legal propositions are either theoretical or practical'. However I prefer to associate with prac¬
tical propositions a more comprehensive notion of correctness than the one referring to theoretical
propositions. In doing so I abide by Alexy's suggestion that correctness in the realm of practical rea¬
soning is connected with the idea of a body of substantive criteria for action (the idea of a right mo¬
rality). Thus, at present, the stated argument anticipates the implications of this line of reasoning
which is going to be discussed in more detail in this and the next chapter.
25 Alexy, Begriff, 126-136.
26 Alexy, Begriff, 136.
27 This is the Habermas' proceduralist conception of practical rationality which is going to be criti¬
cised in the last section of this chapter, infra.
28 Vide Alexy, Theorie, 410 n.; see also Alexy, 'Discurstheorie und Menschenrechte' in idem, Recht,
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The Tightness argument - in both its formal and substantive aspect - supports the
broader claim that the legal argumentation or discourse is a special case or Sonderfall of the
general practical argumentation or discourse, the so-called Sonderfallthese - henceforth
SFT29.
The Sonderfallthese (SFT)
The Special Case Thesis contains the claim that legal or juridical discourse is a special case
of general practical discourse, namely the discourse concerning the existence and the valid¬
ity ofnormative propositions and/or the conditions under which an action of a rational agent
is valid/right. The claim of the SFT refers to all types of legal discourse, institutionalised or
not: the plaintiffs argumentation in the court-room, the law professor's opinion delivered at
his lectures, the lawyer's advice, the legislative debate in the parliament, even the journal¬
ist's comment on a court's decision stated in the morning paper's legal column30. The com¬
mon denominator in all these types of discourse is their reference to valid positive law, a
feature which at the same time distinguishes legal discourse from other types of practical
argumentation. The SFT has three components: (1) legal questions are practical insofar as
they ask what must/is allowed to be done/omitted31. This is further supported by the claim
that legal questions like all other practical questions raise a claim to correctness (2), which
has already been discussed. Finally, the SFT is supplemented by a restrictive argument
which defines legal discourse merely as a special case of general practical discourse: legal
discourse is a special case of general practical discourse due to its being bound upon a se¬
ries of restrictions. These include the positive law, the judicial precedents, the legal dog¬
matic and the procedural law's provisions32 (3).
Vernnft, Diskurs, 127-164.
29 Vide R. Alexy, Theorie', 263-272; 349-359. Idem, Begriff 126-136; idem, 'The Special Case
Thesis', Ratio Juris, 12 (1999), 374-384. To the extent that some degree of interconnection between
law and morality has been implicit from the beginning of this essay, the SFT is a useful tool in con¬
ceptualising that relation. It should further be noted that the Sonderfallthese has not been received
without criticism; for a recent exposition of the criticism see instead of others Armin Englander, 'Zur
begrifflichen Moglichkeit des Rechtspositivismus. Eine Kritik des Richtigkeitsarguments von Robert
Alexy' Rechtstheorie, 28 (1997), 437-485. Part of the criticism of SFT originates from inside the
camp of Discourse-theory, despite the fact that its authors appear to endorse the claim to correctness.
Vide Habermas, Faktizitat, 283-291. Also Klaus Giinther, Der Sinn fur Angemessenheit. Anwen-
dungsdiskurse in Moral und Recht (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); and for a summary of his
criticism in English refer to his 'Critical Remarks on Robert Alexy's 'Special-Case Thesis", Ratio
Juris, 6 (1993), 143-156.
30 Alexy, Theorie, 17-49.
31 Alexy, Theorie, 263.
32 Ibid. 34, 263 n..
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The SFT, via the claim to correctness, associates the validity claims of legal norma¬
tive propositions with the claims of the normative propositions in morality and, broader, in
general practical reasoning. Legal norms and moral norms rest, on the supposition of SFT,
on a common pragmatic-normative bedrock which must be presupposed in order to render
those norms correct or valid. This bedrock contains a set ofmeta-norms that, like the norm
postulating the claim to correctness, can be backed by the method of transcendental deduc¬
tion. The task of grounding and finally spelling out the content of those meta-norms is un¬
dertaken by the discourse-theory of law (regarding legal argumentation) and, broader, the
general discourse-theory which in regard to moral or general practical argumentation is
usually referred to as discourse-ethics. Discourse-ethics takes the level of the pragmatic
meta-norms to consist in procedural rules or rules for the regulation of argumentative pro¬
cedures. These rules are procedural in the sense that they 'accomplish' or better respond to
the claim of correctness by organising argumentative procedures which can result to justi¬
fied (right) normative propositions, moral or legal according to the case. These rules regu¬
late the argumentative procedure by dividing burdens and rights among speakers and pro¬
viding criteria for the validity of the various argumentative speech acts through which the
speakers agree about the valid (action-guiding) norms, moral or legal, that will regulate their
every-day lives. In this sense the rules of the argumentation are merely rules for the speech
and not action-guiding norms, as are the practical norms grounded through the discourse.
This is further the reason why the rules of the argumentation cannot directly provide sub¬
stantive criteria (in the sense of criteria for action) for the grounding of the moral or legal
norms that constitute the object of the discourse. Thus discourse-ethics is alleged to consti¬
tute a modern, post-conventional - as Habermas likes to call it - ethical theory that puts the
emphasis on a procedural framework of norm-grounding that guarantees practical rightness.
Framed in this way discourse-ethics is alleged to avoid absurd moral ontology while guar¬
anteeing a discursive (as opposed to monological) grounding of normative propositions that
realises in the best way the universalisation principle (which is taken to be the condition for
the validity of every practical norm).
Procedure and Correctness
The procedural explication of the normative meta-level of the validity of normative propo¬
sitions, undertaken by discourse-theory, might turn out to be difficult to reconcile with the
claim to correctness, particularly to the extent that the latter is taken to incorporate the sub-
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stantive dimension of a right or objective morality33. The reason is that such a substantive
dimension postulates objective criteria for normative validity, whereas a procedural under¬
standing thereof introduces a high degree of relativity. When one understands the pragmatic
meta-norms as being rules only for speech, their objective existence as standards of norma¬
tive validity is relativised by the contingent ways in which actual discursive or argumenta¬
tive procedures are realised. This comes about when, in a procedural model, the normative
impact of the pragmatic rules is exhausted in the way the argumentative procedure happens
to be realised: then the pragmatic rules, somehow, stand and fall with the actual perform¬
ance of the discursive procedure; there is no other objective standard, as it were, 'external'
to the current discursive procedures that could serve as a criterion of correctness or standard
of criticism for the concrete normative propositions that are generated by the discourse.
The problematic character of such an understanding is rather acute in the case of le¬
gal discourses. There, it is very often the case, that the 'pure' discursive procedure which is
constitutive for the justification of normative propositions, is disrupted by juridical restric¬
tions. Actual rules of legal argumentation are often subjected to a series of restrictions
which do not aim at practical Tightness but serve other more instrumental considerations
(interests of the disputing legal parties, judicial precedent, etc. - hence the speciality pro¬
viso of SFT). What is the conclusion to be drawn is such cases? Should our judgement, as to
whether legal discourses are or are not practical, depend on the degree that their procedures
abide (or do not abide) by the procedures of the general practical discourse? The answer
will be probably affirmative as long as the norm-grounding procedure, the discourse, is
built in the content of pragmatic or communicative normativity. On such an understanding
every time the legal discourse does not follow the prescribed discursive procedure (which is
very often the case), it will cease to be a discourse, hence legal propositions will be
grounded on considerations other than Tightness, in fact they will probably stop raising a
claim to correctness. In other words, any structural disconnection between the legal (or
other special) and the general practical discourse will correspond to a substantive discon¬
nection between legal and moral norms. But to concede this would be tantamount to saying
that the claim to correctness is contingent and not necessary, which is directly in breach of
the transcendental grounding of that claim.
A way to avoid this conclusion would be to say that the restrictions of the special
discourses (like the legal ones) are justified on practical or moral considerations that have
33 Cf. with fn 17, supra.
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been validated through general practical discourses that range over the special/legal ones.
Some proponents of discourse-theory34, have argued, along these lines, that the restrictions
of legal argumentative procedures or discourses need not impair the practical character of
law. They can be shown to be justified through substantive reasons that were validated
within a general moral-practical discourse, whose procedural aspect is purely shaped ac¬
cording to the pragmatic rules of communication. There are two, at least, arguments usually
deployed in support of that claim: The 'restricted', in the sense of efficiency-oriented, legal
discourse is, on the one hand, justified owing to its being finite. It puts an end to the infinite
search for Tightness of the general practical discourse by producing concrete deci¬
sions/solutions in relation to concrete problems35, thus guaranteeing the efficiency of practi¬
cal discourse. On the second consideration legal discourse replaces moral motivation -
which is alleged to be optional for the agents - with a more effective sanction-based moti¬
vational model, thus bridging the notorious gap between the principium dejiudicationis and
the principium executionis, in other words the gap between the knowledge of the right and
the motivation to act according to it.
These arguments fall short of justifying a procedural explication of the claim to cor¬
rectness. This is, roughly, the reason: the issue whether moral reasons might restrict the
practicality of law can only be relevant if law is in the first place practical itself; it is only
then that law will be answerable towards any kind of practical argument; but this would
entail that legal propositions raise the claim to correctness. Besides, for moral considera¬
tions to be valid in the first place, they must necessarily raise a claim to correctness. This
necessity is independent of any actual procedure or discourse. Hence legal normative propo¬
sitions will, independently of the procedure that produced them, raise a claim to correctness.
Any justification of the discrepancies of juridical discourse will be possible on the basis of
the claim to correctness. In other words, it is not the procedure that creates the claim, but the
claim which regulates the procedure, by making it answerable to practical reasons. If we
consider under this scope the case of the practical character of legal norms, it would be to¬
tally uninformative, to say that they are not practical since they are not the object of practi¬
cal discourses, or because legal discourses are not practical36. Such a statement would
34 Vide K. Giinther, 'Critical Remarks' 145; Alexy, Theorie, 37.
35 Cf. with R. Alexy, Theorie, 37. See also K. Giinther, 'Critical Remarks', 145n.
36 This seems to be the objection advanced by some scholars who appreciate the value of discourse-
theory, but argue that it is not applicable in the realm of legal reasoning. Vide E. Christodoulidis, Law
and Reflexive Politics, Law and Philosophy Library, vol. 35 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), Ch. 3; E.
Melissaris, 'Law and the End of Discourse', (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Edinburgh,
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hardly touch upon the issue of practicality. Any evidence that legal argumentation cannot be
taken to be a proper practical discourse, could merely raise doubts in concern to the appro¬
priateness of the discursive procedure and eventually postulate its amendment.
If the priority of the claim to correctness is to be sustained, then it should be linked
up with objective criteria ofcorrectness as constitutingpragmatic norms that are necessary
presuppositions for the validity of all normative propositions. These pragmatic norms can¬
not differ from case to case according to the way argumentation happens to unfold. Were
the opposite true, those rules would be altered not only in the case of legal argumentative
procedures but also in many cases of 'pure' of practical or moral discourses. Namely, there
is nothing that can guarantee that an actual practical discourse, no matter the grade of free¬
dom it enjoys, can implement a perfect or immaculate procedure. But the notion of an 'im¬
maculate' procedure should not even be close to being a desirable ideal, because the prag¬
matic rules for normative meaning do not in the first place aim to organise discourses. The
fact that they certainly posit some strict standards for the conduct of discourses, is only a
secondary effect of theirs. Their primary role is to provide uniform standards for the sound¬
ness and validity ofnormative propositions and the norms depicted by them.
In contrast to the standard conception of discourse-theory, I am going to argue that,
the idea of the right morality or the right standards against which the claim of correctness of
normative propositions is to be measured, is constituted by a set of elementary pragmatic
rules (the aforementioned discourse-rules) that exist in virtue of transcendental necessity.
Clearly those norms are revealed, as all other normative entities, in the structures of lan¬
guage; however, their validity does not presuppose any other normative entity, hence they
are transcendental-pragmatic. Those rules lie on the same level with the claim to correct¬
ness, and in fact, provide the substantive criteria for its satisfaction. That is they provide
criteria for the correctness of action37. Only if this substantive dimension is ascribed to the
pragmatic rules, can they fulfil Alexy's ideal of a 'right morality'. In that case the 'right
morality' is a set of pragmatic norms of correctness that are substantive or categorical in
their quality. This is by no means a dispensable idea; at least not within the context of the
claim to correctness. If the claim to correctness is necessary, so is a substantive conception
of the pragmatic-normative standards of correctness. Conversely, were one to adopt a pro¬
cedural (or speech-regulating) understanding of those normative standards, then one would
2001); idem 'The Hurried Justification of Sanctions' in Law and Critique, 12 (2001), forthcoming.
37 This claim will be discussed in detail in the last part of the chapter, infra.
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be dispensing with the claim to correctness as a necessary claim raised by normative propo¬
sitions. Not the least so because the claim to correctness points towards a notion of correct¬
ness which exists ex ante, before the discourses' actual taking place, while the procedural
explication thereof implies that what is right and what is wrong is specified ex post, i.e. after
the discourse with its substantive content and substantive conclusions has satisfied all pro¬
cedural tests. On the proposed conception the notion of discourse is itself a notion in need
ofjustification and cannot provide the last instance ofjustification.
The claim to correctness and the idea of discourse will be much better off if a
bolder stance is adopted towards the pragmatic presuppositions of normative meaning. That
is, if the pragmatic presuppositions are understood as substantive or categorical reasons
that provide the standards of correctness and, further, postulate practical discourses as the
most appropriate way for grounding specific action-guiding norms. To that extent, the claim
to correctness generates a meta-ethical position which is conceptually prior to the meth¬
odological framework of discourse-ethics. The meta-ethical position implies a cognitivist
stance regarding the possibility of objective justifications of normative propositions38. It is
this meta-ethical position which justifies the idea of discourse as the right procedure for the
grounding of normative propositions. To that extent all actual discourses are to be measured
for their appropriateness against the substantive norms referred to by the claim to correct¬
ness. For those of the actual discourses that do not pass the test there is a strong assumption
that they should be either amended or fully abandoned and substituted with more appropri¬
ate ones39.
This conception of the pragmatic conditions of practical discourses is particularly
fruitful for defending the SFT. The argument for the interconnection between law and mo¬
rality is advanced, as mentioned, on the supposition that there is a necessary conceptual
connection between legal and general practical (i.e. moral) propositions, owing to the fact
that both sets of propositions raise the same claim to correctness, hence, they are analyti-
38 Robert Alexy pointed to me that cognitivism regarding the standards of practical correctness will
presumably assume different degrees of strength, depending on the level of the practical discourse.
Hence in relation to the fundamental transcendental-pragmatic rules of practical argumentation, the
degree of cognitivism will be high; conversely, simple action-guiding norms that are generated by the
argumentative procedure in relation to concrete contexts will enjoy a lower degree of cognitivism.
However that may be, if cognitivism on the fundamental level of the discourse principles can be es¬
tablished, then low-level norm-generation will be less of a 'construction' and more of a 'discovery'
since the transcendental norms will provide for categorical standards of correctness.
39 For a comprehensive critique of the proceduralist ideal of correctness within discourse-theory, vide
Philippos Vassilogiannis, 'Constitutional Uses of the Argument for the Certainty and the Security of
Law' (in Greek) (unpubl. doctoral thesis, University of Athens, 1996), CHs V and VI.
181
cally indistinguishable. This thesis is only satisfied if it is conceded that legal norms fall
under the same correctness-criteria with all other practical or moral norms. These criteria
will then constitute genuine normative facts (normative abstract objects) that are revealed
within linguistic or semantic structures, according to the strategy developed in the previous
two chapters. Understood this way, the correctness criteria for legal norms can successfully
resist the most prominent criticisms put forward against the SFT.
On the Necessity of the Interconnection Between Law and
Morality
From the objections directed against the SFT, the most far-reaching are those that question
the validity of the rightness-argument in its different aspects. Prominent amongst them are
the criticisms of Eugenio Bulygin, advanced in a recent paper which elaborates on earlier
versions of his objections to the SFT40. This author contests the necessity of, first, the va¬
lidity of the pragmatic rule that contains the claim to correctness and, second, of the neces¬
sary relation between legal and moral norms (or norms of practical reason). In the discus¬
sion that follows, I assume Bulygin's arguments to squarely summarise the most effective
criticism of the Tightness argument.
At first blush, Bulygin's criticisms seem to make a strong case against the SFT.
However, upon further reflection, his reasoning instead of being conclusive, rather shows
that the necessity claims involved in the SFT are much more complicated than one initially
might have assumed. I believe that the appreciation of this complexity, undeniably to be
credited to Bulygin's subtle argument, can be exploited towards a successful defence of the
SFT against the same author's criticisms. On the other hand, this appreciation can lead to a
reconstruction of the way discourse-theory thematizes the pragmatic claims of discourses
and the way it understands the norms that contain those claims.
Bulygin directs his first doubts against the justificatory modus of the performative
contradiction. Though he does not discuss this issue in detail (in fact he seems to concede it
to the proponent of the SFT), I take the opportunity for a brief comment, precisely because
the notion of necessity is introduced in the discussion through the devise of the performative
contradiction.
40 Vide Eugenio Bulygin, 'Alexy's Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and Morality',
Ratio Juris, 13 (2000), 133-137.
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The performative contradiction in Kant
Probably the most classical example of transcendental deduction is Kant's justification of
the ultimate principle of practical rationality, the so-called Categorical Imperative (CI). In
its initial formulation, also known as the Formula ofUniversal Law, CI states that:
Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law41.
Kant takes this formula to be knowable a priori, that is via reflection on the presuppositions
upon which agents formulate the maxims (i.e. the concrete, subjective principles) which
guide their action. More specifically Kant says that each time agents choose their principles
for action they should want that they become universal laws or, otherwise, they entangle
themselves into some sort of contradiction. One of the examples he offers is the maxim
'promises should be kept'; in complying with this maxim one should want that every other
agent would do the same. Conversely, one cannot reasonably want that people break their
promises, otherwise, one would entangle oneself in a serious contradiction, since the valid¬
ity of that maxim would entail that the object ofpromising, i.e. promises, contracts, agree¬
ments, and so on, be annulled42.
Disregarding the fact that Kant in several occasions declares as universalisable
maxims that we would not accept as universal laws nowadays, the point of his transcenden¬
tal reasoning is clear: the norm that regulates the validity of our practical principles (i.e. the
Categorical Imperative) can be known a priori through the realisation that, unless we pre¬
suppose it, we will end up committing ourselves to maxims that are self-contradictory. To
that degree contradictions seem to constitute the core of transcendental reasoning. They are
in a way the means for establishing the indispensable character of the items that a transcen¬
dental argument intends to establish as being knowable independently from experience, in a
priori way.
Connectedly the device of performative contradiction can equally be taken to con¬
stitute the core of a transcendental argument. The difference here is that the argument refers
to the pragmatic presuppositions of the act of uttering sentences/propositions that contain
41 Vide I. Kant, The Moral Law. Groundwork of the Metaphysic ofMorals, trans, and analysed by H.
J. Patton (London: Routledge, 1991), 84.
42 Cfwith Kant, ibid. 84-86.
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maxims, while what is claimed to be a priori, on pain of contradiction, is a set ofpragmatic
rules that regulate the performance of those utterances (hence the term performative contra¬
diction). Insofar as the pragmatic transcendental argument is a species of the Kantian
method of transcendental deduction, any attempt to refute it will have to convincingly argue
that transcendental arguments are in general flawed.
The nature of the necessity involved
Instead of rebutting transcendental reasoning tout court it is far more interesting to investi¬
gate the nature of the necessity established through the method of performative contradic¬
tion. Let me examine some of the options available :
(a) Logical necessity, this is the necessity induced by the laws of logic. An example of logical ne¬
cessity is the proposition 'it is not the case both that R is a rule and that R is not a rule'. This
necessity involved is logical because it rests on the logical law of non-contradiction. Clearly
the necessity of the proposition: 'all legal norms raise a claim to correctness' is not of the sort
of a logical necessity.
(b) Conceptual necessity, this is a more promising candidate. Conceptual necessities are usually
granted on the basis of conceptual analysis in connection with the application of the laws of
logic. A simple species of conceptual necessity is the one connected with the proposition: 'it
is not the case both that George is a bachelor and that George is a married man'. The neces¬
sity involved here is not a logical necessity since the concept bachelor is not a logical con¬
cept. Only a further analysis of that concept would amount to the exposition of a strict logical
necessity of the form presented under (a). Propositions of that form are true in all possible
worlds in virtue of the laws of logic plus definitions, hence the conceptual character of the
necessity. Alexy seems to prefer to capture the necessity involved in the claim to correctness
as constituting a conceptual necessity: thus, normative (legal) propositions by conceptual ne¬
cessity raise a claim to correctness. Insofar he is claiming something like the following: the
claim 'it is not the case both that p is a legal norm and that p does not raise a claim to cor¬
rectness' is conceptually necessary.
Arguably, there is a difficulty concerning the availability of an analysis of the concept 'legal
norm' through a definition that would contain the expression 'claim of correctness', or any
equivalent expression. To that degree, there is a point to be conceded to the opponents of
the SFT. Be that as it may, it is possible to argue that a similar analysis could occur on
grounds other than those offered by logical or conceptual necessity. Such grounds could be
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provided through a different sort of argument, namely a metaphysical argument. Metaphysi¬
cal arguments do not rely merely or exclusively on logical or conceptual rules in order to
ground the necessity or the possibility of the claims they advance43. Furthermore, the claims
advanced through metaphysical argument concern not merely propositions but states of
affairs, to the extent that the necessity involved, cannot simply be represented as a matter of
logical contradiction (or, even, conceptual contradiction)44. Rather, the necessity involved
constitutes a distinct kind of necessity, a metaphysical necessity.
(c) Metaphysical necessity; this is the necessity traditionally connected with claims about certain
states of affairs rather than merely propositions and whose necessity cannot (merely) be ex¬
plicated in terms of logical laws and/or definitions of the concepts they contain. Take the ex¬
ample of the proposition 'water is H20'45. This proposition is true in all possible words46, in
virtue of a necessity based on ontological rather than formal or conceptual grounds. Of
course, any metaphysical necessity will also be a logical/conceptual necessity in the broader
sense. I am inclined to suggest that metaphysical necessity is the sort of necessity implied by
transcendental arguments47. It is, hence, along those lines that the necessity of the proposition
'normative (legal) propositions raise a claim to correctness' should be evaluated.
Once we are more enlightened as to the nature of the necessity involved in the initial tran¬
scendental argument, there are some new attractive alternatives at hand for tackling the
complicated issues concerning the necessity of the claim to correctness and the subsequent
thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality (or practical reason).
Transcendental Argument andMetaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity, as already declared, is the necessity concerning states of affairs or
facts which is granted on ontological grounds, or on 'how things really are'. Accordingly,
43 Vide E. J. Lowe, the Possibility ofMetaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), Ch. 1 (8-16).
44 Ibid. 9-10.
45 Ibid. 15. Other examples include the claims: 'nothing is both red and green all over at the same
time', or 'the Morning Star is the Evening Star' etc.
46 For worlds that do not contain water, the proposition can be rephrased as 'for any x, x is water if
and only if x is H20'; then the initial proposition 'water is H20' turns out to be vacuously true in all
worlds in which water does not exist (or, according to the rephrased sentence, in the worlds in which
nothing is water and in which, by the same token, nothing is H20). Vide Lowe, The Possibility, 15.
47 See also the views of Robert Stern in his Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2000), 59-63, where he argues that transcendental claims fall into the same class
with metaphysically necessary truths (however, this author does not seem to distinguish between
metaphysical and conceptual necessity).
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that 'water is H20' is a necessary proposition, has to do with the way water is, rather than
with some laws of logic. To that degree, metaphysical necessities seem to be knowable
somewhat a posteriori, in contrast with strict logical necessities that are, characteristically,
knowable a priori; hence, metaphysical necessities are, arguably, depicted in synthetic
rather than analytic propositions. However, even if metaphysical necessity involves a poste¬
riori knowledge, it is not exhausted in that kind of knowledge. Not the least so, because the
whole point ofmetaphysical argument is to entrench the metaphysical boundaries of what is
possible, in the space of which experience will discover what is actual. Without the meta¬
physical demarcation of the possible, experience alone is not in a position to determine the
actual48. The delimitation of those boundaries consists in providing acceptable metaphysical
principles which establish the actuality of a certain state of affairs, and not in whether the
propositions describing them entail merely logical contradictions49. Insofar metaphysical
necessity involves both a priori knowable principles and a posteriori knowable facts.
Back to the claim to correctness now. The statement 'all legal propositions raise a
claim to correctness' is a metaphysically necessary proposition. Its necessity is ontological
in the sense that it is true in virtue of the nature of legal (normative) propositions or of the
fact that legal propositions raise a claim to correctness. The performative contradiction - for
those who feel it - refers precisely to that nature. Now, there are a couple of different op¬
tions concerning the way of presenting the a priori (metaphysical, as it were) principles that
delimit or render possible in the first place the fact that legal propositions raise a claim to
correctness:
(i) The first option available, is to reconstruct the fact that 'legal propositions raise
a claim...' as the normative fact50 that 'legal propositions ought to raise a claim ...'. Then
the necessity of the transcendental argument will refer to the normative fact (or the rule) R:
'legal propositions ought to raise a claim to correctness', or Op. And in a symbolic language
(Op). Thus the ontological basis for the validity of the metaphysical necessity will consist
in the existence of a normative fact. Notably R can be rewritten as (~,P~p), or that 'neces¬
sarily, it is not permitted that normative propositions do not raise a claim to correctness'.
This says that a (normative) fact is valid in all possible worlds51. The knowledge of the
48 Lowe, The Possibility, 16.
49 Lowe, ibid. 12, 15.
50 See the analysis in Ch IV.
51 This could be taken to signify a normative necessity, a term used often by Alexy to the utter aston¬
ishment of Bulygin (see ibid. 136). Bulygin remarks that something's being normatively necessary (as
meaning obligatory) does not really make sense, since if something is necessarily true in all possible
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(normative) fact 'that normative propositions ought to raise a claim to correctness' is a
posteriori knowledge that is connected with the act of uttering normative propositions in
general. But as already stated, the factual ground of metaphysical necessity, involves a pos¬
teriori as well as a priori elements. If the rule R is, in a sketchy way, taken to constitute a
posteriori knowledge of some state of affairs, there must be also some knowledge involved
which is a priori; this will refer to the metaphysical principles or categories which make the
knowledge of rule R possible. Before stating those principles, I would like to suggest a fur¬
ther way of rephrasing rule R by substituting the term 'claim to correctness' with the ex¬
pression 'admit of evaluation as being right/wrong'. This could be further rephrased as 'ad¬
mit of practical/moral evaluation'. According to this alternative, rule R will say: 'it is re¬
quired that all legal propositions admit of practical/moral evaluation'; coupled with the mo¬
dality of necessity the same rule will amount to the claim: 'necessarily, it is required that
legal propositions admit of practical/moral evaluation' or (Op), or even: 'necessarily, it is
not permitted that legal rules do not admit of practical/moral evaluation'. The aim of this
substitution is to facilitate an understanding of the metaphysical principle that makes the
knowledge of the normative fact R possible. This principle will be, indeed, related to the
meaning of the concept 'correctness' in a way that the latter will be equivalent to the ex¬
pression 'morally evaluable' or 'morally criticisable' (to that extent, I take here the freedom
to anticipate the relation by employing already the equivalent expressions). Apparently,
'correctness', or any other equivalent expression in the context of agency and action, is
rendered possible or intelligible only against the background of the category of autonomy
(which can be represented through something like what I previously called a Norm of
Autonomy (NoA)). This explication rests on the thought that the things we do, our actions,
and the standards we apply to them, can admit of evaluation (right/wrong) only if we think
of ourselves as autonomous agents. Furthermore, on a more elementary level, the very inter-
worlds it does not make sense to make it obligatory (Bulygin, ibid. 136). I am inclined to believe that
this remark is beside the point on the following general reasons: the modal operator O is anyway per¬
fectly conceivable as meaning 'morally or normatively necessary' (Cf. with Rod Girle, Modal Logics
and Philosophy (Teddington: Acumen, 2000), 175); what is implied in this case is that an action-
guiding norm prescribes a course of conduct as being obligatory universally - hence, in all possible
worlds. Clearly the point of normative necessity is not a point about truth. It is a point about auton¬
omy. In other words normative necessity refers to what is necessary from the point of view of auton¬
omy, or morality; a rule of the form 'close the door or leave it open', as in Bulygin's example, is not
expressing any form of normative necessity because it is morally insignificant. An alternative way to
capture 'normative necessity' is the one employed here, when we represent norms as facts. In this case
the necessity operator appears to be postulating ontological necessity, hence to be about truth. How¬
ever, as it is going to be argued, this picture is possible only against the background of the metaphysi-
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est about whether our actions or the norms we abide by are right or wrong, is intelligible
only if we presuppose the concept of autonomy/freedom.
If this explication is sound, then every normative claim or proposition, etc., which
depicts a valid norm, as explained earlier on32, will be raising a claim to correctness as pos¬
tulated by rule R in a necessary way; hence: 'something will be a norm if and only if it
raises a claim to correctness'; Thus, on the level of the conceptual necessity, the claim: 'it
cannot be true both that something is a norm and that it does not raise a claim to correct¬
ness' will be necessarily true, as Alexy seems to imply. Furthermore, as soon as correctness
is with metaphysical necessity part of the concept 'rule' or 'norm', autonomy becomes
likewise part thereof. At this point it is enough to understand the connection between auton¬
omy and the concept 'norm'/'rule', as involving a dependence relationship33 between the
meaning of autonomy and the meaning of every possible actual norm. Besides, the depend¬
ence relation will be sufficient in supporting the thesis that every normative entity will nec¬
essarily be an instance of autonomy: normative propositions whose meaning is an instance
of the meaning of autonomy will depict abstract normative objects that can be thought as
constituting tokens of the principle or Norm of Autonomy (NoA). Demarcated in this way,
the dependence relation satisfies the requirement of a rational explanation of human behav¬
iour within the limits of the 'semantics-exhausts-ontology' thesis.
This conclusion does not vary considerably from the results of discourse-theory.
There the claim of correctness, along with a series of other transcendental-pragmatic rules,
are conjointly taken to ground a norm or principle about the universalisation of normative
propositions, as the transcendental basic norm of communication (concerning both moral
and non-moral contexts)54. For reasons that are going to be explained in the last chapter, I
prefer to locate the metaphysical bedrock of normative or practical knowledge on the level
of autonomy rather than on that of universalisation. In any case, the point is that autonomy
or universalisation can be thought as constituting a priori metaphysical principles that de¬
limit the possibility of practical knowledge. These principles put together the metaphysical
or a priori background against which experience determines what is 'normatively' actual or
cal necessity of a norm introducing autonomy.
52 Vide chapters III and IV, supra.
53 Clearly the nature of the dependence relationship will be in need of painstaking specification,
which, however, escapes the scope of the present project.
54 For the content of the universalisation principle (<U>) in theoretical discourses as well as the form
it takes in practical discourses, the discourse principle (<D>), vide Habermas, 'MoralbewuBtsein und
kommunikatives Handeln', 130-134; idem 'Diskursethik-Notizen', 102n.
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existing. On such an understanding the principle/norm of autonomy will constitute some¬
thing like a Kantian a priori synthetic judgement. As such it will still be depicting a norma¬
tive abstract object which, however, will not be available to experience, but will be uncov¬
ered via transcendental reasoning.
This method of specifying the metaphysical groundwork of practical knowledge,
might create some confusion concerning the status of the pragmatic rules that are grounded
through transcendental argument, as in the case of the rule containing the claim to correct¬
ness. The proposition depicting that rule, it was argued, is true/valid with metaphysical ne¬
cessity in the same way that the claim 'water is H20' is. Now, what one might want to ob¬
ject to this picture is that, whereas the necessity involved in 'water is H20' is knowable a
posteriori (that is through experience), in virtue of the nature of water, this cannot be the
case with the proposition containing the claim to correctness. The reason is that in the case
of the proposition that depicts rule R, there is nothing there for experience to discover;
hence, in the best of cases, the rule can be knowable only a priori. This objection need not
worry us. Arguably, the whole point of metaphysical argument is the idea that what is
knowable can only be determined after the metaphysical delimitation of a domain of knowl¬
edge. Hence, if there are a priori principles that allow for (practical) knowledge of the rule
R (e.g. the claim to correctness), then experience can discover such a rule. However, if this
is too strained a picture of experiential knowledge, there is still another way of explicating
the metaphysical necessity implied by our transcendental argument; a way that demarcates
more accurately the line between what is knowable a priori and what a posteriori.
(ii) Instead of taking the necessity entailed by the transcendental argument to refer
to a normative fact (the rule R), we can take it to simply refer to the fact that 'legal proposi¬
tions raise a claim to correctness'. This can be thought as being comparable to the fact de¬
picted in the proposition 'water is H20'. At the same time, the necessity connected with the
proposition 'all legal propositions raise a claim to correctness' is a metaphysical necessity.
This necessity is knowable through a combination of a priori and a posteriori elements. As
to the latter there shouldn't be much disagreement: the actuality of the fact that legal propo¬
sitions raise a claim to correctness is available to experience. However, there must be some
principles that render possible the actuality determined by experience. These principles are
knowable a priori. Which are those principles? In this case, apart from the principle of
autonomy (NoA), one will probably need to include in the lot of the metaphysical principles
the rule for correctness, as well as any other pragmatic rule that can be grounded on the
basis of performative contradictions. Again here things are not very different from the
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findings of discourse-theory. In fact they might be even closer to discourse-theory than the
assumptions of the first reconstruction; not the least so because discourse-theory under¬
stands the pragmatic rules of communication and the universalisation principle as being a
priori knowable norms. What was said before for the connection between the concept of
autonomy and that of correctness applies mutatis mutandis also here. A considerable differ¬
ence with the first strategy is that here the amount of a priori knowledge increases consid¬
erably: not only the principle of autonomy but also the pragmatic rules are a priori know-
able. Thus, the pragmatic rules are conceived as constituting a priori synthetic judgements
along with the principle/norm of autonomy (NoA).
Even on this reconstruction, the claim to correctness will be a necessary character¬
istic of norms or normative sentences. Hence the proposition 'it is not the case both that
something is a norm and that it is not raising a claim to correctness' will be true with con¬
ceptual necessity. Once the necessity of the claim to correctness is at play, the meaning of
correctness will 'pull' the principle or the norm of autonomy into the picture. Thus the
meaning of every normative claim will be dependent on the meaning of autonomy. Since
ontology is exhausted in meanings, any norm or normative claim will ontologically be a
token ofNoA.
Correctness and Autonomy
In all, the issue of correctness is somehow an issue about autonomy. Once it is shown,
through metaphysical argument, that correctness is a necessary characteristic of (legal)
norms, it becomes true that autonomy is also a necessary characteristic of (legal) norms.
Therefore a transcendental argument which generates the necessity of the fact that norma¬
tive propositions or statements raise a claim to correctness, will also generate the necessity
of the existence of the (normative) fact that a norm or principle of autonomy exists in an
objective way. In short, a transcendental argument like that will demonstrate the necessity
of the fact that normative propositions 'raise a claim to be realising autonomy' or, in other
words, that they presuppose the existence of autonomy. Perhaps this last conclusion will
require, outside of the transcendental deduction, a further premiss that argues that 'auton¬
omy' is built into the notion of correctness, at least in the context of action. Such an argu¬
ment could have the flavour of an anti-reductionist argument (i.e. an argument to the effect
that correctness cannot be taken to be more elementary than autonomy. Or to the effect that
correctness can only be 'autonomous correctness').
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Departing slightly from the discourse-theoretical architecture of transcendental ar¬
guments and the way in which Alexy employs them in the area of law, let me attempt an
expanded form of transcendental deduction35. In doing so I will try to incorporate some of
the insights revealed in the course of the discussion in the previous sections of this chapter.
The argument will contain the following six steps:
(a) we make normative statements or assertions.
This is the usual trivial starting point for any transcendental argument; it simply states a fact
that is more or less generally accepted;
(b) normative statements are about (or aim at) the correctness of (tokens of) action.
The second premiss attempts to state an equivalent expression for something's being a nor¬
mative statement which is trivial and therefore equally indisputable;
(c) if normative statements concern the correctness of action then they raise a claim to be correct
standards thereof.
This premiss introduces the claim to correctness. For the purposes of the present recon¬
struction, this claim can be understood as a fact whose necessity does not involve yet any a
priori knowledge - insofar it can be compared with the necessity involved in the claim
'water is H20'.
(d) if the claim of correctness is raised then we are able to identify objective criteria of correct¬
ness.
The fourth premiss says roughly that if we connect the uttering of our normative proposi¬
tions with a claim to correctness, then it is necessary that we have some ways or methods
for identifying objective criteria of correctness for our norms and rules that guide action.
55 My version of the transcendental argument draws some parallels to the Strawsonian argument dis¬
cussed by Barry Stroud in his 'Transcendental Arguments' in Stroud, Understanding Human Knowl¬
edge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 9-25 (13-16), first published in The Journal of Phi¬
losophy (1968). A basic difference is, of course, that the argument discussed by Stroud refers merely
to the knowledge of the external world, as opposed to practical knowledge.
191
Even if the necessity implied is a metaphysical necessity, the methods of identification need
not be understood in a strong metaphysical way. In a simple way, they could be understood
as merely including the standard forms of practical/moral (or even legal) reasoning which
constitute, more or less, the structures within which we put forward our normative claims.
To that extent the constructivist motive of discourse-theory is preserved, without vesting
discursive procedures with constitutive role in the determination of the standards of correct¬
ness for our normative propositions/norms.
(e) if we are able to know (through the pronounced methods) those criteria of correctness, then in
many cases we know them.
This premiss actually introduces the a priori necessity of the standards of normative cor¬
rectness: the satisfaction of the methods of normative inquiry, which is a prerequisite of
generating practical knowledge, depends on the standards of correctness rather than the
other way round. The fact that there are standards of correctness is what makes our methods
workable. Thus, the stated knowledge of those criteria has an a priori flavour; hence, the
last premiss proceeds to state:
(f) if we know those criteria then there are (exist) objective criteria of correctness for action (and
the action-guiding norms we employ).
The fact that there exist objective standards of correctness for our normative propositions is
what makes, in the first place, our normative claims, and broader our practice of practical
argumentation, intelligible. To that extent the transcendental argument's justificatory effect
works from the bottom to the top.
Arguably, the last two premisses establish a transition from the trivial fact that we
employ normative propositions in our every day practice to the fact that objective criteria of
correctness for action and, further, for the knowledge of action-guiding norms exist. This is
so because a norm is permissible if and only if it is in accordance with the standards of cor¬
rectness of action.56. Further, according to what was previously argued, the transcendental
argument establishes with metaphysical necessity the truth of the proposition 'there are
objective criteria of correctness for action'. In being metaphysical that necessity does not
56 To that extent the standards of correctness of action are also the limits for practical knowledge: no
mle is eligible for 'discovery' if it is in breach with the standards of correctness.
192
refer merely to a proposition but also to a state of affairs, or to the existence of normative
facts (standards) for the correctness of action and the possibility of practical knowledge.
Again, in accordance with what was previously argued regarding metaphysical arguments,
the existence of those normative facts is a necessary fact that is knowable a priori. These
normative standards delimit the metaphysical terrain within which we can 'discover' or
ground the norms which guide action and agency.
I take those standards to amount to a Norm of Autonomy (alternatively one could
accept a combination of the principle of freedom with the principle of equality). To that
degree, regardless of how one would like to iterate the normative standards of action and
practical knowledge, one would have to organise them around a central principle of auton¬
omy. I take this to be a necessary conclusion in the sense that it is not possible to state any
standards for the correctness of action independently of the concept of autonomy. This is
the simple idea that it is not possible to represent the relation between autonomy and nor¬
mative correctness in a way that the latter will be conceptually prior to the former (and,
hence, independent from it). Let me consider an argument to the contrary with the aim to
demonstrate its failure.
Such an argument would probably contain the claim that autonomy entails correct¬
ness but not vice-versa; hence that correctness is conceptually prior to autonomy57. This
would be explained by the assumption that it is possible to conceptualise autonomy as the
conjunction of correctness with whatever must be added to correctness to yield autonomy,
as in the formula:
(a): Autonomy = Correctness of action + x.
In the place of x one would need to substitute some concept that when conjoined with 'cor¬
rectness' would amount to 'autonomy'. A possible candidate is the expression 'a series of
substantive criteria'. In order to make the case more interesting, we can take those substan¬
tive criteria to refer to any possible imaginable morality. However, the circularity of the
argument will show that those criteria cannot be conceptualised independently of autonomy.
Even so, it is purposeful not to specify, for the moment, those substantive criteria in order to
establish that not only they, but also correctness, are not conceptually prior to autonomy.
57 The reconstruction of the argument and the method of its refutation is inspired form a discussion of
Timothy Williamson in respect to the relation between knowledge and belief, advanced in his Knowl¬
edge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2-5.
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Since the conjuncts are conceptually prior to the conjunction and since autonomy
entails correctness, it should be trivial that an action O is autonomous if and only if (1) <J> is
correct, (2) <t> complies to a series of substantive criteria, and (3) if <I> is correct and com¬
plies to those criteria, then O is autonomous58. The force of the equivalence lies in the pos¬
sibility to conceptualise the factors whose conjunction with correctness is necessary and
sufficient for autonomy, independently of autonomy. This is what the conditional endeav¬
ours to establish. Were this possible, 'correctness' would be shown to constitute a necessary
but insufficient condition for autonomy which, when conjoined with some additional factors
(the substantive criteria under x), would produce a non-circular necessary and sufficient
condition for autonomy. Then it would follow that 'correctness of action' is a 'neutral' con¬
cept that can be conceived independently of 'autonomy'.
Alas, this does not seem to be the case here: the equivalence is incapable of estab¬
lishing the desired conclusion, owing to the circularity of the conditional employed in order
to support the independence of 'correctness': 'autonomy' reappears in (3); hence, it is not
possible to conceptualise the factor x independently from 'autonomy'. It follows that a nec¬
essary but insufficient condition ('correctness') need not be a conjunct of a non-circular
necessary and sufficient condition (the conjunction of 'correctness' with x). To draw an
analogy with colour: though being coloured is a necessary condition for being yellow, it is
not possible to state a necessary and sufficient condition for being yellow by conjoining
'being coloured' with other properties individuated without reference to yellow39. Neither
the equation 'yellow = coloured +x' nor the equation 'autonomy = correctness + x' need
have a non-circular solution.
The circularity of the argument based on the equivalence ( ) shows that not only
the criteria for correctness but also correctness itself cannot be captured as being conceptu¬
ally prior to autonomy. Thus the objection that even if we concede that legal (normative)
statements raise a claim to correctness this need not be uniform for every judge or legisla¬
tor60, seems to collapse. Instead, it might be more reasonable to conceptualise correctness of
action in terms of autonomy, in the simple sense that the former refers or becomes relevant
only in connection to tokens of action that are autonomous (or, to use a more accurate ex-
58 The same conditional can be constructed with minor alterations, if instead of actions we take per¬
sons or even norms to be predicated as autonomous.
59 Vide Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, 3.
60 This was Bulygin's second objection against Alexy's the claim to correctness. See Bulygin, ibid.,
134.
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pression, that are performed by autonomous agents)61.
Qualifying and Classifying Connections Between Law and
Practical Reason
Explicated as above, the claim to correctness is able to support a robust thesis for the inter¬
connection of legal with practical reasoning as advanced in Alexy's Sonderfallthese. This
happens when the necessary connection between the uttering of a legal proposition and the
claim to correctness is being recast as signifying a necessary relation between legal
norms/claims and a general principle of autonomy. Then the principle of autonomy repre¬
sents a somewhat ideal dimension that generates the criteria for the correctness of all practi¬
cal norms.
In this context Alexy has suggested62 that one should distinguish between two as¬
pects of the claim to correctness: the one of raising the claim and the one of fulfilling it.
Further, those two aspects relate in a different way to legal systems taken as a whole and in
a different one to individual legal rules. In particular, he argues that the raising of the claim
to correctness has a classifying impact on whole legal systems: a legal system that does not
raise the claim to correctness (explicitly or implicitly) cannot be classified as being legal.
Conversely, if a legal system raises the claim but does not live up to it, then it is a legal
system, however a faulty one. In this second respect, i.e. of fulfilment, the claim to correct¬
ness has a qualifying effect. In contrast, the claim to correctness can only have a qualifying
impact on individual norms. The reason is that any norm that belongs to a legal system is
anyway, from a classificatory point of view, a legal norm63. Hence, the only effect that the
claim, both in its raising and fulfilment dimensions, can have on an individual norm is of a
qualifying character. Additionally, Alexy takes the qualifying impact of the fulfilment of the
claim to involve some form of necessity both in the case of legal systems and that of indi¬
vidual norms; in other words he holds that it is necessarily true that legal systems/norms that
do not raise the claim to correctness are faulty.
Bulygin seems to feel uncomfortable with the concept of necessary qualifying con-
61 The notion of the autonomous agent or person will reaper in the last chapter in an effort to group
together the transcendental pragmatic norms that govern normative meaning.
62 For the following distinctions, see briefly, Alexy, 'On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection be¬
tween Law and Morality: Bulygin's Critique', in Ratio Juris, 13 (2000), 138-147.
63 Alexy seems to be very sceptical in accepting the contrary, cf. ibid.
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nections64. He directs his criticism at two points: first, he remarks that if the claim to cor¬
rectness has merely a qualifying effect in regard to legal norms, then it is implied that there
are things that can be classified as legal norms and yet not raise the claim to correctness. In
which case, raising the claim would not be a necessary but merely a contingent feature of
legal norms. The second point of the criticism refers to the fact that it is not possible for
qualifying connections to be necessary in the first place. The argument here is that 'fulfill¬
ing the claim to correctness' cannot be taken to be a defining or necessary feature of 'legal
systems/norms' but merely of 'faulty legal systems/norms', and hence to be trivial.
Against those allegations I am going to corroborate Alexy's defence65 of the claim
to correctness. In doing so I will suggest a few modifications in Alexy's understanding of
the classifying and qualifying effects of that claim in relation to whole legal systems and
individual legal norms:
(i) First, there is no reason for treating asymmetrically legal systems and legal
norms in respect to their raising the claim to correctness. Our transcendental argument has
argued that it is a necessary fact that normative propositions raise the claim for Tightness,
and that, further, this is a metaphysical necessity which is knowable a posteriori. This en¬
tails the truth of the proposition 'something is a legal norm if and only if it raises a claim for
Tightness'. According to the necessity connected to the claim to correctness, its being raised
is unconditional and can not be compromised according to whether one actually (i.e. explic¬
itly) raises the claim or not66. The raising of the claim is an objective feature of every legal
and broader practical norm67.
(ii) Clearly, the claim to correctness is a necessary objective feature of both legal
systems and individual norms. Being thus necessary and objective it is not possible that
either a system as a whole or an individual norm do not raise it. Furthermore, it is not possi¬
ble to conceive something as being a legal system or norm prior to deciding whether it
raises the claim or not. To that extent it is not possible to imagine either a legal system that
does not raise the claim (and hence is not a legal system) or an individual norm which does
64 Vide Bulygin, ibid..
65 Vide Alexy, 'On Necessary Relations', 167-183. Idem, Begriff, 64-136; idem, 'Bulygin's Kritik
des Richtigkeitsarguments', in E. G. Valdes et al. (ed.), Normative Systems in Legal and Moral The¬
ory. Festschrift fuer Carlos E. Alchourron and Eugenio Bulygin (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997),
235-250; idem, 'Bulygin's Critique' (fn. 61).
66 Vide Alexy, 'The Special Case Thesis', 382. Also G. Pavlakos, 'The Special Case Thesis. An
Assessment of R. Alexy's Discourse-theory of Law', Ratio Juris, 11 (1998), 126-154 (148, 15 In.).
67 Alexy tries to capture this objectivity by introducing a distinction between the claimant's subjective
intention and an objective or official dimension of the claim to correctness, vide his 'Bulygin's Cri-
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not raise the claim (and is merely faulty). Even if legislators, bodies, or judges omit or even
explicitly deny the claim, the objective dimension of the claim cannot be suppressed. What
happens in those cases, and especially in the case of the explicit denial, is that one fails to
comply with the demands of the claim rather than avoiding the claim altogether. This is
precisely the power of the claim: it is not possible to dispense with it; it will always be
posing its substantive demands on the content ofnormative systems or individual norms.
(iii) In the face of the fact that it is anyway impossible to imagine an absence of the
claim altogether, the only interesting connection that the claim can have with individual
norms or systems is what Alexy calls a qualifying connection. Alexy, in introducing the
connection between individual norms and the claim to correctness, says68 that it can be only
a qualifying connection, since legal norms are already norms within the framework of a
legal system. This claim will be contradictory unless it is taken to mean that the fact of a
norm's raising the claim to correctness is somehow secured by their belonging in the sys¬
tem. Hence the only thing remaining to be examined is if they live up to the claim. This can
be right, however, under one condition: the claim's being raised is guaranteed not by the
legal system but by the standards of correctness which include a norm of autonomy. The
existence of those standards (as normative facts) constitutes a metaphysical necessity which
is knowable a priori, as the transcendental reasoning revealed. Now, if one moves a level
higher, a whole legal system will, by the same token, always be a legal system in virtue of
the existence of the aforementioned substantive standards. It is a different thing, however, if
it is going to be a correct or a wrong legal system. Consequently even in the case of whole
legal systems the only question that remains open is whether they are correct or wrong.
(iv) To further elucidate this view let me use some findings from the discussion in
the previous chapters, and suggest something like the following network of normative enti¬
ties: The claim to correctness is connected to a series of objective standards for action,
whose existence constitutes an a priori knowable metaphysical necessity. Once those stan¬
dards exist, every normative proposition will necessarily raise a claim to be correct accord¬
ing to those standards, or to be abiding by them. This correctness will consist in the propo¬
sition's depicting a valid normative object. To that extent it is important to keep the distinc¬
tion between normative propositions and the norms they depict69. Then the claim to correct-
tique', 145 (fn. 61).
68 Cf. with fn. 38.
69 In a non-representationalist theory of content it is still possible to distinguish between the environ¬
ment and our propositions about it. Even if the environment is revealed within the semantic structures
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ness will be raised by normative propositions, whereas correctness will be a feature of valid
normative objects (norms). Valid are those norms that meet the standards of correctness. As
argued before, those standards are, in one way or another, dictated by NoA. Hence correct
are those norms that realise autonomy. This realisation practically means that a correct norm
will be a token of NoA, in the sense that it is a regulation of a concrete case within the
boundaries of NoA. To use another formulation, every particular norm will be a token of
NoA concerning a concrete case. What emerges is something like the following picture: the
standards for correctness and NoA are normative objects that are necessarily valid and
knowable a priori. All other norms are tokens of those standards/autonomy. As a result,
what is possible to be depicted by normative claims/propositions is delimited by the stan¬
dards of correctness plus autonomy. Those standards plus autonomy delimit ontologically
the domain of valid norms. Normative propositions and other claims necessarily aim at valid
normative entities because they necessarily raise a claim to correctness. They fulfil the
claim if they depict an existing or valid normative object; they fail it if they do not. Further,
they depict a valid norm if their meaning is compatible with the meaning of the norm of
autonomy (or, more accurately, the proposition that thematises the norm of autonomy); they
fail to depict a valid norm if their meaning does not abide by the meaning of the norm of
autonomy70.
(v) The meaning ofNoA can be taken to express the content of a (minimal) morality
shared by anyone who advances legal claims. To that extent, one does not need to actually
share or agree with the content of autonomy. As in the case of the claim to correctness,
autonomy is a necessary objective condition for the validity of our normative propositions.
Intertwined in this manner with autonomy, the claim to correctness can be reconstructed as
prescribing that all legal propositions/claims ought to be in accordance with what autonomy
decrees (the meaning of NoA). This can be further analysed as saying that all normative
of language, it is not the case that it is constituted through them. The mam assumption of such a theory
is that content is shaped by the environment in an immediate way, without the intervention of any sort
ofmental interface.
70 A last issue might arise in connection to the relation of the claim to correctness with whole legal
systems. Is it intelligible to distinguish between a legal system on the level of legal propositions to
which the claim for correctness will refer, and a legal system on the level of legal norms to which the
fulfilment of the claim will refer, as we did in the case of individual norms? Arguably this would be a
rather confusing distinction. In order to keep things simpler here, it might be purposeful to approach
legal systems through the individual norms that constitute the system, and examine the different possi¬
bilities in the way explained. A legal system would cease to exist if the majority of its norms are inva¬
lid or non-existent. 'Majority' will be defined not on a quantitative but also on a qualitative basis:
namely, if some norms of the system directly cancel autonomy or fail to respect those constitutional
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propositions should depict a valid norm (that is a token ofNoA). Conceived in that manner,
the meaning of autonomy will derive from all the norms that we know to be valid at a given
time. By being valid tokens of a general norm of autonomy, those special valid norms will
have a 'saying' in shaping the meaning of 'autonomy'.
(vi) To summarise: legal propositions, claims, or statements necessarily raise the
claim to correctness. They do so because they are, as it were, empowered by a series of nec¬
essary standards of correctness plus the norm of autonomy, that are knowable a priori. In
raising the claim for correctness, legal propositions depict or aim at normative objects
(norms). Those normative objects can be correct or faulty. They are correct if they abide by
the standards of correctness (and, insofar, are tokens ofNoA). They are faulty if they do not
comply with the standards of correctness/autonomy. Correctness and wrongness are thus
substantive issues that are measured against the content of autonomy. Furthermore, since
the norm of autonomy is valid with metaphysical necessity, any norm that contravenes it, is
necessarily faulty. Admittedly, to say that faultiness is a necessary feature of faulty legal
norms is to concede a trivial tautology. What is very important, however, is that we can
know to which cases the tautology applies because we know the criteria according to which
norms are faulty. To know that is, clearly, anything but 'trivial'71.
On the face of the above remarks, there does not seem to be enough room for expli¬
cating the criteria of correctness as being other than objective action-guiding norms. In what
follows, I am going to discuss briefly the lines along which discourse-theory (and in par¬
ticular the Habermasian version) opts for a procedural understanding of the pragmatic pre¬
suppositions of communication. It will be then argued that, to a large extent, the preoccupa¬
tion with a procedural paradigm of knowledge and rationality - that is so typical of dis¬
course-theory - emanates from a problematic (representationalist) understanding of the re¬
lations between the mind and the environment. The ground for this understanding will be
located in an erroneous interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument. The
conclusion will be, roughly, that the rationale of the Wittgensteiman argument does not let a
representationalist reading go through. Once, however, the discourse-theoretical picture of
the mind-world relations collapses, so does the need for a strict proceduralist explication of
the transcendental pragmatic norms of communication.
Finally, the last chapter will attempt to accommodate the discourse-theoretical in-
rights that actually guarantee autonomy, then the system will be invalid altogether in its entirety.
71 As Bulygin tenders, ibid..
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sights into a philosophical framework that appears to respect the point of the Wittgen-
steinian argument. This framework will be in accordance with the previous discussion of
anti-representationalism while, at the same time, it will point towards a substantive concep¬
tion of the criteria ofpractical correctness, as constituting objective action-guiding norms.
Substantive and Procedural UnderstandingOf The Standards
of Correctness
The discussion of the pragmatic-normative presuppositions of normative meaning has by
now reached an understanding thereof as consisting in a series of norms that exist with
metaphysical necessity and that are knowable a priori. Those norms provide for the condi¬
tions under which our normative claims are intelligible (necessity of the claim for correct¬
ness), as well as the substantive criteria under which action-guiding norms are cor¬
rect/wrong or valid/invalid (necessity of the qualifying effect). Connectedly, the transcen¬
dental-pragmatic norms do not themselves fall under the requirements of the binary code
correct/wrong or valid/invalid. Rather, their validity is a precondition for constituting the
distinction right/wrong or valid/invalid in respect to every other action-guiding norm.
The transcendental-pragmatic norms are abstract normative objects. For such an
understanding one need not presuppose a demanding ontology. That possibility is, rather,
available through nominalisations of certain normative sentences, as it was demonstrated in
chapter iv. As such, the transcendental pragmatic norms constitute part of the environment.
Their 'objecthood' guarantees our ability to distinguish between 'internal' or mind-
dependent and 'external' or mind-independent states of affairs and objects (chapter iii).
An ontological explication of action-guiding norms that relies upon semantics,
amounts to placing practical (i.e. action-guiding) meaning in the centre of the ontological
enterprise. The transcendental-pragmatic norms are specified as the necessary condition for
the possibility of the meaning of normative propositions and, hence, for the existence of the
corresponding norms. Our ability to depict norms by constructing semantic structures
(through employing normative propositions) is constrained by the meaning of the transcen¬
dental norms. But the meaning of those necessary and a priori knowable norms gives us
sufficient access to their ontology. Consequently, it is the case that both on the level of the
transcendental norms as well as on that of any a posteriori knowable action-guiding norm,
practical meaning becomes constitutive for the ontology of norms. Hence, transcendental as
well as simple action-guiding norms are ontologically on a par: they are action-guiding
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normative abstract objects, their only difference lying in the fact that the former are know-
able a priori whereas the latter only a posteriori 2. To that degree, the objecthood of practi¬
cal norms is intertwined with their practical or action-guiding meaning to the effect that
those two aspects presuppose each other.
In conjunction with those remarks, an analysis of the transcendental pragmatic rules
that support practical meaning and validate action-guiding norms, needs to be aware of their
double nature: first that they are mind-independent, abstract normative objects. Second that
they are normative objects concerning the regulation of human agency, because their
meaning is practical (i.e. signifies instances of autonomy).
I want to suggest that, in conflict with those requirements, the two most important
theoretical programs that undertake the task of exploring the transcendental normative pre¬
suppositions of practical meaning - Apel's Transcendental-Pragmatics and Habermas' Uni¬
versal-Pragmatics - fail to live up to the demands that such an enterprise poses73. In expli¬
cating the transcendental pragmatic norms as norms that regulate merely speech, the two
philosophical programmes, fail to provide for some categorical reasons or criteria, on the
basis of which practical discourses would be able to ground more specific action-guiding
norms.
A conception of discourse-rules as rules for speech, results into an anti-realist, in
the sense of mind-immanent, explication of the norms of morality and law, according to
which there is no way of distinguishing between subjective understandings of rules and
some mind-independent conception thereof74, i.e. as constituting objective parts of the envi¬
ronment75. Anti-realism on the ontological level results in a failure to appreciate practical
norms as being objective standards for action: if the transcendental norms are binding for
speech but not for action, then there are no action-guiding standards that could constrain
72 Furthermore, both are knowable only within the context of social practices.
73 Having said that, it is fair to mention that K.-O. Apel's Transcendental-Pragmatics strives to make
room for a substantive ethical Grundnorm as a necessary presupposition of practical discourses (Cf.
Apel 'Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Grundlagen der Ethik', 415-423). How¬
ever the postulation of such a norm strikes one more as an assertive claim rather than a logical conse¬
quence of the theoretical scaffolding of Transcendental-Pragmatics, since Apel, as much as Habermas,
accepts a dualist picture of the mind-environment relations in which the discourse-rules remain rules
strictly for the speech.
74 This is particularly acute on the face of discourse-theory's dualist understanding of the mind-world
relations: if conceptual content is not directly 'shaped' through the environment, then all normative
concepts that are conceived as norms for the speech face the danger of being radically idiolectic or
private and hence relative in value.
75 Though 'environment' here can not be taken to refer to the natural environment, one can still allude
to the use of the term in connection to rules, provided it is taken as encompassing the products of
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discursive outcomes. Hence the content of the action-guiding norms that are generated
through practical discourses is relative to the various contingent factors that might affect the
discursive procedure. However, if the justificatory power of discourses is rendered as rela¬
tive as that, then their raison d' etre seems to wither away.
But is the proceduralist picture compulsory? Rather not: it seems that there is a se¬
ries of good reasons that speak against it and the attendant understanding of discourse rules
as rules for speech.
Against Habermas' Proceduralisrn
In this section I will attempt to demonstrate that the premisses and broadly the theoretical
background of discourse-theory does not warrant the proceduralist explication of the dis¬
course rules that is advocated by Discourse-theory, in particular in its Habermasian version.
Let me start with a clarification concerning the content of the term 'pragmatic' that is at¬
tributed to the discourse rules which are taken to constitute the transcendental presupposi¬
tions of speech. Arguably, the discourse rules are pragmatic only to the extent that they
derive from action-related contexts and not because they are ephemeral or temporally lim¬
ited. The normative aspect of these criteria demands rather that they be equipped with a
more permanent character, a sort of semantic stability. In this sense, the term 'pragmatic'
refers merely to normative standards which can be derived from the context of a human
action or a chain of human actions (or a practice). At the same moment, though, these stan¬
dards determine the meaning of all normative utterances, a fact which speaks for their pos¬
sessing some sort of stability. This stability does not occur either on the basis of semantic or
syntactic forms, or on the basis of any other, as it were, 'empowering' norms that are ante¬
rior to the pragmatic norms, but emerges from the reflection on the fact that certain prag¬
matic norms are necessary presuppositions for certain forms of human acting or practice.
This conception of the pragmatic character of norms seems to be the one informing the
philosophical programme of the speech act theory which lies at the bottom of Universal
Pragmatics, or the linguistic-philosophical part of Discourse-theory.
The basic intuition of the speech act theory is the interconnection between language
and human action/agency. The term 'speech act' reflects precisely the fact that the semantic
level of a language is constituted through the valid acts of use of this language. Hence, in a
way, the actuality from which logicians abstract whenever they speak about the sense of a
social practices and, broader, of intellectual activity.
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term or a sentence is, at the end of the day, constituted by our deeds and linguistic prac¬
tices76. The validity of the speech acts depends further upon norms that derive from human
action and, for this reason, have to be understood as genuine action-guiding norms. Their
pragmatic character is exhausted in the fact that they are derived in a pragmatic way, i.e. in
relation to a practice and, at the same time, as presupposition of this practice. Consequently,
if one adopts the speech act theory, one should also endorse its normative implications. This
is of great importance in the case of practical utterances, whose normative presuppositions
have the character ofmoral action-guiding norms.
In contrast, Habermas' understanding of the pragmatic universals of the speech
seems to be rather formal: according to his account, the validity-claims that illocutions en¬
tail have an impact merely upon the external form of utterances. They behave like coher¬
ence-criteria, by which every speaker has to abide, provided they wish to express them¬
selves appropriately. In this account the pragmatic norms are somehow reduced to a kind of
code, which aims to guarantee meaning and coherence among speakers. This yields a pic¬
ture in which the substantive dimension of the validity-claims is obliterated. This fact is
untenable in the case of the claim for correctness. Furthermore, the dependence of semantic
properties on action-related normative contents is one of the main intuitions of the speech
acts theory. Habermas' refusal to endorse these views is allegedly justified by the fact that
he wants by all means to avoid a retreat towards 'occult' moral entities. But is it really ten¬
able to believe that the only possible way to derive the normative co-ordinates of human
communication, is by endorsing a kind of occult metaphysical realism? Rather not; at least
not since the linguistic turn. The normative presuppositions of human communication that
can be grounded through reflection upon our action are ontologically rather modest and
cannot be compared with any kind of 'material' moral entities. Their modesty results from
the fact that they are grounded within and on the basis of our practice (on this side of the
world!), while it is possible to ontologically depict them within linguistic structures, as the
semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis has demonstrated77. At the same time, however, they
present a sufficient argumentative/justifying force, since they are shown, through reflection
upon our practice, to constitute the normative presuppositions of this practice. There is,
namely, no higher normative level that could provide us with stronger evidence!
Habermas' reluctance to accept the normative presuppositions of speech in their full
76 McCulloch The Mind and its World (London: Routledge, 1995), 95.
77 Vide supra, chapters II, III, IV.
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range leaves the whole project of the universal-pragmatics hanging in the air. It is not
enough to acknowledge the possibility of universally valid pragmatic presuppositions of
speech; one should further know on what grounds their universality is possible. Habermas
tries to fill this gap by employing the concept of the argumentation-community [Argumen-
tationsgemeinschaft].
The Argumentation-Community
If the pragmatic universals of the speech are merely rules for an argumentation or a dis¬
course, they cannot sufficiently ground the necessity of a discourse. The notion of the dis¬
course is, in this case, prior to those rules and its justification has to be derived from another
concept. This purpose is served by the argumentation-community. The main features of this
concept can be summarised as follows:
The argumentation-community incorporates the universalization-principle (U) in
relation to the validity of utterances78. Utterances can be rendered true or correct only
within the framework of an argumentation-community: The transcendental program of uni¬
versal-pragmatics, which was to unveil the general (normative) presuppositions of speech, is
here totally modified or even abandoned; what is rendered transcendentally valid are not
norms but the universalization-principle in the form of the argumentation-community! It is,
however, absurd to render a formal/procedural rule like (U) transcendentally valid. The
validity of (U) needs to be supported by substantive reasons. Habermas himself seems to
understand the problem when he endeavours to derive (U) from the pragmatic rules for ar¬
gumentation79. In this case, however, the argumentation-rules have to be understood as sub¬
stantive norms, or else the 'backing' enterprise must fail. Substantive reasons do not derive
from formal speech rules.
The argumentation-community is further related to a consensus theory of practical
Tightness and theoretical truth80. The idea of a consensus-based theory of truth and Tightness
is totally consistent with the universalization principle which constitutes the core of the
argumentation-community. According to the consensus theory true/right are those proposi-
78 Here is obvious the influence of the Kantian Categorical Imperative, as well as of other contempo¬
rary moral theories (Hare, Baier); see also Leist, 'Diesseits der 'Transzendentalpragmatik': Gibt es
sprachpragmatische Argumente fur Moral?', Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung, 43 (1989),
303n. (306).
79 Habermas, 'Diskursethik - Notizen', 97n.; idem Faktizitat, 138.
80 For the content and the main ideas of a consensus theory of truth and Tightness vide the body of
Habermas' main work as indicated in fn. 1, supra.
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tions which have concentrated the consent of all participants within an argumentation.
Habermas further distinguishes between a false and a true, in the sense of justified, consen¬
sus81. The criterion for a justified consensus should not require anew a consensus, but has to
be traced back to an ideal speech-situation [ideale Sprechsituation]. The ideal speech-
situation is conceived as a regulative ideal as opposed to the real speech-situation [reale
Sprechsituation]. This practically means that among all action-guiding norms (moral/legal
norms) that have met an actual consensus within a real discourse, only those are assumed to
be justified which additionally would have met the consent of all participants of an ideal
discourse82.
The idea of an argumentation-community is grounded (transcendentally) on the
philosophical thesis of the impossibility of a private language, which Ludwig Wittgenstein
formulated as the Private Language Argument in his Philosophical Investigations; here is
the locus classicus:
And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is
obeying a mle is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey
a mle 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a mle would
be the same thing as obeying it8'.
The necessity of the argumentation-community derives allegedly from this thesis. If one
cannot privately follow a rule, which is the same as saying: if one cannot define privately
meanings in a language, then we need a community in order to make communication and
meaning possible. The necessity of the community indicates further the communicative
character of language, as well as its immanent intersubjectivity. On these grounds some
expectations of reciprocal recognition and appropriate behaviour are ascribed to the mem¬
bers of the argumentation-community84.
The above conception of the argumentation-community demonstrates some of the
seminal problems and inconsistencies of discourse-theory as a theory of procedural Tight¬
ness of practical norms. These problems originate mainly from a superficial or erroneous
interpretation of the private language argument, as will be demonstrated in the last chapter.
81 For a comprehensive presentation of consensus-theory, see Keuth 1993, 112n. (132, 151n., 154n.).
82 The philosophical justification for the requirement of an ideal speech-situation is derived from the
need to explicate the concept of truth without recurring to 'an ontological relation between the lan¬
guage and the world'. Insofar, Habermas takes the idea of the ideal speech-situation to share the intui¬
tions of the pragmatic philosophy of C. S. Peirce. Vide Habermas, Faktizitat, 28-32.
83 Vide, L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), §202.
84 Keuth 1993, 57-62.
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For the moment, we will just focus on the weaknesses of the concept of the argumentation-
community without questioning its corresponding interpretation of the private language
argument.
The argumentation-community, whose necessity is assumed on the ground of the
private language argument, generates the transcendental conditions of any form of argu¬
mentation. It incorporates, as it were, the normative requirements for any possible form of
human communication and has a priority over all other normative presuppositions of the
speech. In other words: all those elements which universal-pragmatics bring forth as the
general normative co-ordinates of speech, are in a sense subordinated to the presuppositions
of the argumentation-community. On the other hand, the argumentation-community is
something like the epitome of the universalization principle. This fact alone makes the ne¬
cessity of the community dependent on a series of substantive reasons: i.e. the perspective
of universalization requires the existence of certain common features among the members of
the argumentation-community. This line of reasoning can also be reconstructed under the
angle of the private language argument: Why is it impossible for one to fix privately mean¬
ings in a language, hence to speak privately? One possible answer could be formulated on
the hypothesis that we all are, with an existential necessity, members of a transcendental
community that has always to be presupposed in any form of communication. I am not go¬
ing to pursue further this occult line of argument. Instead, I will focus on a more plausible
alternative which concentrates on the fact that speaking as acting and acting as speaking
make implicitly some normative presuppositions which can ground the necessity of the ar¬
gumentation- or discourse-community. According to this view, the concept of the commu¬
nity follows after and on the ground of the normative presuppositions of the speech as the
most elementary form of human action. Consequently, the argumentation-community cannot
stand on its own but has to be understood as a concept in need of justification [be-
griindungsbediirftiger Begriff] through substantive normative reasons. The suggested line of
argument aims to intensify the problematic aspects of the relation between a discourse-
community and the general normative presuppositions of the speech. Habermas' interpreta¬
tion of the private language argument more or less says: 'we need to presuppose an argu¬
mentation-community if it is for the universal-pragmatics to be possible and for the dis¬
course to be postulated'. My questioning shifts the main emphasis: 'On which conditions
can we be members of a communication-community, and how can this community be de¬
fined, hence justified?' These conditions and further the grounding of the community are
substantive questions that can be answered only on the ground of the pragmatic normative
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presuppositions of communication. The latter are further to be understood as comprehensive
action-guiding normative objects which constitute instances of a Norm of Freedom or
Autonomy and, further, refer to a certain conception of persons. The point, namely, I want
to make here is that the argumentation-community and a consensus theory of truth/rightness
can only be grounded on the basis of the normative presuppositions of speech and not vice-
versa. It is not the case that the presuppositions of communication must be justified on the
ground of an argumentation-community, but rather that the argumentation-community can
only be conceptually constituted on the ground of the communication-presuppositions. This
generates on the level of the validity of practical norms a couple of important consequences:
(i) The notion of an ideal argumentation-community seems redundant; the original need for an
ideal argumentation-community is the need for a criterion that makes the distinction between
a true and a false consensus possible. If, however, the notion of the consensus has to be con¬
structed on the basis of comprehensive norms, then the criteria of a true consensus are al¬
ready included in the concept of the consensus. In this case, the concept of ideal community
is a thought experiment that loses any rationale of existence when deprived of its role as con¬
sensus-criterion. The ideal community does not serve any other purpose: the rules of the ar¬
gumentation [Argumentationsregeln], even if they are perceived as pure rules for the speech,
are already available within the scope of the actual or real argumentation-community. These
rules are in any case grounded on the real argumentative practice; and this practice is the only
means through which we can gain an insight into the normative presuppositions of speech.
One could name this practice as one likes, and the term 'real/actual argumentation-
community' [reale Argumentationsgemeinschaft] that Habermas uses, is not bad indeed.
Anything more than this, though, is superfluous and reveals a misunderstanding of the private
language argument.
(ii) The universalization principle (U) as the validity condition of practical norms, is also
grounded on the normative presuppositions of the speech. These presuppositions correspond
further to a conception of persons: this conception is underpinned by the idea according to
which action-guiding norms should be universalizable precisely because they address moral
(i.e. free and equal) persons. Habermas strives, implicitly though, to establish an (indirect)
connection between the discourse and the concept of the free and equal person: either by ar¬
ticulating argumentative norms of freedom and equality between the discourse members
(which though are strictly conceived as rules for the speech and are therefore too weak to
lead to a conception of persons); or by claiming that from all possible action-guiding norms
that could be the outcome of a discourse, only the ones concerning freedom and equality can
generate the true consensus within a real discourse (without though explaining where these
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action-norms owe their magical power!)85.
In all, I have suggested that the way in which Habermas constructs the two, central to the
discourse-theory, concepts of universal-pragmatics and the argumentation-community
makes them antithetical to each other instead of complementary, as they are alleged to be.
The original purpose of universal-pragmatics was to accomplish anew the task of the tran¬
scendental grounding of practical/moral norms in an enlightened post-metaphysical way
[nachmetaphysisch], and in this sense to restore moral cognitivism as a plausible alternative
to moral scepticism. This enterprise has been blocked in the process by two counter-forces:
the fear of an occult moral realism and the formalism akin to Kantian practical philosophy86.
These two obstacles generate something like an epistemological akrasia within the camp of
discourse-theory, which fails to perceive the transcendental-pragmatic rules for communi¬
cation as action-guiding normative objects. This inability undermines the justifying capacity
of universal-pragmatics and subordinates the whole transcendental enterprise to the formal
concept of an argumentation-community.
As indicated earlier, much of the reluctance to connect the pragmatic level of dis¬
course with the level of action rests on some problematic assumptions concerning the rela¬
tions between the mind and the environment. Furthermore those assumptions seem, pecu¬
liarly, to derive from a 'representationalist' reading of Wittgenstein's Private Language
Argument.
Private language and discourse: preliminary remarks
Evidently, Apel's and Habermas' reluctance to adopt a more realist stance towards the tran¬
scendental norms that support practical meaning, stems from something like a dualist under-
85 Analogously vague seems to be the effort to combine a pure procedural discourse model with the
concepts of the discursive impossibility/necessity and the discursive possibility (Alexy, Theorie, 256,
415. The discursive impossibility/necessity emerges in the case of a rule that 'excludes people from
the discursive will-formation process by conferring on them the legal status of a slave' (ibid. 256). In
these cases the transcendental-pragmatic discourse-rales are used as normative premisses from which
derives the discursive impossibility, a fact that totally contradicts the character of the discourse-rales
as pure rales for the speech.
86 Characteristic are the following passages from Habermas: '...indem sie [die Diskurstheorie] die
Sphare der Sollgeltung von Handlungsnormen herausarbeitet, grenzt die Diskursethik den Bereich des
moralisch Giiltigen gegeniiber dem der kulturellen Wertinhalte ab' (Habermas 'MoralbewuBtsein und
kommunikatives Handeln', 132). This last thesis has as effect that: 'Grandnormen des Rechts und der
Moral fallen iiberhaupt nicht in die Zustandigkeit der Moraltheorie; sie mussen als Inhalte betrachtet
werden, die der Begriindung in praktischen Diskursen bediirfen' (Habermas 'Diskursethik - Notizen',
96).
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standing of the relations between the mind (and language) and the environment87: under this
understanding, the mind and the world are radically separated from each other. Here, at¬
tempts to gain knowledge of the environment can be as subjective as those concerning in¬
ternal states. In contrast to this sceptical picture, the two fathers of discourse-theory take
communication via language as offering a possibility to establish something like a commu¬
nal mind in relation to which it is possible to have objective or shared knowledge. Thus, the
conditions for that portion of objective knowledge are upgraded to the conditions of all pos¬
sible knowledge. The underlying though^ seems to run along the following lines: if all we
can have objective knowledge abou^hes on the side of a version of the Internal (communal
mind) rather than the External (environment), then the conditions that enable us to do so are
to be taken to constitute the conditions of knowledge. Since the notion of the communal
mind is constituted on the basis of communication through language, the conditions for
knowledge will be the conditions for communication. To that extent, those conditions need
to be kept within the boundaries of language, i.e. as conditions of speech. In this way Uni¬
versal- and Transcendental-Pragmatics end up excluding the environment from their ac¬
count of both theoretical and practical knowledge. On their conception, true and justified is
only what can be validly 'translated' into the schemata of the 'internal' common mind, con¬
strued on the basis of communication. In what I am going to argue that is a mistaken inter¬
pretation of Wittgenstein's thought, the discourse theorists take their theoretical construc¬
tion to follow from the discussion of the private language argument.
Clearly, there are innumerable problems concerning the concept of a common mind.
Besides, the scepticism that the dualist picture entails for the knowledge of the environment,
can very easily be expanded towards undermining knowledge in respect to other minds,
including a 'communal' mind88. Furthermore, any reading of the Wittgensteinian private
language argument as pointing towards such a conception of communal mind and the ensu¬
ing anti-realist understanding of knowledge (or of truth and justification) is highly contest¬
able. Be that as it may, discourse-theory is indispensable to the extent that it makes explicit
the evaluative side ofmeaning and content, which play a decisive role in our account of the
87 It should be noted that those premisses are never made explicit by the two main proponents of
discourse-theory. However, I take them to depict, more or less, the assumptions on the philosophy of
mind that support the program of discourse-theory. For instance, compare with Apel's remarks on the
private language argument, when he says that the purpose of this argument is to show that rule-
following and thought-formation cannot be performed privately by an individual but have to be per¬
formed publicly (offentlich) within a community of speakers; Apel 'Das Apriori der Kommunikations-
gemeinschaft', 399-400.
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moral or normative environment. This is, in other words, the idea that meaning and, further,
content are not independent from the way we communicate and interact with each other, an
idea that suggests that interaction and communication are central to an understanding of
ontology (the world). Legitimate as this enterprise might be, it raises a question in respect to
the asymmetry of the relation between communication and the environment: 'Why need
meaning and content be only about communication and not also about the environment'? To
deny the latter would more or less amount to denying that communication and agency are
about the world/environment and to affirm that they are radically introspective89. The
asymmetry seems to be arbitrary unless one can provide for a reason that would explain the
advantage of an account from the 'inside to the outside'.
Notoriously, such a reason could only emanate from the camp of representational-
ism90: the thesis, namely, that we have some privileged access to our internal states which
are able to reflect the environment in a mysterious way. To the worry: 'what if those inter¬
nal states are just too 'private' in order to be able to offer an account shared by everyone'?,
discourse-theory's answer is that we need to make them public to the extend that we can
infer the existence of something like common or public internal states (mind). In order to
achieve that, discourse-theory resorts to a communicative practice based on the concept of a
public language. The role of that language in relation to mental states is not very clear. It
seems plausible to suppose that the public language is used as a means of individuating
tokens of internal states which - for that reason - become public, as opposed to mental states
that are private, owing to their being individuated via sentences of a 'private' language, or a
language that is not comprehensible by all members of the linguistic community. The pic¬
ture that emerges from these assumptions is that a public language, in transcending the sub¬
jectivity of the individual's internal devises of content-formation, can function as a means
for pointing towards an inter-personal and hence more objective device of representation of
the environment. Since direct access to the environment is tied up with the extreme scepti¬
cism of a private language, the 'communal' device of representation is the means closest to
objective knowledge we have. Thus, in a way, discourse-theory seems to present the fol-
88 For a discussion of those points see infra chapter VI.
89 Cristina Lafont has recently advanced - from within the camp of discourse-theory - a powerful
critique towards this direction, with the aim to highlight potential points of contact between discourse-
theory and other philosophical programmes that are explicitly realist (in particular the so-called theo¬
ries of 'direct reference'). Vide her The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy (Cam. Mass: MIT
Press, 1999), 277-281 and CHs 6 and 7.
90 See supra, chapter II and infra Ch. VI..
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lowing dilemma as unavoidable: either we can have objective knowledge by alluding to
public representational states while giving up any hope of having direct access to the envi¬
ronment, or we rely on our direct depicting of the environment which is radically private
and leads to extreme scepticism. Either way the environment is not constitutive in shaping
our internal mental states. Insofar as discourse-theory takes this conclusion to derive from
Wittgenstein's discussion of a private language, the dilemma posed need not be compulsory.
Further objectives
There are very good reasons for arguing that Wittgenstein's discussion of private language
aims precisely at the opposite conclusion from what discourse-theory takes it to do, namely
at discrediting all forms of representationalism and, further, at restoring the connection be¬
tween the mind and the environment. This is going to be the topic of the last chapter. At the
same time, the discussion will help in recasting the main arguments of discourse-theory to
the effect that the enterprise of depicting the pragmatic-normative presuppositions of
meaning will be environment-sensitive. In particular, in the area of practical rationality, the
environment will consist in the norms of law and morality that are depicted through the
every-day communicative practices of any community, plus the necessary transcendental
norms that validate those norms of law and morality. As to the issue how normative content
is individuated, I am going to stick to the semantics-exhausts-ontology thesis, which seems
to agree with how discourse-theory understands the individuation of mental states in gen¬
eral.
The proposed account purports to place anti-representationalism about normative or
practical content, within the framework of human practices and modes of communication.
On the one hand, normative meaning is generated by or within communicative practice.
Practice is an ongoing regulated activity that both requires and posits action-guiding stan¬
dards; hence, to the extent that meaning is sufficient for an ontological underpinning of
norms, the ontology of norms presupposes practices of communication. Consequently,
communicative practices constitute the environment into which one will have to look, in
order to 'discover' norms. On the other hand, communicative practice offers the conditions
for advancing the transcendental argument concerning the standards of normative/practical
correctness. This fact has two aspects: first, communication incorporates a self-reflective
dimension91 which offers to its participants the possibility to transcend its contingency and
91 See especially Habermas, 'Erlauterungen zur Diskursethik', passim.
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reflect upon its necessary normative prerequisites (as prerequisites for normative meaning).
Second, communication, as an ongoing activity which incorporates substantive action-
guiding patterns, offers the raw material from which the transcendental argument derives its
aboutness: the transcendental standards (discourse-rules) are standards about the determi¬
nation ofaction; further, the semantic structures of those standards, as before in the case of
simple norms, are sufficient in accounting for the ontology of the corresponding (transcen¬
dental) norms. Taken together these two aspects signify our ability to depict objective ac¬
tion-guiding standards within our communicative practices. Hence, even if the transcen¬
dental norms rank normatively as being anterior to communicative practice, they can only
be conceivedfrom within communicative practice.
Resting on the anti-representationalist content of the private language argument I
will further attempt to paint with a very broad brush a picture of communicative practice, in
which the transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions feature as substantive (action-guiding)
norms with the result that the Habermasian idea of an argumentation-community looses its
normative priority. The substantive character of discourse-rules will be revealed when one
pursues further the claim to correctness of normative propositions: this claim raises, as it
were, the question about the moral point of view, namely the angle under which normative
propositions first 'claim' to be correct/justified (the claim for correctness), and second are
considered to be correct/justified (the criteria of correctness)92. Then it becomes clear that
the moral point of view is dictated by a set of substantive norms which envisage procedural
discourses as the best way to justify our every day action-guiding norms (rules of morality
and law)93.
In this broad picture two thoughts will be associated with discourse rules as sub¬
stantive norms: first, the thought that they bring into expression the idea of autonomy. This
thought can be specified in different ways: one is to say that the discourse rules amount to a
Norm of Autonomy (NoA); another is to say that they are the inescapable tokens of a norm
of autonomy; perhaps a more practicable way is to say that in the light of those norms all
potential subjects of communication are constituted as being autonomous persons/agents.
92 It should be noted here that the quest for justification and the justification criteria cannot be strictly
distinguished, since the semantic depth of the word 'justification' already incorporates some qualita¬
tive criteria: it is not possible in other words for any 'backing' of normative propositions (for instance
the criminal's threat towards his victim) to be considered as justification.
93 This is a broader claim saying that these rules are the epistemic conditions of any knowledge and
not only of moral knowledge. See K.-O. Apel, 'Szientistik, Hermeneutik, Ideologiekritik. Entwurf
einer Wissenschaftslehre in erkenntnisanthropologischer Sicht', in J.Habermas, D. Henrich and J.
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Second, the thought that discourse rules constitute the limit of any procedural discourse and
any justification, in the sense that they justify procedural Tightness only to the point that it
serves the autonomy of persons94. Having said this, procedural discourses are, still, the best
means among equal and free (i.e. autonomous) moral agents in order for them to settle the
norms and principles of their every-day life, as there is no privileged standing point for any¬
one as far as the quest for Tightness is concerned95.
Taubes (eds.) Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), 7-44.
94 This seems to be the idea behind R. Alexy's conception of discursive necessity and/or impossibil¬
ity, vide fn. 80, supra.
95 It would not be misleading ifwe draw an analogy between procedural discourse and the democratic
principle (the rule of the majority) as the best way among equal free citizens to fix the legal/political
framework of their lives in a political community.
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CHAPTER VI
PRIVATE LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION: MEANING,
CONTEXT AND PERSONS
Introduction
This chapter offers an anti-representationalist reading of Wittgenstein's private language
argument along the lines suggested in chapter V. This reading aims to generate the require¬
ments for an account of the normative presuppositions of the meaning of normative sen¬
tences and broader propositions, as constituting substantive (action-guiding) norms that are
knowable a priori. These requirements involve, roughly, two aspects: First the need to un¬
derstand the communicative practices that generate normative meaning/content as instances
of interaction between intentional agents and the environment (in other words, as being
world-involving). Second the need to explicate the normative patterns that underlie practices
as action-guiding norms that aim at the regulation of (inter) action between agents and the
environment (or other agents). Then those patterns can be identified with the transcenden¬
tal-pragmatic rules that regulate normative meaning (and in the language of discourse theory
are called 'discourse-rules').
In demarcating the limits of such an ambitious enterprise I would like to make ex¬
plicit a series of assumptions that will guide the following discussion:
1. The discussion is situated within the environment of discourse theory. It shares
with discourse theory the same interest in unveiling the normative groundwork of communi¬
cation (meaning and understanding) through language, while it endeavours to take into ac¬
count the referential function of language that is obliterated by discourse theory. To this
effect, it employs something like a post-metaphysical explication of the ontology of norms
which is based on the semantic structures of language. This is possible against the back¬
ground of the tenet of anti-representationalism and the rejection of the mind-world dualism.
2. The proposed analysis endorses the idea inherent in discourse theory, that con¬
ceptual content largely depends upon the interpretative dimension of language which is
characteristically intersubjective or communicative. The interpretative dimension of lan-
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guage is consolidated within communal practices of communication. This is the conclusion
suggested by Wittgenstein's private language argument which is employed against a radical
scepticism of content, meaning and understanding. To that degree, the discussion is embed¬
ded in the broader movement within analytic philosophy commonly referred to as the prag¬
matic turn (part two).
3. In contrast to discourse theory, the proposed analysis explicitly rejects the idea of
representations as the bearers of content. Rather, content and meaning are said to be con¬
stituted by the environment's direct impact on minds. According to this line of argument,
practices are the bearers of the objectivity of content, meaning and communication only
under the condition that they are not another representation or intermediary. Rather, prac¬
tices are thought as constituting the environment which impinges upon minds. To ground
this understanding a non-representationalist reading ofWittgenstein's argument is employed
(part three).
4. The anti-representationalist explication of practices advances a holistic under¬
standing of content and meaning in which mental content (and broader knowledge) is medi¬
ated by agency and vice-versa. In this holistic picture content (and in particular normative
content) is not formed through the impact of separate fragments of the environment upon
the mind but, instead, it is formed by the way practices impinge upon the mind. Practices
organise the environment into a coherent whole1. Outside them the environment does not
make sense. This is going to be one of the main assumptions of the exposition. As a result, it
is not enough for an anti-representationalist account to merely reject all intermediaries. It
needs to take practices as constituting the environment that impinges upon our minds. For
that reason an anti-representationalist explication of practices is indispensable for the over¬
all analysis, while it advances and elaborates further on the shorter discussion of represen-
tationalism in chapter II.
5. Within those limits the analysis takes normative content to derive from the im¬
pact of normative practices on minds2. Action-guiding norms are abstract objects that are
located within the environment of normative practices. Mental content concerning these
objects is generated by the impact of the practice-generated environment upon minds (part
1 This is the point at which content and meaning acquire a practical or action-guiding dimension: the
point at which the conditions for the intelligibility of 'practice' become the conditions of content for¬
mation.
2 As already implied, discourse theory equates normative with non-normative practice (discourse) by




6. In particular, the analysis focuses on the content of the pragmatic norms on
whose ground a communicative practice is constituted (transcendental-pragmatic conditions
of communication). These norms are - as every other norm - abstract objects attached, as it
were, to the environment of practices. In contrast to all other 'simple' action-guiding norms
which are somehow revealed along the way a community goes on, the norms that ground
practice are the condition of that practice. Hence, their validity is tied up to the practice, yet
it is a transcendental validity that ranks normatively as anterior to the practice: the transcen¬
dental norms set the standards according to which practice may unfold. The transcendental
norms set, further, the validity conditions for all other 'simple' action-guiding norms (law,
morality) (part three).
7. The transcendental norms that support communication put together a Grundnorm
or super-norm of autonomy which grounds all communication (to that extent the rest of the
transcendental norms can be thought as constituting tokens of the norm of autonomy). The
norm of autonomy is the necessary presupposition for the intelligibility of all practices (part
three).
8. The norm of autonomy envisages all potential subjects of communication as
equal and free persons. In the discourse-theoretical picture, this means that all 'simple' ac¬
tion-guiding norms that are validated in discourses must abide by this requirement; this
could also be explicated as meaning that all 'simple' action-guiding norms that are valid are
tokens of the norm of autonomy. For that reason it makes sense to talk about norms as being
revealed rather than constituted within discourses.
A last methodological remark: throughout the discussion I will abide by the main
assumption of discourse theory that both normative and non-normative meaning rest on the
same network of pragmatic-normative presuppositions. Thus, I will not discuss separately
normative from non-normative meaning, but instead I will offer a short justification for their
uniform treatment.
Content and Language
Among the most important accomplishments of the early phase of analytical philosophy,
commonly referred to as the linguistic turn, is the view that language enjoys the status of an
indispensable epistemic presupposition of our knowledge of the world. According to this
view, initiated by Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the propositions which represent facts or states
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of affairs are not merely the conditions for the possibility of the description of the facts (to
be known) but they are also the conditions for the possibility of the existence of the facts to
be described3. This transcendental interpretation of the Tractatus which establishes the a
priori of language is in the best way summarised by Wittgenstein himself4:
The limit of language shows itself in the impossibility of describing
the fact which corresponds to a sentence...without simply repeating
the sentence.
It is precisely this thought that finds its elegant formulation in Tarski's semantic definition
of truth: "p' is true if and only if p'. Or in the famous example: "snow is white' is true if
and only if snow is white'. In order to describe under which conditions it is the case that the
snow is white, we can not do anything else but repeat the propositional sentence that con¬
tains the description of the fact. In this sense the world-representation through the language
seems to be an undeniable prerequisite.
It is, nevertheless, the case that the fact that snow is white should have a more ob¬
jective status than its mere verbal reflection in a propositional sentence. From a phenome-
nological point of view one could object that it is possible for someone, through perception,
to be certain that the whiteness of snow is not just his subjective opinion but corresponds to
some objective fact. Perception would provide evidence that one's mental contents corre¬
spond to actual facts. Evidence through perception would gain then the objective status of a
truth criterion that transcends the limits of language or -to be more accurate- that is lan¬
guage-free. Precisely in the way it is possible to photograph just the (objective) phenomenal
parts of an object (e.g. a snow flake). Such a photograph represents the common objective
level between all observers. Moreover this kind of evidence offers a way out of the vicious
circle of a problematic purely logical-semantic correspondence theory of truth which is of¬
ten related to the above transcendental interpretation of the Tractatus. As long as an inter¬
pretation leads to the circular formula 'a true proposition is what corresponds to a fact, and
3 K.-O. Apel, '1st Intentionalitat fundamentaler als sprachliche Bedeutung? Transzendentalpragmati-
sche Argumente gegen die Riickkehr zum semantischen Intentionalismus der BewuBtseinsphiloso-
phie', in Forum fiir Philosophic Bad Homburg (ed.), Intentionalitat und Verstehen (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), 13-54 at 20. Vide also K.-O. Apel, 'Szientistik Flermeneutik, Ideologiekritik.
Entwurf einer Wissenschaftslehre in erkenntnisanthropologischer Sicht', in J.Habermas, D. Henrich
and J. Taubes (eds.) Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), 7-44
(13-36).
4 From L. Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 27 as
quoted in K.-O. Apel, '1st Intentionalitat', 20.
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a fact is what corresponds to a true proposition', then one must indeed recur to a criterion of
evidence for the correspondence between the intended and the real.
But the transcendental argument in favour of the a priori character of language is
not so nai've: as already said, language is indispensable at the level of the description of the
facts that can be the object of our knowledge5. And this appears to be the case even if the
previous phenomenological objections are indeed justified. If we imagine a photo picturing
a strange UFO or any other hitherto unknown object, no one will be able to say what it is.
The pure, unadulterated fact of its existence may indeed qualify it as being there (perceptual
evidence) but as long as the possibility of its propositional description is missing, we can
not grasp it; we can not interpret it as being something. This is because the interpretative
dimension presupposes the existence of a language. At the same time it is true that the tran-
scendental-propositional argument cannot fully account for the interpretative dimension of
language. Its formal-semantic character is too abstract in order to be able to do justice to the
interpretative function of language and therefore it needs amendment. The point namely of
the interpretative function of language is that it contains common linguistic symbols which
provide for the depiction of the phenomena's meanings. This commonness introduces the
element of the intersubjectivity that is in the first place missing from an abstract for-
mal/semantic-propositional conception of the linguistic a priori. On this new or supple¬
mentary account knowledge is possible only through interpretation which is taken to be
intersubjectively valid.
The acknowledgement of the interpretative dimension of language signals the de¬
parture of the philosophy of language from a pure logical-semantic understanding of lan¬
guage (pragmatic turn). The analysis is from now on focused upon the character of language
as an interaction between speakers/agents reconstructed against the background of the
speaker-listener relations (pragmatic level); that interaction is, further, embedded in com¬
municative practices. 'Elementary unit' of the analysis ceases to be the proposition and
becomes the speech-act, which optimally brings into expression the triangular relation be¬
tween speaker, listener and the object to be known. This relation reveals further a series of
normative-contextual implications which are rooted in the interaction of speakers as agents
and which mark language as, perhaps, the most fundamental form of human action.
5 It might be helpful at this point to draw one's attention upon the fact that the linguistic argument for
the indispensability of language departs from an interest for knowledge, whereas the phenomenologi¬
cal argument concerning perceptual objectivity is rather initiated by an interest for truth.
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At this point discourse theory catches up with the pragmatic turn6: it attempts to
make explicit the that any form of communication through language is a morally/practically-
laden activity or practice that rests upon a series of pragmatic-normative conditions. As
pointed out earlier in Ch. V, discourse theory endeavours further to organise those condi¬
tions into a corpus of rules (discourse-rules) that envisage communication as an interper¬
sonal discourse. These rules are not merely formal rules concerning the syntactic clarity of
speech, but are in a position to enable interpersonal understanding. In their interpersonal
capacity those rules are capable of bringing about a non-private or objective account of
content, meaning and understanding to the extent that content-formation and, further,
knowledge about the environment are mediated by a communicative linguistic practice
which is regulated by those rules. Furthermore, those rules are advanced as offering an ap¬
propriate underpinning of Wittgenstein's claim for the impossibility of a private language.
By the term 'private language' Wittgenstein seems to be referring to a language
which is not merely monological but unintelligible and non-translatable to anyone apart
from its originator, hence the use of the predicate 'private'. Such a language - Wittgenstein
concluded - would necessarily be unintelligible to its supposed originator too, for he would
be unable to establish meanings for its putative signs7. In the discourse theoretical reading
of the argument, the necessary unintelligibility of a private language derives from the prac¬
tical-pragmatic framework of any communication. Since this pragmatic framework shapes
communication as interpersonal there is no room for any private language. The upshot of
this line of argument is that any form of meaning is subjected to the practical-pragmatic
presuppositions of language-as-communication, a thesis which captures in the best way the
transition from the linguistic to the pragmatic turn (language cannot be abstracted from its
communicative framework, hence all meanings are settled on the basis of some elementary
practical/moral contents). Monologues also obey that rule; the reason is that even in the case
ofmonologues semantic clarity and narrative coherence can only be guaranteed against the
practical-pragmatic canvas of language-as-communication. Otherwise monologues would be
private, hence unintelligible.
So far so good. But Wittgenstein's point can be understood as addressing a further
worry: the worry that if language as practice counts amongst the epistemic conditions for
6 Vide thediscussion of the philosophical programmes of Apel and Habermas in Ch V, part 2, supra.
7 For a short albeit very informative and up-to-date review of the Private Language Argument, vide
St. Candlish, 'Wittgensteins Privatsprachenargumentation', in E. von Savigny (ed.), Wittgensteins
Philosophische Untersuchungen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997), 143-165.
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acquiring knowledge about the environment, this is only possible if practice is not con¬
ceived as being some new kind of mental intermediary between the mind and the environ¬
ment8. In this respect the Wittgensteinian argument seems to take seriously the phenome-
nological objection stated earlier about an unadulterated, pre-linguistic grasping of certain
parts or aspects of the environment. Wittgenstein seems to believe that the objection has a
kernel of truth: the immediateness by which the environment shapes intentional content. To
deny that would amount to falling back to some form of intermediary which, sooner or later,
will undermine the possibility of (objective) content. Hence, if (linguistic) practice is a bet¬
ter means for explaining acquisition of content, this is the case only on the ground that it is
located in the environment. Discourse theory does not appear to share this concern. Rather,
a discussion of the problem seems to be lacking all together in the work of Karl-Otto Apel
and Jiirgen Habermas. However, from various passages on related topics it is legitimate to
infer that discourse theory assumes that practice/discourse is something quite like a peculiar
or special intermediary which is able to preserve objectivity, owing to minds' ability to
grasp it in a uniform way. But if it is impossible to establish a point of contact between a
pure phenomenon and the mind via mental representations, the problem does not vanish
through a public practice as long as this practice is taken to be another kind of representa¬
tion9; unless, of course, one assumes that the notion of 'practice' incorporates some magical
representational powers.
In contrast, an understanding of practice as being (part of) the environment will be
advantageous in several ways: it will sufficiently explain the objectivity of content and
meaning as emanating from the normative background of practices. And it will account for
the objectivity of the normative conditions that support practices; those will have the status
of a conditio sine qua non for the intelligibility of any practice.
Private Language andMental Intermediaries
Recent exegesis10 has treated Wittgenstein's private language argument as being about the
content of intentional states and concepts, thus inscribing it into the discussions concerning
8 Or at least this is one of the most plausible interpretations ofWittgenstein's thoughts, which anyway
are notorious for being amenable to competing interpretations. Vide infra, part three.
9 Vide the discussion on practices in part II, infra.
10 Vide in particular G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity,
vol. 2 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Interpretations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988);
S. L Hurley, Consciousness in Action (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1998); McDowell, 'Wittgen¬
stein on Following a Rule' in Moore (ed.), Meaning and Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
220
the relations between the mind and the world which pertain to contemporary philosophy of
mind and epistemology. Understood this way, the argument is an attempt to clarify the rea¬
son why concepts we employ end up signifying things (objects, states of affairs, value-
properties, etc.) in a way that is objective to anyone using them. Consequently, it is only at a
later stage that the same argument can be taken to provide grounds for envisaging meaning
and understanding as a communicative enterprise amongst rational agents, let alone for
treating communication as a discourse which imposes upon its members moral or practical
requirements. The merit of these further conclusions notwithstanding, it is important to treat
the private language argument as what it is in the first place, before proceeding towards
unfolding its rich insights concerning the practical requirements of communication tout
court. It is in this way only that the reading of the private language argument can be demon¬
strated to disclose a holistic account of language and communication-as-action upon which
the Habermasian project of Discourse-ethics rests, while avoiding the inconsistencies which
a selective reception of the argument - as in the case of Habermas - might evoke.
Along these lines, the first step is to address the problem of the content of those
mental states that constitute the outcome of our perception or the ground upon which our
intentional action rests: why is it the case that these states (beliefs, desires, and so on) have
one content rather than another, thus being able to tell us something determinate about the
world, irrespective of the fact of their being true or false, and therefore to cause our intend¬
ing to do something, irrespective of the fact whether we succeed or fail at doing it? Under¬
standing why content is determinate or certain sheds further light on our understanding of
how there can be a distinction between being correct (level of perception) or successful
(level of intentional action) in one context and mistaken in another. In this respect the
problem of content or the problem of aboutness refers both to the level of experience or
perception as well as to that of intentional action".
The problem of content or aboutness is certainly a variation of the question about
the relation between mind and world. This is the reason why the way one is going to ac¬
count for the determinate character of concepts' content is very much dependent upon one's
understanding of the mind-world relation. Thus a platonic philosopher would respond to the
riddle of content by invoking a mysterious power of objects as such (objects meaning here
both material and abstract entities) which have the ability to impinge upon minds. For the
1993), 257-293.
11 Hurley, Consciousness, 221 n..
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platonic philosopher:
If the question arises of whether someone meant add two rather
than quad two, and so of whether he is wrong about addition or
right about quaddition, it is in some way answered by the superior
status of addition in this respect12.
On the other hand a Cartesian or lato sensu mentalist philosopher would try to solve the
problem of content by appealing to some intrinsic qualities of objects stemming from the
opposite direction, i.e. that of the mind. In this case they are images, formulations of rules,
experiences or feelings that posses the mysterious power to draw the world towards the
mind and in this way to bridge the mind-world gap.
The relations between mind and world, as reflected upon the problem of the content
of concepts, are a central part of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy and particularly of
his considerations about rule-following and the private language argument. In these consid¬
erations of his, Wittgenstein rejects both platonic and mentalist explanations of the content
or meaning of concepts as futile and unsatisfactory. For him platonic constructions of the
world's intrinsic mind-drawing powers are inasmuch idle as are their correlative mentalist
constructions of those world-indicating powers that are intrinsic to minds'3. There is, how¬
ever, enough evidence to suppose that this rejection seems only to be symptomatic of a
more general and all-encompassing rejection. Platonism and mentalism are, according to
this assumption, rejected only as the most extreme and therefore naive versions of a deeper
problem: the deep-rooted mind-world dualism. As long as this gap is maintained not only
absurd platonic or mentalist intrinsic qualities of items (worldly and mental respectively)
fall short of bridging it, but so does any other kind of intermediary, either platonic or men¬
talist in nature, along with their interpretations, as well as any criteria for the determination
of the interpretations (including the appeal to any sort of practice). To that extent Wittgen¬
stein's account might well be taken to emerge on the level of the theory of meaning but
cannot be convincingly restricted there, thus excluding any considerations in the realm of
epistemology or the account of how we acquire knowledge of the world14.
The discussion is going to unfold as follows: first I attempt to scrutinise representa¬
tive intermediaries which picture the environment (ideas, images etc.) and are alleged to
12 S. L. Hurley, Consciousness, 223.
13 Vide Hurley Consciousness, 223.
14 For a brief overview of the epistemologicalrelevanceof a 'private language',vide B. Wilson, Witt-
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provide for determinate connections with it. Second, after these intermediaries are shown to
depend upon interpretations and therefore to fall short of providing determinate meanings,
the appeal to practice is employed as a safe way to provide determinate interpretations of
representations of the world.
Intermediaries
Since the Myth of the Given]5 cannot be sustained in its full range one has to introduce in¬
termediaries which undertake the task of bridging the mind-world gap. As long as the mind-
world dualism is not put into question intermediaries of various kinds are the only way of
filling the gap. The main idea behind intermediaries goes roughly as follows:
Concepts (or their meanings) are embedded in symbols and words within languages.
We use words in order to describe worldly things (material and non-material), to express
thoughts, judgements, desires and hopes. For some reason we take our words to mean or
signify the same thing each time we use them. Surprisingly enough we even take words
from different languages to signify the same thing each time we use them. But our words (or
language) do not have any kind of natural connection with the world (at least under the du-
alistic conception). The fact that we nevertheless keep on using words and understanding
them does not account for the kind or the nature of the determinacy of meanings or the con¬
cepts' contents. What is it that connects language with the world in such an unambiguous
way that we keep on understanding meanings in one way and not another? If a dualist wants
to account for this connection he needs to introduce a tertium; an intermediary between
mind and world, which has to be of a double quality: on the one hand to be of the same sub¬
stance as linguistic units are - i.e. mental - and on the other hand to stand in a privileged
relation or, rather, connection with the external world. According to this idea words need to
be reinterpreted into an intermediary that has its own Tines of projection into the world'16
or, in other words, its own powers to represent the world. This double hypothesis constitutes
what has been called a dog-legged11 theory and can readily be shown to suffer from a dou-
genstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 7-16.
15 This is the idea that our judgements never fail to say something about the world, owing to the lat¬
ter's (somehow magical) ability to guarantee an objective justification of our judgements. The term
was first introduced by Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy ofMind (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1997) and has since been employed regularly in discussions concerning the
mind-world problem; vide amongst others McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
UP, 1994); S. L. Hurley, Consciousness in Action.
16 Vide Blackburn, Spreading the World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 43.
17 Ibid. 42.
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ble deficiency: First, the reinterpretation of our words and symbols into another medium
might not be as unproblematic as these theories take it to be. Second, the representational
powers of the intermediary might themselves be in need of interpretation in a way that
would cancel the unambiguous character of the representation. Representation would be in
this case substituted by a chain of interpretations or the need for a new intermediary that
would be able to provide determinate outcomes, hence a regressus ad infnitum would arise.
The gravity of these deficiencies depends, of course, upon the nature of the intermediary
employed. If the representative medium is grounded on the side of the mind (like say the
Lockean ideas), then it is much more likely that the regress will emerge at the level of rep¬
resenting the world, since the mentalistic character of the intermediary will make it fairly
easy to connect it to things like words and concepts. And vice-versa: if the intermediary
employed counts as a distillation of the world (like say the Platonic forms) then it is much
more likely that the regress will lurk on the level of the connection of the medium to lin¬
guistic entities.
Ideas
Locke uses the concept of ideas in his theory of understanding in order to account for the
way we connect determinate meanings to our words. In doing this he places himself in the
philosophical tradition of Aristotle and Hobbes in which Ideas are the mental likenesses
which men form, whenever their minds are confronted by things which belong to the exter¬
nal world18. Locke believes that our ideas as mental representations of the world are hidden
somewhere in 'our Breast'19. We on the other hand come to make use of our words as the
signs of our ideas in order to record our thoughts in our memory or to expose them in front
of others. This connection is no natural connection between particular sounds and certain
ideas, but a voluntary one. This is so because for Locke: '...words in their primary or im¬
mediate Signification stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them'20.
This passage reveals a lot about the place of ideas in Locke's theory of understanding. Since
words are voluntary they cannot signify anything with a natural or inevitable necessity.
Ergo, according to Locke, they can only be used by men to signify things they know. So far
so good, as long as the implied premiss is that we cannot make signs signify something,
18 For a brief account vide Blackburn, Spreading the World, 41-42.
19 As cited in Blackburn, Ibid. 41.
20 This is the expression Locke uses at the beginning of the 2nd chapter of his Essay Concerning Hu¬
man Understanding; cf. with Blackburn, Spreading the World, 41.
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unless we have to a certain extent some knowledge of that thing21. But Locke's argument
suppresses another premiss, namely the premiss that our words can only be used to signify
ideas, because ideas is all we (can possibly) know. In the Lockean universe everything we
know about external, worldly objects, other people and abstract entities, we know only de¬
rivatively through the immediate knowledge of our ideas. Hence, our knowledge of things
like chairs, clouds, the sun, numbers or other people is not immediate but just a reflection of
our genuine knowledge of the respective (or corresponding) ideas that hide in our breast.
Which fact, of course, makes it very difficult to have any reason to suppose that we know
anything about the world, and that there is something more in the world apart from our ideas
or, to put it differently, that we are not just brains in a vat connected to a powerful evil
computer which supplies us with stimuli.
The inability of the theory of ideas to account for our knowledge about the world
appears to be connected with a serious problem on the level of content. How is it possible to
relate our words or concepts to the external world through the medium of ideas? The whole
point behind the theory of ideas was to provide for a reliable medium that would be related
to the metal fabric of our words and concepts, but which, simultaneously, would be able to
establish connections with the world in a more determinate way than our linguistic symbols
do. Ideas can certainly meet the first demand since they are as much mental as linguistic
symbols are, but fall short of succeeding in their second task; namely the task to provide for
a determinate connection to the external world. They seem to be as inappropriate for this
task as words are. The assumption then that words point out through such things like ideas
to a different class of things which are part of the external world, would seem somewhat
improbable. It would be rather the case that we would need a new medium in order to get
ideas out of 'our breast' and connect them to the external world. But if we are in need of
something like new ideas in order to reinterpret our ideas a dangerous regress would be ante
portas\ It would be pretty much like trying to get someone to understand that a painting
might represent a landscape by showing him more and more paintings22.
It seems that the theory of ideas, at the end of the day, is doomed to fail in account¬
ing for the meaning or the content of concepts and, broader, intentional states. But this is the
case for any other theory which introduces intermediaries as private reproductions of reality
21 Ibid. 41.
22 Cf. Blackburn, Spreading the World, 42.
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(what Blackburn calls dog-legged theories)23. Reproductions of this sort are supposed to
explain how words can be understood to refer to an environment that they themselves re¬
produce. These reproductions must themselves be taken as representative of the external
world, and in this respect we don't have any satisfactory explanation of what it is to so take
them24. Ifwe need to introduce another medium in order to illuminate the powers of the first
reproduction, we face the danger of sliding into a regress like the Atlas problem25: the re¬
gress, namely, which occurs when providing an explanation of why the world stands in its
place by saying that it is carried on the shoulders of Atlas and when we are asked who car¬
ries Atlas, then change the subject. This danger will always lurk as long as we don't explain
the representative powers of the original medium and instead introduce a new medium that
seems to require the same kind of explanation as the original. Furthermore this danger will
be present as long as the indeterminacy of words and concepts is relocated in explanatory
indermediaries and then anew in the intermediaries' interpretative methods (or media).
The lack of any direct, intrinsic connection of words with the things they signify
has, in the first place, generated the need for an explanation of the fact that we understand
them in one way and not another. The answer was that if we are to understand them in a
determinate way, then we need to know what they signify. In order to know what they sig¬
nify, the argument goes, we must have a way of representing to ourselves what they signify
in a more reliable way. This is the moment where ideas are employed. But this is also the
moment where the indeterminacy of words is transferred to the explanatory indermediary
(i.e. to ideas): if ideas are just a way of representing things to ourselves then they do not
seem to be less voluntary than words when applied. In this case we are once more in need of
a new medium (something like second-order ideas) in order to know what our original ideas
represented. This absurd regress would only be interrupted, if it would be possible to intro¬
duce an intermediary which is essentially representative, i.e. its existence within our minds
would guarantee that we know in a determinate way which part of the external world is
represented26. Such an intermediary should not just be a way of representing things to our¬
selves, but the way of representing things erga omnes:
A medium whose mere presence ensures that it also represents the
right thing....a medium which carries its own interpretation with it,
23 Ibid. 40.
24 Ibid. 43.
25 This is a paraphrase of Blackburn's term 'elephant problem'. Cf. Blackburn, ibid. 43-44.
26 Cf. Blackburn, Spreading the World, 44.
226
so there is no possibility of misunderstanding what is thought of,
once it is present27.
In contrast to ideas, whose private character renders them insufficient in accounting for the
explanation ofmeaning and content, the new medium's explanatory power has to rely on its
direct representative character irrespective of the fact of being located in minds.
Images
Images seem prima facie to be a strong candidate as a solution to the problem of the perfect
representational indermediary. First, they possess a sort of self-evident ability to intrinsi¬
cally re-present particular objects or aspects of the world by their mere presence, in the way
a photograph 'copies' those bits of the world which the camera points at. Second, the form¬
ing of images seems to be a rather uncomplicated and non-mysterious ability of our minds.
Images were the main ingredient of the so-called picture theory of meaning which Wittgen¬
stein endorsed in his early work and later renounced. However, a closer look on images
reveals a series of problems that prevent them from being able to account for meaning and
understanding.
Blackburn demonstrates this inadequacy against a simple thought experiment28. He
imagines a landscape which contains unthinking objects and a number ofmirrors or pictures
which respectively reflect or picture those objects. Then he goes on to remark that the mir¬
rors, in whatever angle they are located, do not add any more significance to the landscape,
as the one that was already there before any mirrors or pictures:
The landscape and its pictures may reflect each other perfectly
well, but this in itself gives us no ground for saying that the pic¬
tures...are thinking of features of the landscape, any more than that
the features of the landscape signify the features of the picture29.
The point, in other words, is that the employment of images in order to explain meaning and
understanding could amount to a circular argument. The way we take an image to represent
one or another feature of the environment depends rather upon our method of projection of
the picture on the world and not upon an intrinsic feature of the picture itself. Wittgenstein
27 Cf. Blackburn, ibid. 44.
28 Vide Blackburn, ibid. 45.
29 Ibid. 45.
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tries to point to this with a simple example30. He imagines an old man climbing up a hill;
then he concentrates upon his image carefully. Could it not be, he asks, with a high prob¬
ability, that the old man is rather sliding backwards down the hill? What decides which is
really the case is not a quality intrinsic to the image but the interpretation one imposes on it.
On the other hand, if one tries to justify the interpretation by saying that the image has to be
taken in this way 'because the man is climbing on the hill', then one starts going in circles
and misses the whole point. Namely, that images were introduced as the very intermediary
to explain how we understand these words in the first place. Thus, the conclusion is that the
image of the man can not account for the meaning of the expression 'a man is climbing the
hill'.
Images thus fail to account for understanding despite the fact that they were put
forward as the ideal representational medium, owing to their intrinsic ability to literally
represent things. But because a picture is susceptible to interpretations and also because a
picture's mere presence is not by itself sufficient to guarantee any particular way of taking
it. Thus images are proven to be incapable ofputting an end to the regress of interpretations.
And if images cannot halt the regress of representations then nothing can. This failure might
give rise to the suspicion that the problem does not lie with images or representational me¬
dia in general but with the original reasoning that generated the need for representation.
Namely the argument that the need to take words in a determinate way has to amount to the
need to find a way to (objectively) represent to ourselves what it is that they stand for. It
might be, on the contrary, that representational media and images in particular, are not in¬
dispensable for the content of our thoughts in the first place let alone for understanding.
Wittgenstein tries to make a case against representational media in a theory of con¬
tent by considering what happens when we ask somebody to 'fetch a flower from the
meadow'. According to an image-based theory of understanding this person would have to
determine a mental picture of, say, a red flower, or a red patch, which he holds until he finds
a real flower that corresponds to it. But Wittgenstein goes on to object to this picture:
...this is not the only way of searching and it isn't the usual way.
We go, look about us, walk up to a flower and pick it, without
comparing it to anything. To see that the process of obeying the or¬
der can be of this kind, consider the order 'imagine a red patch'.
You are not tempted in this case to think that before obeying you
must have imagined a red patch to serve you as a pattern for the red
30 As mentioned in Blackburn, ibid. 46-47.
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patch which you were ordered to imagine31.
By highlighting the regress Wittgenstein wants to show that the image of the flower cannot
explain the understanding of the imperative 'fetch a flower' because it itself presupposes the
understanding of that imperative:
(The image) can only figure in an explanation if we understand that
it is the right image...knowing which is the right kind of flower is
not explained by knowing that the flower matches some given pat¬
tern, unless we also know that it is the right kind of pattern. But
recognising patterns to be the right ones is no easier than, or differ¬
ent from, recognising flowers32.
The need to represent to ourselves objects or aspects of the world seem rather to complicate
things than to contribute to a solution of the problem of content and meaning. Representa¬
tions just re-present the world and along with it they re-produce the problem ofmeaning. In
fact they duplicate the problem ofmeaning: apart from the initial need to connect the world
to our language, an additional need emerges: to connect language with our images which are
supposed to account for the language-world relation33!
Practices
Wittgenstein and his commentators seem to be clear about the implications of Lockean du¬
alism for the theory of meaning. Given the mind-world gap no conceivable intermediary is
in the position to efficiently bridge it. Such intermediaries as ideas or images at the end of
the day merely create a regress of interpretations and therefore fail to promote the idea of
meaning and understanding. However, aside from the unanimity that prevails in respect to
the negative conditions of meaning, there seems to be little agreement about what positively
makes meaning possible. Wittgenstein's well-known appeal to practices as the vehicle of
meaning and understanding has not been interpreted or understood in a uniform way.
Wittgenstein's appeal to practice is a composite argument that mainly combines two
individual arguments: the so-called practice and use arguments24. The use argument departs
from the insight that all questions about meaning can be rephrased as questions about use.
According to Wittgenstein: 'for a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we
31 L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 3.
32 Blackburn, ibid. 49.
33 Similarly Blackburn, ibid. 50.
34 Vide B. Wilson, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, 17-24 and 45-56.
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employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the
language' (PI 43)35. This definition is usually taken to support an argument for the impossi¬
bility of a private language. One should be careful at this point: private languages or, in
other words, uses of concepts or private ascription of contents to concepts are according to
the use argument not meaningless lato sensu, i.e. unintelligible in terms of syntax and
grammar, but meaningless stricto sensu, i.e. deprived of any practical consequences, use¬
less36. It is this lack of an ordinary or reputable use that deprives any private language from
real meaning. Employing private definitions, to use a favourite analogy from the Philo¬
sophical Investigations (henceforth PI), is tantamount to my right hand offering money as a
gift to my left hand. Wittgenstein comments on this exchange that it is futile because 'the
further practical consequences would not be those of a gift'37. Analogously, in the case of
the private definition, the practical consequences would not be those of ascribing meaning
to our expressions: if one says 'I have something' referring to a private object in one's
mind, this expression would pass the normal grammatical and logical tests for meaningful-
ness, but not the test of use. 'I have something' is, in this case, practically meaningless since
we have no idea what a more detailed description of a private object would be38.
The use argument is further supplemented by the so-called practice argument.
Within the practice argument the use-criterion of meaning becomes use as part of a concrete
practice. Wittgenstein stresses the point that the "appropriate 'mental accompaniments' plus
the appropriate behaviour, do not constitute following a rule, making a chess move, being
guided by a sign-post. There must also be a practice in each case, to which the behaviour in
question conforms or belongs"39.
At this point it should be said that Wittgenstein's appeal to practices is strongly
founded on the insight of the normativity or regularity of meaning. It is this very idea of
meaning as rule-following that leads Wittgenstein to appeal to practices, since rule-
following before anything else, or aside from everything else is practice, or performance40.
At the same time there is a big controversy among commentators about whose prac-
35 Cf. Wilson, ibid. 45.
36 Vide Wilson, ibid. 45-56, who even distinguishes an autonomous 'consequences argument' within
the PI, ibid 14-16.
37 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), §268.
38 This is more or less a summary of the presentation in Wilson, ibid. 52-53.
39 Cf. Wilson, ibid. 18.
40 Vide McDowell, 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule'; and Hurley, Consciousness in Action, 225n..
Against this idea is Wilson, ibid. Appendix, 134-145.
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tice Wittgenstein refers to41. Is a single individual's practice sufficient in producing mean¬
ing, or must one recur to more public forms of practice, like the community's linguistic
practice, in order to account properly for meaning and understanding? Wittgenstein does not
seem particularly concerned to clarify the kind of practice he is postulating (public or pri¬
vate). His concern within the practice argument is rather to connect meaning (as rule-
following) with use and practice. After having shown, in numerous passages of the PI, that
all intermediaries between a rule and its application cannot guarantee the determinacy of
meaning he points to practices as the solution to the regress resulting from interpretations
and other intermediaries. If it is for meaning to be construed as a normative notion then
there must be something which gives rule-following an objective status that enables speak¬
ers to say that they are saying this thing and not that; this item has further to provide for an
objective criterion that would tell right from wrong applications of rules. This is something
that cannot be generated by interpretations. Rule-following, as Wittgenstein insightfully
demonstrates in the PI, succumbs to deep scepticism if one starts relating rules to applica¬
tions (or courses of action) via interpretations or other intermediaries:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by
a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord
with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to ac¬
cord with the mle, then it can also be made out to conflict with it.
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. (PI, §201)
Normativity ofmeaning and understanding seems to go astray as long as it is accounted for
in terms of interpretation and other intermediaries. Wittgenstein's remedy, i.e. use and
practices, is therefore presented not merely as a supplement or an alternative to the discred¬
ited intermediaries but as something radically different from them. Following a rule, pro¬
ducing meanings, is according to this insight not an interpretation:
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere
fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation
after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, un¬
til we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shows is
that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation,
but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the mle" and "go¬
ing against it" in actual cases. (PI, §201)
What is then the advantage of practices over interpretations and other intermediaries? Does
41 Vide instead of others Hurley, Consciousness, 225 n..
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it, further, make a difference if one talks about public practices instead of private? In what
follows I am going to discuss the difference in strategy pertaining to different kinds of prac¬
tice (private or public). Then I will relate the conclusions to the earlier discussion about the
mind-world dualism. This will show that the introduction of practice into the theory of
meaning amounts to a powerful critique of the epistemological thesis of (Lockean) dualism.
Privatepractice
There is a number of commentators who believe that the practice of an individual is enough
in order to escape the regress of interpretations. Blackburn takes the example of the born
Robinson Crusoe who develops a technique for solving a Rubik's cube washed onto his
island, in order to show that a solitary individual could develop a practice or technique and
could abide by rules. This thought, however, appears to be in conflict with a number of re¬
marks in the PI which, prima facie, deny the possibility of private practices. Thus Wittgen¬
stein says in sec. 199:
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on
which someone obeyed a mle. It is not possible that there should
have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order
given or understood; and so on.- To obey a rule, to make a report,
to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, insti¬
tutions).
Or in the more famous sec. 202:
And hence also 'obeying a mle' is a practice. And to think one is
obeying a rale is not to obey a rale. Hence it is not possible to obey
a rale 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would
be the same thing as obeying it.
These remarks have led many commentators (like Saul Kripke or Norman Malcolm) to ob¬
ject that practice, at least in the way Wittgenstein employs the term, means communal or
public practice. Under this scheme we can indeed regard a born Crusoe as having his own
'private', as it were, practice, but we can only do so by projecting upon him the point of
view of our own community. Blackburn comments on this objection that:
it is not clear what this means, nor whether it gives the community
any particular prominence in the creation of meaning... The prob¬
lem that Crusoe poses is that he does have a practice (follows a
rale) regardless of how we or anybody else think of him. Of
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course...it is our judgement that he is following a rule. But this does
not bring our community or any community far enough into the
picture. It would be our judgement that an island has a tree on it.
But whether an island has a tree on it is quite independent of how
we or any community describe it, or even of whether any commu¬
nity exists to describe it42.
And then he goes on observing that one must not fall in the trap of automatically equating
practice with public practice, since this equation requires an independent argument showing
that the practice of isolated individuals cannot count.
But even if individual practice can indeed be considered as a valid candidate in ac¬
counting for meaning and understanding does it do the job any better than the discredited
interpretations? Let us consider the famous example of the student who applies the rule 'add
two'43. Our student having counted by twos all the way up to 1000, he then goes on: '1004,
1008...' and so on. Upon our challenge he responds that he is not making a mistake, that this
is what he was doing all along and that this agrees with his prior uses of the rule 'add two'.
And indeed why are we entitled to think that he is wrong in applying the rule of addition
rather than being right in applying another rule, say that of 'quaddition' (which is his own
private use of the rule 'add two')? Appeal to his prior uses of the rule does not help more in
order to give a determinate answer as to which is the actual meaning of the rule in question.
Every party could 'read' in the student's prior uses one's own interpretation precisely be¬
cause uses and practices do not interpret themselves anymore than anything else (images,
ideas, etc.) does. The student's own appeal to the agreement of his present application to his
prior uses of the rule cannot stop us from imposing on him our own interpretations:
It doesn't help ... to appeal to the agreement of the application in
question with his other applications up to now, because what's at
issue just is what determines whether those previous applications
agree with this way of going on or that one; they don't interpret
themselves44.
Clearly (private) practices do not prevent the regress from arising, because they are them¬
selves open to multiple interpretations. They more or less behave like private sensations,
images and ideas. Hence any practice can be made out to accord with the rule, or to conflict
with it (PI 201). Private practice or the practice of an individual does not seem, therefore, to
42 Vide Blackburn, Spreading the World, 84-85
43 Vide the discussion in Hurley, Consciousness in Action, 225-229.
44 Cf. Hurley, ibid. 227.
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be a reputable candidate in resolving the regress which threatens meaning. Private practices
are proved to be trapped in the mind-world dualism in the same way that images or ideas are
and therefore they end up merely being one amongst many other intermediaries. But inter¬
mediaries are inescapably subjected to multiple interpretations and are, for this reason, in¬
capable of guaranteeing meaning and understanding. These remarks lead to the conclusion
that private practice can be fruitful only if it is conceived in a distinctively different way
from mental entities like images, ideas and other relevant intermediaries. In other words if it
is for private practices to have any worth in the account ofmeaning and content, one has to
seriously address the problem of mind-world dualism. As long as one accounts for (private)
practices within the realm of dualism one is going to face the same problems that emerge
from the employment of mental intermediaries.
There is, nevertheless, a number of philosophers who, without properly addressing
the problem of dualism, appeal to public or community practice in order to escape the in¬
adequacy of the private practice account. This strategy is equally bound to fail, as long as it
remains hostage to a dualistic epistemology. In the dualistic landscape community practice
encounters exactly the same problems as the private one.
Communal practice
Inserting an interpretation between a representation and what is represented does not ex¬
plain the connection between them. The reason is simply that interpretations are themselves
open to new interpretations and so on. The regress amounts to a total inability to explain
meaning and understanding with the notorious effect that no course of action can be deter¬
mined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule.
Private practice does not seem to be able to offer a solution out of the regress. Still Wittgen¬
stein keeps talking of practices in his effort to offer a solution to the problem. Furthermore
it is indeed the case that he often mentions practice in the context of a more collective form
of social practice and at the same time contrasts this public practice to private practice (as in
the famous sec. 202 of the PI, cited earlier).
This has led some commentators to conclude that the regress is something which
cannot be entirely avoided and that one has to learn to live with it43. The regress, on this
account, leads to a serious scepticism about the concepts' content and meaning which can
45 Op. cit. 227. Locus classicus for this view is Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1984).
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be only dealt with if one develops something like a sceptical solution46. This solution cannot
dispense with the regress but aims to provide us with some guarantee in order not to lose
any concept ofmeaning and understanding47.
The sceptical solution strives to moderate the regress by substituting communal
practice in the place of interpretations and other intermediaries. Communal practice, on this
account, is something not entirely different from interpretations. It is rather something like a
safer criterion for arriving at more objective interpretations, owing to its being grounded on
the way the majority of the members of a community apply meanings. Conceived in this
way, communal practice is obviously deprived of any objective or stable content and is con¬
structed in pure behavioural terms. Its content consists in pointing out just how one has
learned -through communal practice- to react to specific situations48. In this way the scepti¬
cal solution is supposed to be anti-realist because it renounces the existence of any kind of
items like images or ideas or any metaphysical patterns and platonic rails. At the same time
it endeavours to reject, on the one hand, the view that the relation between a rule and a
course of action is nothing more than a relation between brute movement and its casual
explanation and, on the other hand, to avoid idiolectic interpretations, (which cannot guar¬
antee any objective meaning)49.
Prima facie the main problem of the behaviourist sceptical solution is that it fails to
provide for an 'innerness' or certainty of meaning. Moreover, when compared to the dis¬
credited intermediaries it does not seem to demonstrate any serious advantage. It is true that
inner entities (like images or ideas) were inner (hence private) to such a high degree that, at
the end of the day, they were incapable of generating objectivity. But, at least, they were
fulfilling the purpose of their employment, namely to relate meaning to something indisput¬
able50. If the problem there was that mental entities were placed in the heads, hence too
46 'A 'sceptical solution' to a sceptical problem is one that begins....by conceding that the sceptic's
negative assertions are unanswerable'; vide McDowell, 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule', 257-293
(262).
47 For a recent revival of the discussion between those who endorse the sceptical solution and those
who reject it vide George Wilson, 'Semantic Realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein', Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 83 (1998), 99-122 (who defends Kripke's interpretation); and Michael
Kxerner, 'Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85 (2000),
571-584 (who criticises Kripke's views).
48 Vide McDowell, ibid., 275.
49 McDowell, 'Wittgenstein: On Following a Rule', 262.
50 McDowell seems also to acknowledge this point when he writes: '...The idea of interpretation
seemed hopeful because it promised to enable us to attribute, to items (he refers here to ideas, images,
etc.) that are in themselves normatively inert, a derivative power to impose a normative classification
on items in the world outside the mind', vide McDowell, 'Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgen-
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remote from each other for meaning to be possible, in the behaviourist account the problem
is even more acute: public or community practice is taken to be totally independent of any
stable pattern, hence to be totally random or contingent. The account of meaning and under¬
standing from the sceptical solution's point of view more or less amounts to the following
picture:
At the basic level of any language-game, there are no normative elements (rules) to
be found. We merely have brute facts (movements, sounds, etc.), which need to be inter¬
preted in order to obtain meaning. This interpretation cannot be ldiolectic but has to be per¬
formed on a communal basis in order to guarantee objectivity. The criterion of objectivity is
in this case the fact that the community, or the larger part of the community happens to
agree in doing this rather than something else (which, on another interpretation, could also
be shown, to fall under the same course of action). To that extent, the Kripkean account of
the linguistic community seems to share some common features with Habermas' formal idea
of the argumentation-community51. In both cases the validity of the relevant speech acts is
judged against the background of a communal practice which is devoid of any further nor¬
mative criteria. To follow a rule is equated here to an ex post ratification according to the
reactions of the community. This behaviourist account falls short of being able to generate a
persuasive account of why meaning and understanding are possible, let alone of persuading
us that it is Wittgenstein's intended solution in relation to the indeterminacy problem. The
main reason is that such an account of the community's practice is circular and derives its
normativity from its normality/regularity (in the sense of habitual repeating). Therefore, it
fails to generate a satisfactory concept of meaning (or any concept of meaning at all) and
communication52. This failure becomes apparent every time a dispute arises among the
members of a community about the true meaning of a previously established (and now
challenged) communal practice. Then easy cases become hard cases that cannot be an-
stein's Later Philosophy' in McDowell, Mind, Value and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer¬
sity Press, 1998), 263-278 (265).
51 Vide Ch V, supra. In any case, this is by no means a claim about a common theoretical background
of the two concepts. Habermas' concept is much richer since it perceives the discourse-rules as neces¬
sary normative criteria for the realm of speech/argumentation.
52 McCulloch demonstrates accurately the inconclusiveness of the sceptical conclusion: 'If Wittgen¬
stein really has demonstrated that understanding cannot be explained in terms of inner processes, the
contemplation of ideas, the grasping of senses and so on, then all we are left with are dispositions to
use words. So if they cannot deliver an account of meaning and understanding, there are simply no
such things...But the outcome here is spectacular: there is no such thing as meaning, and there is no
such thing as correct understanding of language', in McCulloch, The Mind and its World (London:
Routledge, 1995), 104.
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swered through a 'shared' background, since the 'divided', or better, disputing community
can no longer generate safe criteria of meaning orientation.
Norman Malcolm, another philosopher who alludes to this picture but tries to avoid
the behaviourist reduction, goes a step further in holding that Wittgenstein's claim is that
there is a conceptual necessity between the existence of a community and the possibility of
advancement of practices or techniques concerning meaning and understanding: the ac¬
tual presence of a multiplicity of persons is necessary if a person is to have thoughts, devise
a system of signs, set down rules of action for his own guidance and so on...'53. But even
this qualification does not save the account, at least not as long as one still remains within
the realm of the mind-world dualism. Even if one concedes that there is a conceptual con¬
nection between practice and the content and meaning of concepts, one does not yet explain
why this practice has to be communal rather than private34. In fact, it seems, that there are
reasons for supporting the contrary: whatever the problems of private practices are they can
be claimed to equally burden public practice35: Simon Blackburn puts the problem like this:
The members of a community stand to each other as the momentary
time-slices of an individual do. So just as the original sceptic que¬
ries what it is for one person-time to be faithful to a rule adopted by
a previous person-time, so the public sceptic queries what it is for
one person to be faithful to the same rule as that adopted by an¬
other56.
In more general terms, one could easily conceive communal practice as being as idiolectic
as that of a 'private' individual. For instance, when one compares practices between differ¬
ent communities. This means that if one wants to escape a behaviourist 'majoritarian' ac¬
count ofmeaning, which eliminates all certainty ofmeaning, one discovers that community
practice does not very much differ from the private one. Both types of practice seem to face
exactly the same problem, i.e. they don't seem to be able to provide for determinate mean-
53 Cf. Wilson, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, 19.
54 For the lack of any such conclusive argument in the Wittgenstein literature vide Wilson, Wittgen¬
stein 's Philosophical Investigations, 17-24.
55 Susan Hurley calls the community-practice view the socialised version of Physiological Individu¬
alism, or the view that there is no necessary 'relationship between the contents of someone's mind and
what someone does, on the one hand, and the character of his natural or social environments, on the
other'. The socialised version might avoid individualism but is credited with the incapability of keep¬
ing 'the problem of arising again in a socialised form, as a consequence of the collective independence
ofmind from the world'. Vide Hurley, Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (Oxford: Oxford UP,
1989), 23.
56 Vide Blackburn, 'The Individual Strikes Back', Synthese 58 (Pages), 294, as cited in Hurley, Con-
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ings.
All these remarks do point in the same direction: irrespective of which type of
practice (private or communal) one chooses to insert at the bottom of one's account of
meaning, one has to cope with the same problem: practices do not interpret themselves more
than all other 'discredited' mental intermediaries do37. This amounts to the fact that every
practice is open to multiple interpretations with the effect that any practice can be brought
into accord with a rule or to conflict with it. The question which practice agrees with a rule
or with a prior practice cannot be answered by pointing to the fact of the agreement.
Agreement is what we are trying to establish. It would be a useless petitio to use it for justi¬
fying itself. Wittgenstein's words illustrate vividly this point:
One does not learn to follow a rule by first learning the use of the
word 'agreement'. Rather, one leams the meaning of 'agreement'
by learning to follow a rule58.
And in another passage:
It is no use, for example, to go back to the concept of agreement,
because it is no more certain that one action is in agreement with
another, than that it has happened in accordance with a rule59.
If practices are conceived as another intermediary they do not seem to escape the regress
which renders mental intermediaries useless in accounting for content and meaning. If no
sign or image as such can generate its own interpretation, neither can any practice (or
agreement in practice). This amounts to the conclusion that agreement in meanings does not
follow automatically from agreement in practice60. But the sceptical solution is grounded on
exactly the opposite conclusion. It starts by recognising the inability of private sensations,
images and even private practice to account for determinate contents and meanings, only to
go on, later, to say that community agreement in practice can establish determinate mean¬
ings. In other words it starts by stating that nothing stable underwrites content and then goes
on to make a strong case that content is guaranteed by the contingent fact that we happen to
sciousness, 227.
57 Vide the discussion ofHurley, Consciousness, 229-233.
58 Vide L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations ofMathematics, G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees,
and G. E. M. Anscombe (eds.), 3rd edn, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), 405; quoted in Hurley, Con¬
sciousness, 233.
59 Wittgenstein, op. cit., 405; quoted in Hurley, Consciousness, 233.
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agree in doing this rather than that. This is like first saying that meaning, on the account of
private entities, is impossible because of the contingent or indeterminate character of these
mental entities, while on the other hand trying to ground meaning on another contingent
factor, namely the fact that we happen to agree in doing this rather than that. But if nothing
underwrites meaning (because everything that could be taken to underwrite it is contingent
- this seems to be the implicit premiss of the sceptical solution), then it is inconsistent for
the sceptic to help himself to something he has already denied (meaning based on contin¬
gent practices). Susan Hurley writes:
...it is not an adequate answer to say that the solution that practices
provide is a sceptical one, that nothing underwrites content, and
that we just, contingently, happen to agree in doing this rather than
that. This answer simply fails to take the point: the problem, if
there is one at all, runs to as much to action...as to sensation or
anything else. Unless it's defused, it deprives us even of arbitrary,
groundless decisions...If the absurd conclusion is in force, we're
not entitled to talk about what we just do, whether contingently or
not, about our practices or decisions or choices or anything inten¬
tional in the way needed, because they are content-presupposing;
this would be a case of the sceptic helping himself to resources his
own argument denies him61.
Disclosing an inconsistency within the sceptical line of argument will not do any good to
the effort to rescue content and meaning. On the contrary: it might be the case that the con¬
sistent sceptic conclusion is that one should discard meaning tout court. This is probably the
most likely conclusion to draw anyway after having diagnosed the radical indeterminacy of
both mental intermediaries and practices (private or individual). This rather pessimistic
conclusion does not need to pertain, though. Prima facie it can be refused on the grounds of
a syllogism with the form of a transcendental argument. In its first premiss it states some¬
thing which, according to our trivial experience, is the case: 'meaning and content seem to
be possible since we communicate'. The second premiss focuses on the conditions for the
possibility of such meaning and content: 'meaning is possible upon the condition that there
is something underlying it which is not contingent'; or in its negative form: 'if it is for
meaning to be possible it should not be dependent upon mental intermediaries or any other
contingent items (practices included)'. Then the conclusion more or less amounts to some¬
thing like: 'there is something underlying meaning which is not contingent or indeterminate
60 This seems to be also the point ofMcCulloch, The Mind and Its World, 82.
61 Cf. Hurley, Consciousness, 233-234.
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in they way mental intermediaries are'. This conclusion is far from clear about what this
thing might be in positive terms. But if we take the powerful intuition of the transcendental
argument combined with Wittgenstein's insistence on practices, we might be able to have a
fresh go at practices and try to find a way not to treat them as contingent.
A first requirement for a fruitful exploitation of practices is to conceive them in a
way that is consistent with Wittgenstein's prescription that there is a way of grasping a rule
which is not an interpretation. Practices must be reconstructed as being interpretation-free
(or ratification-independent62) items or patterns, which lay at the level of the 'bedrock' or,
in other words, at the bottom of any language, where justification reaches an end63. But if
one follows this path, all of a sudden, one realises that one can no longer feel comfortable
within the dualistic mind-world picture. This is the moment when the theory ofmeaning has
to seriously deal with the relation between the mind and the world and the problem of dual¬
ism.
Beyond theMind -World Dualism
A number of commentators64, who by and large share the concerns of the previous analysis,
attempt to steer between the Scylla of mentalism and the Charybdis of scepticism by sug¬
gesting a different reading of Wittgenstein's discussion of practices and agreement. Ac¬
cording to this view, practices are to be understood as something totally distinct from inter¬
mediaries. Wittgenstein's appeal to practices does not aim to compare them with all previ¬
ous discredited intermediaries in order to make a case for their superiority. What Wittgen¬
stein actually does, the argument goes, is to claim that a practice is not a third thing standing
between a rule and its applications, hence that it is not a medium like the rest. This reading
rests predominantly on sec. 201 of the Philosophical Investigations where Wittgenstein
stresses the point that 'there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation'.
On this 'alternative' reading the relation between the rule and acts of its application
is, rather, internal. Rule and acts of following make contact at the level of language63 pre¬
venting therefore any gap to arise and any intermediary to be essential for bridging the gap.
It is this internal relation or, in other words, 'what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going
62 This is how McDowell calls them in his , 'Wittgenstein: On Following a Rule', passim.
63 Cf. McDowell, ibid. 274.
64 For a comprehensive account vide Hurley, Consciousness, 235 n.; also McDowell, 'Wittgenstein
on Following a Rule', passim.
65 Cf. Hurley, ibid. 235.
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against it' in actual cases' (PI, sec. 201) that provides for a way of grasping the rule which
is not an interpretation. This emphasis on the interdependence between rules and acts of
abiding by the rules offers a solution out of the infinite regress which usually undermines
the employment of any intermediate entities. Baker and Hacker write:
The apparent logical gulf between a rule and its 'extension' arises
from the mistaken assumption that understanding a rule is at least
partly independent of how it is projected on to actions. But how¬
ever it is formulated or explained, a rule is understood only if it is
correctly projected. To be ignorant or mistaken about what acts are
in accord with it is to be ignorant or mistaken about what the rule
is66.
But if the understanding of a rule is not at all independent of how it is projected on to ac¬
tions, this means that the mind-world dualism can no longer be sustained. Meaning and
content, which were alleged to inhabit the mind, are now placed within the world, within the
actual applications of the rules or the practices and the contexts of human action. It is the
context of action or, in other words, the practices, that provide for the concept's content and
make meaning and understanding possible. Practices constitute the bedrock 'where our
spades are turned' (PI, sec. 217) and where every interpretation or 'justification' reaches an
end.
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;
-but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as
true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which
lies at the bottom of the language game67.
On this contextualist reading68 of Wittgenstein, meaning and understanding have to be
placed within this 'acting' if they are to be something more than a blind reaction to a situa¬
tion, or to be an attempt to act on an interpretation and still be a case of going by a rule. In
the contextualist account practices and rules (as the two faces of the same coin) constitute a
normative groundwork which is neither contingent upon, nor susceptible to interpretations.
In this way the contextualist account is realist, can account for objectivity and, hence, it
escapes scepticism.
66 G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, 97.
67 Cf. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. v. Wright and P. Denis (Ox¬
ford: Blackwell, 1975), sec. 204.
68 Cf. Hurley, ibid. 236-237.
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Contextualism, realism and obectivity
The contextualist account does not allow the mind-world gap to open in the first place.
Practices are here constructed as parts of the environment that can account for mental con¬
tent and meanings. This has the effect that the mind (and its contents) is constituted on an
externalist basis, by using, as it were, worldly ingredients. This externalist account does
away with dualism in a simple and straightforward way and spares one from the need to
seek entities which, in order to be able to bridge the mind-world gap, need to posses self-
interpreting properties (like images or ideas). Therefore practices do not need to be thought
as self-interpreting entities or, on Hurley's successful expression, as ultra-interpretations69.
Ultra-interpretations are in a very strong way connected to dualism: if the mind is
radically separated from the world then the need arises for entities within the mind which
posses the property to create (powerful and self-evident) connections to the world. This is
the test that all ultra-interpretations fail: there is no such thing as one that can provide for its
own interpretation in an unambiguous and indisputable way; hence, all ultra-interpretations
end up being extended into an endless series of interpretations which prevents them from
fulfilling their task as self-standing, ultimate points of reference or ratification-independent
patterns. The ultra-claim to provide definitive interpretations, which is encapsulated in ul¬
tra-interpretations, is, through their failure to do so, transformed into an unfulfilled ultra-
burden that exposes their total dependence on a radically sceptical regressus ad infinitum.
Ultra-interpretations are rendered radically sceptical not on the ground of their initial claim
(this is perfectly anti-sceptical), but because their inability to satisfy this claim deprives
them of any possibility to stand as ratification- or verification-independent patterns which
alone would enjoy and would provide for objectivity.
On the other hand practices, on the contextualist account, are not self-interpreting
entities and therefore can be taken to constitute ratification-independent patterns which
enjoy objectivity. Or, to use a somehow informal expression, practices are, in a way, able to
provide for their own interpretation, only this is possible because it is happening without the
dualist bit, i.e. not in another sphere which is independent of the world. To say this might be
somehow misleading and inconsistent with the previous remark that there is nothing which
could provide for its own interpretation. Nevertheless, the ability of self-interpretation
seems in a way to be implicit in the assumption that practices in the contextualist account
69 Vide Hurley, Natural Reasons, 34-38.
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enjoy the status of ratification-independent patterns: because how else, if not through its
ability to be self-interpreting, can a pattern be ratification-independent? The alleged incon¬
sistency is untangled by the fact that practices, as accounted for in a contextualist theory, do
not actually pose the claim of being self-interpreting entities or ultra-interpretations because
they do not need such a strong claim: unlike images and ideas they are not hidden in iso¬
lated vats (minds) and therefore their objectivity is the result of their public character and
not of their capacity for a second order re-production or picturing of the reality. Whereas
ultra-interpretations need to be re-interpreted and brought into accord with each other, prac¬
tices lie on the same level as both the mind and the world and are therefore common to all
minds. They have, in a way, undergone a naturalisation process. Naturalised practices do
not need a second- (or third-, fourth-...., or v-) order interpretation (or any interpretation at
all, which is almost the same as though they were already interpreted) in order to become
common or objective to all minds, hence able to account for meaning and content. Therefore
they do not succumb to an infinite regress but are ratification-independent, i.e. objective.
Minds acquire their common ground as they participate in practices which unfold or happen
and not because they possess entities that re-present the world. In this way the contextualist
account of practices establishes a normative link to the objective world in order to account
for the identity of what is in one's mind70, rather than beginning with something that exists
in one's mind. In the spirit of this contextualist reading of Wittgenstein's account of prac¬
tices, Hurley writes:
[Wittgenstein's] point is...that it is a mistake to conceive of the re¬
lation between the mind and the world in such away that the need to
postulate intrinsically self-interpreting entities of any kind
arises...He appeals to practices...not as [such entities], but because
he conceives them as identified in relation to and constitutively en¬
gaged with the world. His appeal to them is in effect a repudiation
of the conception of the mind as independent of the world that
gives rise to the problem which makes [self-interpreting entities]
seem necessary71.
It seems that both contextualism and mentalism adhere to some form of realism. Owing to
their different relation to dualism, however, each of the two realisms seems to lead to com¬
pletely different results. Mentalism holds to something like a realism in the mind by postu¬
lating the existence of entities within the mind (images, ideas and other ultra-
70 Cf. Hurley, ibid. 237.
71 Vide Hurley, Natural Reasons, 35-36.
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interpretations). Due to its dualist origin, realism in the mind cannot account for objectivity
in meaning and understanding. Ultra-interpretations amount inevitably to an infinite regress
of interpretations that undermines the possibility of establishing any connection to the ex¬
ternal world, the further result being that a general or global scepticism about the external
world and its existence arises. Meaning and understanding go astray along with the objec¬
tivity of the external world. They both fall into the dualistic trap by becoming dependent
upon a contingent chain of interpretations which nurtures radical scepticism about meaning,
content and the world.
Contextualism, on the other hand, supports something like a realism in content and
?neaning by establishing a normative link between the mind and the world (in the form of
practices). Dualism falls and ultra-interpretations are rendered unnecessary. Practices (the
world) stand on their own as objective, ratification-independent patterns which provide all
minds with common contents. Realism in content and meaning, on this account, amounts to
realism about the external world and can account for objectivity in a straightforward way72.
Contextualism must be carefully distinguished from crude Platonism: Platonism allows the
mind-world gap to open and then tries to bridge it, thus succumbing to the futile logic of
intermediaries. On the contrary contextualism's main contribution is that it prevents in the
first place the gap from opening. For this reason it can be, according to a successful expres¬
sion, referred to as relaxed Platonism73.
The paradox - on the level of the theory of meaning - which emerges by the fact
that ultra-interpretations behave as ratification-dependent (not objective) entities, though
they are self-interpreting, whereas practices are ratification-independent (objective) pat¬
terns, though they claim to be non-self-interpreting, can only be untangled if - on the level
of the theory of knowledge - the issue of dualism is properly addressed: one is then able to
understand that realism in the mind (ultra-interpretations and other items) becomes non-
realism on the level of meaning, content and the world, whereas realism about meaning,
content and the world rejects the existence of any entities in the mind. The former amounts
to scepticism and to the loss of meaning and understanding, whereas the latter can success¬
fully account for objectivity (ergo possibility) ofmeaning and understanding.
72 This conception of realism dovetails with the analysis ofmind-independence in Ch III, supra.
73 Cf. Hurley, Consciousness, 236, where she also refers to McDowell's distinction between rampant
and relaxed Platonism.
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Detour: theMyth of the Giving
Hurley, in her Consciousness in Action74, detects an asymmetry which emerges from a
privileged treatment of practices over experience in respect to the problem of content and
meaning. According to Hurley this asymmetry ensues when one tries to abandon the Myth
of the Given, or the idea that the content of experience can be treated as an unproblematic
pre-given input, by shifting to intentional action as the unquestionable item that makes con¬
tent and meaning possible (or what Hurley calls the Myth oftheGiving).
In her account, Hurley treats Kant and Wittgenstein as members of the same philo¬
sophical tradition that attempts to undermine the naive idea about the unquestionable char¬
acter of perceptual experience. Philosophers belonging to this tradition argue that neither is
there a pre-given unity of things nor can our experience of them be taken for granted.
Hence, perceptual experience is not something given which imposes itself upon the mind.
According to a characteristic Kantian expression, 'Combination does not lie in the ob¬
jects'75. It has rather to be reconstructed through the spontaneous activity of synthesis
(Kant), which is predominantly an activity- or agency-involving procedure. However, Hur¬
ley goes on to argue, agency or intentional action cannot be, in turn, taken to enjoy any
primitive or inherent ability to generate content, since that would require an answer to the
problem of how intentional content is possible in the first place:
How can the activity of synthesis have the transcendental role of
making content possible, when any role it plays will presuppose
that intentions with content are possible? The view that unity de¬
pends on the transcendental role of the activity of synthesis leaves
unexplained the source of the unity presupposed by conceiving of
synthesis as an activity to begin with, as an expression of agency as
opposed to merely a series of natural events7''.
The problem of the content is therefore as much a problem for action as it is for experience.
By shifting from the unquestionable character of experience to some kind of intentional
action which enjoys a strange charisma of pre-given content, one is just postponing the set¬
tlement of the problem of content and meaning, thus asymmetrically favouring the Myth of
the Giving over the Myth of the Given. Both myths are equally misleading since no act (like
no experience) can provide for its own content (or interpretation) and therefore one has no
74 Vide Hurley, Consciousness, 240-244.
75 Cf., ibid. 240.
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good reason for favouring one over the other.
Hurley notes that holding to the Myth of the Giving while rejecting the Myth of the
Given leads in many ways away from realism, into various forms of idealism. But to rescue
some form of realism (like the one discussed in Chapter III), one need not return to an in¬
sensitive form of the given. It is much more fruitful to elaborate a balanced account (like the
previous contextualist account) which would unify action and experience in a way that
would demonstrate that only perceivers are agents and vice-versa77. Such an account would
reject both myths and still be able to subscribe to realism. Under this light Hurley suggests
that Wittgenstein's appeal to practices (i.e. forms of life) should be read not as a practice-
oriented asymmetry but as a way of avoiding both myths by recognising the interdepend¬
ence of experience and practice within forms of life.
We can correct the traditional philosophical subordination of agent
to subject without going to the opposite extreme. We can adopt a
sophisticated, activity-laden view of experiential content, without
taking intentional content as primitive in the ways associated with
the myth of the giving. What is needed, rather, is to understand why
it is no accident that only perceivers are agents, as well as why it is
no accident that only agents are perceivers: to understand the inter¬
dependence of perception and action. There is no apparent reason
this cannot be done compatibly with realism78.
Though this reasoning escapes the scope and the ambitions of the present discussion, I
would venture a comment on the asymmetry of action and perception in respect to
moral/practical concepts. In a unified (presumably contextualist) account the content of
theoretical concepts is undoubtedly defined in a stronger sense by the existence of the natu¬
ral/physical environment (through a healthy account of experience as a normative concept
76 Cf., ibid. 241.
77 This seems to be also the pivotal insight of Apel that underlies his programme of the transforma¬
tion of the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason into a 'Critique of Language'. Apel locales the com¬
mencement of this enterprise in the Tractatus where Wittgenstein is taken to argue that language is not
merely the (transcendental) condition of the possibility of describing facts but at the same time the
condition of the possibility of the facts themselves as existing states of affairs. Language is in this way
taken to be inescapably interwoven with experience. What Wittgenstein does not yet see in the Trac¬
tatus is that language apart from its semantics and syntax has also a third pragmatic level. This last
level concerns agency among speakers and can be shown to transform language and communication
into an agency-related activity. This pragmatic level, Apel holds, constitutes, together with the other
two levels of language, a transcendental condition of experience (as the existence of facts as states of
affairs) and therefore can be assumed to indicate that the role of the perceiver and the agent cannot be
disconnected convincingly. For a brief, albeit reliable, account of the evolution of Apel's argument,
vide Apel, From a Transcendental-Semiotic Point of View, 9-42.
78 Cf., Hurley, Consciousness, 242.
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intermediated by our agency). This seems to imply a domination of the aspect of the given
in the domain of theoretical knowledge.
On the other hand the content of moral or practical concepts and other terms has to
do with normative entities and objects which are revealed through practices or as a presup¬
position of them. To that extent practical concepts and terms are rather to be accounted for
in connection with practices (the Giving). In other words, in this case, the content of 'practi¬
cal experience' would be practices rather than material entities. In a more holistic context,
of course, these practices usually 'unfold on top' or supervene upon the physical world or
make use of the physical world, but again here, like before, there seems to lurk an asymme¬
try to the extent that agency seems to be able to account better for the Practical.
In any case what is important in Hurley's remarks is that every form of perception is
an act of perception, that is, perception is necessarily intermediated by action and vice-
versa. Therefore, if there is anything like action-guiding norms which apply to the domain
of agency as general presuppositions or constraints of intentional action, their power will
also extend to perception (as action).
Mentalism: Ultra-Interpretations
It would not be an oversimplification to say that in a mentalist account of content and
meaning the actual bearers of meaning are interpretations. Ultra-interpretations, or repre¬
sentations in the mind, are conceived in such a way that they cannot be linked to the world
unless the proper interpretation are employed. They just stand there in the mind as norma-
tively inert entities, or 'mental' sign-posts which, in themselves, do not signify anything
before they are interpreted. What we need in order to establish a normative connection to
the world 'is not that item, whatever it was, considered in itself, but that item under the right
interpretation'79. But then the question 'which is the right interpretation' cannot be an¬
swered by the fact of the mental sign-post's standing-there, with the result that any inter¬
pretation could be made to be the right one. And if one tries to block this indeterminacy by
further employing another item from 'the restricted inventory' of mental items one can ap¬
peal to, the story repeats itself:
It does not matter what item, from the restricted inventory, we pick
on as a plausible candidate to be what someone's putting the right
interpretation on, say, the heard instruction "Add 2" (or anything
79 Vide McDowell, 'Meaning and Intentionality', 265.
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else) might consist in. Whatever it is, it cannot be what we hoped it
would be, since considered in itself it in turn just "stands there like
a sign-post". We might be tempted to require putting the right in¬
terpretation on the item that was supposed to be an interpretation,
but that is clearly to embark on a regress, which looks as if it must
be hopeless. The item that is supposed to be the right interpretation
of the first putative interpretation will shrink in its turn, under the
requirement of fitting into the restricted inventory of available
items, into something that "just stands there". So the very idea of a
person's understanding, as something that determines a distinction
between behaviour that is in accord with the understanding and be¬
haviour that is not, comes under threat80.
Meaning and content as being in accord with or as abiding by a rule, as a normative enter¬
prise in other words, seem to come under threat in a mentalist/dualist account. If mental
items and processes in general are like sign-posts with versatile use, then accord to a rule, or
a thought, or an intention is akin to accord with a contingent interpretation. Which is not far
from saying accord to nothing or accord to anything. Thus, instead of taking states of affairs
in the world to correspond to forms of mental content in a determinate way, dualism forces
one to relate mental content to contingent interpretations. Along these lines, if one has a
thought about, say, 'today's rainy weather in Hamburg', it is not the rainy weather in Ham¬
burg that is decisive for the content of one's thought but an interpretation which, if one is
lucky, might establish the link between rainy weather in Hamburg and one's thought81.
Without that amount of luck, however, any weather in Hamburg can be taken to constitute
the content of the thought 'today's rainy weather in Hamburg'.
To this contingency and the total loss of the notion of accord is juxtaposed the (anti-
representationalist) contextualist account of content and meaning82 that mainly endeavours
to establish a normative link between mental contents and states of affairs in the world. This
normative link is established by not allowing the mind-world gap to open or, as it were, by
not disconnecting mental contents from worldly states of affairs. This normative link pro¬
vides for certainty of content and meaning: Content and meaning, under this account, can be
shown to reach ahead of any actual performance of the users. To this limited extent, and
only to this, contextualism can be claimed to constitute a healthy form of Platonism83.
80 Ibid. 266.
81 This is a modified version of an example offered by McDowell, ibid. 270-271.
82 For such an account, vide generally the work of John McDowell and in particular his 'Wittgenstein
on Following a Rule' in Moore (ed.), Meaning and Reference; also his 'Meaning and Intentionality in
Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy' in McDowell, Mind, Value and Reality.
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...the label 'Platonism' is also used for ideas that are simply part of
the conception of meaning as reaching normatively into the world:
for instance the idea that the meaning of, say, an instruction of ex¬
tending a numerical series ...reaches forward in the series ahead of
anyone who actually works the series out, and is so to speak al¬
ready there waiting for such a person, ready to stand in judgement
over her performance, at any point she reaches in the series84.
Interpretations are incapable of establishing the normative link between worldly states of
affairs and mental contents. It is rather language games, practices and forms of life that are
able to conceive meaning as a normative concept by generating the normative link between
mind and the world. Accordingly, a contextualist account discards the idea of interpretation
as the last instance of grounding content and meaning and concentrates upon language
games, practices and forms of life as the successful candidates for a normative conception
ofmeaning and content.
Contextualism: Forms of Life and Constraints of Interpretation
Language-games
If one reads the private language argument under the light of the contextualist assumption
then its exegesis reveals an argument for a normative link between mind and the world as
the only means that can account for the normativity of content and meaning. On this reading
the private language argument cannot be regarded as occupying an isolated position within
the Philosophical Investigations (PI) but has to be brought into connection with another
concept that is also seminal to the PI, i.e. the language-game. In order to establish a connec¬
tion between language and action Wittgenstein employs what he calls 'the whole, consisting
of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 'language-game"85. By operating
this concept Wittgenstein endeavours to locate the normative content or the presuppositions
of meaning and content within the realm of human agency. Language-games fulfil the role
of substantiating the normative link between the mind and the world. The normativity of
meaning derives then from the language-games (as a more elaborate concept for practices or
'customs') within which we employ meanings. They put together the 'bedrock' or the nor¬
mative basis of our language. Language-games reveal or - more accurately - can reveal the
83 Vide McDowell, 'Meaning and Intentionality', 273-274.
84 Cf., Ibid. 273-274.
85 Vide Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, sec. 7.
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norms or the rules by which meanings, as instances of rule-following, abide.
Transcendental necessity
The normativity at the level of the bedrock of our language can be taken to constitute a tran¬
scendental necessity, as long as one does not want to be deprived ofmeaning as a normative
concept; these are the lines along which the relevant transcendental argument could be con¬
ceived86:
PI - Meaning as a normative concept exists.
P2 - For meaning to be normative there are necessarily ratification-independent patterns.
C - Ratification-independent patterns necessarily exist.
This normativity at the level of the 'bedrock' is richer than a mere collection of linguistic
rules concerning the use of symbols and words87. It is a normativity tied up with agency and
practice and therefore can be assumed to incorporate a certain amount of practicality (in the
sense of action-relevance). Accordingly, the bedrock-level contains at least some norms or
patterns that possess a strong pragmatic/practical character which emanates from the inter¬
personal relations between the agents(-perceivers). This pragmatic/action-related dimension
flows through the totality of the acts of cognition and action which constitute the relevant
language-game. The content of this pragmatic/practical dimension is more or less that per-
ceivers-as-agents should acknowledge some rules of conduct which guarantee their mutual
recognition as participants of the language-game and, therefore, guarantee the successful
employment of the language-game. Since the normative content at the bedrock is presup¬
posed with a transcendental necessity so are these latter norms/patterns that we labelled
practical. The transcendental necessity of the norms at the bedrock-level does not mean that
they constitute a super-rigid machine, independent of any practice, but that they can be con-
86 McDowell, in his effort to refute anti-realist accounts of meaning, seems to offer a similar tran¬
scendental argument when he says that one cannot do without ratification-independent norms at the
level of the bedrock, as long as one does not wish to abandon the idea of the normativity ofmeaning.
Vide McDowell, 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule'. For an authoritative account of the 'anti-realist'
view which does not accept ratification-independent patterns as necessary presuppositions of the de-
terminacy of meaning, vide B. Hale, 'Rule-following, Objectivity and Meaning' in B. Hale and C.
Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy ofLanguage (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 369-396.
87 For such a rich conception of bedrock-normativity one needs to refer to a series of universal-
pragmatic norms that are presupposed by any practice of communication, along the lines of the dis¬
course rules which are advanced by Apel's Transcendental-pragmatics and Habermas' Universal-
pragmatics (cf. with Ch V).
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ceived only through our practice; yet at the same time as presuppositions of this practice.
These norms function as prerequisites of our practice in the sense that, if we do not presup¬
pose them, we cannot understand our practice. At the same time, it is only within our prac¬
tice that we can 'unveil' them or become aware of them. They are, in other words, prior to,
but also present only within, our practice/language-game88. To that extent the normative
content of the bedrock can be easily compared and even identified with the universal prag¬
matic presuppositions of speech which are worked out by the Transzendental- and Univer-
salpragmatik of Apel and Habermas89. The main difference here, however, is that these
norms cannot be assumed as referring strictly to the realm of speech since they are action-
guiding patterns connected to human agency. Furthermore this is not just an alternative way
of presenting things. The transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions of speech cannot be
revealed to be other than action-guiding norms.
The morality ofthe bedrock
This line of argument can be pursued even further towards the establishment of more sub¬
stantive conclusions. The scope of the practical content of the bedrock is not restricted to a
value-free or neutral employment of the language-games in a sheer purposeful way. In other
words, the interpersonal relations of the agents/speakers do not just entail (or prescribe)
strategic rules which just aim to facilitate any kind of communication, to the effect that they
stand neutral towards any conceivable form of communication. It is rather the case that the
normative bedrock imposes a series of non-optional moral standards upon communication
that function as constraints, outlining the morally permissible within communication. This
assumption mainly rests on the simple fact that within our overall language-game or form of
life90 there are necessarily some language-games which are rendered possible only against
the presupposition of a specifically moral relation between the speakers-as-agents. These
'moral' language-games gain their moral dimension through the performance of some spe¬
cific speech-acts that constitute an elementary component of any language-game. The
88We could say that communal practice in this second context constitutes merely the heuristic
boundaries of the normative groundwork, and in this way, enables persons to criticise other persons or
even the community. It is precisely this reflective/critical attitude that is obliterated in the so-called
'non-realist' view since the communal practice defines at all times, constantly, the rules and thus can
never be criticised ofbreaking them (which though could very often be the case...).
89 Vide the analysis in Ch. V, supra.
90 I am using the term 'form of life' as a broader concept referring to the totality of communication
which contains a variety of language-games as the more particular domains that refer to thematically
specified domains of speech-as-action. Furthermore speech-acts will stand for the components of
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stipulated moral dimension ensues owing to the practical/moral constellation which these
speech-acts launch between those who employ them. Traditionally the speech-acts which
are taken to incorporate or to reveal such moral contents are the elementary speech-acts of
assertion and questioning91.
If, according to the contextualist assumption, the content of a concept is
gained/established against the background of the performance of the relevant rule (embed¬
ded in the associated practice) which governs the application of a concept, then the content
of 'assertion' must lie in the way (practice) of making an assertion (or raising a question,
etc.). But the way of making an assertion is by connecting to it, explicitly or implicitly, a
claim to truth/correctness92. Whenever I say 'the cat is in the garden' or 'abortion should be
allowed', my statement implies, on the pain of a performative contradiction93, that I further
allege or claim that this is also the case (or that it is right, in the case of abortion). But if this
point is made explicit, it is further easy to imagine that on the other end of the line, corre¬
sponding to the claim to correctness, stands an obligation for justification through means of
the speech or discourse (here as a neutral concept). These claims can be further refined and
combined with more claims and all of them, taken together, can be organised into a group of
norms or rules that govern communication. Robert Alexy lists about 29 rules that regulate
communication as a rational discourse along with the, so-called, Diskursprinzip which pos-
language-games thus denoting the elementary unit of language-as-action.
91 In a more comprehensive account, these speech-acts can be assumed to emerge from domains or
spheres of human agency which can not be avoided by any human being. Martha Nussbaum in an
attempt to ground a non-sceptical or non-particularist reading of the Aristotelian virtues holds that
there are some inescapable contexts in relation to which every human being has to react (vide Nuss¬
baum, 'Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach' in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen (eds), The
Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 242-269). These elementary contexts constitute,
according to Nussbaum, the baseline of agreement for the conceptual content of corresponding virtues
(moral imperatives) in a non-optional way. Virtues, on this account, become fully-fledged moral
guidelines only after they are worked out in specific cultural and historical contexts. Nevertheless,
their relevance for human agency is based upon elementary contexts which no human being can avoid
(p. 244-247). Therefore whenever people argue about the content of a virtue 'they are arguing about
the same thing, and advancing competing specifications of the same virtue' (p. 247). The great merit
of this alternative way of grounding the transcendental relevance of morality for agency notwith¬
standing, it seems to me that the approach through the elementary speech-acts is more suitable for a
unified account of perception and agency through language. On top of this Nussbaum's account refers
from the outset to the realm of agency and does not directly purport to address issues ofmeaning and
content, which is rather the case within the present account. I am indebted at this point to Prof. Susan
Hurley for drawing my attention to the parallels with Nussbaum's line of argument. For a very inter¬
esting attempt to explain the reasons of divergence between accounts ofjustice and virtue, while at the
same time to restore the unity between universalism and particularism, vide Onora O'Neil, Towards
Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), Ch. 1.
92 Vide Ch. V, supra.
93 For the concept of the performative contradiction, vide Ch. V, supra.
tulates the universalisation of all practical norms that are claimed to be right within a dis-
94
course .
According to this picture the reality of our practices and language-games comes
along with the 'reality' of a series of normative claims whose existence is demonstrated
transcendentally, in the form of a sine qua non conditio, as presupposition of the specific
practices. The reality (or the existence) of the normative claims means that the communi¬
cating persons stand in a non-optional normative relation to each other. This is so because
these normative claims only make sense when one ascribes some moral qualities to the
communicating agents. In this way a claim to correctness or an obligation for justification
makes sense only if one assumes that the communicating parties are equal and free agents.
These moral qualities can clearly be viewed as imperatives regulating all communication,
but also as setting the correctness criteria according to which the claim to correctness, raised
through the particular speech-acts, can be judged. If it is the case, as implied earlier, that the
meaning of 'assertion', as a rule-guided concept, reaches forward ahead of anyone who
actually performs an assertion then the validity of its moral background is also imposed on
any future use as a standard of correctness. Accordingly the understanding of the concept
'assertion' implies the validity of some non-optional moral presuppositions
This is a pivotal point of the argument and, needless to say, calls for more elabora¬
tion: what constitutes the moral/normative reality is not the use or employment of what we
called the 'moral' speech-acts taken on their own. The grounding of the normative reality is
performed at a higher level, namely that of the normative claims which necessarily escort
the relevant speech-acts. These claims are not yet assumed to be moral imperatives them¬
selves. But they possess the unique ability to actually place speakers/agents in a mutual
relation which is morally significant. This interpersonal relation generates the normative
presuppositions of perception and agency through communication. The latter can be envis¬
aged as categorical imperatives corresponding to a concept of communicating agents as
moral persons.
This relation among communicating agents as moral persons has a stable, unalter¬
able character, hence it cannot be exchanged for any other current or random constellation
that would deny the predominately moral personhood of the communicating agents. At least
not as long as communication cannot afford losing the elementary moral speech-acts of
assertion and questioning and the corresponding concepts of justification and explanation.
94 Vide Ch. V, supra.
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In this sense the moral groundwork of communication constitutes a standard which regula-
tively refers to the totality of our practical/normative meanings and discourses. Against the
background of this standard one can measure the correctness of the employment of norma¬
tive or evaluative concepts, as well as the appropriateness of the employment of our practi¬
cal/moral speech-acts and language-games. But, one would ask, 'isn't it the use or practice
of their employment that determines the content of concepts like, say, 'right', 'just', or
'equal' to the effect that, any change in practice would amount to a change in mean¬
ing/content'? And indeed it is; but this practice or employment has its limits in the basic
concept of the moral person.
The concept of the moral person functions, as it were, like the boundary within
which we are able to understand our moral constructions, according to the maxim 'we un¬
derstand what we fabricate'. Of course this commitment to the authority of the moral person
is a general and 'in the last instance' commitment. Practical concepts, complex or simple,
acquire their full content through their every day use and the engagement in specific con¬
texts. But this specific elaboration of their full content is legitimised only to the extent that
it does not violate the imperatives which derive from the underlying concept of the moral
person. The content of the concept, say, 'equality' could never be legitimately shaped to
mean 'all persons except those who are...' (at least not without a justification that would be
in its turn in accordance with the notion ofmoral personhood). The 'local' use of normative
and evaluative concepts cannot, on this account, override the fundamental concept of the
moral person and the imperatives it entails. It is rather the case that the employment of
practical concepts in 'local' language-games can only be meaningful against the normative
background of personhood.
It is further interesting to observe that the concept of the moral person more or less
generates the common denominator of the meaning of our concepts. It is like if a pragmatic
concept which derives from the constellation amongst agents would possess the stability to
fix (even as a negative constraint) the semantic content of concepts. 1 will call this prag¬
matic stability a transcendental-pragmatic stability, meaning the stability which comes
before and precedes the elaboration of meanings on the semantic level. It is upon this tran¬
scendental-pragmatic stability that the conceptual agreement of all communication is based.
To use a more figurative expression, meanings do not stand on their own like sign-posts but
carry their point with them; this point resides within the pragmatic/normative presupposi¬
tions of speech as communication. Disagreement about practical and evaluative concepts
turns out, on this account, not to be a different-meaning case, or a case of radical incompre-
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hensibility in which the engaging parts just talk past to each other, but rather a same-
meaning - different-belief case in which the parts are disputing about different conceptions
(or nuances) of the same concept.
The pragmatic presuppositions of communication and the concept of moral person
are assumed to concern the totality of our language-games, practical and theoretical. Their
impact upon evaluative/practical 'moral' language-games is, as already argued, straightfor¬
ward. On the one hand they prescribe the rules according to which practical language-games
should be performed and on the other they set the standards which shape the content of
practical/evaluative concepts. But this is just half the story. 'Moral' language-games are not
isolated but constitute unavoidably part of our form of life. To the extent that they provide
an answer to the question 'what shall I do'? or to the extent that they prescribe positive
moral 'oughts' they can be assumed to constitute negative moral constraints to any other
value-free domain of our overall language-game (or form of life). This rests upon the as¬
sumption that perceivers are at the same time always agents and therefore whenever they
act as perceivers they are also subjected to the norms which regulate their identity as
agents. Accordingly, even 'value-free' language-games are subjected to the transcendental-
pragmatic presuppositions of communication, by being subjected to the moral point of their
value-laden 'neighbours'. Value-free language games do not acquire directly a moral di¬
mension but they may well do so indirectly, through their employment within the form of
life. In a way it is this integration in the broader context of communication that gives them
determinate content (like isolated sign-posts are rendered meaningful by being integrated in
the broader context).
Moral Persons and Constraints of Interpretation
The pragmatic-practical presuppositions of our diverse language-games point towards the
inescapable (transcendental) existence of a set of moral imperatives which ascribe to
agents/perceivers a moral dimension or value. Despite what might seem a contrary first
appearance, the later work of Wittgenstein does not aim to restrain the range of the un¬
avoidable character of the moral/practical requirements of meaning and understanding95.
The diversity of language-games, often mentioned by Wittgenstein, does not purport to re¬
duce the normative content of the bedrock to a language-game bound normativity. It
95 Onora O'Neil argues for the contrary in her Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 17; 80-87.
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shouldn't be thought that each language-game rests on its own local normativity with the
result that no normative requirements are universal for all language-games, hence that nor¬
mativity is in the best of cases relative. The contextualist account, as previously employed,
rather shows that there is a species of language-games, those that I called the 'moral' lan¬
guage-games, which impose constraints on the meaning and content of concepts and inten¬
tional states. These language-games show that the transcendental necessity of language for
knowing and describing the world is not a necessity of a formal medium that absorbs all
dimensions of the reflecting perceivers-agents. It is rather the case that perception and
agency through language rest upon the autonomy of the perceivers/agents and the possibility
of their self-reflection upon the presuppositions or requirements of their perceiving and
acting. It is this autonomy or ability of self-reflection which is encapsulated within the
(elementary) moral language-games. This is not a case ofpetitio principii. It is not the case
that we establish the moral language-games as necessary because we want to arrive to
autonomy thus begging the question. Rather, it is the fact that we cannot avoid the moral
language games which demonstrates the inescapable requirement of autonomy.
Apel's Grundnorm ofcommunication
Apel makes a very similar claim by employing what he takes to be the 'transcendental lan¬
guage game' of philosophical discourse96. This is the language game within which it shall
be possible to question all other language-games but which cannot be itself transcended or
put in question. It is within this ultimate or elementary language-game where reflection
upon the possibility of all argumentation takes place and hence the presuppositions of all
meanings are substantiated. If we deny its fundamental character then all reflection upon
what we do, know and mean has, in the best of cases, the worth of a temporary 'ladder'
which needs constantly to be thrown away or substituted, hence being in itself unable to
ground the possibility of meanings. Contrary to this self-refuting idea, it seems that the ele¬
mentary 'moral' language-games, taken to constitute something like the transcendental lan¬
guage-game of communication, may provide for a unification of our diverse language-
games into what can be called the human form of life.
The human form of life consists in those normative-practical presuppositions that
are rooted in a group of transcendental elementary pragmatic conditions which provide for
the semantic certainty amongst the various language-games. Besides, the human form of life
96 Vide K.-O. Apel, From a Trsanscendentcil-semiotic Point of View, 17-19.
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- on this account - entails a picture ofperceivers/agents as autonomous moral persons. The
totality of the elements of the normative groundwork which put together the human form of
life force us, as an imperative with categorical merit, to treat all agents and perceivers as
moral persons. Not only in the realm of language, as Habermas thinks, but also within
agency and perception. Apel tries to capture this normative requirement of all agency and
perception via language by employing what he takes to be the prescriptive dimension of
Discourse-ethics (Praskriptive Dimention der Diskursethik). According to this thought there
is a dimension of discourse which goes beyond the narrow boundaries of speech and lan¬
guage and extends upon agency (and perception). This dimension rests upon a moral/ethical
Grundnorm which prescribes that:
All beings who are capable of communicating via language ought
to be acknowledged as persons97.
According to this imperative every potential participant of discourse is an autonomous per¬
son and, further, he or she should acknowledge all others as autonomous persons. This
Grundnorm can be taken to constitute the content of the Norm of Autonomy (NoA), that
was earlier98 introduced as the transcendental-substantive norm that delimits the metaphysi¬
cal possibility of all practical knowledge"
By employing the Grundnorm as a transcendentally grounded normative require¬
ment of communication/discourse, Apel endeavours to relieve the tension resulting from a
strict and unconvincing separation between action and language which is favoured and de¬
fended by Habermas. It is easy to see why: if the discourse (meaning, communication, and
so on) rests, in the last instance, upon an ethical Grundnorm (or NoA), then a reciprocal
acknowledgement of all potential discourse participants is granted. From that it follows that
a merely linguistic/pragmatic interpretation of the normative groundwork of discourse can¬
not be justified. Adela Cortina writes,
... [the] Grundnorm constitutes that indispensable dimension of the
discourse-principle which does not emphasise the aspect of the
97 Cf. K.-O. Apel, 'Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Grundlagen der Ethik', in
K-O. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie vol 2: das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft, 4th
edn (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 358-435 (400). The necessity of the Grundnorm is also
accepted by Adela Cortina in her 'Diskursethik und Menschenrechte', in ARSP 76 (1990), 37-49.
98 Vide CHs IV and V, supra.
99 It should be noted that in Apel's theory the ethical Grundnorm of the Discourse enables not only
practical but all kid of knowledge (i.e. including theoretical). Vide his 'Das Apriori der Kommunika-
tionsgemeinschaff, 395-405 and 415n..
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norms but prescribes the endorsement of all able for communica¬
tion beings as persons'00.
However important the introduction of the Grundnorm may be, there are a few reasons for
which Apel's justification of the Grundnorm would need to be modified in order to be able
to support his claim for a unified treatment of action and language.
The Norm ofAutonomy as a 'Fact ofReason '
Apel seems to believe that the only difficulty in the way of admitting something like an
ethical Grundnorm into the normative groundwork of Discourse consists in the possibility
that such a norm might not be valid unconditionally i.e. categorically (kategorisch). In his
'das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft' Apel expresses the concern that the content
of an ethical Grundnorm could be interpreted as being valid only hypothetically, that is,
only in connection to the speakers explicit or implicit will to accept the validity of such a
norm101. Were this the case, Apel argues, then the validity of the norm could be made de¬
pendent upon some empirical judgement concerning the conditions under which speakers
accept the norm in connection to any context of communication or to specific contexts of
communication. Such an explication of the validity of the Grundnorm in empirical terms
would make the categorical, unconditional character of the moral Grundnorm vulnerable to
the objection that it is not good enough for the justification of an 'ought' to derive it from
an 'is'. Connectedly Apel argues that the categorical character of a substantive (action-
guiding) Grundnorm requires a justification that shows that the validity of that norm cannot
be subsumed under some sort of'naturalistic fallacy'.
For that reason Apel advances the claim that the issue of the validity of a moral
Grundnorm is not an empirical issue. The reason he offers is that our will to accept the
Grundnorm is not empirically conditioned but instead it is itself the transcendental condi¬
tion for any meaningful discussion of any empirical hypotheses: to the extent that we appre¬
ciate that our discussion concerning the conditions ofcommunication has to be meaningful,
we cannot but accept the categorical or unconditional character of the Grundnorm which is
implicit in the will for communication102. Put in this way the validity of the Grundnorm of
100 A. Cortina, 'Diskursethik und Menschenrechte', 44.
101 Apel, 'das Apriori', 415-423.
102 'Das Apriori', 415. Accordingly the transcendental grounding of the Grundnorm can be per¬
formed along the lines of a performative contradiction that entails the validity of that norm; for that
method of transcendental 'deduction' vide Ch. V.
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communication constitutes an objective reality, or some kind of fact. However in constitut¬
ing a fact the validity of the Grundnorm does not constitute some sort of empirical fact but
rather a transcendental inescapable fact, akin to something like Kant's Faktum der Ver-
nunftm, upon which rests the possibility of any form ofmeaningful speech. Thus construed
the moral Grundnorm of the discourse is categorically valid.
In a way Apel's argument takes for granted that the Grundnorm of communication
is a substantive (i.e. action-guiding) norm, and it merely tries to establish its categorical
character. This creates the following problem: even if the Grundnorm is proved to be cate¬
gorically valid within the realm of discourse, its action-guiding character could still be dis¬
puted. That is, one could maintain that critical reflection upon the presuppositions of com¬
munication through language can only amount to the grounding of rules that refer to
speech/the use of language and not to action. Moreover, if this turns out to be the case, then
Apel's Grundnorm is rendered hypothetical on grounds that escape his transcendental rea¬
soning: the Grundnorm can be considered hypothetical insofar as it is possible to conceive
action independently from speech/communication. The likelihood of such a possibility in¬
creases with an account of practice that leaves room for any sort of mind-environment du¬
alism, as it is the case with the interpretation ofWittgenstein's private language argument
undertaken by discourse-theory (including Apel's variant). Within the dualist environment
of such an account there is nothing that could block the interpretation that practice (as in¬
corporating tokens of action) escapes the limits of discourse while the later refers merely to
internal mental processes that can be characterised independently from the environment
(and, hence from practices of any sort). Then action, as an activity that is located in the en¬
vironment rather than in discussions or in forms of inferential reasoning, can take place
outside the sphere of discourse. This would further lead to the conclusion that Apel's ethical
Grundnorm would be categorically valid only in relation to discourse but not to action. In
other words that it would be rather a norm for the regulation of speech rather than of ac¬
tion/agency.
Clearly such a conclusion is not sufficient for the aims of the present project (nei¬
ther it is for Apel's philosophical programme). But that need not worry us. Apel's transcen¬
dental reasoning can still be proved to be useful as long as the implicit dualism that resides
in the theoretical premisses of discourse-theory is replaced with the results of the interpre¬
tation of the private language argument that were suggested earlier in this chapter. Once we
103 Cf. Apel, ibid. 417-419.
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dispense with the dualist picture, Apel's transcendental reasoning acquires the holistic di¬
mension it intended to acquire all the way long. This is, roughly how the rehabilitation of
the transcendental argument would run:
Once language and meaning are shown to be intertwined with action/agency in the
way an anti-representational theory of content would have it (CHs II, III, IV), then the tran¬
scendental argument would be applicable to both discourse and action: The moral
Grundnorm, or the Norm of Autonomy, can be then shown to be a necessary presupposition
not only for the meaningfulness of speech but also of action. Thus, paraphrasing Apel one
could say that: to the extent that we appreciate thefact that our action as well as our speech
have to be meaningful, we cannot but accept the categorical or unconditional character of
the Grundnorm which is implicit in the willfor acting and communicating™4.
This formulation agrees with a conception of practical norms as being (abstract)
objects that are not of our minds' making and which constitute the concept 'action' as a
concept whose content lies outside our heads.
Meaning and Disagreement
On the human-form-of-life account meanings are deeply determined by pragmatic or nor¬
mative-practical considerations and cannot any longer be viewed having the formalised
rigidity they were assumed to have under centralist semantic theories of the type of the cri-
terial model105. In an account where there is no mind-world dualism and where meanings are
not located in the head, the ideal-typical understanding ofmeaning as something crystallised
which is able to anticipate the dynamic of the world without belonging to it, changes drasti¬
cally. What shapes meanings and the concepts' contents are pragmatic contexts which
evolve through interaction with the world. Their practical dimension makes meaning a nor¬
mative concept with a (practical) point. This 'point' is that quality which can account for
predictability or certainty for the future cases (meaning as rule-following) without the need
for any set of pre-given semantic criteria.
On this account normative (but also non-normative) meaning can be taken to de¬
pend roughly upon two levels of pragmatic contexts which eventually compose its practical
point. On the first level there are the local pragmatics of the marginal language-games; on
the second level there are the (non-alterable) universal pragmatics of all communication
104 Cf. fn. 104, supra.
105 Vide the discussion in Ch. I, supra.
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(which entail NoA). Under this conception the point ofmeaning is constructed according to
a piecemeal procedure in which local and universal pragmatics play the role of interpreta¬
tive constraints. Certainty of content and meaning is therefore generated in association with
pragmatics both susceptible to revision (local pragmatics) and unalterable (transcendental-
pragmatics). Certainty in the last instance is guaranteed by the transcendental pragmatics
(NoA) which pose non-exchangeable or absolute constraints of interpretation.
These remarks help, in retrospect, to realise an important difference between the
role of interpretations in the composition of meaning in the two juxtaposed accounts of
mentalism and contextualism. They also offer us an opportunity to repair the heavily dis¬
credited reputation of interpretations which occurred through our previous analysis. In
mentalism (or in any dualistic account of content and meaning) interpretations carry the
burden to account for content and meaning in the last instance. And we saw the reasons why
they fail. Under the contextualist picture interpretations are not, in any case, rendered use¬
less but just not suitable to carry in the last instance the burden of content and meaning. A
contextualist account succeeds in showing that if we don't let the mind-world gap open up,
then it is the pragmatic parameters ofmeaning and content which actually provide for their
determinacy, hence make content and meaning possible. It shouldn't be thought, though,
that interpretations in a contextual account are futile. Interpretations are still our most im¬
portant means to interact with the world. The difference is, however, that the pragmatic
parameters (both the more marginal and the transcendental) function as constraints for our
interpretations106. They don't allow interpretations to become indeterminate and therefore
unable to generate meaning. Interpretations, on another expression, just incorporate our
effort to capture the 'point' of our concepts. Whereas the pragmatic parameters set the outer
constraints of this 'point'. Upon interpretations we manage to enrich the content of our con¬
cepts by performing something like a hermeneutic circle. The pragmatic presuppositions
provide for the permissible span of the spiral movement, show us in which direction inter¬
pretations should evolve.
Interpretation and disagreement
Constraints of interpretations are set by the (transcendental) pragmatic presuppositions of
communication and are neither optional nor themselves the products of interpretation107.
106 Hurley also opts for constraints of interpretation; vide Hurley, Natural Reasons, 36-38.
107 Cf., ibid. 37.
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These constraints generate agreement in the human form of life by constituting, as it were,
something like the structure or formula of the human form of life. Against their background
all disagreement can be explained as local substantive disagreement which rests upon a
global form of conceptual agreement10^. Disagreement in this way is taken to be a same-
meaning-different-belief-case where those who disagree still follow the same rule and it is
not taken to be a different-meaning case where the disputing parties are following different
rules and speak past each other. In this picture the pragmatic presuppositions of communi¬
cation and the concept ofmoral person they impregnate, provide for the conceptual common
ground or the interpretative constraints which render all cases of disagreement rational pro¬
cedures of reconciliating different beliefs (substantive disagreement). On the contrary in a
dualistic account, where ultra-interpretations have the last word, disagreement is not possi¬
ble since each one of the disputing parties can always insist that they follow a different rule,
hence that they are right under any circumstances (conceptual disagreement).
The importance of the above account becomes apparent in the case of the discussion
about complex evaluative concepts like 'just', 'good', 'right', or Taw', 'morality', etc.
Those concepts have been called essentially contested concepts109 because their meaning
can be defined only through complex substantive disagreement which presupposes:
...a baseline of agreement regarding paradigm cases, the relevant
criteria, the mles of constructing theories about the criteria (how to
determine whether the concept applies when the criteria conflict),
and paradigm examples of such theorising110.
The discussion about these concepts is meaningful only against the background of a com¬
prehensive human form of life. The human form of life guarantees a baseline of semantic
agreement, on the ground of which substantive arguments about the precise definition of
those complex concepts can be exchanged. These substantive arguments form rival inter¬
pretations which compete to capture in the best way the content of the contested concept at
issue. Their common reference to the contested concept is generated by the underlying
agreement in the human form of life which at the same time dictates the outer limits for the
validity of the interpretations' content. Competing interpretations are taken to constitute
108 This is idea is employed by various authors in order to account for disagreement in law and mo¬
rality without endorsing relativism. Vide R. Dworkin, Law's Empire, CHs 2 and 3; S. L. Hurley,
Natural Reasons, Ch 3; Stavropoulos, Objectivity in Law.
109 Vide Hurley, Natural Reasons, 46-50.
110 Ibid. 47,48.
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merely different conceptions of the same concept against the background of the transcen¬
dental-pragmatic presuppositions of communication and the concept of the moral person
which they generate.
On the other hand, the discussion about essentially contested concepts shows
clearly that NoA and the concomitant concept of autonomous persons neither automatically
solves all problems concerning the meaning of normative concepts, nor provides for a com¬
plete 'how-to-do-it' guide for any concrete application-case. The perception of all potential
discourse participants as persons may, namely, generate semantic certainty and successful
communication, but cannot guarantee the transparency of other persons in relation to their
conception of the good and their personal experiences or preferences. This means that the
substantive level of the employment of interpretations, which compete for the definition of
complex legal or moral concepts, is of great importance and should by no means be forgot¬
ten or omitted. All these interpretations, when viewed through a different angle, can be en¬
visaged as corresponding to different 'thick' conceptions of the good which may be harmo¬
nised after being subjected to the scrutiny of the 'thin' normativity of the transcendental
moral person. Substantive disagreement (or the employment of competing interpretations) is
not, therefore, to be performed in a contingent way but has to respect a series of (interpreta¬
tive) constraints which may well be taken to be both procedural and substantive in their
nature.
As a result, even if one prefers to organise substantive disagreement into rational
practical discourses, according to the Habermasian model, the rules which will be responsi¬
ble for their regulation (discourse-rules) can only halfway be conceived as being procedural.
Amongst them there will always be those categorical norms which embody the conception
of the autonomous person. Procedural rules, in this context, should be understood merely as
hypothetical imperatives in relation to the categorical norms that correspond to the norma¬
tive conception of the autonomous person. The intuition underlying this line of argument is
the idea that the claim to correctness raised by legal and broadly normative propositions is
inescapably interwoven with the idea of the autonomous moral person to the degree that
only autonomous moral agents are interested in justified norms. Thus the way in which the
claim is justified is important only at a latter stage, though it can not be contingent. It has to
correspond in the best way to the idea of the autonomous person, and it has indeed to be
discourse-procedural. For the question however, which propositions fall under the moral
point of view (and need to be justified within proper rational discourses), decisive is their
raising of the claim to correctness and not the fact of their having been the object of a ra-
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tional discourse (this would constitute a petitio principii, since the point is precisely to de¬
cide which propositions should be subjected to practical discourses, in other words which
propositions are practical).
A last point concerning practical norms of law and morality is that, according to the
suggested interpretation of the Wittgensteinian argument, the meaning of the propositions
that depict them is, to a great extent, interwoven with the pragmatic-normative presupposi¬
tions of speech. On the level of the ontology of the corresponding practical (moral, legal and
other ethical) norms, this has the implications spelled out by the 'semantics-exhausts-
ontology' thesis'". Insofar as the moral meaning of every practical norm depends on the
transcendental norms of communication, then the ontological autonomy (irreducibility) of
legal and, broader, practical norms lies, at the end of the day, in their dependence upon the
transcendental norms of communication which foster a concept of discourse participants as
autonomous persons.
Ill Vide CHs II, III and IV, supra.
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Conclusions
Using Hart's analysis of the concept of law, the discussion of law's normativity was initially
recast in terms of reductionism. Connectedly it was argued that in order to account for the
irreducible normative properties of legal phenomena one has to account for two distinct
aspects of legal discourse: its ontological foundation and its action-guiding force (norma¬
tivity).
The first task, namely to account for law's ontology, was referred to a semantic ex¬
plication of ontology. Using arguments from contemporary metaphysics and ontology the
thesis argued that the semantic structures of language are sufficient in offering an account of
the ontological structure of the environment. Along these lines it was tendered that the se¬
mantic structures of legal sentences reveal the existence of legal norms and broadly legal
entities which were classified as abstract objects (alongside with numbers, games of chess,
novels, Mahler's symphonies and so on), in juxtaposition to physical objects that are usually
classified as concrete objects (tables, chairs, trees and so on). The important advantage that
the semantic account of law's ontology carries with it is the ability to account for the objec¬
tivity of the referents of legal expressions without making use of any notion of robust ob-
jecthood. Thus, instead of evoking the suspicion of some version of rampant Platonism, the
semantic explication of ontology accounted for the objectivity of legal objects through the
objectivity of the logical structure of (legal) semantics. In all, the semantic account of law's
ontology made possible to corroborate the claim that there exist irreducible legal entities
which are depicted by legal discourse.
The second task, consisting in an analysis of law's action-guiding force, was tackled
through an investigation into the pragmatic dimension of legal language. Other than in the
ontological discussion, the account here focused predominantly on the meaning/content
rather than the structure of legal discourse. Departing from a theory of meaning-as-use the
discussion argued that the meaning of legal (and broadly normative) sentences and expres¬
sions should be understood as being generated by the acts ofuttering (using) sentences and
expressions. Along these lines it was tendered that meaning/content is embedded in a
broader communicative practice of interaction between speakers as agents and the environ¬
ment. This practice is underpinned by a series of pragmatic rules which hold it together as a
meaningful whole and which further determine linguistic meaning by laying down validity
standards for the employment/utterance of sentences and expressions. To that extent the
pragmatic rules were explicated as transcendental presuppositions for communication tout
court. Applied in the context of normative discourse these thoughts showed that the utter¬
ance of legal sentences necessarily rests on a pragmatic rule of correctness; this rule was
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shown to require further that the transcendental-pragmatic rules which underlie communi¬
cation be conceived of as action-guiding norms as well as being norms for speech. The up¬
shot of this line of argument was that the transcendental-pragmatic rules that validate le¬
gal/normative meaning point to a fundamental norm (Grundnorm) of communication which
prescribes that 'all beings who are capable of communication through language should be
acknowledged as autonomous persons'. Connectedly it was argued that insofar as legal and
moral meaning/content are validated by the same Grundnorm, law is a special case ofmo¬
rality (Sonderfallthese).
Parallel to the discussion of the presuppositions of legal meaning the dissertation
offered a deeper justification of the idea that meaning and communication are intertwined
with action/agency by advancing an anti-representationalist account of mental content. This
account consists, roughly, in the idea that mental content cannot be characterised independ¬
ently from the environment and, further, that it is acquired via the way knowers interact
with the environment as agents. Along these lines it was maintained that the practice of
acquiring content and meaning is intrinsically linked with agency, the result being that the
normative patterns of content/meaning rest on the more fundamental patterns of agency.
Taken conjointly, the anti-representationalist theory of content and the pragmatic
analysis of (normative) meaning served the purpose of underpinning the link between the
two aspects of the anti-reductionist argument in respect to law - the semantic-ontological
and the pragmatic-normative - by establishing three important theses: first that mental con¬
tent can be individuated through semantic structures; second that mental content is acquired
through agency (more accurately: through the interaction of knowers-as-agents with the
environment); third that agency is intelligible only against the background of a series of
transcendental norms that contain a fundamental Norm of Autonomy. The combination of
these theses supports the conclusion that norms' ontology, i.e. the semantic structures of the
relevant sentences, is constrained by the content of the transcendental norms that regulate
agency and communication.
All in all, the dissertation exploits the two dimensions of language that are neces¬
sary for the antireductionist argument concerning law: on the one hand the referential di¬
mension of language, to the effect that it shows that language is employed in order to depict
things that exist independently of our minds' making; on the other hand the pragmatic-
normative dimension by evoking the presuppositions upon which meaning (and specifically
normative meaning), and broadly communication, is enabled. The combination of these two
dimensions makes a strong case for the irreducibility of legal discourse: whereas the refer-
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ential function of language guarantees that there are things (i.e. legal entities) that exist
objectively as part of the environment, the pragmatic function succeeds in accounting for
the content or the meaning of the expressions that depict those normative objects. Further,
since the project unfolds on the supposition that language exhausts ontology, the pragmatic
aspect becomes constitutive in the description of norms' ontology. In this way the pragmatic
aspect is able to account for the evaluative or internal aspect of rules, which, according to
Hart, produces a feeling of commitment to those who appreciate it, and which cannot be
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